



## **UCD GEARY INSTITUTE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES**

# **What “World of Welfare” fits? Ireland in a comparative perspective.<sup>1</sup>**

**Anthony McCashin (Trinity College Dublin)  
Diane Payne (Geary Institute, University  
College Dublin)**

**11 January 2006**

This paper is produced as part of the Public Opinion and Political Behaviour research programme at Geary; however the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Geary Institute. All errors and omissions remain those of the author.

---

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this paper entitled “Welfare State Legitimacy: The Republic of Ireland in Comparative Perspective” was presented at the ESPAnet05 Conference at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, on 22<sup>nd</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> September 2005

**Paper to be presented at European Consortium of Sociological Research  
conference “Comparative European Studies” in Paris November 25<sup>th</sup>-  
26<sup>th</sup> November 2005.**

**Introduction**

This paper arises from two recent, inter-related strands in the comparative analysis of welfare states. First, Esping-Andersen's (1990) celebrated *Three Worlds* analysis has spawned a rich literature on welfare regimes and the place of individual countries (and groups) of countries in his typology. Ireland's place in the worlds of welfare is ambiguous. Esping-Andersen (1990: 35-78) locates Ireland in the liberal category on the basis of its low de-commodification score. However, in analyzing the detailed attributes of welfare states he describes Ireland as having low scores on socialist regime attributes, low scores on liberal attributes and medium scores on conservatism. A standard work on comparative social policy, however, unambiguously describes Ireland as 'Catholic corporatist' (Cochrane and Clarke, 1993), a description that owes much to the role of the Catholic church in one well-documented instance of Church-state conflict in social policy and to the persistent adherence of the population to Catholic moral norms and religious practice well in to the 1980s.

Recent commentaries on specific aspects of social policy also allude to the corporatist elements in Irish social policy. For example, Millar and Adshead elaborate on Cochrane and Clarke's analysis and in an institutionalist analysis of the health care regime conclude that the "‘Catholic corporatist’ paradigm is still a fruitful one in investigations of the Irish welfare state" (Millar and Adshead, 2004: 18). In the case of social security, Daly and Yeates point to the strong British influence in the emergence and later development of the system, but they also highlight a "new corporatism" as an important factor in the recent development of social security policy (Daly and Yeates, 2001:94). This account rests on the existence of formal, national social pacts in which some aspects of social protection

policy are formulated in a consultative process involving the government and the social partners.

Cousins' (1997) observations on Esping- Andersen emphasize aspects of the Irish welfare state that highlight some similarities with the Mediterranean and semi-peripheral states- late industrialization, clientelist and populist politics, strong agrarian influences and centralized state structures. More recently, Bonoli (1997) offered a 'two dimensional' analysis of both the *scale* of state social spending and the *source* of revenue (whether taxation or social insurance). This exercise identifies Ireland as having a low level of state spending and a low share of social insurance in social spending, and therefore firmly locates Ireland in the liberal world.

Indigenous analysts have tended to focus on Ireland's late, state-sponsored industrialization in an already globalised world economy. This perspective, stressing the role of the state in simultaneously achieving economic development and social improvement, has given rise to the recent characterization 'developmental welfare state' (O'Riain and O' Connell, 2000; Breen, Hannan, *et al*, 1990, NESC, 2005).

Second, the welfare regime literature has been enriched by the search for the normative basis of various regimes. A number of researchers have analysed international data sets with a view to 'matching' the three-worlds typology with cross-national variations in normative support for the welfare state. (Papadikis, 1992; Peillon, 1995; Svallors, 1997; Gelissen, 2000; Gelissen, 2001; Bonoli, 2000; Quadagno and Blekesaune, 2003). To date, the outcomes of this research have been somewhat inconclusive. On the one hand, Gelissen (2000:298-299), reports from his study that " [no] evidence was found for the thesis of there being a relationship between the type of welfare state, as defined by Esping-Andersen, and levels of popular support for the welfare state". On the other, Svallors (1997: 295) found support for regimes in the form of "rather clear-cut configurations regarding the aggregated levels of attitudes" (albeit four rather than three regimes in this study). Likewise, Andrefs and Theien (2001) offer support for regime-consistent variation in welfare state attitudes. Taylor-Gooby (1991) suggested that

welfare regimes' norms might be distinguished not by their overall level of legitimation, but by the patterns of cleavage within regimes; corporatist regimes, for example, will display strong support for employment and social insurance based welfare. This line of reasoning has yet to be confirmed or refuted.

Ireland's profile in these comparative studies is puzzling: in the limited evidence available it is consistently recorded as having a very high level of welfare state legitimacy – one that is intuitively implausible, or at least puzzling. The next section outlines this in more detail.

Against this background, Bonoli (2000) argued that the inconclusiveness in the comparative studies derives from a reliance on an overly narrow definition of welfare state legitimacy. Pointing out that much of the comparative work relies on the ISSP items about the role of government specifically in relation to social protection, he suggests (2000:432) that:

the analysis of welfare regimes cannot be limited to the welfare state only, but must be expanded and encompass other sources of non-market based economic security, such as labour laws and collective bargaining by labour market actors. These sources of economic security play an important role in many European countries and do affect people's perceptions of what is appropriate practice in given areas of social protection. They are part of the traditional political economy of nations, and can be expected to translate into observable patterns of what mass publics expect from their governments in terms of social protection.

Bonoli analysed public attitudes towards a range of political economy issues- as distinct from social protection – and showed that when this wider definition of social protection is adopted, it is possible to clearly identify welfare regimes. Our analysis bridges these two concerns. We draw on national survey data about attitudes to social policy in an attempt to clarify the dimensions of welfare state attitudes, and we offer a view, based on these data, about what 'type' of welfare state the Irish population legitimizes.

We go beyond Bonoli's approach and set out a framework for the analysis of the link between the welfare state and cultural values, offering an analysis of welfare state legitimacy in Ireland based on a wide range of survey data. To anticipate our findings, we confirm the value of a 'broad' approach, and we report a legitimisation picture of Ireland that is somewhat liberal in orientation. This leads us to conclude that accounts of Ireland that emphasise its so-called corporatist traits require revision, and that the liberal patterns of legitimisation are strongly consistent with policy and observed outcomes.

### **Ireland in the ISSP**

Table 1 below summarises the existing published data on the aggregate levels of welfare state support in Ireland along with selected data from countries representing the three worlds- West Germany (Corporatist), Norway (Social Democratic), United Kingdom (Anglo-Saxon) These data record very high levels of welfare legitimacy for Ireland. Peillon's study based on the 1990 ISSP role of government items shows that its welfare legitimacy equates with that of the former GDR, leading him to note "striking popular support for the welfare state in Ireland" (Peillon, 1995: 3) Support for social protection in Ireland is significantly higher in these data than that for the UK, and yet Irish provisions and policies have remained close to their British origins. In each of the rows of the table the overall level of welfare legitimacy is as high – or higher- than the figure for the social democratic regime. This picture contrasts with Ireland's allocation to the liberal category in most of the welfare regime literature (Bonoli, 1997: Castles and Mitchell, 1993: Esping-Andersen, 1990). The details of welfare state support in the table report the figures in Peillon's (1995) paper. A similar pattern is evident in the 1996 unpublished ISSP data (data not given here). On the corresponding items in this later data set the aggregate levels of welfare support are as high in Ireland – or higher- than corporatist or social democratic countries.

Following Gelissen's (2001: 495-501) discussion, we can note two broad approaches to understanding cross-national differences in beliefs about redistribution. The

institutionalist model argues that beliefs and opinions are influenced by social structure: what people consider fair and legitimate will reflect the actual distribution of rewards and outcomes. In contrast, the ideology model argues that societies have specific cultural traditions, relations and values that affect the development of attitudes. These values then underpin the institutions, attitudes, and social and economic regulation that comprise welfare regimes. The point about the data in Table 1 is that whichever general approach is taken to beliefs and attitudes it implies a broad convergence between beliefs and actual institutions- or presumably the absence of a very marked divergence.

The contrast with international variations in the share of social spending in GNP- an acceptable proxy here for the size and redistributive intent of the state- is equally striking. Without resorting to the assumption that this figure should closely follow in descending a social democratic- corporatist – liberal sequence, the data are at odds with the beliefs data. Ireland's figure of 15% is less than half that of the social democratic case and substantially lower even than the liberal case. It is also important to note that the patterns recorded in Table 1 are not dependent on the specific countries chosen as exemplars of the regimes, and that the results hold no matter which individual countries are chosen.

**Table 1: Summary Data on Aggregate Levels of Welfare State Support and Social Expenditure as Percent of GDP in Ireland and Selected Countries.**

Selected ISSP data: % Agreeing role of government is to ...	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Ireland
Role of government item (1990): pensions	98.0	94.7	99.0	<b>98.1</b>
Role of government item (1990):unemployed	90.6	78.3	80.0	<b>90.6</b>
Role of government item (1996): reduce rich/poor income differences	73.3	49.4	66.7	<b>78.1</b>
Role of government item (1996): decent housing	74.1	77.9	86.6	<b>93.9</b>
Social Expenditure as % of GDP (2001)	32.0	30.8	25.0	<b>14.5</b>

Source: *Peillon (1995) and OECD*

Finally in relation to Table 1, the aggregate social expenditure data may understate the extent of the divergence between the high level of welfare legitimacy and the extent of welfare provision and redistribution. Detailed accounts of social protection, pensions,

health care, child care, housing and other aspects of social policy in Ireland point to the relatively modest role of the state in these areas. For example, the state pensions system is a simple, flat-rate pension offering a low replacement of earnings; the health care system does not offer comprehensive coverage and, in fact, institutionalizes differential and unequal access as between public (lower income) and private (higher income) patients; there is no direct state provision of child care services for working parents and the housing system is overwhelmingly private with a very limited role for social housing- all of this is underpinned by a low tax burden. This pattern of policy and provision is- not unexpectedly- reflected in poorer social outcomes than in most EU and many other developed economies; these include a higher than average rate of child poverty, the highest rate of pensioner poverty, low levels of life expectancy by European standards, high mortality differentials between social classes, and greater than average dispersion in earnings and incomes (McCashin, 2004; McCashin, 2005; Wren, 2003; Nolan, 2000; Nolan and Nolan, 2004). All of this suggests that we need to re-examine attitudes to welfare in Ireland, going beyond the ISSP role of government items and exploring a broader approach to the normative basis of welfare regimes.

### **A Broader Approach**

Our analysis of the normative basis of the welfare state builds on the framework elaborated by Pfau-Effinger (2005). She argues that - notwithstanding the growing body of empirical cross-national work on attitudes to welfare – there has been insufficient conceptual clarity about the role of culture in the welfare state. Invoking the concept of ‘welfare culture’ as the ‘relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state and the way it is embedded in society’, Pfau-Effinger points out that there are three levels of welfare culture: values and models as a basis for policy; cultural values and beliefs in the population at large; and public and political discourses that mediate between the attitudes of the public, on the one hand, and political decisions, on the other (2005: 4-10). The implication of this distinction between levels of culture is that existing research on welfare regimes and legitimacy is focused only on one level of culture- popular beliefs. This may help to explain the inconclusive findings in the research to date.

Turning to the specific content of welfare culture, Pfau-Effinger outlines the key domains of welfare beliefs and ideals.

*The cultural foundations of policies towards work and employment:* this refers to ideas about the role of employment in peoples' lives, expectations about which social groups should be integrated into employment, and ideas about how social protection and employment should be connected;

*Cultural ideas about citizenship and social inclusion:* here the point is that welfare states' policies are based on notions of 'solidarity' and 'integration' and these may vary.

*Cultural basis of redistribution:* welfare policies reflect, in part, underlying beliefs about justice and redistribution, and populations will vary in the relative importance they ascribe to need, fairness, personal responsibility, incentives and so on, as the criteria for structuring remuneration systems, and tax and social policies generally.

*Cultural values about poverty:* Differences across countries in beliefs about the causes of poverty may be related to differences in welfare states' policies. Specifically, the extent to which poverty is regarded as the fault of the individual rather than inflicted by society may be a crucial factor in shaping a welfare state. For example, those cultures (typically the US) that emphasise individual effort are unlikely to sustain strongly interventionist or redistributive social policies.

*Cultural ideas about state-market relationships:* Populations may differ about the roles of the state and the market in the economy, both in terms of the general beliefs about the state and beliefs about state versus market provision in specific areas of policy (health, employment, price control, wage determination, income inequality, taxation etc.)

*Cultural ideas about services, the welfare mix and the family:* Populations differ in terms of cultural preferences about the mix of family, state and market in the production of



welfare, and this may lead to quite different types and levels of provision of social services in relation to the elderly, children, and so on.

At a conceptual level, it is obviously possible to debate the underlying logic of the separate elements of welfare culture. Equally, it is a matter for empirical research to determine whether, and to what extent, these *a priori* elements of welfare culture exist in reality in specific contexts, and whether these supposed elements of welfare culture can be identified statistically as specific dimensions of public attitudes. For our purposes, we will use the framework outlined above and give an overview of the welfare culture in Ireland. In this exercise we draw on a national representative survey of social and political attitudes in (the Republic of Ireland), the *Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey* (ISPAS). This survey was undertaken in Spring 2002 and had a total sample of 2,500 persons aged 18 and over drawn from the electoral register. The survey questionnaire was administered by the fieldwork team of the Economic and Social Research Institute and contained a core questionnaire covering demographic and related variables and four attitudinal modules: using a split-design sample, one half of the total (1250) were administered the core questionnaire and two modules on race/ethnicity and the environment; the other half were administered the core and two other modules- one on gender and the family and one on attitudes to social justice. Our analysis is therefore based on the 1,250 respondents in the latter half of the sample design whose views we elicited on a range of social justice items. A full account of the research design, sampling strategy, and details of the attitude items is given in a forthcoming publication (Garry, Payne, and Hardiman, 2005).

In this paper, we sought to explore and identify the range of dimensions of welfare state attitudes in Ireland, to create meaningful scales from the items selected in the factor analysis and to examine the characteristics of individuals who held the range of attitudes exhibited by the scales identified. It should be stated that the attitude items were not formulated with a view to testing the specific elements outlined in Pfau- Effinger, but taken as a whole our data span many of the domains she outlines. The ISPAS survey elicited respondents' beliefs about inequality, the role of the state in the economy, the

relationship between gender, family and work, the causes of individuals' poverty-whether personal or societal, the relative roles of the family and state in care provisions, the role of private market provisions and incentives, wealth, and welfare provisions for minorities. Although ISPAS contained many questions about specific aspects of current policies in Ireland, we confine ourselves to material about general beliefs (following Bonoli's strategy).

The relevant details about the factor analysis are given in the appendix. After a variety of analyses the results there, based on a Principal Component Analysis using Varimax Rotation, represent what might be close to the most satisfactory analysis possible. The KMO (0.716) and Bartlett's (chi-square = 5387.061, df=435, sig .000) tests confirm the statistical adequacy of the factoring exercise. Second, the factors explain 46% of the variance, when thirty items are included in the analysis. The sharp 'scree' diagram in the appendix allows an intuitive understanding of the factors and their relative importance.

We have identified seven factors which combined items that could be scaled, while also capturing the range of the underlying attitudinal dimensions on the Irish welfare state. These seven scales and their corresponding factors are given in Table 2 below and the items belonging to each of the scales are identified in factor analysis output, given in the appendix. To determine the degree to which the items in the same scale measure the same aspects of the respondents' perception of the Irish welfare state, a measure of internal consistency, the Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) was computed to provide reliability data for the factors identified. The results are presented in Table 2. As indicated there, the highest alpha reliability was obtained for the scales of Social Care, Maternal Employment and Familialism/Male Breadwinner and the lowest reliability (0.55) for Income Inequality. While Nunnally (1978) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient, lower thresholds are sometimes used in the literature, particularly in exploratory work (Reynaldo and Santos, 1999).

The first scale measures the familiar **Familialism/Male Breadwinner** syndrome. This reflects items about women's role in the home, views about the impact on the family of

married women's labour market participation, and so on. The relevant items here all have loadings in the range .5 to .8. It is important to note that the questionnaire contained an entire module on aspects of the family and public policy. Hence the importance of this factor may be, in part, an artifact of the sheer number of relevant items. However, the factor stubbornly asserts itself in a variety of factor analyses using different items and varying numbers of items.

**Table 2: Mean, Standard Deviation and Cronbach Alpha Reliability of Irish Welfare State Attitudinal Scales.**

Scale	Mean	Std Dev	Alpha
Familialism/Male Bread winner (Factor 1)	16.7	4.26	0.72
Individualist/Liberal (Factor 2)	38.16	6.6	0.60
Social Care (Factor 3)	21.9	5.56	0.80
Private Welfare (Factor 4)	17.9	5.17	0.67
Income Inequality (Factor 5)	28.16	5.49	0.55
Maternal Employment (Factor 6)	7.27	2.39	0.73
Corporatism (Factor 7)	10.61	3.33	0.59

Second is a mixed **Individualist/Liberal** scale. The scale pulls together a range of items concerning attitudes to wealth accumulation and the role of government, inclusion/exclusion of minorities in Irish society and attitudes to individualist effort. Here one of the items asked respondents to agree (or otherwise) that wealthy people should be allowed to pass on wealth to their children without the government imposing taxes, and another item posed the statement that taxes should kept low to encourage people to work even if this means greater income inequality. The individualist attitudes are also identified largely from the questions about why some are poor and some well-off and it expresses an individualist explanation of poverty; people are poor because they waste

money, or do not work hard enough. This factor also reflects what Pfau-Effinger refers to as cultural beliefs about social inclusion and integration, and incorporates attitudes towards immigration and resettlement provisions and policies towards Ireland's indigenous, nomadic minority, the Travelers.

A **Social Care scale** emerges from a battery of survey items that asked respondents to choose the relative importance (from 0 to 10) of the state or the family in responding to these care needs: the costs of supporting older people at home, giving financial support to carers, helping older people in the community, and meeting the costs of child care for working parents. All three items in relation to care for the elderly loaded highly on the same factor. However the fourth item relating to meeting the costs of child care did not load on this factor but in fact does loaded more highly on a later factor, **Maternal Employment**, which identifies attitudes to working women and support for families.

The fourth scale, which we term **Private Welfare** emerges from the items that identify beliefs about fairness. Here respondents were asked about whether private provision and its associated inequalities in terms of access to health, education, pensions and housing is fair. The logic underpinning these items is that issues of social equity and fairness are articulated in Ireland the context of the hybrid, public-private mix in Irish social policy.

A fifth scale identifies attitudes to **Income Equality**. The items here relate to the question about why respondents believe some people are poor and some are well off. These items are indicative of a societal dimension to respondents' perception of why some people are poor and some are well-off; because the government does not give enough money to people on social security, or employers do not pay enough, or because people only do well if they have money to begin with. The loadings on the underlying factor here range from 0.5 to 0.6.

A sixth factor, **Maternal Employment**, emerges quite separately from the general familialism factor. The former has two items that load heavily; first, 'there should be financial benefits for child care when both parents work', and, second, 'working mothers

should get paid maternity leave’. The third item related to who should have responsibility for the cost of childcare, the government or the family loaded quite poorly (0.47). Strikingly, these items do not load on familialism no matter what combination of items is included, nor do they load in specifications with a smaller number of factors. This result echoes the gender-based analyses of welfare states in Lewis (1992) and Siaroff (1994). The latter offered a four-category typology of countries one of which was Late Female Mobilisation: this category included Ireland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain. Our data seems to support the notion that the later development of women’s work participation – and social and political discourses associated with this transition- may be a defining characteristic of some welfare states. In defining the scale, Maternal Employment, we chose to leave aside the third item “who should have responsibility for the cost of childcare, the government or the family”, to improve the overall alpha coefficient of the scale.

The seventh and last scale which we label **Corporatism** embodies items which relate to government intervention in the production rather than the distribution aspects of the economy including should industry be free of state control, and should businesses be entirely free or strictly controlled by the state? Interestingly, items such as ensuring adequate pay for all workers and other items tapping support for non-market criteria for pay, did not emerge in this factor. The items in this factor, combined with its limited explanatory power, suggest that corporatism, in the terms illustrated by Bonoli, is not an important dimension of welfare culture in Ireland.

Before turning to the results of the multivariate analysis, some general points about the research findings presented so far should be noted. While we did not set out to formally identify the elements of welfare culture in Pfau-Effinger’s framework, the results seem to support a broad notion of welfare culture of the type she outlines. We established that there are clear dimensions related to family/labour market attitudes and to notions of state versus family responsibility for care services. We examined attitudes to distributional issues and found that there are clear dimensions related to people’s notions of fairness, to their beliefs about why people are poor, and to social integration. As regards the efforts in

existing research to ‘place’ Ireland in regime terms, there is one relevant finding. We found one dimension that we identified as Individualist/liberalism , and one of very low explanatory power that is quite corporatist. While the Individualist/Liberal factor explained nearly twice as much variance (7.5%) as the corporatism factor (4.4%), neither of these results are particularly striking given the overall pattern of factors identified as well as the pattern of variance explained across these factors. These results are not sufficiently clear to allow us to characterize Ireland as either liberal or corporatist in terms of beliefs. The results -on balance- seem to confirm in normative terms Esping-Andersen’s summary of Ireland’s regime attributes; it is low on both corporatism and liberalism. Overall, the analysis highlights the analytical challenge of understanding welfare culture in socio-political contexts where Left-Right cleavages have not been central to welfare state developments and where, consequently, distributional and socio-economic issues are poorly mobilized and less salient.

### **Attitudes to Welfare in Ireland**

In this section we present in Table 3 below a descriptive overview of some of the key findings with regard to our analysis of the pattern of attitudes to welfare in Ireland. For ease of presentation, we have recoded each of the seven scales to a binary form, indicating agreement or disagreement with the scale. The percentage of those in agreement or disagreement with each scale is analyzed in terms of the respondents’ socio-economic status, age and gender. The statistical chi-square significance of the percentage values across the different categories of respondents for each scale analyzed is also given. We examine the effect of the (independent) variables socio-economic status, age and gender on the distribution of attitudes in a scale (dependent), using logistic regression; the percent of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independents as well as ranking the relative importance of the independents. In our analysis, five of the seven scales could be successfully modeled using these three independent variables, while for two scales (private welfare and corporatism) no

satisfactory model incorporating these independent variables could be fitted.<sup>2</sup> Finally in the last part of this section we present the Inter-scale correlation to examine whether there

---

<sup>2</sup> In a later version of this paper, we can extend the range of independent variables used to fit the logistic model.

**Table 3: Percentage of those in agreement or disagreement with scale and respondents' socio-economic status, age and gender.**

Scale		Familialism/Male Breadwinner Scale		Individualist/Liberal Scale		Social Care Scale		Private Provision Scale		Income Inequality Scale		Maternal employment scale		Corporatism Scale	
Overall %		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Indep. Variables		54.7%	45.3%	73.2%	26.8%	17.6%	82.4%	60%	40%	66.3%	33.7%	57.2%	42.8%	13.2%	86.8%
		Col%		Col%		Col%		Col%		Col%		Col%		Col%	
Socio-econ. Group	Lower	34.3**	27.6**	34.4***	21.9***	34.7	30.6	32.4	29.9	34.7***	24.4***	31.5	29.3	38.1	30.2
	Middle	36.1**	34.2**	36.1***	34.2***	31.2	36.3	34	37.6	37.6***	31.7***	35.5	35.7	33.8	35.7
	Upper	29.6**	38.2**	29.5***	43.9***	34.1	33.1	33.5	32.5	27.8***	43.8***	33	35	28.1	34.1
Age	16-35	30***	52.1***	38.8**	44**	37.7	40.7	38.7	42.4	41.2	38.9	43.2***	34.7***	42.5	39.9
	35-54	33.2***	34.4***	32.6**	37.2**	31.6	34.6	33.5	34.7	32.6	36.7	37.6***	31***	34.1	33.9
	55 plus	36.8***	13.4***	28.6**	18.8**	30.7	24.7	27.8	22.9	26.2	24.4	19.2***	34.3***	23.4	26.3
Gender	Male	51.4*	46*	50.2	47.7	56*	47.6*	50.9	46.2	47.6	52.1	46*	51.2*	41.3*	50.4*
	Female	48.6*	54*	49.8	52.3	44*	52.4*	49.1	53.8	52.4	47.9	54*	48.8*	58.7*	49.6*

Note: Chi-Square Significance \*p 0.05 \*\*p 0.01 \*\*\*p 0.001

Familialism/Male Breadwinner item Agree: "A man's job is to get the money, a woman's is to look after the home"

Individualism/Liberal item Agree "Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and very little"

Social Care item Agree: "Parents/family (*not state*) should take full responsibility for cost of help for Elderly living alone in the community"

Private Provision item Agree: "It is fair that people with more money can afford to get a better education for their children"

Income Inequality item Agree: "The Government does not give enough money to people on Social Welfare"

Maternal employment item Agree: "Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby"

Corporatism item Agree: "Most of industry should be state owned and run"



is any pattern emergent from the clusters of scales where there is high/low inter-scale correlation.

Table 3 shows that there is a moderate level of agreement with male breadwinner views<sup>3</sup>. There is a clear pattern in the cross-tabulations: older respondents consistently record support for male breadwinner views and the differences are not only statistically significant but also quite large. However there are also differences across the population in terms of age and socio-economic status. More men than women support the male breadwinner model while those from higher socio-economic groups tend to reject it. An examination of support/rejection of the individual items making up the Male Breadwinner scale show that women are more likely than men to agree that maternal employment affects pre-school children, and higher socio-economic groups are far less likely to agree with a male job/female care arrangement.

The Individualist/Liberal scale combines items on support for immigrants in Irish society, as well as attitudes to poverty and wealth distribution in Ireland. The results show strong support for the scale and for items statements such as “Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and very little”. The strong statistical differences in terms of the support for the scale with regard to individuals’ socio-economic status and age, whereas gender is not a discerning variable. Surprisingly perhaps, a higher proportion of those who support the individualist/liberal model come from the lower socio-economic groups whereas the results for age categories suggest that of those who reject the individualist/liberal agenda, the substantial proportion of these are younger. Our earlier individual item analysis provides some useful insights for this overall scale analysis (McCashin and Payne, 2005). The immigration and asylum seeker items recorded some not unexpected findings. There is very general support for immigration restriction and socio-economic variation in attitudes; for both items the lower socio-economic groups were substantially more restrictive in their attitudes. Overall, this suggests that more complete data on a range of social groups would reveal clear boundaries in the Irish

---

<sup>3</sup> Some caution must be attached to the results presented in Table 3 which examine the pattern of attitudes across different aspects of welfare in Ireland, given that each of the scales has been re-coded to a binary format.

population in terms of the social groups that are accorded access to full social rights. There are a number of items that indicate an individualist perspective on the causes of poverty. The figures from our earlier individual item analysis suggested pervasive support for individualist perceptions of poverty and this support does not vary by socio-economic status: in the case of the distinctly punitive attitude (people who are badly off just waste the money they have) those in lower socio-economic groups are *more* likely to agree. Men and older adults are also more likely to agree with these views. The difference between the effort and hard work items on the one hand and the punitive item is marked: there is very little agreement with this judgmental view about the failings of the poor. The findings about wealth run somewhat in the same direction as those for poverty. There is pervasive support for limited state taxation. Over 70% of the population believe that the rich should be allowed to pass on their wealth to their children without the state taking some of the wealth in taxation, and also believe that taxes should be kept low to encourage people even if this means greater inequality. As in the case of the poverty items, where there are statistically significant differences they run in the ‘wrong’ direction: the lower socio economic groups are more likely to endorse these views.

Turning to the Social Care scale, the data here are clear-cut, with a very large majority opting for the state end of the continuum when asked whether family or state is the appropriate source of support. There is little evidence of an age cleavage here, except for the item on responsibility for older persons in the community. Individual scale item analysis (not reported directly here) shows that there is a higher (statistically significant) proportion of older people opting for the family rather than the state, but the actual difference is quite small. There significant statistical differences between men and women with more women supportive of state intervention in the care of the elderly whereas men prefer a family-based model.

The results for the Private provision scale are interesting on a number of levels. Looking at the results presented in Table 3, there are no significant differences or cleavages across individuals in terms of age, gender or socio-economic status yet overall as much as 40% of the respondents rejected this forms of welfare provision. Moreover, an individual item

analysis indicates that some individual items generate significant differences across respondents and these are discussed further below. The items which make up this scale were formulated with a view to the institutional mix in Ireland of public and private provision and finance in social policy, and the political and ideological discourses associated with this mix. In health, pensions and education, Irish provision is far from the comprehensive, universal model of provision familiar in so many areas of the welfare state in so many countries. For example, access without charge to the full range of health services is available to only 30 % of the population, and private health insurance plays a significant role in structuring access to a wide range of services- notably hospitals. This is associated with differentiated and unequal utilization of health care; accordingly, this two-tier system is implicated in public debate about fairness and equality (Wren, 2003).

Similarly, the pensions and education system have distinct fault-lines that differentiate public and private provisions. In the former case, the state pension is a Beveridge-style flat-rate benefit set at about 30% of earnings. The generality of private sector employees do not have income-related pensions and some are dependent on the modest, last-tier means-tested pension. Employers face no legal requirements to fund occupational pensions, and hence these pensions are concentrated among higher income groups and they are subsidized by substantial tax relief. These tax reliefs now cost the budgetary equivalent of state spending on social security pensions and benefit only those in the higher income groups. In this context a high and rising proportion of the elderly experiences relative income poverty (McCashin, 2005). Turning to education, the state is extensively implicated in the financing and management of what are, in practice, privately owned institutions. At the second-level of the system, the funding streams differentiate those schools that are wholly reliant on state funding from those that selectively recruit from higher socio-economic groups with a combination of state subsidies and private fee income. As in the case of health care, this hybrid, public-private mix results in sharp and visible differentiation in access to schools and ultimately third level education.

These provisions- unusual in an international context- are historically rooted and deeply institutionalized, and they provide the context in which the attitudes of the Irish population about fairness are formed. It is important to note that the items are focused, not on specific policy choices, but on general beliefs. Specifically, the respondents were asked to agree or not that: 'It is *fair* that... Overall, the data suggest a high tolerance for the institutionalized inequality on which these aspects of Irish social policy are based: for all three items there is a majority of the view that the underlying principle of these arrangements is fair. Nor is there a marked socio-economic pattern in the results. In the area of education the *higher* socio economic groups were more likely to *disagree* with private provision; while the result is statistically significant, the difference in the overall level of agreement between the highest and lowest socio-economic groups is less than 10%. Moreover, the result may be an artifact of the compressed, three category socio-economic scale. Age and gender recorded one statistically significant result each; women are more likely to disagree with the advantages of private health insurance, and the young population (18 to 34) is more likely to repudiate the private funding of education. These results may be reflecting an implicit element of self-interest, with women as primary carers more likely to experience the health care system and young people likewise in education. However, our data are not sufficient to test a general self-interest model, and the observed gender and age differences are quite modest.

Table 3 also reports on support for/disagreement with items comprising the Income Equality Scale. Three of the items refer to the question about why respondents think some people are poor, and the fourth item is one of a series about wealth and fairness. The figures show pervasive sympathy for a societal perspective on poverty and wealth, with a very substantial majority indicting employers' low pay rates as a cause of poverty. However, these data do not necessarily provide an endorsement to legitimization for redistributive policies, nor do they express class based attitudes. First, our earlier individual item analysis (not reported here) indicated that only half agree that great disparities in wealth are unfair. Furthermore while the socio-economic differences are statistically significant, the actual percent differences between high and low socio-economic groups are again quite small- in all cases less than 10%.

The results for the Maternal Employment scale are also reported in Table 3. There is a reasonable level of support for state policies underpinning maternal employment. Our earlier individual item analysis showed that the issue of maternity benefits is not contentious: over 90% support such provisions. However, the figure for financial support for child care costs is only 61%, and the same figure applies regarding the statement that working mothers can have just as warm a relationship with children as their non-employed counterparts. The pattern of statistical significance shows a relationship between gender and all three variables in the expected direction. Men were less likely to endorse the policy statements than women, but these differences are not large.

The Corporatism scale shows that there is very little endorsement of what might be typically corporatist opinions. These refer to the state's direct role in the economy, for which there is little overall support. In passing, it should be noted that a specific, policy – worded question about the detail of Ireland's legal minimum wage showed a very large majority in favor of a legal minimum, and the corporatist items here are not a reflection, therefore, of public attitudes about pay and government's role in pay determination processes.

In Tables 4-8, the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented. Only five of the seven scale could be modeled using logistic regression analysis and the three independent variable age, socio-economic status and gender. Remaining scales could not be modeled with regression modeling. For each of these five tables, *the B values for the intercept are the log odds-ratios of being in agreement versus opposing the scale (Disagreement with scale, the reference category) if all the independent variables are zero (Upper class, old and female).*

Looking at Table 4, the effects of socio-economic class origin are positive indicating that the lower the class origin of the individual, the more probable it is that he/she will be in agreement with the familialism/male breadwinner model and that the effect is strongest for the lower socio-economic versus highest socio-economic category. The negative sign

associated with the variable age show that there is a reduced probability for younger age categories compared with older categories of being supportive of a familial or “male breadwinner” view of welfare represented by the statement “A man’s job is to get the money, a woman’s is to look after the home”. Finally there is also a higher probability that men rather than women will be in agreement the familial/male breadwinner model. For Table 4, the majority of the results presented are strongly significant.

**Table 4: Results of Logistic regression: Familialism/Male Breadwinner scale and Social-economic status, Age and Gender.**

Model Dependent Variable		Agreement with the Familialism/ Male Breadwinner scale (Scale item example: “A man’s job is to get the money, a woman’s is to look after the home”)
Independent Variables		B Values
Intercept		0.818***
Socio-Economic Status	Lower	0.367*
	Middle	0.315*
Age	Young (16-34)	-1.623***
	Middle Aged (35-54)	-1.102***
Gender	Male	0.384**
Total N= 1240 Reference category (dependent variable): <i>Disagreement with the Familial/ Male breadwinner scale.</i> Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant. Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 103.9 with 5 df and significant. Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> 0.129		

Table 5 presents the results for the Individualist/Liberal scale. Again the effects of socio-economic class are positive and strongest for the lower socio-economic versus highest socio-economic category, indicating the lower an individual’s socio-economic group, the

more likely they will agree with the individualist/liberal view of welfare indicated by the statement “Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and making a little”. As with Table 4, negative sign for the age variable indicates that the younger an individual is the lower probability that they will agree with the individualist/ liberal model. Gender is not a significant independent variable in this model.

**Table 5: Results of Logistic regression, Individualism scale and Social-economic status, Gender and Age.**

Model Dependent Variable		Agreement with Individualist/Liberal Scale (Scale item example: “Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and very little”)
Independent Variables		B Values
Intercept		.948***
Gender	Male	.058
Socio-Economic Status	Lower	.803***
	Middle	.435**
Age	Young (16-34)	-.426*
	Middle Aged (35-54)	-.486*
<p>Total N= 1240  Reference category (dependent variable): <i>Disagreement with the Individualist/Liberal scale</i>  Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant.  Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 29.64 with 5 df and significant.  Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> 0.041</p>		

In Table 6 the results of the logistic regression for the Social care scale are presented. Interestingly there are two different signs associated with the Socio-economic variable, indicating that the further an individual's socio-economic status is from the highest socio-economic group, the less likely it is they will agree with the social care scale. This suggests that respondents from lower socio-economic categories are more likely to want greater government intervention in the provision of care and responsibility for the costs of this care of the elderly in the community. Men are also much less likely to agree with the social care model where families or parents take full responsibility for care of the elderly. On the other hand the younger you are, the more likely it is you will agree with this social care model. Overall however, the statistical results for this model are not very satisfactory with relatively few of independent variables indicating statistical significance and a very low Pseudo R square at (Nagelkerke  $R^2$ ) 0.02.

**Table 6: Results of Logistic regression, Social Care scale and Social-economic status, Age and Gender.**

Model Dependent Variable		Agreement with the Social Care scale
Independent Variables		(Scale item example: "Parents/family ( <i>not</i> govt) should take full responsibility for cost of help for Elderly living alone in the community")
		B Values
Intercept		1.44***
Socio-Economic Status	Lower	-0.045
	Middle	0.146
Age	Young (16-34)	0.542*
	Middle Aged (35-54)	0.363
Gender	Male	-0.344*



Total N= 1240
Reference category (dependent variable): <i>Disagreement with the Social Care scale.</i>
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant.
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 12.611 with 5 df and significant.
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> 0.02

In Table 7, there are only two independent variables age and gender which are significant in the logistic regression model presented for the Maternal Work scale. The negative sign indicates that it is less probable that men will agree the scale and for instance will be less likely to agree with the statement “Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby”. On the other hand there is a positive probability with age where younger age categories are more likely to agree with the statement and this independent variable is also highly statistically significant.

**Table 7: Results of Logistic regression, Maternal Work scale and socio-economic status, age and gender.**

<b>Model Dependent Variable</b>		<b>Agreement with the Maternal Work scale.</b>
<b>Independent Variables</b>		<b>(Scale item example: : “Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby”</b>
		<b>B Values</b>
Intercept		-.381*
Gender	Male	-.291*
Age	Young (16-34)	1.017***
	Middle Aged (35-54)	.900***
Socio-economic	Lower	.246

group	Middle	.052
<p>Total N= 1240</p> <p>Reference category (dependent variable): <i>Disagreement with the Maternal work scale.</i></p> <p>Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant.</p> <p>Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 45.825 with 5 df and significant.</p> <p>Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> 0.061.</p>		

**Table 8: Results of Logistic regression: Income Inequality scale and social-economic status, age and gender.**

Model Dependent Variable		Agreement with the Income Inequality Scale
Independent Variables		(Scale item example: “The Government does not give enough money to people on Social Welfare”)
		B Values
Intercept		.412*
Gender	Male	-.162
Age	Young (16-34)	-.102
	Middle Aged (35-54)	-.246
Socio-Economic Status	Lower	.806***
	Middle	.607***
<p>Total N= 1240</p> <p>Reference category (dependent variable): <i>Disagreement with the Income Inequality scale.</i></p> <p>Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant.</p> <p>Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 31.32 with 5 df and significant.</p> <p>Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> 0.041</p>		

Finally Table 8 presents the results for the Income Inequality scale where there is only one significant independent explanatory variable, the socio-economic status of the individual. The results indicate that the lower the socio-economic category of the individual, the more likely it is that they will agree with statements such as “The Government does not give enough money to people on Social Welfare”.

## **Conclusion**

Our analysis started from the point that the conventional (ISSP) data about welfare legitimacy confers a high level of legitimacy on the Republic of Ireland. Our analysis conveys a distinctly different picture- one that suggests an institutionalized acceptance of some processes that sustain marked inequality. Furthermore, although our data on this are tentative, it is possible that a liberal-individualist element has taken root in Irish public attitudes. This is not surprising perhaps in the context of Ireland’s exceptional prosperity in the last decade or so. However, it is also clear that income adequacy/inequality is a separate theme in Irish public attitudes. The co-existence of this element, along with the support for private welfare and an emergent liberal individualism across all social groups, point to the existence of what Kluegel (1989) and his colleagues termed ‘split-consciousness’. Social care and related services for the elderly is the one area of social policy where there seems to be a generalized belief in state intervention.

The data throw some light on the persistent problem of placing Ireland in regime terms. At one level they offer evidence about beliefs that vindicate Esping-Andersen: there is no strong, consistent evidence pointing to either liberalism or corporatism as belief systems. However, the weak forms of liberalism and corporatism that we identified should be considered alongside the findings on private welfare and wealth. Taken together, these may all suggest that more thorough research would portray Ireland as having moved decisively into liberal mode. One striking finding is the clarity of the familialism/male breadwinner dimension, highlighting the importance of the late female work mobilization

that Ireland has experienced, and the centrality of this transition in a society that had intensely idealized the male breadwinner paradigm.

On a wider note the analysis gives tentative support to a framework for comparative analysis based on the notion of a multi-dimensional welfare culture. Much of the research is based on the role of government module in the ISSP and, as Gelissen (2000) has pointed out, these data only touch on views about how *extensive* government should be. It may be that in regimes lacking salient left-right political cleavages and reflecting the hybrid influences of British liberalism and Catholic familialism the value of such a multi-dimensional approach is enhanced.

## References

- Agresti, A. (1990). *Categorical Data Analysis*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Arts, W. and J. Gelissen (2002), "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report" *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 137-158
- Andrefs, H. and T. Heien (2001). "Four Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes: A Comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States", *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 337-356
- Blekasaune, M. and J. Quadagno (2003), "Public Attitudes toward Welfare State Policies: A Comparative Analysis of 24 Nations" *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 19, No. 5
- Bonoli, G. (1997) "Classifying Welfare States: A Two-dimensional Analysis", *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 26, No.3, pp. 351-372
- Bonoli, G. (2000) "Public Attitudes to Social Protection and Political Economy Traditions in Western Europe", *European Societies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 431-452
- Breen, R., D. Hannan, C.T. Whelan, D. Rottman, *Understanding Contemporary Ireland. Class, State and Development in the Republic of Ireland*. London: Macmillan
- Castles, F. and D. Mitchell (1993) "Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations", in Castles, F. (ed.) *Families of Nations. Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies*. Aldershot. Dartmouth Publishing.
- Cochrane, A. and J. Clarke (1993) *Comparing Welfare States*. London: Sage

- Cousins, M. (1997) "Ireland's Place in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" *Journal of European Social Policy* Vol. 7, No.3, pp. 223-235
- Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. *Psychometrika*. 16, 297-334.
- Daly, M. and N. Yeates (2003) "Common Origins, different paths: adaptation and change in social security in Britain and Ireland", *Policy and Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 85-97
- De Vellis, R. F. (1991) *Scale development: Theory and application*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Garry, J., N. Hardiman and D. Payne (2005) *Social and Political Attitudes in Ireland*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press
- Gelissen, J. (2000), "Popular Support for institutionalized solidarity: a comparison between European welfare states", *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Vol. 9, pp.289-300
- Gelissen, J. (2001), "Old Age Pensions: Individual of Collective Responsibility? An investigation of public opinion across European welfare states", *European Societies*, Vol. 3, No.4, pp.495-523
- Kluegel, J. and M. Miyano (1989) "Justice Beliefs and Support for the Welfare State in Advanced Capitalism" in Kluegel, J. , E. Smith, B. Wegener (eds.), *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter

- Logan, J.A. (1983). A Multivariate Model for Mobility Tables. *American Journal of Sociology*, 89, 324-349.
- Long, J. Scott. (1997) *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Sage Publications.
- McCashin, A. (2004) *Social Security in Ireland*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan
- McCashin A. (2005) "Towards a Basic Income for the Elderly" in Stewart, J. (ed.), *For Richer, For Poorer*. Dublin: New Island.
- McCashin, A and Payne, D (2005) "Welfare State Legitimacy: The Republic of Ireland in Comparative Perspective". *Paper presented at the ESPAnet05 Conference at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, on 22<sup>nd</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> September 2005*
- Millar, M. and M. Adshead (2004), "Health Care in Ireland: applying Esping- Andersen's typology of welfare to the Irish case" *Paper to Political Studies Association Conference, University of Lincoln*
- NESC (2005) *The Developmental Welfare State*. Dublin: National Economic and Social Council
- Nolan, B., B. Maitre, D. O'Neill, O. Sweetman (2000) *Income Distribution in Ireland*. Dublin: Oaktree Press
- Nunnally, J. (1978). *Psychometric theory*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- O'Riain, S. and P.O'Connell (2000) "The Role of the State in Growth and Welfare", in Nolan, B., P. O'Connell and C.T. Whelan eds. *Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration

Papadakis, E. (1992) "Public Opinion, Public Policy and the Welfare State", *Political Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 21-37

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005), "Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex Interrelation", *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 34. No. 1, pp.2-20

Peillon, M. (1995), "Support of Welfare in Ireland: Legitimacy and Interest". *Administration*, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 3-21

Quadagno, J and M. Blekesaune (2003), "Public Attitudes towards Welfare State Policies", *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 19, No.5

Reynaldo, J and A. Santos (1999) Cronbach's Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the Reliability of Scales. *Journal of Extension*, Volumn 37, No. 2.

Siaroff, A. (1994), "Work, Welfare and Gender Equality: A New Typology" in Sainsbury, D. (ed.) *Gendering Welfare States*. London: Sage

Svallfors, S. (1997) "Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution", *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.283-304

Taylor-Gooby, P. (1991) "Welfare State Regimes and Welfare Citizenship" *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 1, pp.93-105

Wren, M. (2003) *Unhealthy State*. Dublin: New Island




## Appendix

### Factor Analysis

**KMO and Bartlett's Test**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.716
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	5387.061
	df	435
	Sig.	.000

**Scree Plot**



Component Number

Analysis weighted by WGTYELL

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
pre school child-suffer if mother works	1.000	.572
family life suffer-when woman has ft job	1.000	.622
most women really want home & kids	1.000	.462
h/wife as fulfilling as working for pay	1.000	.401
mans job=get money,womens=care	1.000	.503
help elderly alone in comm-family/govt	1.000	.670
nursing home for elderly-family/govt	1.000	.769
financial support carers-family/govt	1.000	.668
strict limit on no. immigrants	1.000	.303
everyone in irl-better off than 5yrs ago	1.000	.327
wealthy pass on to kids-w/out taxes	1.000	.374
badly off just waste money they have	1.000	.405
govt shld keep taxes low	1.000	.345
some-dont make effort to help themselves	1.000	.286
not have put up-halting sites in n/hood	1.000	.232
hard work-diff bet make lot/little money	1.000	.204
people with pvt health ins,better access	1.000	.588
more money-can afford better educ kids	1.000	.640
higher income-buy better pension prov	1.000	.600
pvt & coop houses-separate estates	1.000	.284
work women shld get pd maternity leave	1.000	.555
financ b/fit,child care-both parents wk	1.000	.683
business=free/strict controlled by state	1.000	.485
industry=state/private owned & run	1.000	.531
govt doesnt give enough social welfare	1.000	.432
to become well off-start out with money	1.000	.389
employers dont pay enough to some wkers	1.000	.315
poor are getting left behind	1.000	.382
great diffs in wealth/income is unfair	1.000	.382
cost c/care working parents-family/govt	1.000	.377

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

### Total Variance Explained

Componer	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.125	10.417	10.417	3.125	10.417	10.417	2.456	8.186	8.186
2	2.611	8.702	19.120	2.611	8.702	19.120	2.262	7.541	15.727
3	2.172	7.240	26.359	2.172	7.240	26.359	2.176	7.252	22.979
4	1.745	5.817	32.177	1.745	5.817	32.177	2.081	6.938	29.917
5	1.530	5.099	37.275	1.530	5.099	37.275	1.868	6.227	36.144
6	1.430	4.766	42.041	1.430	4.766	42.041	1.629	5.428	41.573
7	1.171	3.904	45.945	1.171	3.904	45.945	1.312	4.373	45.945
8	1.138	3.792	49.737						
9	1.039	3.462	53.199						
10	.981	3.272	56.470						
11	.920	3.067	59.538						
12	.885	2.951	62.489						
13	.837	2.790	65.280						
14	.824	2.748	68.028						
15	.804	2.681	70.709						
16	.789	2.631	73.340						
17	.776	2.588	75.928						
18	.751	2.502	78.430						
19	.716	2.388	80.818						
20	.694	2.313	83.130						
21	.646	2.153	85.284						
22	.614	2.047	87.331						
23	.607	2.024	89.355						
24	.560	1.866	91.221						
25	.550	1.833	93.054						
26	.496	1.652	94.706						
27	.461	1.536	96.242						
28	.410	1.366	97.608						
29	.387	1.290	98.898						
30	.331	1.102	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotated Component Matrix <sup>a</sup>

	Component						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
family life suffer-when woman has ft job	.782						
pre school child-suffer if mother works	.737						
mans job=get money,womens=care	.654						
most women really want home & kids	.605						
h/wife as fulfilling as working for pay	.571						
wealthy pass on to kids-w/out taxes		.559					
strict limit on no. immigrants		.533					
everyone in irl-better off than 5yrs ago		.532					
govt shld keep taxes low		.524					
badly off just waste money they have		.451					
not have put up-halting sites in n/hood		.446					
hard work-diff bet make lot/little money		.437					
some-dont make effort to help themselves		.426					
nursing home for elderly-family/govt			.865				
financial support carers-family/govt			.806				
help elderly alone in comm-family/govt			.803				
more money-can afford better educ kids				.782			
higher income-buy better pension prov				.762			
people with pvt health ins,better access				.748			
pvt & coop houses-separate estates				.493			
govt doesnt give enough social welfare					.608		
to become well off-start out with money					.573		
great diffs in wealth/income is unfair					.571		
poor are getting left behind					.571		
employers dont pay enough to some wkers					.544		
financ b/fit,child care-both parents wk						.821	
work women shld get pd maternity leave						.731	
cost c/care working parents-family/govt						-.474	
industry=state/private owned & run							-.702
business=free/strict controlled by state							.685

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.