RESOLVING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

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This volume looks at hard cases of conflict, where the displacement of populations, radical power imbalances and state and regional instabilities predispose to violence and impede conflict resolution. This introductory article focuses on the particular difficulties that make some conflicts continue over long periods with intermittent periods of intense violence. It explores the conditions under which such conflicts come to be resolved, and asks why this often appears to happen suddenly. After an overview of the theoretical literature it argues for a historical-structural approach that looks at the changing structural conditions of conflict and the different ways that seemingly insoluble conflicts can be reconfigured at other levels (international, regional, state).
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INTRODUCTION

What makes some conflicts particularly persistent, difficult to resolve, seemingly intractable? This volume looks at hard cases of “ethnic” conflict, where the displacement of populations, radical power imbalances and state and regional instabilities impede conflict resolution. This introductory article focuses on the particular difficulties that make some conflicts continue over long periods with intermittent periods of intense violence. It explores the conditions under which such conflicts come to be resolved and asks why this often appears to happen suddenly. In the first section of the paper, we discuss the major theories or paradigms relevant to an answer to these issues, ending with the structural-historical approach which we elaborate in this paper. In the second section, we give a very brief overview of the existing quantitative comparative literature, arguing that it leaves open important questions of combinations and mechanisms of causality. It argues for a structural-historical approach that looks at the changing structural conditions of conflict and the different ways that seemingly insoluble conflicts can be reconfigured at other levels (international, regional, state). In the third section, we look at existing structural-historical theories relevant to explaining conflict and settlement. In the fourth, we outline the case selection in this volume and the central findings of each of the papers. And in the fifth section we provide tentative answers to our initial questions, designed as provisional conclusions to guide readers through the rest of the volume, and to be tested out in these and other cases. We review the argument in the conclusion.

RESOLVING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS? THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Why are some conflicts persistent, protracted, seemingly intractable, irresolvable? And how and why do such conflicts sometimes suddenly get resolved? Was their seeming intractability an illusion? Why then did they persist? Can comparison of a number of such diverse conflicts reveal patterns of conflict and of conflict resolution? As we show below, conventional theoretical approaches are inadequate to address these questions, precisely because they fail to explain both “intractability” and the fact that such conflicts may suddenly get resolved.

One plausible approach in the conflict-literature identifies intractable conflicts in terms of the zero-sum conflict of interests and ideals of the warring parties.¹ Yet there are many cases - South Africa, Macedonia, Columbia, and in this volume Timor Leste, Northern Ireland, Burundi—where seemingly incompatible perspectives were quickly changed once settlement came on the horizon. Mentalities are important, but they also change and sometimes very quickly. A key question is what sort of structural changes provoke (and what do not provoke) enough change in mentalities to allow for settlement.

A second approach focuses on the balance of power. Intractable conflicts are those where neither side can be beaten and neither side can win. Yet it is precisely such
stalemates (at least where they are perceived as hurting) that are also argued to be a condition of settlement.\(^2\) One of the key questions is when such short-term stalemates give incentives for the actors to keep fighting in the hope of long-term victory, and when they give incentives for them to redefine their aims and interests in order to reach a compromise. The power balance is undoubtedly important in each respect, but it takes on a different significance depending on the temporal perspective and the plausible assumptions about the future.

A third approach—once very common and now less fashionable—argues that ethnically based conflicts are particularly likely to be persistent, protracted, intractable.\(^3\) As we argue below, once reformulated to allow for the multiple and constructed character of “ethnic” distinction, this answer, focussing as it does on the relations of populations and states, grasps something of the conjunctural character of such conflicts.

Finally, for our purposes, there are the theories that focus on weak state capacity, poverty and opportunity for insurgency rather than specific cultural relationships.\(^4\) This volume, and this article, looks at a range of conflicts in different types of states. It includes outliers, where there is violent conflict in rich and strong states, and peaceful development in poor states with weak capacity and opportunity for insurgency. This allows us to show how the rational incentives towards and away from conflict are not dependent on any specific structural context.

As an alternative to these theories, we propose a perspective that is relational, conjunctural and historical, based on a theorisation of “ethnic” conflict (conflict that involves whole populations, ascribed as well as assumed), that sees it as built from conjunctural combinations of cultural, politico-economic structures.\(^5\) It is the dynamics of cultural opposition, communal division and structural exclusion that makes some conflicts so difficult to resolve and that continues to reproduce tendencies towards violence. It is the evident breach in this dynamic, typically involving state change, that allows resolution.

Of course not new to look at clusters of variables, or horizontal inequalities which interrelate cultural distinction and structural exclusion, or interrelations of state exclusion and politicised ethnicity, or transnational linkages, or to take a multi-levelled approach to conflict.\(^6\) Nor is it new to look at the mechanisms by which exclusion triggers cultural opposition, mobilisation and reframing of aims.\(^7\) Our interest here, however, is in longer historical processes with path-dependent quasi-systemic properties. In this article we focus on historical relationships whereby states find it very difficult to meet groups’ demands, and groups to integrate into states. We explore the hypothesis that such persistent, seemingly intractable conflicts possess path-dependent characteristics, fed by a multiplicity of motives, interests and assumptions.\(^8\) We ask, how far is this an accurate characterisation of the very different conflicts discussed in this volume, and when is it accurate?
CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND POTENTIALS FOR SETTLEMENT: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

Extensive quantitative research on ethnic (or internal) conflict and settlement over the last fifty years has arrived at little consensus, in part because of classificatory debates. Without entering the detailed discussions about the relative importance, however, it is possible to list the factors which make violent conflict more likely:

- Weak states/low capacity states
- Poverty (which gives an incentive for young men to join militias)
- Wealth—oil, diamonds (which produces competition for resources)
- Unstable regions
- Politicised ethnic groups, excluded from the state
- Horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al; World Bank)

There has also been considerable recent research on the factors that facilitate or impede conflict resolution, that is the reaching and the stabilising of peace agreements. Factors that disfavour the stabilisation of settlement include:

- Lack of democratic tradition
- A history of very intense violence
- State refusal to grant autonomy to insurgents
- State refusal of power-sharing, particularly in areas such as the military
- Lack of international presence/intervention
- Information/communication barriers
- State sponsored population transfers
- Refugee movements

It is however important to explore the mechanisms by which these factors work to produce conflict and/or impede agreed settlement. To this end, large-n analysis needs to be complemented by case studies and small-n comparisons which take both typical and atypical cases, as in this volume. This is particularly important since so many of the factors listed above are “continuous” variables: for example when we consider the extent of poverty, the intensity of violence, the degree of horizontal inequality, state capacity, or refugee flows, each varies on a continuum. If indeed it is a causally relevant factor, at what point on the continuum does change in the factor produce change in its effects on conflict? Does gradual change in the factor produce incremental movement towards settlement? Is this
cumulative? Or do we need much more major change in the factor (perhaps in combination with change in other factors) to change its effects on conflict? Causality in this case may take the form of a “threshold”, whereby it requires major change in the factors (overcoming a threshold) to produce any change in the conflict, but once the threshold is overcome, change towards settlement comes quickly. But then we need to identify where the thresholds lie and why.

We work with the theoretically derived hypothesis that what is at issue in long conflicts is not simply states, inequalities, structures alone, nor mentalities, cultural divisions, communal boundaries, alone, but their interrelation in a configuration that makes for a nexus of conflict that becomes self-reproducing, affecting the rational assumptions and expectations of actors just as much as their interests, and incorporating not just the “ethnic” interests of state incumbents, but also their everyday interests in stability, institutional inertia, a commitment to routines. Such historically given “conjunctures” may provide quasi-systemic incentives to conflict. We follow Braudel in thinking of such “conjunctures” as combining long-lasting elements (in these cases, poverty, regional inequalities, cultural differences, geo-historical linkages, ethnic origins) in ways that can create dynamic quasi-systems with path-dependent properties. It is this that makes it so difficult even for strong states to compromise with some of their minorities, and for those populations to accept a compromise with that state. So, for example, such conjunctures explain why Protestants have difficulty still in full social integration in Ireland and not in France, or why the British state found it so difficult to make the changes which allowed settlement in Northern Ireland and required help from the Irish state. Where such a conjuncture exists, it means that quite radical change in the shape of the state is necessary for settlement, and this meets all sorts of “non-ethnic” resistance to change.

If some conjunctures link populations within the state, others link them across states, in more complex conflict matrices. Saleyhan and Gleditsch have shown, for example, how refugee movements make conflict more likely, while Keating has shown how positive transnational linkages make possible compromise settlements of very long-running conflicts.

In the next section we outline the ways such conjunctures have been understood in the comparative-historical literature.

CONJUNCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS OF CONFLICT

Different theories of conflict are given in the comparative historical literature on the nation state, on empire and colonialism, and on political economy.

There is an extensive literature on the formation of the modern state and the ways in which it leads to ethnic and national exclusion. Most recently Wimmer has argued that the very form of the modern nation state is ethnically exclusive, although exclusion takes two forms, either where states develop as national states on the basis of a constitutional “cultural compromise”, or where they develop as ethnic states with ethnic control or incumbency of key state apparatuses (the military, the civil service). Wimmer perhaps overestimates the national/ethnic intent of state leaders and functionaries. Whatever the historic origins of exclusion, it is
highly likely that this becomes routinised in modern complex state apparatuses, reproduced by the habitual understandings of the state elite (what Bulpitt referred to as the “habits of statecraft”), including the geopolitical tradition of what is necessary for state stability and security. The relative strength of such state-inertia, compared to ethnic incumbency or national consciousness varies from state to state. If in Spain, the constitutional compromise of 1978 underlies the state’s resistance to compromise with the sole excluded party, Basque nationalists, in Britain, habitual understandings take priority over the constitutional principles of the 1690s and still more over the specific interests of the once-dominant “aristocratic ethnie.” In Israel, ethnic incumbency converges with national self-understandings and with a consensus on what is necessary for state security and stability. In each case a conflictual nexus of state interests vs nationalist demands develops, with a different logic depending on the primary reasons for exclusion.

There is equally extensive and multi-disciplinary study of the impact of imperialism and colonisation on identities and social relations. Colonial structures not only privilege a dominant group and displace the dominated—its a highly potent manner of making difference of ultimate social importance—but they also connect that privilege to an overarching sense of civilisation and modernisation. In interlinking cultural distinction and radical power imbalance, this creates highly exclusivist boundaries between groups in which the dominant denies the value—even the existence—of the dominated, while the dominated wishes to destroy the dominant. Colonisation is state-centred, and generates a distinctive triangular form of conflict, where the state—often against explicit intent and even interests—is involved in conflict on the side of one population against the other. Over time this too may become routinised, part of the normal conception of modernity and civilization in Britain or France.

The political economy and development literature focuses upon the economic as well as the state-sponsored roots of population transfers and displacements, which create transborder linkages and push distinctive cultural groups into competition and conflict (refs). Such population movements are as common in the European Union (see Pragnere on the Basque country) as in Mindanao or the Democratic Republic of Congo (see Harris, Ramadhani et al, this volume) and in all they create the potential for ethnic conflict. They may be exacerbated by other population movements—displacements and refugees from neighbouring wars which threaten radically to change the balance of ethnic power in the host country. At the limit, as in the Balkans, they provide flows of arms, armed militants, repertoires of violence and supporters of violence, and radical changes in the demographic and power balance with refugee flows, which create cycles whereby conflict in one country leads to conflict in its neighbours.

Such macro-level processes can create dynamic quasi-systems which reproduce cultural oppositions and structural exclusion, constituting solidary “groups” out of diverse populations. Rather than focusing on one ideal type system (e.g. the modern nation-state), we are interested in how different state-building, colonizing and politico-economic processes intersect in specific historical conjunctures in particular societies and regions, to create a form of state(s) and a form of popular
identities, cultures and aims as radically conflictual and conflict generating. Do such conjunctural processes with their tendency for escalating conflict, lie at the heart of difficult, protracted, and intractable conflicts? That is the question that animates this volume.

**CASE SELECTION**

We take some cases in this volume that - in comparative terms - would not be expected to be particularly hard to resolve: conflicts in rich and stable states and regions. We take other cases where conditions are much less favourable to a successful outcome—poor and relatively low capacity states, unstable regions—some with recurrent conflict, some with conflict-resolution, some without conflict.

The cases are chosen to illustrate a very wide range of types of state and of state-population nexus. Some are stable democracies, some unstable and weak states in unstable regions, with a history of dictatorship. All have been touched by imperial history—as actors or victims—but only sometimes does this take the form of colonial settlement and population displacement. In all, however, different types of population displacement exist and in all—to differing degrees—populations as well as organisations are involved in supporting or constraining overt violence. The conflicts are of different forms and about different aims: in Mindanao, the Basque Country and East Timor about autonomous rule and division of responsibility and power: in Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Uganda, about ways of sharing power even more than about secession or division of power. But for many of the cases—from Northern Ireland to Israel and the Basque Country—complex institutional forms involving power-sharing, autonomy, and cross-border linkages have been promoted as forms of conflict resolution.

We work from the assumption that the appropriate forms of resolution may be known and recognised by most parties long before it is possible to achieve it, and indeed that more than one form of resolution may be possible. Our interest is less in the specific form of resolution than in the obstacles to achieving it: whether these are rooted in the form of the state, the types of population interests and transnational linkages, or organisational structures, or in a complex interaction between them. In this introductory article, we outline the conclusions of the case studies, focussing on the interests that prevented agreed settlement, and the ways in which they were—on occasion—rechanneled.

We begin with a case—Timor Leste—where state power was massively greater than insurgent resources, yet the insurgents eventually won independence. Paul Hainsworth explains how it happened. It is a case where Indonesian power was of relatively short duration, and Indonesian interest more in terms of the reputation effect on other potentially secessionist regions than in terms of economic or intrinsic symbolic importance. Nonetheless Indonesian rule was incredibly brutal. Hainsworth traces the continued resistance of the East Timorese and the gradual creation of an international context where the new Indonesian ruler saw an interest in confronting his own military in order to increase his international reputation and leeway in the rest of the territory. Here a temporary and contingent opening was
used by a coalition of external allies and internal insurgents to push for new policy direction. Hainsworth shows how the East Timorese leaders were able to maximise external alliances in large part by effective appeal to international norms.

The next article compares the conflict potential in a range of states which share conditions of relative poverty and low state capacity. The Great Lakes Region (GLR) provides a fascinating panorama of states sharing very similar socio-economic conditions, but with radically different histories of conflict and settlement. Lupa Ramadhani, Patrick Paul Walsh and Jennifer Todd take the simple question, why four of the GLR states have experienced persistent and protracted intensely violent conflicts while the other four have more or less escaped conflict. Taking a fifty year span, they identify the conditions which made some states so much more liable to conflict than their neighbours. Indeed some states faced a more difficult ethno-political conditions than others: particular forms of indirect rule in the colonial period cemented ethnic competition—particularly important between dyadic large ethnic groups—while early state building processes and openness to international trade created environments which were less or more vulnerable to armed contention. In these ways, a conflict-configuration was created in four of the states and absent in the others: as intense violence spiralled and refugee movements took place, the conflict-free states now had while the conflict-prone states lacked the means to resist being pulled back into conflict. The initial conditions generated significantly more difficult contexts in some states than in others: they do not prevent resolution (as the cases of Burundi, and to a lesser extent Rwanda, illustrate) but a realistic assessment of the difficulties is necessary if international and regional efforts towards peace are to be successful.

In the third article, Albert Harris focuses on one of the factors which generates major conflict potential: state-sponsored population displacements and transfers. Mindanao and Sri Lanka illustrate the major conflicts generated and the difficulties of conflict resolution. The context of the two cases is quite different, with a very strong Sri Lankan interest in retaining control of the Northern part of the island, a strong Sinhalese interest in restricting Tamil advance and autonomy, and a purposeful state-promoted process of population displacement during the war against the Tamil Tigers. In Mindanao, in contrast, population movement was advanced (primarily but not exclusively by the state) as much for economic as for strategic purposes. In both cases, as Harris traces, a set of dilemmas and contradictions emerged that precluded easy resolution of conflict. In each case, population transfers reduced the options open to the insurgents, who had a much reduced territorial area in which they could claim to be a majority with the right of self-determination, much reduced potential to determine their own living conditions, and who faced the continual danger of further dispossession. Population transfer policies increased the local antagonisms between populations, creating new constituencies which pushed the state against compromise, creating a situation where limited autonomy could be portrayed as an affront to national honour. How different parties attempted—and in each case failed—to create a compromise settlement is shown. The failure of international actors to help mediate a settlement is particularly marked in the case of Sri Lanka.
In the next article, Pascal Pragnère focuses on a case - the Basque Country - which is very different from the others in this volume, in that the conflict is a result of state-building rather than also colonisation. Yet the case is also very similar in the complex imperatives experienced by successive Spanish governments and in the cross-border linkages that in this case exacerbate conflict. The intractability of this case lies in the fact that it is the only part of Spain where a significant group (nationalists in general, radical nationalists and ETA in particular) did not fully accept the post-Franco constitutional compromise of 1978. The majority nationalist party did accept the Basque statute of autonomy of 1979, but the radical nationalists did not, although the majority nationalist party (but not the radical nationalists) did accept the Basque statute of autonomy of 1979. Pragnère traces the demands of the radical nationalists—not just for independence but for unity with the historic Basque areas of Navarra and of South-Western areas of France—and their aim to politicise and radicalise the Basque population through violence. They partially succeeded, retaining significant popular support, because the state had very limited room to manoeuvre. The state was based on a compromise between democrats and military which could not survive greater independence. Moreover the main competing political parties had more interest in challenging each other than in resolving the Basque conflict. Thus successive opportunities—not least when the Basque nationalist population stood against ETA violence—were missed.

Finally, Jennifer Todd compares two cases, Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, which are societies divided through state-sponsored population transfers, with a particular focus on ways that these difficult conflicts may be resolved. Akin to Harris’s argument, Todd shows how in these cases a structural bind—a particular form of security-rights dilemma—is constituted, whereby the security of the dominant group is incompatible with the rights of the dominated. This generates a polarizing dynamic, which brings the state into play on behalf of the dominant group, and creates a zero-sum conflict. Once this conjuncture is formed, processes of integration into a “one state” structure become unworkable, but “two-state” structures, in particular partition, fail to resolve the structural bind. In Northern Ireland, however, agreement was eventually reached through a gradual moderation of the two-state structure, together with an externally generated equalisation within Northern Ireland. The latter gave new incentives to each population to participate in a complex power sharing arrangement that left open a number of future constitutional-institutional options. The process of undoing the initial dynamic took centuries, and required the intervention of the Irish state to disrupt habitual British practices of governance. In Israel/Palestine, where the power imbalance and the security imperatives are each very strong, neither a one-state nor a two-state structure is likely to undo the structural bind. The process of Israeli securitisation and struggles for Palestinian rights are likely to continue. In this case, however, the Irish example suggests the value of an iterative structure of conflict resolution where future changes in power relations are at once anticipated and their effects constrained within present agreements.

COMPARATIVE PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The articles which follow show a wide variation in the issues in conflict, in the intensity and extent of violence, in the role and demands of the populace and the constraints they put on insurgents, and in state capacity and self-imposed state constraints on repression. Even more there is variation in outcome: if Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya and Zambia have been relatively free of violent conflict, East Timor, Northern Ireland and Burundi have relatively successfully resolved a long standing conflict, and the Basque Country, Rwanda and Mindanao partially so. In contrast, Sri Lanka, Israel Palestine, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have signally failed to reach agreement (for very different reasons—respective military victory, state strength, and state weakness).

In each case, a nexus exists conjoining the regional context, state structure and imperatives and insurgent forces and demands. In some cases, in particular the DRC, insurgent strength is highly dependent on regional interlinkages and state capacity is sufficiently weak to allow continual cycles of violence: the state a resource to be fought over rather than an arena which may itself generate a dynamic of conflict or settlement. In stronger states, it is the nexus between states and insurgents which takes prominence, although the regional context plays an important role in defining state interests and providing insurgent resources. In such cases, it is of crucial importance to trace the state’s role, the interlinking of incumbent interests, cultural understandings and routinised practices. Where state exclusion of populations is primarily determined by incumbent interest—as in Burundi and Rwanda for long periods—there is a choice of overthrow of incumbents (as in Rwanda in 1994) or international action to bargain with them to achieve a level of power-sharing (as in Burundi in 200?). If state policies are primarily determined by a constitutional consensus, as in Spain, then the prospects of endogenous change without major state transformation are slim. Where they are determined by routinised practices and understandings, a different dynamic of conflict and resolution can develop, with a (still slim) possibility of endogenous change, once institutional inertia which blocks insurgent issues from the agenda is overcome. Thus the conjunctural nexus which generates conflict takes quite different forms in different cases, although in each of the conflict-cases discussed in this volume it generates a strong tendency to conflict and away from settlement.

The appropriate paths to resolution differ accordingly. In some cases, as in Northern Ireland, institutionalised Irish influence provided a range of additional repertoires of understanding and practice and generated a slow endogenous process of British state change which in turn incentivised change in both republicans and unionists. In other cases, such as Burundi, strong international intervention and insistence on change is necessary to enforce, promote or persuade incumbents to change. Sometimes the pressure may be effective although relatively light: for example when B. J Habibie, the new Indonesian ruler calculated that losing East Timor was less costly than keeping it, international influence gave him added weight in the internal politics of secession, particularly in dealing with the military (see Hainsworth, this volume). Without some such external action, however, the prospect of internally generated state change is slight: external pressure is necessary even to overcome state inertia and traditional “habits of
statecraft", and most certainly to overcome the interests of ethnic incumbents. International and regional organisation also affects the incentives to insurgency. The Great Lakes Region shows the importance of regional organisation in restricting the negative aspects of transborder flows (of militants and arms).

The political forms of settlement under discussion in the cases in this volume vary from secession to power-sharing—not just consociationalism but also equalisation policies in the security forces, state employment, land ownership and regional policies—with a range of more complex combinations between. These are the means of remedying the grievances that underlie much conflict: lack of public recognition of “national” identity, state exclusion and horizontal inequality. Even in the most successful cases of settlement, however, these grievances are far from fully resolved: in Northern Ireland, where there is extensive and effective equality legislation enforced by a rich and powerful state, full equality of condition between opposing groups has not been achieved, nor is it likely to be achievable or sustainable in the long term. Nor is it likely that the full demands of the radical nationalists in the Basque country for independence for the Greater Basque Country will ever be fully met. Yet less than full equality of condition, and less than full national self-determination, is enough to satisfy many insurgent movements. What is necessary, as the Northern Ireland case illustrates, is an opening up of further possibilities of change: a radical and visible change in the conjuncture of conflict so that the state no longer functions to block opportunities for change. As this historic conjuncture of conflict changes, so do many of the reasons for insurgency. How that conjuncture changes, and is seen to change, necessarily varies from one state and one conflict to another: it is in this sense that the settlement must “best fit” the local circumstances of conflict.35

CONCLUSION

This brief overview of the detailed analyses in the volume leads us to seven conclusions.

First, there is need for a multi-levelled analysis of the causes, course and resolution of conflict. In all of these cases, the causes of conflict transcend state boundaries, and the forms of conflict resolution equally call upon international actors and use transnational resources and linkages.

Second, the causes of protracted and seemingly intractable conflicts are not just complex, but they are connected in path-dependent conjunctures which are particularly difficult to change. Change requires a multiplicity of inputs, often a combination of cumulative slow change and new regional or international opportunities. In this sense, some conflicts just are more intractable, more difficult to resolve, than others. But once change in the conjuncture occurs, a threshold is passed and swift change towards settlement may follow.

Third, in such conflicts, violence is simply the most urgent sign of a wider configuration which predisposes towards violence, and which can continue even in imposed peace.
Fourth, that the state generates conflict through very different mechanisms, even if the resulting violence has very similar forms. As well as ethnic control and incumbency, and national exclusion, there are the more everyday mechanisms of state inertia and routinised practices which may have had their origins in colonial or ethnic dominance, but now have become part of the normal practices of the state. While the forms of violence generated by different mechanisms may appear similar, the modes of possible settlement vary considerably.

Fifth, that while politicised ethnicity is indeed central to conflict, its forms and impact vary with the structural context.

Sixth, that the regional context is all important, both in generating state interests in stability and security and in providing resources for insurgents.

Seventh, and finally, that the “fit” of the settlement to the historic configuration of conflict is all important. What is most important is to show that the conjunctural pattern of exclusion is broken, not that full equality has already been attained.

NOTES


Ruane and Todd (note 5).


Brown, (note 6); Gleditsch, “Transnational dimensions” (note 6).

Cederman et al, “Why do ethnic groups rebel?” (note 6).


17 Hartzell and Hoddie (note 16).


20 Ibid; Jarst and Nilsson (note 16), pp. 217-8; Glassmyer and Sambanis (note 16), pp. 375-381 note the difficulty of effective military integration of rebels, and the dangers of increasing violence when it is badly structured and implemented; see also Mattes and Savun (note 16), p. 520.

21 Hartzell and Hoddie (note 16); Glassmyer and Sambanis (note 16), p. 372.


27 Cordell and Wolff (note 6) pp.6-9; Gleditsch (note 6).

28 Saleyhan and Gleditsch (note 24); Keating (note 6).


