The Europeanization of Planning and the Role of ESPON

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Abstract: The formation of the EU – EUnre, to distinguish it from the geographic entity Europe – is the exponent and also the driver of a broader process with roots in history and geography, Europeanization. After reviewing literature concerning the dialectic relation between the two, the paper discusses the Europeanization of spatial planning. It resulted from ideas and practices crossing borders and from the elites involved attempting to let planning share in the building of EUrope. Success has so far eluded them, but there has been much mutual learning, including the creation of a common evidence base for territorial development and cohesion, the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON). ESPON may be the platform from which to re-launch the campaign.

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'Notions of European citizenship, spatial development concepts, visionary cartography, regional policy doctrine and new governance paradigms .... have been woven together within Europeanising discourses that extoll the virtues of co-operation, networking, social capital and ... general values.' (Scott 2002, 155)

Introduction

A peninsula of Eurasia (Davis 1995), Europe is in no way co-extensive with the territorial reach of the currently twenty-seven – with the accession of Croatia in 2013 twenty-eight – Member States of the European Union (EU). Contrast for instance the EU with the Council of Europe. Because of its poor credentials, Belarus is not a member but, however defined, its coverage is vastly more inclusive of European space.¹ With no executive authority, the Council of Europe includes not only the Russian Federation, unlikely ever to join the EU, but for a long time also Turkey whose European credential EU members question to a point where Turkey may call off ongoing accession negotiation. In common parlance, protagonists and critics of the EU nonetheless refer to it as ‘Europe’ and Europeanization is taken to mean progress in EU integration. This is true also for the Europeanization of planning standing for progress in giving the EU a planning role, its EUropeanization as it were. Taking a leaf out of Clark and Jones (2008) I distinguish EUropeanization as the building of EUrope from the broader, historic process of Europeanization as the forming of common European outlooks.

The literature on the Europeanization of planning hints at such a distinction which I will expand upon, providing examples of the Europeanization of planning predating the EU. Eventually, protagonists attached themselves to an emergent EUrope, thus setting their sights on its EUropeanization. More than a play of words, this distinction will help assessing the contingency of the EUropeanization of planning – and maybe also EUropeanization as such! – stalling. My modestly hopeful take on this is that planning has become Europeanized to a degree that makes a return to the status quo ex ante inconceivable. Whatever the future, planners can no longer operate within borders separating their areas from a terra incognita outside.

¹ By virtue of the Russian Federation being amongst its membership, this Europe even hails from across the Baring Street.
The paper comes in four parts. The first expands upon the distinction between EUropeanization and Europeanization. The second reviews literature on the Europeanization of planning. Drawing on literature, including my own works done, amongst others on account of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the third part revisits European spatial planning. Presently it no longer progresses as one might have hoped for. Nonetheless, the Europeanization of planning in the sense of a learning process, of the creation of Europeanness amongst experts and academics continues. This is where ESPON, discussed in part four, comes in. With its brief to generate a common evidence base for – terminology is constantly shifting – territorial development and cohesion, it is a stand-in for a missing platform for promoting EUropean planning. The conclusions draw implications for its future against the backdrop of a contested EUrope.

A short comment on terminology seems in order. ‘Europeanization of planning’ obviously refers developments in planning, more in particular ‘spatial planning.’ The ‘Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies’ (CEC 1997) refers to it as ‘…methods used by the public sector to influence the distribution of people and activities in spaces of various scales’ like invoking comprehensive land-use plans to back up controls on development or investing public funds. However, there is endemic conflict between land-use planners attempting to coordinate, not only private but also public development with a view to some overall view, and those wielding spending power, sometimes with the single-mindedness of a Robert Moses. Now, obviously, where public investments hurt public and/or private interests, there we would not speak of planning. What distinguished planning is thus what the European Spatial Development Perspective, or ESDP, labels the ‘spatial approach’ where it identifies its contribution as providing a vision of the future territory of the EU as ‘…a general source of reference for actions with a spatial impact, taken by public and private decision-makers.’ (CEC 1999, 11) Providing a frame of reference for public and private development with a view to its spatial or territorial impact is my understanding, too, of spatial planning.

Having invoked the ESDP, the most pronounced exponent so far of European planning, it is time to explore what its Europeanization may mean. As a preliminary, I distinguish two meanings of the term.

**Europeanization and EUropeanization**

Writing on ‘The spatialities of Europeanisation: territory, government and power in "EUrope’” Clark and Jones do not distinguish two meanings, not in so many words anyway. The justification for my making the distinction is that they do distinguishing between Europe and EUrope. Implicitly, by stating also that European affinities are older – much older in their view – than the most recent manifestation of Europeanness around the EU,

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2 The three Lincoln-sponsored volumes apart (Faludi ed. 2002; 2007; 2008), I also draw on a synthesis of my published works on European spatial planning in Faludi (2010).
they, too, give two meanings to Europeanization. Indeed, they say that, ‘…while the integration narrative and Europeanisation’s underlying processes have tended to be conflated, importantly they are not the same. (Clark and Jones 2008, 303)

Having justified making the distinction, I hasten to add that Europeanization and EUropeanization are related. EUrope is the contingent, but not the accidental outcome of Europeanization and presently the chief driver of the formation of Europeanness. At the same time it should be clear that Europeanization is not exclusive to what happens in and with the EU. The issue is virulent in the fringes of the EU. As the Ukrainian writer of dissident fame, Yuri Andrukhovych once said,

…one could assume that Europe exists wherever the local people believe that they are part of Europe. Or, to go one step further, wherever they consider themselves to be European. So: Europe is a completely subjective term. A Chinese person in China or in Singapore would never consider himself European, neither would an Arab, an Indian, a Mongolian or an Iranian. But an Azerbaijani might do, and you can be pretty sure an Armenian would.3

Discussing the '…construction and projection of Europeanisation by 'EUropean' elites in contested and newly constructed spaces…’ (Clark, Jones 2008, 301), our two authors invoke terms relevant to spatial planning. An equally important theme is how government has been implicated in configuring Europeanness. Thus, political elites

...were aware of the potency of Europeanisation's shared transnational understandings, and devised the integration narrative to harness these processes to transcend the horrors of world war. Crucially this narrative has given contemporary Europeanisation's learning and socialisation a renewed direction and purpose, focused since 1957 upon state institutional governance change. (Op cit., 303)

The consequence is that Europeanization

...is reproduced as much through exchange of specialised codified knowledge peculiar to "EUrope" as it is through the tacit microgeographies of everyday life…We argue, therefore, that Europeanisation proceeds independently of European integration although over the last 50 years the integration narrative has been critically important in shaping the focus of Europeanisation's coordinative ... processes. (Clark, Jones 2008, 304)

Building on social science and humanities scholarship, Clark and Jones arrive at no less than nine, sometimes overlapping meanings of Europeanization. This confirms its

complexity as a concept, something that Olsen (2002) and Radaelli (2004) also emphasize. Clark and Jones discuss the various meanings under territory/territoriality, government/governance and power. Under the first category they list the diffusion of knowledge through the exchange of best practices and through imitation and the rescaling of national identities and interests buttressing state-based orders. Under government/governance they refer to a supranational governance converging towards EUropean norms, the reconfiguration of the territorial bases of authority, the multidirectional transformation of statehood through state actors assimilating EU policy and to responses to global change leading to adjustments in spatial frames of thought. Concerning power, they mention multidirectional social transformations through interpenetration, exchanges and so forth and also the projection, by means of soft power, of a hegemonic 'EUropean' identity.

They point out that scale is socially produced and that, ‘…although Europeanisation is actively (re-)produced from interrelations that originate locally, regionally, nationally and globally, these cannot be disentangled meaningfully.’ (Clark, Jones 2008, 309) As will become evident, Europeanization moving between scales is well-recognized in the planning literature. Also, research on Europeanization from the humanities and the social sciences shows the importance ‘..of underpinning socialisation and learning processes (e.g. consensus building, network establishment and maintenance, elite bargaining and knowledge construction...). It is these transnational socialisation and learning processes that .... come closest to what researchers term "Europeanisation".’ (Op cit.) In summary, Clark and Jones (2008, 313) identify Europeanization as

…a uniquely geographic suite of processes springing from territorial propinquity, comprising myriad socialisation and learning processes that have been configured over centuries by distinctive patterns of European government and power. Suppression and/or control of these continent-wide processes has been integral to nation state building, and the inherent tension between states and the supranational political project of building 'EUrope' arises precisely because Europeanisation processes are both supportive of yet transcend national territory-government power bases.

This refers to the ambivalence evident in the construction of EUrope from which European planning, too, will be shown to suffer. First, I discuss literature on the Europeanization of planning showing that it makes sense to distinguish between its narrow sense focusing on EUrope and a wider one.

**The Europeanization of Planning in the Literature**

In the previous publication sponsored by the Lincoln Institute concerned with ESPON, Böhme and Waterhout (2008) give an overview of the literature, starting with Böhme (2002) writing at a time when Europeanization was not yet a common concept. Distinguishing between planning for Europe and planning in Europe and emphasizing their
interrelations, he in fact talked about it even so. Building further on this and on Waterhout (2008) on the institutionalization of European planning, the two authors explore the dialectic between planning for Europe being shaped by examples of planning in Europe until it crystallizes into a dominant discourse on planning for Europe with a feedback effect on planning in Europe. This makes observing the variety of planning in Europe interesting. It is described in the ‘Compendium of Planning Systems and Policies’ (European Commission 1997) and a host of works since.4 Focusing on territorial knowledge channels and territorial knowledge communities, Adams, Cotella and Nunes (2011) come to similar conclusions about the dialectic between planning in and for Europe, and so do Cotella and Janin Rivolin (2011) writing about Europeanization as a cyclical process of institutionalization.

The paper then analyzes the development of planning for Europe, detailing the relevant intergovernmental, as well as the tentative initiatives by the Commission, developments that I am going to revisit below. The authors conclude that Europeanization of planning is complex and reflects mixes of domestic and EU influences, making one-size-fits-all approaches unsuitable. As a bottom-up process it represents changes in policies and systems due to domestic responses to EU initiatives; works through multiple channels, but in particular by way of EU regulatory and spending policies; and is being taken forward by a suit of intergovernmental and Community activities. Europeanization leads to some confluence between planning and planning systems, but thanks to the heterogeneity of structures of government as well as to spatial diversity not to uniformity:

Europe is and will remain diverse, but Europeanization processes make sure that its diversity will be closely connected to and can be used as a strength in European development and planning. The ongoing Europeanization of planning … may, in turn, lead to an increased sense of urgency to further develop planning for Europe. (Böhme, Waterhout 2007, 245)

A point which they emphasize and which the literature confirms5 is the dominant influence, not of planning for Europe but of the policies of EU sectors. With their regulatory and/or spending power, they have often unexpected and disparate impacts. The incidences of such impacts on the territories of Member States, their regions and local authorities have led, amongst others, the makers of the ESDP to argue for an EU spatial framework into which sector policies should fit, but whether they will ever allow planning to such a role is a moot point.

**European Planning Revisited**

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4 Böhme (2002) compared Nordic planning systems. For other comparative works see Nadin, Stead (2008); Knieling, Othengrafen (2009); Stead, Cotellechanges a (2011).

5 Ravesteyn, Evers (2004), Waterhout 2007; 2008)
Here I take a fresh look at a topic that I have studied for close to two decades, showing that the Europeanization of planning is not a new phenomenon. It is part of a broader process of a more comprehensive international exchange of planning practices documented by Healey and Upton (eds., 2010) Eventually, and obviously, where such exchanges within Europe were concerned, they led to attempts at the Europeanization of planning – letting it participate in the making of Europe – which in turn is leading, if nothing else, to its further Europeanization.

The Europeanization of Planning

In the late-nineteenth century zoning under police powers on the German model reached the Netherlands and the shores of the United Kingdom. Another idea floating around was that of the Green Belt, with Vienna instituting one in 1905, an example keenly observed in the first issues of the first planning journal ever, the ‘Town Planning Review’. Of course there is no better example of a planning idea that has conquered the world than Ebenezer Howard’s ‘Garden Cities of Tomorrow’.

Not only such substantive concepts travelled, Patrick Geddes’ ‘survey-before-plan’ did the same. So did the idea of regional planning. Thomas Addams, a British planner working for the ‘Plan for New York and Its Environs’ attended the first conference of the International Garden Cities Association, an offshoot of the Town and Country Association reinventing itself later as the International Federation of Housing and Planning. This was at Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 1924 where Dutch planners were inspired to embark on their decade-long campaign for regional and eventually national spatial planning.

The authors of such ideas moved around, too. Patrick Geddes held commissions in India and in the British Mandate of Palestine, and had a part in discussing reconstructing Belgium after World War I. Another widely-travelled pioneer is the, outside the Netherlands less well-known Joël de Casseres. He studied at Dresden and at the Paris Beaux Arts and took the External Examination of the Town Planning Institute which to his mind qualified him to lecture his more senior Dutch compatriots at the International Garden Cities Association. No less an authority than Patrick Abercombie wrote a foreword to his book. He also travelled to America, writing a book-size report on the New Deal. Drawing on the example of the Tennessee Valley Authority, he drafted a regional plan for one of the Dutch provinces.

Congress like Amsterdam were important opportunities for exchanging ideas. There was the 1925 Art Déco Exhibition in Paris and the famous meeting of the Congrès International de l’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) on board of the Patras from Marseille to Athens. On a somewhat different issue, in 1931 Amsterdam hosted a World Social Economic Congress discussing amongst others the Soviet Five Year Plan. An Austrian philosopher and planner, 6 Perhaps, US zoning was influenced by the example, too.
Otto Neurath, destined to become a refugee in the Netherlands and later in the UK, was on the Patras as well as at Amsterdam, giving papers on his unique graphic method ISOTYPE of presenting survey results respectively on central planning.

Through similar channels planners learned about national spatial planning in the Third Reich, the sinister aspects of which were only dimly perceived. For Dutch planners, this was a further impetus for propagating national planning, something in which eventually they succeeded in a cloak-and-dagger operation under German occupation sustaining their own ideas against the wishes of an occupier increasingly distracted by the war in the east.

As had World War I, World War II brought with it extraordinary resources mobilization. This seemingly required the central management of the economy which its protagonists wished to see continued, something that Karl Popper writing about ‘The Open Society and its Enemies’ and Friedrich von Hayek about ‘The Road to Serfdom’ opposed, but there were successful examples, like in the US and the UK – of which Winston Churchill wrote with pride that the mobilization of its workforce exceeded that of all other participants – that bore little resemblance to a command economy. In fact, once Albert Speer had taken over as armaments minister, the German war economy saw more collaborative management and, allied bombing notwithstanding, output peaked in 1944. In this, Speer allowed himself to be inspired by what he saw under the collaborationist Vichy Regime in the unoccupied part of France. Pressed to deliver more and more goods for the German war effort, some form of cooperative planning had emerged there.

Surviving staff continued in positions in the Fourth Republic at the postwar Ministry of Urbanism. They favored an integrated spatial policy, the opposite of what the Commissariat Général du Plan headed by Jean Monnet practiced. The latter favored indicative planning of industrial sectors, planification, much discussed as the postwar antithesis of Soviet-style planning. Later, Jean Monnet would of course become the éminence gris behind the Luxembourg-born and German-educated French minister of foreign affairs, Robert Schuman and his European initiatives. A leading figure in the European Federal Movement, Monnet remained true to his belief in intervening in specific sectors, trusting in the gradual spillover of such initiatives to other areas. This is a version of the classic planning struggle against sectors. In Europe, the struggle still goes in favor of the spending departments and the regulators. Efforts, essential to spatial planning as they are, to coordinate such interventions within some spatial framework, as for instance in the ESDP, meet with opposition. This is evident both at national level, as well as within the European Commission. Even within the Directorate General responsible for regional policy, the home of such believers in EU planning as there are, using funds to immediate, demonstrable effect wins over the long and broad view which planning propagates.

Returning to the immediate postwar situation, reconstruction was a common concern, and the adagio of short-term activity driving out long-term activity continued to hold true. In the Netherlands national planning survived the scrutiny by the returning government-in-exile but was dwarfed by the Reconstruction Service bent on building, no matter where.
Also, for the first time the Netherlands like other countries in Europe embarked on a regional policy, investing in industrial development. Here, too, the influence of Dutch spatial planners was limited, but at least there was a confluence of opinion that the Randstad and the Green Heart should be preserved, leading to the deliberate spread of development initiatives.

Investment in the impoverished European economies was what the Marshall Plan was about. It required a clearing house, what would eventually become the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As its director, an American-educated Frenchman, Robert Marjolein, held up the New Deal as an example. And with US prompting, the European Coal and Steel Community came into being, with Jean Monnet at the helm. It drew spatial planners into its orbit. With this, the Europeanization of planning began to undergo qualitative change. Except perhaps in the imagination of European federalists, the EU was of course not yet on the cards, but in retrospect one can say it represented the start of its EUropeanization.

EUropeanization on the Cards

The expectation was that rekindling the coal and steel industry, vital as it was to the development of Europe’s economy, in the industrial basin straddling the borders between Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands would raise planning issues. Previously, drafting minders after World War into the Ruhr Area where Germany was supposed to generate the cash needed for paying war indemnities had been the occasion for the first experiment in regional planning. Now, the top of the spatial planning establishments got together considering taking a joint approach, in the process allowing their German colleagues to escape from their pariah status. Some even focused on the opportunity which the coming European Economic Community might provide. A prominent member of the Dutch planning in his capacity of high-level civil servant was privy to the relevant negotiations. In fact, the Treaty of Rome bears his signature: Johannes Linthorst Homan. He lobbied unsuccessfully for a European role for spatial planning.

There were more disappointments. The group under the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak preparing the Treaty of Rome had proposed that national regional policies be coordinated amongst each other and with any future policies of the European Economic Community. It also suggested a regional fund to finance ‘European projects,’ one surmises mainly infrastructure of transnational importance. Only in the second instance the purpose was to support what is now the main object of EU regional policy, distressed regions, but anyhow, Member States paid only lip-service to the ‘harmonious development of the Community territory’ in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome. The Italian Mezzogiorno

7 A contemporary photograph shows him in his office with the Tennessee Valley Plan on the wall.
would have been the main beneficiary, but there was no enthusiasm amongst the rest, and
to hand over major infrastructure decisions was – and continues to be – unpopular.  

The planners licked their wounds and formed the Conference of Regions of North West Europe presided over by the Dutch planning director. Dutch planning had built up momentum, forming a coherent mental map of urban development in their own country. With assistance from the College of Europe, the Conference of Regions of North West Europe likewise documented the intensity of urban development reaching from south-east England to the north of Italy, surprisingly like the ‘Blue Banana’ of decades later. The publication by Jean Gottmann (1961) on the megalopolis stretching along the US East Coast from Boston to Washington had its European equivalent! The implication was clear: Joint planning was needed on a scale commensurate with the problem. Conveniently, if it were to come, this would enhance the position of national planners.

Another demonstration of the need for planning on a macro-scale related to the Channel Tunnel, still very much at the drawing board. A vast area would be affected, and so the chief planner of the German federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia, Norbert Ley, produced a sketch plan for the Conference of Regions of North West Europe exploring its spatial implications.

Nothing came of this. Inevitable, institutionalization on whichever level, including that of Europe, is a slow process. First successes in Europeanizing planning, such as they were, were not only modest, they occurred outside the EU. Thus, the Netherlands and Germany concluded a treaty on cross-border planning, and the Benelux did the same. Also, there were initiatives in cross-border planning, with once again the Dutch-German border a fertile field of experimentation. The Association of Border Regions of Europe, now a well-established lobby organization, still has its seat at the small German city of Gronau, the seat also of the Euregio, the latter a model for many such Euroregions that have been established since.

The spatial planners had no foot between the door at Brussels, seat of the European Economic Community, but lobbyists for regional policy at the Parliamentary Assembly, precursor of the European Parliament, raised the issue, already broached in the Spaak Report, of support for distressed regions. An activist European Commission bent on promoting further integration – promoting integration is after all its institutional brief – and also of course on enhancing its own position, was glad to comply. It organized a ‘Conference on the Regional Economies’ in 1963. The Commission President, Walter Hallstein, gave an opening speech, and Robert Marjolein, now its Vice President, actively pursued the idea. There was talk about – English not yet being a Community language – aménagement du territoire européen – EUropean spatial planning!

8 Flagship policies like the Trans-European Networks are merely co-financed by the EU and the outcome of bargaining between Member States.
The initiative ran up against French President General Charles De Gaulle’s dislike of anything like a supranational EUrope. The issue was voting by qualified majority, foreseen in the Treaty of Rome to become operational, threatening the project of a Common Agricultural Policy with its unique advantages for France. Without going into detail, we may simply report that the so-called ‘Empty Chair Crisis,’ a months-long boycott, led to a compromise. National vetoes remained, leading to what is described as Euro-sclerosis. Aménagement du territoire européen was stopped dead in its tracks. De Gaulle having set up the Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale (Datar) to develop the French regions by channeling state funds to them could conceivably have played a role.

Planners looked elsewhere, to the Council of Europe where Europeanization progressed, with a working party on ‘Regional Planning a European Problem.’ Note that ‘regional’ here was a generic term not referring to administrative regions. The ministers of the Council of Europe members eventually submitted the ‘Torremolinos Charter,’ in fact a charter for the Europeanization of planning.

Europeanization, not EUropeanization

The departure of De Gaulle eventually allowed the enlargement of what meanwhile was called the European Community with the UK, Ireland and Denmark, to be followed by Greece and eventually Spain and Portugal. A Community regional policy of sorts was introduced, a financial mechanism with no ambition of any kind of overall planning. The European Parliament balked at this and demanded that Community policies should be coordinated with a view to promoting balanced and integrated development and the preservation of the European heritage, topics defined by the Council of Europe. EUropeanization of planning was once more on the wish list. Indeed, the European Parliament asked for a Commissioner for regional planning, not just regional policy. Concurrently, under an Italian Commissioner, an Integrated Mediterranean Programme experimented with stakeholder participation.

The heyday of the EUropeanization of planning, indeed of EUropeanization in general, seemed to begin when Jacques Delors became President of the European Commission in 1985. He pulled the European Community out of its slumber, was involved in creating European Monetary Union – the euro – and the transmutation of the European Community into the European Union. The seedbed of renewed planning initiatives was Cohesion policy, an enhanced regional policy pursuing a more programmatic approach. It competes with the Common Agricultural Policy for the position of premier spender of EU moneys. It benefits, not only ‘least developed regions’ as identified by GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power and by unemployment rates but, albeit at a much lower rate, all regions

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9 It also led to neither Hallstein nor Marjolein receiving another term of office.
by giving incentives to improve growth and competitiveness.\textsuperscript{10} The Commission administering the program stretches its tentacles past national to subnational administrations and private stakeholders to mobilize what Delors called the \textit{forces vivres}, or life forces. Net-contributors amongst the Member States to the EU budget tend to dislike the Commission, as well as their subnational constituencies, having a voice in spending their tax money.

A small group of French and Dutch planners in cahoots with a very few Commission officials thought of a spatial framework for Cohesion policy. With an eye on the coming of the ‘Single Market’ – the Delors Presidency making good on the completion of a Common Market in Europe – planners were looking forward also to positioning their respective countries in the emergent integrated macro-space. For both reasons, a spatial strategy or vision on behalf of the Community seemed the obvious thing to aspire to.

The making of the ESDP doubling up for a Community strategy has been recounted before.\textsuperscript{11} What is important here is that the original attempt at the EUropeanization of planning has failed, but the ESDP is a bonus, nonetheless, for its Europeanization.

The Dutch-French initiative led to a series of informal meetings of national ministers, to the formation of an equally informal Committee on Spatial Development and to the making of the ESDP. However, the EU just created was under suspicion. An EU spatial framework prepared by the Commission would have enforced its programmatic approach. Spatial planners are not necessarily involved in Cohesion policy as such; ministries of economic affairs and/or finance are. So even where planners were positive about a Community spatial strategy, more powerful ministries reigned them in. National planners operating well-developed planning systems were apprehensive, too. They seized upon the formalistic objection, one that would have been easy to overcome, that spatial planning was not an EU mandate. The EUropeanization of planning: the Commission preparing a spatial strategy or vision as an under girder for Cohesion policy, and conceivably also for other Community policies with a spatial impact quickly, was a non-starter. The ESDP progressed as an ‘intergovernmental’ document providing an indicative framework. As indicated, it articulates the spatial approach: integration of policies as they affect space, or territory. It also identifies three spatial policy guidelines reflecting the earlier philosophy of the Council of Europe: polycentric development, parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge, and responsible management of the natural and cultural heritage. Böhme and Waterhout have already been quoted for saying that these guidelines reverberate in planning thought throughout Europe.

\textsuperscript{10} On territorial cohesion more in particular and how it reflected the ‘European Model of Society’ which Delors pursued see the Lincoln-sponsored volume edited by myself: Faludi (ed. 2007).

\textsuperscript{11} See the first of the three Lincol-sponsored volumes looking at it from various perspectives, including those of participants involved (Faludi ed. 2002). See also Faludi, Waterhout (2002).
Another achievement is the learning effect of engaging in the making of the ESDP, an effect that the so-called Community Initiative greatly facilitated. So, what was dubbed INTERREG IIC co-funding transnational planning initiatives was introduced. Now in its fourth programming period and sharing in the enhanced status of an official objective of Cohesion policy, ‘European Territorial Cooperation,’ there is plentiful evidence of its having led to cross-border and transnational learning\(^\text{12}\). EUropeanization of planning may have stalled, but its Europeanization continues, and as Clark and Jones have been quoted saying for Europeanization general, EUrope is its main sponsor. What remains to be discussed is another avenue of Europeanization/EUropeanization, ESPON.

**ESPON: Beyond Evidence-based Planning**

Those involved in ESPON may not wish to be associated with spatial planning seemingly a concept that is a relic of the past which the European Commission, trying to address the same issues under the ‘territorial cohesion’ flag, has put on the index of forbidden terms. So the original meaning of the acronym, ‘European Spatial Planning Observation Network,’ is preferably forgotten. Currently it is ‘The European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion.’ Nonetheless, the pursuit of territorial cohesion which is the official term now is nothing but the functional equivalent of what was previously understood under EUropean spatial planning.

Origin and meaning of territorial cohesion are not at issue here\(^\text{13}\). Rather, the message is twofold: to suggest that for good reasons ESPON is going beyond its original brief of providing an evidence base for planning, and that it represents a modest hope for some form of future EUropeanization, the shape of which remains obscure.

The last of the previous Lincoln volumes (Faludi ed. 2008) has discussed the origins and implementation of the idea of ‘evidence-based planning’ on which ESPON is based.\(^\text{14}\) In fact, ESPON was never limited to providing evidence. It was involved in ‘low politics,’ including bureau politics, against the backdrop of the ‘high politics’ of EUrope about funding and so forth – and for this purpose produced ‘Synthesis Reports.’ Not only does any kind of synthesis involve making choices, the timing suggests that – *Honi sois qui mal*

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\(^{12}\) The learning effect is well-recognized feature of in the literature. See Dühr, Stead, Zonneveld (eds. 2007); Dühr, Colomb, Nadin (2010); Faludi (2010).

\(^{13}\) For this see the papers in Faludi (ed. 2007). For the meaning in the context of an enlarged Europe see Cotella, Adams, Nune (2012).

\(^{14}\) See also Schön, Böhme (2006).
y pense\textsuperscript{15} – they were intended to influence policy, in particular concerning the continuation of ESPON itself.

After the successful re-launch of ESPON, a similar concern of building a constituency has led to programs involving, not only researchers but also stakeholders, in presently twenty-two\textsuperscript{16} ‘Targeted Analyses’ representing, as the ESPON website has it, a new type of projects supporting the use of existing results in partnership with different groups of stakeholders. These projects thus work according to briefs formulated from the bottom-up, answering to practical needs rather than to researcher priorities. All this is laudable where planning research is concerned but goes beyond the dispassionate production of an evidence base. It represents what Davoudi (2006) has aptly described as ‘evidence-informed’ rather than ‘evidence-based’ planning.

The partisan rather than neutral nature of ESPON research is the more evident since, being approved by a Management Committee with the Member State and the Commission on it, naturally, the ESPON program itself is the outcome of bargaining. One may in fact view the Monitoring Committee as a stand-in for a non-existent ‘Comitology Committee’ for planning where national representatives could share in the conduct of Community business.

Indeed, as far as spatial planning – nay, territorial cohesion – is concerned, ESPON is presently its mainstay. With its well-oiled machine around a Coordination Unit based in Luxembourg – with the Luxembourg government giving support and operating the important Monitoring Committee dealing with financial matters – it is in fact the only game in town. It promotes the further Europeanization of planning and in fact has the potential of becoming the core of any renewed effort at its Europeanization. A reason for entertaining such hopes is that, involving hundreds of researchers from all over Europe in so-called Transnational Project Groups, ESPON contributes to the further Europeanization of planning. In due course this could create a momentum for change. Anyhow, ESPON represents the only platform for articulating the need, if any, of a renewed effort at the Europeanization of planning. Projects under ESPON 2006, like the Scenario study (see Robert, Lennert 2008) and ‘Europe in the world’ (see Beckouche, Grasland 2008) already held the potential of instigating such a debate. Under ESPON 2013, a scenario study looking forward to 2050 is under way. It once again may do so, whether to good avail is of course for the future to tell. The paper ends with reflections as to the future and also regarding the comparison with the US.

Conclusions

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Shamed be he who thinks evil of it’, the motto of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, the highest order of chivalry in England.

\textsuperscript{16} As of July 2012; the total count of projects stands at sixty-three with a total budget of €47 million, say $57 million.
These are not the most propitious times for discussing EUropean planning. Needless to say, presently there are other pressing issues. The EU is in the midst of negotiating its next Financial Framework 2013-2020. In themselves, such negotiations are prone to be crisis-ridden. There is conflict over attitudes towards European integration, and there is the cross-cutting issue of net-contributors versus net-beneficiaries. At the last occasion, in 2005, the outcome was merely a timetable for evaluating the compromises arrived at. A reasonable take on what is likely to happen during the late hours of a morning in November 2012 is a very tired European Council of Heads of State and of Governments, each mindful of his/her chances of reelection, agreeing to a package representing another last-minute compromise. All the careful preparation notwithstanding, it will not necessarily be consistent, but Cohesion policy may escape the fate which some net-contributors have Hold outlined for it, of being ‘renationalized.’ Surely, there will be no time even for thinking about EUropean planning, not even under its disguise of pursuing territorial cohesion, according to the EU treaties an stated objective of the Union.

The survival of Cohesion policy would be sufficient for the prospect of a form of EUropeanization of planning in the future. The Commission has after all announced that territory will play a role in the management of the funds. There is also the experience of macro-regional strategies for the Baltic Sea Area and the Danube Space, of which it has been claimed that they will play some unspecified role in future.

What remains are modest reflections on what all this may mean for the US. Thanks to persistent interest from the Lincoln Institute, the 2000s have seen some east-west traffic of planning. At some stage, Carbonell and Yaro (2005) have even talked about an American Spatial Development Perspective, metamorphosing into ‘America 2050’ since. The expected massive demographic growth – the opposite of Europe – is expected to create a need for planning, much like the problems north-west European planners saw coming when they argued the case for EUropean planning to address the development of a megalopolis in Europe. Rather than urban development, in EUrope Cohesion policy has been the vehicle, though, for attempts to EUropeanize planning. Cohesion policy has no equivalent at the level of the US federal government.

When arguing the case for a United States of Europe – on the Continent, the United Kingdom would stay aloof – Winston Churchill surely had the US example in mind, but EUrope is after all a different animal. Rifkin (2004) has called it the first post-modern experiment in governance, and Sabel and Zeitlin (2010, 8) – all of them Americans – a ‘…forerunner of new forms of governance especially suited to the temper of our times at both national and global levels’. Being an experiment and a forerunner, we cannot know what shape it will take.

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17 I myself have argued the case for European planning as ‘soft planning for soft spaces.’ (Faludi 2010; 2012)
Some speculation as to lessons for the US may be permitted even so. Where the Europeanization of planning is concerned, much play has been made of learning and Europe-wide platforms like ESPON. In the much more homogenous linguistic landscape of the US, with a truly continental market for academics and practitioners, learning should be much easier. In fact, volumes like ‘Planning & Growth Management in the States’ (DeGrove 1992) – sponsored by the Lincoln Institute – are evidence of a long-standing interest in comparisons, and we may expect the forthcoming volume by Knaap and Lewis, ‘Lessons from State Development Plans’ to make a further contribution.

Cross-border and transnational cooperation, let alone cooperation across international borders, seems less developed. If so, then the US is behind because these initiatives are prominent in Europe.

Nor has anything like ESPON come to my attention. Protagonists of state planning should aim for something like it. The federal interest seems mainly in promoting sustainable development. Declarations, for instance in the ESDP, to the effect of promoting sustainable development notwithstanding, the arena for planning initiatives in Europe has been Cohesion policy. The environmental Directorate-General has not been involved – nor the one responsible for the Trans-European Networks.

Writing on the history of national planning, Fishman (2007, 11) reports on President Roosevelt convening a ‘Governors Conference’ in 1908 to initiate a round of national planning. He also makes the interesting comment that ‘…the federal government itself was created in large part to overcome the barriers to national planning that existed under the Articles of Confederation.’ (Op cit., 1) Arguably, one may say about the EU, too, that its purpose has been overcoming barriers to joint action, but this is not the point here. The point is, national planning in the US has a reputation to defend.
Bibliography


