COUNTRIES

Values:

AT: Austria
BE: Belgium
CY: Cyprus
CZ: Czech Republic
DE: Germany
DK: Denmark
ES: Spain
ET: Estonia
FI: Finland
FR: France
GR: Greece
HU: Hungary
IE: Ireland
IT: Italy
LA: Latvia
LI: Lithuania
LU: Luxembourg
MA: Malta
NL: Netherlands
PL: Poland
PT: Portugal
SE: Sweden
SI: Slovenia
SK: Slovakia
UK: United Kingdom
DEGREE OF POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION

A. Financial autonomy of local units

- local_tax: percentage of taxes raised by local governments over total taxes raised
Source: OECD National accounts

- local_exp: percentage of local expenditure over total public expenditure
Source: OECD National accounts

B. Indexes on degree of federalism and decentralisation

- fed_cen: Lijphart’s index of federalism-centralism
Source: Lijphart (1999: 313)

First criteria: existence of a federal constitution (distinction between unitary, semi-federal and federal systems). Second criteria: each category can be divided in centralized and decentralized.

Values:
1: Unified and Centralised State
2: Unified and Decentralised State
3: Semi-federal
4: Federal and Centralised State
5: Federal and Decentralised State

- autonomy: institutional autonomy index of Lane & Ersson
Source: Lane & Ersson (1999: 187)

Lane & Ersson calculate and additive index of four sub-indexes that they also create assigning subjective values and which reflect various aspects of the level of institutional autonomy: degree of federalism (0-3); special territorial autonomy or home rule (0-2); functional autonomy (sociological federalism in terms of Lijphart) (0-2); and the degree of discretion of the local government (0-3).
Values: continuum
0: Minimum Autonomy
10: Maximum Autonomy

C: State Format and Organisation

- fed_uni: territorial structure of state

Values:
1: Federal
0.5: Semi-federal
0: Unitary

- fiscal_gov: central government revenues as a % of general government

- de_central: degree of autonomy for sub-national government.

The variable de_central is a measure of the territorial organisation of the polity in terms of other units of governance than central government. By examining the number of non-central tiers of government in combination with rights constitutionally given to these units, scores have been attributed as follows:

Values:
- 3: other units have specific rights
- 2: sub-national units have some independent rights
- 1: all other cases

autonomy2: composite index of non-central independence from central government

autonomy2 indicates the degree of local or regional discretionary powers of non-central units of governance. It is an additive index and an indicator of how independent the
non-central units of government are as regards policy making. The operationalisation of the variable is as follows:

- If a country has a degree of Fiscal Centralisation lower than 75% a score of 2 is obtained, if more than 75% a score of 1 and if neither is the case: 0;
- If regional autonomy is formally laid down (as is the case in federalist states) then a score of 2 is assigned, if it is a semi-federalist system: 1, and if neither is the case: 0;
- If the state is considered to be highly centralised (see de_central variable) then a score of 0 is given, if it is medium 1, and in all remaining cases: 2;
- If Local government is mentioned in the constitution in combination with independent rights and its own representative body it obtains a score of 2, if one of the conditions is met 1, all other cases: 0. Added together the maximum score possible is 8.

- veto: degree of veto-points available vis-à-vis central government


Veto indicates the presence or absence of institutional provisions supporting the democratic and independent rights of those who are not part of the government or the civil service. Positive scores are awarded for the availability of political institutions to which citizens and organized interests can appeal in order to prevent the state (central or local) from acting or to promote alternative decision-making by the people themselves. The following indicators compose this additive index:

- Is there a referendum and can it be organised by the “people” and is it binding? This gives a score of 2 if the “people” can initiate a binding referendum; if there exists only the possibility of a referendum then a score of 1 is given; and if there is no such option at all: 0.
- Is there a bicameral parliament and is it “strong”? Strong bicameralism is assigned 2, the weak version 1, and Unicameralism: 0.
- Does Government dominate Parliament or not, (i.e. can it continue despite parliamentary censure?. Values: 2, 1 & 0.
- Finally, a “rigid” constitution is seen as a strong “veto-point” for the executive. Hence, if this is the case a score of 2 is assigned, if neither rigid nor flexible 1 and all other scores are scored 0. Added together the maximum score possible is 8.
AVAILABILITY OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY INSTITUTIONS

- **for_ref**: formal regulation of referendum (until 1990)
Source: Morales (2004: 287)

Morales (2004) elaborates an index of direct democracy from the assignment of numerical values to the classification proposed by Bogdanor (1994) having as a result the creation of a global additive index.

Classification proposed by Bogdanor and numerical values of Morales:

- Referendum mentioned in the Constitution (0-1)
- Referendum required for constitutional amendments (0-2)
- Constitutional provision for referendum in non-constitutional legislation? (0-1)
- Who is entitled to trigger the referendum? (0-4)
- Provision for qualified majority? (0-1)
- Referendum consultative or binding? (0-1)

Values: *continuum*

0: Minimum regulation of referendums
10: Maximum regulation of referendums

- **pop_sov**: Suksi's popular sovereignty index
Source: Suksi (1993: 156-58)

Suksi has created an index of popular sovereignty -as opposed to State sovereignty- that combines information on the existence of basic democratic institutions and institutions of direct democracy. The inclusion of the former type of institutions is due to the fact that Suksi also considers non-democratic countries, but for western democracies the variation in the index comes down to, almost exclusively, the configuration of institutions of direct democracy. In this way, positive values indicate more popular sovereignty, and negative ones less sovereignty through mechanisms of direct democracy. The theoretical range varies between -10 and +10.
Values: \textit{continuum}

- (-10): Minimum direct democracy
- (10): Maximum direct democracy

- \textbf{num_ref:} \textit{number of National referenda (January 1991-December 2004)}

  Source: Own elaboration. Data from Centre d’études et documentation sur la démocratie directe - Université de Genève. http://c2d.unige.ch/

  When several questions have been asked at the same day, we have counted only one referendum. Questions implying both European and Domestic issues, are counted as European issue.

- \textbf{num_ref\_eu:} \textit{number of National referenda on European issues (January 1991-December 2004)}

  Source: Own elaboration. Data from Centre d’études et documentation sur la démocratie directe - Université de Genève. http://c2d.unige.ch/

  When several questions have been asked at the same day, we have counted only one referendum. Questions implying both European and Domestic issues, are counted as European issue.

- \textbf{num_ref\_dom:} \textit{number of National referenda on Domestic issues (January 1994-December 2003)}

  Source: Own elaboration. Data from Centre d’études et documentation sur la démocratie directe - Université de Genève. http://c2d.unige.ch/

  When several questions have been asked at the same day, we have counted only one referendum. Questions implying both European and Domestic issues, are counted as European issue.
DEGREE OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION & POLARIZATION

A. Party System Fragmentation

- **enep**: *effective number of electoral parties on last election*
  

  Calculation: $N = 1/ \sum_{i=1}^{m} v_i^2$, where $v_i$ is the share of votes for party $i$ and $m$ the number of parties.

- **enep_av**: *effective number of electoral parties: average on last three elections*
  
  Same sources than previous variable for last election and Siaroff (2000) for the other two.

- **enpp**: *effective number of parliamentary parties on last election*
  
  Source: Armingeon et al. (2002). For Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom: own calculation using www.electionworld.org data. Only are take in account those elections held before January 2004.

  Calculation: $N = 1/ \sum_{i=1}^{m} s_i^2$, where $s_i$ is the share of seats for party $i$ and $m$ the number of parties.

- **enpp_av**: *effective number of parliamentary parties: average on last three elections*
  
  Same sources than previous variable for last election and Siaroff (2000) for the other two.
B. Government Fragmentation

- **one_gov**: minimal-winning one party cabinets (%) (1971-96)

\[
\frac{\% \text{ of time with minimal winning cabinet} + \% \text{ of time with one-party cabinets}}{2}
\]

It measures the overall degree of majoritarianism in the formation of cabinets.

- **av_num_pgov**: average number of parties in government weighted by its term in office (1980-1998).
  Source: Own calculation from Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000). Different years for new democracies: Czech Republic (1992-96); Estonia (1992-96); Hungary (1990-93); Latvia (1993-94); Lithuania (1992-96); Poland (1991-96); Slovakia (1992-94) and Slovenia (1993-96). No data for Cyprus (presidential system); as such, even though members of political parties sit in the cabinet, parliamentary elections as such do not determine the composition of the government.

- **coal_gov**: % time with coalition governments (Government’s elected in 1980s until 1996)
  Source: Own calculation from Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000). Different years for new democracies: Czech Republic (1992-96); Estonia (1992-96); Hungary (1990-93); Latvia (1993-94); Lithuania (1992-96); Poland (1991-96); Slovakia (1992-94) and Slovenia (1993-96). No data for Cyprus (presidential system); as such, even though members of political parties sit in the cabinet, parliamentary elections as such do not determine the composition of the government.

C. Political Polarisation

- **polaris1**: Variance in the parties' ideological position (weighting for the number of parliamentary seats of each one)
  Primary sources: Huber and Inglehart for most parties; Castles & Mair (1984) for the following parties not included in Huber and Inglehart, and whose values were reasonable for the end of the 1980’s: PVV (Belgium), Workers’ Party (Ireland). In
some cases, a different value was given depending on the available information: for the SKDL (Finland) an average value was given (2.65) between that given by Castles & Mair (1984) and that given to Vasemmiistoliitto inn Huber and Inglehart (1995); for DEVA (a Prosoviet faction of the SKDL in Finland that only obtained seats in 1987) the same value was allocated as that of SKDL (1.8) in Castles and Mair (1984); for the PCI (Italy) an average value is give (2) between that given to the PCI in Castles and Mair (1984) and that given to the PDS in Huber and Inglehart (1995), to account for the important ideological movements that the PCI underwent at the end of the 80’s; for the PR (Italy), as it is not included in Huber and Inglehart (1995) and, therefore, assigning it a value of 4; the PRD (Portugal) does not appear in Castles and Mair (1984) nor in Huber and Inglehart (1995), so Morales (2004) give it a value to the left of the PSD (6) following the results of Budge et al. (2001). Secondary source: Morales (2004).

- **polaris2**: Variance in the parties’ ideological (without weighting for the number of parliamentary seats of each one)
  
  Source: the same as the previous indicator.

- **polaris3**: percentage of votes obtained by extreme parties (Communists, Populists, and Extreme Right)
  
  Source: Lane & Ersson (1999).

- **polaris4**: Variance of ideological self-placements
  

- **polaris5: weighted electoral polarization index**
  
  Source: own elaboration from Benoit and Laver (forthcoming 2006: Appendix B) data on left-right policy position of parties on a 1-20 scale, and % of vote of parties showed in the same appendix.

  The index on electoral polarization is based on the statistical formula for variance. The formula is:

  \[
  \text{Left-Right Polarization} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right)^2
  \]
Where N is the number of parties in the system, \( p_i \) is the percentage of votes won by each party, \( x_i \) is the respective left-right ideological position of each party, and \( x \) is the weighted system mean of the left-right seat distribution for that election. The weighted system mean of seat distributions, for a particular election, is attained by multiplying each party’s percentage of the vote by its position on the left-right scale and summing (Hazan 1995: 426).
SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

- **enlg**: effective number of language groups
  Source: Neto & Cox (1997)

  Calculation: \( N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} l_i^2} \), where \( l_i \) is the share of population who belongs to language group \( i \) and \( m \) the number of language groups.

- **enethg**: effective number of ethnic groups
  Source: Neto & Cox (1997)

  Calculation: \( N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} e_i^2} \), where \( e_i \) is the share of population who belongs to ethnic group \( i \) and \( m \) the number of ethnic groups.

- **enrg**: effective number of religious groups
  Source: Neto & Cox (1997)

  Calculation: \( N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i^2} \), where \( r_i \) is the share of population who belongs to religion \( i \) and \( m \) the number of religious groups.
DEGREE OF GOVERNMENT POROSITY IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

- **corporatism**: Siaroff’s condensed index of corporatism  
  Source: Siaroff (1998)

This index is a measure of the values of 13 indices of corporatism, many of which are centred on the almost monopolistic situation of the big union’s and employers groups in decision-making processes in the areas of economic and social policy.

Values: *continuum*  
    0: Pure pluralist interest representation systems  
    13: Pure corporatist interest representation systems

- **consensus**: Siaroff’s condensed index of the consensual element of corporatism  
  Source: Siaroff (1998)

This index is the measurement of five indices that give prominence to the role of consensus and bargaining in policy determination –fundamentally in the economic field. In contrast with the first index, it provides more information on conflict in the methods of interest-representation.

Values: *continuum*  
    0: Conflictual representation systems  
    5: Consensual representation systems

- **integr**: *integrated economies*  
  Source: Siaroff (1998)

This index is the measurement of eight indices that give prominence to a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic management involving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social, policy, etc.).

Values: *continuum*  
    0: Non-Integrated economies  
    8: Integrated economies
ORGANIZATIONAL HERITAGES

- **party_memb**: *party membership as a % of the electorate*
  Source: Mair & Van Biezen (2001)

- **party_member**: *% of current members of political party in each country*
  Source: European Social Survey-round 2

- **tu_memb1**: *trade union membership as a % of population (incl. non-active and dependent labour force).*

- **tu_memb2**: *trade union membership as a % of population (incl. non-active members and excluding dependent labour force).*

- **tu_memb3**: *% of current members of trade unions or similar*
  Source: European Social Survey-round 2.

- **tu_memb4**: *% of current and ancient members of trade unions or similar*
  Source: European Social Survey-round 2.
OPENNESS OF THE ECONOMY (STATUTORY RULES)

- **curacc**: *index for restrictions on payments and receipts of goods and invisibles*

  Source: Armingeon et al., 2000

  This index is the sum of the index for restrictions on payments and receipts of goods and invisibles and the index for restrictions on payments and receipts of capital (the next to indexes), and an index for legal international agreements that constrain a nation’s ability to restrict exchange and capital flows. The result is a 0-14 measure of financial openness.

- **capital**: *index for restrictions on payments and receipts of capital*

  Source: Armingeon et al., 2000

  For each dimension of exchange restriction a 0, .5, 1, 1.5, 2 scale had been adopted, from 0 meaning that e.g. import payments were forbidden, to 2 meaning, that e.g. import payments are unrestricted. For the 4 dimensions considered, this generates a 0-8 score, with 0 representing a close economy and 8 representing an open economy.

- **openness (curacc+capital+international agreements)**: *index for the financial openness of an economy*


  Is constructed in the same way as the last index. Since it considers only 2 dimensions of restrictions a 0-4 score is generated, with 0 representing a closed economy and 4 representing an open economy.
ELECTORAL CYCLE

- **simult_elec**: *is there another election on European Parliament Election Day?*
  
  Source: Maximiliano Herrera electoral calendar
  
  http://www.angelfire.com/ma/maxcrc/elections.html

  Values:
  
  0=No
  1=Yes

- **type_elec**: *type of simultaneous election* ♠
  
  Source: Maximiliano Herrera electoral calendar
  
  http://www.angelfire.com/ma/maxcrc/elections.html

  Values:
  
  0= None
  1=Partial local and partial regional elections
  2=Local elections
  3=Local elections and national referendum
  4=Local and regional elections
  5= Parliamentary elections
  6=Presidential election

- **last_elec**: *have been held a general election in last twelve months?*
  
  Source: IFES election guide
  
  http://www.electionguide.org/

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* In the case of referenda, partial local and partial regional elections, the concrete referendums and elections are: 1) Germany: mayoral, municipal city and regional elections in the states of Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony; Thuringia: regional and municipal elections; 2) Ireland: local elections and referendum on restricting the citizenship rights for children born in the country to parents from abroad; 3) Italy: provincial elections in 63 provinces and municipal elections in 4499 municipalities; regional elections in Sardinia; 4) United Kingdom: regional elections in Scotland and Wales; mayoral and local assembly elections in London.
Values:
0=No
1=Yes

- **month_last_elec**: number of end months since last general election
  Source: IFES election guide
  http://www.electionguide.org/

- **next_elec**: have been held a general election in next twelve months?
  Source: IFES election guide
  http://www.electionguide.org/

  Values:
  0=No
  1=Yes

- **month_next_elec**: number of months until next general election
  Source: IFES election guide
  http://www.electionguide.org/
Bibliography

Armingeon, Klaus; Philipp Leimgruber; Michelle Beyeler; Sarah Menegale (2004): *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2002*, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.


