Andrew Jorgensen
Email: andrew.jorgensen@ucd.ie
Dissertation:
A Study of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects.Publications:
'Understanding semantic scepticism' in: Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed) The Cognitive and Phenomenological Turns in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, forthcoming.
'Lewis's Synthesis' International Journal of Philosophical Studies16.1 (2008)
'Holism, Communication and The Emergence of Public Meaning:Lessons from an Economic Analogy' Philosophia (DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9143-7)
'Meinong’s Much Maligned Modal Moment' Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002): 95-118.
'Types of Negation in Logical Re-constructions of Meinong’s Object-theory' Grazer Philosophische Studien. 67(2004): 21-36
'Understanding as Endorsing an Inference' Polish Journal of Philosophy Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 2008), 35-54
“Holism, Communication, and the emergence of Public Meaning: Lessons from an Economic Analogy” Philosophia 37.1 (2009): 133-47.
“Review of Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of Language” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15.4 (2007), pp. 626-9
“Review of Jeremy Wanderer Robert Brandom” forthcoming in Philosophical Papers
“The Sky over Canberra: Folk Discourse and Serious Metaphysics” forthcoming in Philosophia(2009). DOI 10.1007/s11406-00 - 9-92046
"Understanding Semantic Scepticism" to appear in Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.) Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Volume II: The Philosophical Turn Ontos Verlag.
"Semantic Scepticism" Language and Linguistics Compass (in preparation)
Current Project:
Meanings of Thumb: A Semantic Error Theory
The project grew out of a dissatisfaction I have with realist accounts of linguistic significance. ‘Realist’ theories assert that a sentence is meaningful if and only if there is something that it means. It seems to me that Meinongian theories are the results of properly following through the intuitions underlying realist accounts of meaning and that these theories face insoluble epistemological objections.
In the post-doc, I make the case for rejecting realism, which involves unifying and casting in a common light a number of sceptical challenges to the concept of meaning from recent decades (esp. Quine on indeterminacy of translation, Putnam’s model theoretic paradox, Kripke on rule-following). In the latter part of the project, I argue for a nominalistic, “use-theoretic” alternative.
More information about this project can be found here.
B. Soc Sci (1996) MA (1998) University of Waikato, New Zealand
PhD (2002) Temple University, USA
