Thesis
'The Political Economy of Aid Donation'
Given that it amounts to over $120 billion annually, it is unsurprising that the topic foreign aid has received a great deal of scholarly attention to date. The vast majority of this literature however, has tended to focus on issues of aid effectiveness and aid allocation. Relatively little attention has been paid to the significant disparities which exist in donor behaviour, or more simply, to the question of why donors differ so greatly in the quantity and quality of the aid which they disburse?
Traditionally, explanations of donor motivations have focused on the strategic incentives of donors. These studies have generally eschewed domestic politics within donor countries, arguing instead that donors give aid in order to gain policy concessions from recipients and to increase their economic and political influence. This project takes a different approach, examining instead the role of domestic politics in the formulation and implementation of donors’ aid policies. It argues that it is differences in the domestic politics within donor countries which most consistently explain variation in aid policies.
Drawing on both International Relations Theory and Comparative Political Economy, this project ‘unpacks’ the domestic politics of donor countries in order to explain disparities in donor behaviour. Employing primarily quantitative methods, the project analyses the aid policies of the 23 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, examining how donors’ policies are affected by factors such as: public opinion, electoral systems, constitutional design and bureaucratic structures.
Areas of expertise;
Foreign Aid, Comparative Political Economy, International Relations Theory.
Publications:
Book Review, "The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence", (2009) Journal of International Studies 38: 475-476
Scholarships:
Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences Postgraduate Scholarship