TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
ON THE EVE
OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

edited by
David Evans and Ioanna Kuçuradi

Ankara 1998
This book was published on the recommendation of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the financial assistance of UNESCO.

Copyright © 1998 by Editions of the Philosophical Society of Turkey for the International Federation of Philosophical Societies
Ahmet Rasim Sokak 8/4, Çankaya
06550 Ankara, Turkey

ISBN 975-7748-20-X

Printed by METEKSAN, Ankara, Turkey.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Evans and Ioanna Kuşuradi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Contributions of Philosophy to Deliberative Democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Lipman, New Jersey</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Philosophy and the Values of Democracy in Israel</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niva Arav and Menachem Luz, Haifa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Teaching of Philosophy in the Chinese Construction of Modernization</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao Jiehou, Beijing</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy in Developing Countries and Countries in Transition-Its Influence on Philosophy in the New Millennium</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieter du Toit, Pretoria</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Philosophy to Other Disciplines</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Akin Makinde, Ile-Ife</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paideia and an Ancient Quarrel</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Warner, Warwick</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Philosophy to Other Disciplines</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shokichi Uto, Matsudo</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Analytic-Continental Divide: Teaching Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermot Moran, Dublin</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Learning: Global Agenda for the Teaching of Philosophy</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuang-ming Wu, Taiwan and Florida</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As teachers of philosophy, how are we to handle the questions of pluralism which are engendered by the very practice of philosophy itself? As we reach the end of the twentieth century this question is becoming more urgent as contemporary philosophy becomes more and more diverse, generating, with almost frenetical productivity, a vast literature of critical studies on every conceivable topic. Yet, accompanying this diversity and productivity, there comes a general reluctance to engage in debates concerning the meaning of philosophy in any over-arching or global sense, though clearly pluralism is a challenge to traditional conceptions of philosophy. Recently there have been a number of works written on the natures of analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy. If the two generally opposing traditions styled as 'analytic' and 'Continental' can be said to agree on anything, it is that we live in a post-Hegelian age, meaning thereby that philosophy can no longer be understood in the role of the self-expression of human reason, as the very incarnation of scientific knowledge in all its forms and the living witness to the integration of those forms in a living whole. Both Derrida and the later Wittgenstein would agree with the sentiment (if not the language in which it is expressed) that philosophy provides no metanarrative, no master narrative. As such, perhaps, contemporary philosophy of all shades may be understood as inhabiting what Lyotard calls the post-modern condition, defined as an "incredulity towards metanarratives", though immediately a dispute would arise as to what this means and whether it is something to be celebrated or deplored.

It seems that philosophers everywhere are busy denying the claim of philosophy to be the keystone in the arch of the human and natural sciences. There are many alternative visions available. Some, perhaps unconsciously, resort to a Lockean model of the
philosopher as under-labourer to the sciences; others subscribe to a Kantian model of philosophy as critique; others promote the notion of philosophy as conceptual problem-solving, without, however, a determinate set of problems to solve; while yet others see philosophy as celebration of a way of life, abandoning argument for a kind of yea-saying and confidence-building. Yet, while this profitegante diversity is evident in the professional practice and the many conflicting conceptions of philosophy, at the very same time, academic philosophy departments project a public image of the integrity of their subject particularly against attacks from without. Furthermore, in presenting the subject to incoming students, they suggest at least the form of a unified narrative (Plato to Nato, Frege to Quine, Hegel to Habermas, and so on) and a unified theoretical enterprise, thereby tacitly endorsing assumptions concerning the distinctness, unity, and progress, as well as the global nature, of the subject philosophy, a vision which seems at variance with current practices.4

Philosophy's current diversity, then, may be indicative of conceptual richness and profusion, but its rather rigid institutional form may also indicate a degree of discomfort in the face of radically divergent claims as to the nature of the subject. At the end of the twentieth century—as at the beginning—we are again faced with philosophy in crisis about its very nature. Thus we have Hilary Putnam calling for the renewal of philosophy as providing support for our moral practices, just as Bergson, Dilthey and Husserl made similar appeals at the opening of the century. As at the beginning of the century also, there are again calls for philosophy to be continuous with science, with post-Quinean varieties of naturalism and materialism echoing Comte and Mach. And, while, on the one hand, we have professional philosophers simply carrying on as they have always have done, at the century's end, we again have a revival of Nietzschean and Kierkegaardian postures of irony undercutting philosophy's claim to self-seriousness.5

That this tension between professional practice and institutional self-presentation seems not to have provoked much sustained philosophical comment is all the more surprising given the widespread view that philosophy is the most self-conscious of practices, and that scrutiny of its basic concepts and motives is essential to its dynamism. Many philosophers agree with the view that—as Heidegger puts it in Being and Time (§3)—a subject only becomes truly productive when its "basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself".6 Polarities have always been utilised productively in philosophy, but this particular tension between the institutional form of the practice and the matter of the practice itself has been left unanalysed. But ignoring this tension may have some nasty consequences for the institutional forms of philosophy in our academic institutions. When Richard Rorty speaks approvingly of the "all purpose intellectual of a post-Philosophical culture" are the philosophical educators in tune with this vision of their graduates? Is there not a danger that the subject philosophy will dissolve into a set of disciplines which range from the exact sciences to creative writing and self-expression classes?

The standard way of reading the institutional dilemma is to see the choice facing any department as that between opting for 'analytic' as opposed to 'Continental' philosophy. Once that choice is made, a whole further series of decisions about the teaching of philosophy seem to fall into place: e.g., how classical philosophy gets taught, or ethics, or whether there are courses on supervenience or narrow/wide content on the one hand, or courses on hermeneutics or the politics of difference on the other. Few institutional efforts are made to inquire whether these conceptions of philosophy mesh in any way, and even in so-called 'pluralist' departments (about which we shall have more to say), students in the different traditions develop separately rather than being forced into an intra-disciplinary dialogue on the nature of the subject they are pursuing.

Of course it is harder now to define these two traditions or movements in any convincing way. Continental philosophers have never been comfortable with the label 'Continental', since they see themselves as doing philosophy in the traditional sense (and
upholding the tradition of historical scholarship). They see "Continental" as a label imposed on them from without, often from a rather narrow Euro-sceptical British perspective. Recently philosophers in this tradition have begun to express a preference for describing their tradition as "European philosophy". This title does have the merit of linking together current developments with the longer European tradition from the Greeks through German Idealism. The problem is that European philosophy includes LaPlace, Comte, Frege, Carnap, Schlick, Popper and Wittgenstein alongside Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and Lacan and again seems to be mirroring the British Euro-Sceptics in excluding Hume, Mill, Russell and Ayer from the cast of acceptable Europeans. On the other hand, the term 'European' philosophy also seems to exclude all those in the USA who write about Heidegger, Derrida and others, excluding thereby Richard Rorty or Charles Taylor.

In his book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Reality* and in subsequent publications, Richard Rorty has avoided reading the current split as one between analytic and Continental philosophy. Instead he presents the choice as that between systematic philosophy on the one hand and edifying discourse of the other. Systematic philosophy aims at truth, edifying discourse aims at education, Bildung. Systematic philosophers in Rorty's account include Plato and Aristotle, Husserl and Russell. Systematic philosophers act as if they are quite certain of their own practices and how they should be communicated to others. Philosophy on this account includes conceptual analysis, definition, argument, justification, rigour, formal presentation, and clarity. There is a long-standing claim of philosophy to be a rigorous science (to borrow Husserl's phrase), engaged in difficult conceptual analysis, and perhaps even achieving discoveries akin to those in the natural sciences. But dissenting voices are not hard to find. Richard Rorty has made the point that much of this talk of bringing traditional philosophical skills to bear may be mistaken. Though philosophers have written very well in applied areas, it is not easy to isolate what is distinctive in their skills form that of other professionals writing in the field. Many of the skills supposedly honed by philosophy (though obviously not the distinct bag of conceptual tools) could just as easily have been garnered in legal or political studies.

It is no longer easy to distinguish between styles of philosophising on the basis of their claim to a distinctive method. Post-positivist analytic philosophers have in general abandoned the idea that there is a unique method proper to philosophy. It is less clear where Continental philosophy stands with regard to method. Some Continental philosophers have been vociferous that they are just as concerned with argument, conceptual analysis, and rigour as are their analytic colleagues. The early founders of phenomenology—Husserl and the Heidegger in *Being and Time*—were insistent on the need for method and indeed quite exclusive in their claims to be possessors of the only true method. Thus we have, for example, Husserl's repeated claims concerning the necessity of carrying out the transcendental reduction, and Heidegger's inflated claims that "only as phenomenology, is ontology possible" and "philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology". In Continental philosophy methods have come and gone—descriptive phenomenology, hermeneutical phenomenology, structuralism, semiotics—almost as fashions or styles, without there being genuine refutation of an earlier position. Kevin Mulligan has characterised the style of post-Heideggerian Continental philosophy as "melodramatic", positions are elaborated and then jettisoned, and, Mulligan says, it is "very difficult to find a claim that has been modified as the result of discussion by a number of philosophers". Interestingly, Alfred North Whitehead made the same observation, though in a more general way, claiming that philosophical positions are rarely in fact definitively refuted, so this trait may not be a satisfactory mark of the Continental. There is no doubt, however, that style is an issue. Continental philosophy proclames "the end of man", "the death of the subject". In contrast Quine's slogans, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" or "no entity without identity", seem less earth shattering and less likely to incite people to the barricades. But in part, the social effect of this sloganising is a result of the perceived social role of the philosopher in different cultures (France contrasting here with Britain and the USA). In part, it is a difference about the kinds of claims a philosopher is
Continental philosophy has often claimed to speak for the big issues and to carry a torch for civilisation and the history of culture, whereas analytic philosophy is seen as having a much narrower conception of its role. This difference is sometimes expressed as the distinction, à la Quine, between those who did philosophy and those who were interested in the history of ideas. Indeed, Continental philosophy has been defined in terms of its self-consciously historical approach and it is certainly still the case that philosophy on the European mainland is carried out largely through doing the history of philosophy, whereas, in the UK, philosophy in the leading universities is problem-oriented. But, by and large, this contrast no longer designates distinct philosophical kinds: few will now contest that philosophy cannot be done rigorously through a critical-historical reading of Aristotle, or Descartes, or Hume or Kant. Rorty has made the point that the contrast now is between those who take a historical orientation towards their subject and those who are not interested in this orientation. This contrast can divide analytic philosophers —there are those interested in the history of analytic philosophy and those interested in its contemporary application. Analytic philosophers too believe they have history on their side —Plato and Aristotle can be fruitfully read as analytic philosophers avant la lettre.

Furthermore, Continental philosophy, too, can be criticised (as much as analytical philosophy has been) for having a very narrow approach to its own history, ignoring whole strands of western philosophy, and clinging to an overly circumscribed vision of the subject known as philosophy. While analytic history of philosophy —at least as represented in the curriculum— frequently skips the philosophical periods from Aristotle to Descartes and from Hume to Frege without comment, history of philosophy as told by Heidegger, Derrida and Lévinas is also deficient. The Neo-Heideggerians all assume as given a certain conception of the history of philosophy which is too circumscribed and limited for any genuine historian of philosophy. Heidegger posits a unified structure beginning with Plato and ending in Hegel and Husserl which has to be reacted against. Lévinas sees this inherited structure as being dominated by representation, while Derrida sees it as dominated by logocentrism and presence. The strategy is simple; build a straw man and then reject it. In rejecting this pre-conceived notion of philosophy, Lévinas, Derrida and the later Heidegger thereby place themselves outside philosophy proper, as not doing philosophy in the traditional sense.

Now, if someone —on his or her own admission— stops doing philosophy, why should their post-philosophical musings still be read within philosophy departments? The very unwillingness of philosophers to put any kind of boundaries on their subject leads them to tolerate forms of discussion which even repudiate the title of being philosophical. Philosophers are often cavalier about boundary disputes in the humanities and indeed are apt to welcome any interest in philosophy wherever it arises. They have, in general, been slow to set down rigid criteria for the operation of their own discipline, slow to explicitly specify a canon or initiate discussion on the meaning of that notion in philosophy. They have generally continued to do what they think they always have done and ignore the meta-philosophical debates. There is, however, a cacophony of voices all claiming to be doing "real philosophy" and professional philosophers are as apt to cry "that's not philosophy!" when they see some practice of which they disapprove, as newspaper columnists struggling with the latest outrage on exhibition in the publicly-funded art gallery are apt to cry "That's not art!".

Presumably this unconcern about boundaries arises from the belief that one still must learn the traditional idiom in order to appreciate what the new order is trying to achieve, or else they may see the new areas as interesting challenges which lie out on the perimeter of the subject and of concern only to the hardy pioneers of those areas (just as issues as to the nature of truth are often bracketed in philosophical discussion of other areas). This may be like the claim that Newtonian physics provides a roughly approximate description of the world of middle-sized
objects we inhabit. Other areas of contemporary physics deal with the very small or very large, whose behaviour may well even contradict that of our middle-sized objects, but for day to day practice this can be seen as irrelevant. Surely there comes a time when the different ends of the discipline have to be matched up? This must be a matter of concern for those who consider wherein philosophical education consists. After all, most philosophers today are engaged primarily in teaching and their research is often an outgrowth of their teaching practice. Even allowing for the necessary specialisation which must take place in the different areas of philosophy, surely the philosophers, as colleagues in a single Department, must perform come into contact with other areas of their discipline. The specialised research aspects of the philosopher's life less often come into conflict with hard reality. There are specialised journals and conferences in different areas, so that a Quinean naturalist and Derridian deconstructionalist need never be forced to debate as their separate journals keep their contributions safely corralled off from one another. It is really in issues clustered around teaching in a Department, issues such as what areas of the curriculum to expand, what colleagues to hire, what graduate areas to open up, that the real clashes between different intuitions of the philosophical process occur. For those then, who are concerned by the proliferation of styles of philosophising, or indeed by the nature of some of the global claims concerning the philosophical process, its end, or even its very impossibility, there is need to examine how these conflicts shape the teaching process. It is not surprising that these issues tend to provoke the philosophical equivalent of the culture wars —rows over who is admitted to the philosophy department, who gets the honorary degree (Derrida at Cambridge University, for example), whether the Chair of Philosophy should be renamed the Chair of Philosophy and Rhetoric, and so on.

As Rorty says, there is a working difference in reading habits and in philosophical canons. It is simply the case that one set of philosophers do not read the work of those in the alternate tradition. Whereas at the beginning of the century there was cross-fertilisation —Russell read Frege and Meinong, Moore read Brentano, Carnap read Husserl, Husserl corresponded with Frege and Cantor— now there seems to be no mutual engagement or even a sense of common purpose. Thus Paul Ricoeur laments he could find no one in Paris to teach him Russell in the nineteen thirties. Ricoeur also states that, when he published La Métaphore Vive (The Rule of Metaphor), it was his explicit wish that "the French would understand the Anglo-Saxon part" but his French audience ignored what he wrote about Davidson and other analytic philosophers because they were unfamiliar with this tradition. Unfortunately, this ignorance is mutual, and most analytic discussions of Derek Parfit on personal identity, for instance, have also ignored Ricoeur's critique in Oneself as Another. Perhaps one could sum up the reason for this benign neglect as being that the sophisticates of one tradition believe they have little to learn from contemporary exponents of it who come from another tradition —the newcomers have too much catching up to do.

It is very difficult to identify precisely all the reasons for this mutual hostility. After all analytic philosophers do read philosophy written in the German language, e.g. Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap for instance. Michael Dummett is an excellent example of an Oxford philosopher who has carefully read not only Brentano, Meinong and Frege but also the early Husserl. Furthermore, there is a thriving interest in analytic philosophy on the European Continent, especially among younger philosophers in Germany who write on Davidson, Tyler Burge and others; in France, with Jacques Bouveresse, François Recanati, Pierre Jacob, and others, and in Italy. Of course, Northern Europe —Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland (e.g. Von Wright) and Iceland have strong traditions of logic and analytic philosophy. In part, the barriers were laid down by differences in political outlook culminating in the Second World War, and since then the traditions have developed separately.

If the ice were to thaw and philosophers from different traditions were to begin again to read one another, they might be surprised
to find a considerable number of themes and problems which overlap between analytic and Continental philosophy — the nature of intentionality is one such theme.17 Other overlapping themes are the fate of metaphysics, the problem of reference, the relation between language and thought, the nature of speech acts, transcendental arguments and their nature, and so on. The question is whether dialogue is even possible and whether, if possible, it ought to be pursued.

The attempt to generate dialogue has been most evident in Germany and in the USA. In Germany, Ernst Tugendhat has been in the forefront of those who wished to see a rapprochement between Heidegger and Wittgenstein and saw a way of doing it through a systematic Sprachphilosophie. Karl-Otto Apel has also been able to see a possible philosophical position which unites German transcendental philosophy, Wittgensteinian pragmatics and Peircean semiotics into a single new philosophy. But such attempts at fusion have not met with great success.

In the USA there is more evidence of open debate — thus John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas have debated in the pages of the Journal of Philosophy; and Daniel Dennett and David Carr have debated the value of different approaches to intentionality. Hubert Dreyfus has been active in trying to relate the insights of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty into the American debate about cognitive science.

But the debate, where has it begun at all, has broken down quickly. One of the encounters which perhaps typifies what is worst in inter-traditional exchange was the confrontation which took place between Searle and Derrida over the interpretation of Austin's account of performatives.18 Searle simply dismisses Derrida's interpretation of Austin as a misunderstanding, owing mostly to Derrida's ignorance of post-Wittgensteinian developments in linguistics and the philosophy of language.19

Derrida, in reply, claims he has been misunderstood, his statements taken out of context, ignoring the larger claims of his other work and so on. Derrida's evasion, his play on the very notion of seriousness in philosophy, all indicate that he was not seeking to seriously engage with his opponent. However, perhaps it would be a mistake to take Derrida's non-encounter with Searle as typifying the analytic-Continental divide. Derrida never directly engaged with Gadamer in his supposed debate with him.20 So the confrontation need not fail simply because it is between analytic and Continental philosophy. Within so-called Continental philosophy, the Germans don't necessarily understand the French. Thus Habermas' reading of Derrida as a Jewish mystic in his The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity has also been repudiated by Derrida.21 It seems, then, that mutual incomprehension is not limited to the analytic-Continental encounter.

Of course, confusion about the nature and goals of the discipline and fears of its disintegration is not confined to philosophy. In other areas of the humanities, most notably in what used to be termed "English Literature" there has been, for some years, a growing uncertainty, even crisis, concerning the nature and extent of the works to be read, the curriculum (the "canon," alternatively, the Dead White European Males or, the "stale, pale and male" set, the "malestream") to be followed, and the supposed skills to be imparted to students. English literature saw itself first having to expand the reading lists to include American literature, Anglo-Irish literature, and then world literature in translation (Russian novelists, South-American literature, etc.). Arriving with this rapidly expanding set of texts, came a change in vision concerning the nature of the interaction with the texts. English teachers had to gradually revise their teaching methods themselves to give more time to "critical theory" or what has become just plain "theory".22 Within the space of a few decades, English Literature departments had given birth to Comparative Literature; films became as much discussed as written texts; and cultural movements (including issues of race, class, gender, economic status) became the focal point of discussion in a literary education. Just as in the nineteenth century moral criticism (Matthew Arnold) gave way to biographical and historical criticism, so too in the twentieth century New Criticism, which focused on close readings of the text in isolation, was replaced by
Marxism, structuralism, deconstruction, postmodernism, postcolonialism, new historicism and so on. The theoretical component of literature departments expanded so much that it threatened to engulf all that philosophers did and it is not an uncommon experience in the classroom to find that philosophy students (who frequently take English as their joint major) have already had their opinions formed on Hegel and Heidegger, on Nietzsche on women, or on the status of the signified, before any of these topics have been encountered in the philosophy course. The manner in which literary departments pillaged philosophy for their own purposes was of course highly selective and literature students would often find themselves quite disappointed when they discovered that their philosophy lecturers do not share the same intellectual tastes and enthusiasms as their literary colleagues across the hall. Moreover, it would be extremely rare to find colleagues in literary departments discoursing on Quine or Kripke, the nature of the indexical, or the nature of possible worlds, and this itself is indicative of a certain mood—again generally left unarticulated—which holds that literary theory has a greater affinity with certain areas of philosophy ('Continental') whereas 'analytic' philosophy was treated as somehow alien to this literary, culture-critical mood and would, if followed, be threatening to the very existence of literary theory, likely to induce dryness of the spirit. Indeed the common view of the theorists was that both philosophers and literary critics are essentially doing the same thing, a view encouraged by university programmes (such as those at Johns Hopkins, Chicago or Yale) which merged literature and philosophy in new and interesting ways.

Yet the sense of crisis so evident in the humanities has not gained the same momentum in philosophy. Rarely in the course of the culture wars does the spotlight fall on the manner in which philosophy is taught and philosophers have been remarkably diffident when it comes to articulating the fundamental nature of the discipline as they envision it.

Why have philosophers not felt the need to radically interrogate the current status of philosophy as an academic subject? Perhaps one reason for the benign neglect of any interrogation of the traditional practices of academic philosophy departments, is that the moods and moments of uncertainty and crisis so well documented in other areas of the Humanities, and which sometimes implicate philosophy in so far as it is linked to postmodernism or social constructivism, don't in fact affect many areas of philosophy as traditionally understood. Indeed certain branches of philosophy seem sublimely indifferent to any sense of crisis. Branches of philosophy such as logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, classical philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, appear to be able to continue their professional work with little sense of crisis. It may be argued that logic underwent its radical crisis at the end of the last century when the rethinking of the nature of the subject by Frege, Russell and others, spawned the current set of disciplines of logic. Disputes about multivalued logic or the way to treat of possibility and necessity, or vagueness, though radically challenging traditional intuitions about logic are not usually thought to be threatening to the subject as a whole and are usually seen as theoretical discussions which don't impede the normal practice of the subject.

But whereas logic may have survived its own crisis, other areas appear never to have been in crisis at all. Thus epistemology (despite the strong anti-epistemological mood of pragmatists such as Rorty) continues to seek to classify the conditions under which it can be truly said that "I know that p" in a manner which Plato's protagonist Theaetetus would not have found alien, and perhaps this recognition of the longevity of epistemology along with a view of its 'modernity' are the main reasons many introductory philosophical textbooks choose to begin with this subject. Of course there is a certain ebb and flow of activity in different areas so that sometimes the tide ebbs before the crisis comes to a head. Thus, philosophy of language, perhaps the greatest single development in twentieth-century philosophy, which claimed to have toppled most traditional ways of speculating, currently seems to be idling, after an extraordinarily
productive period from the mid-century until relatively recently. Certainly one branch of this subject—ordinary language philosophy—has receded into the background. Philosophy of mind, on the other hand, which was for many years in the doldrums, is now developing rapidly and perhaps even taking centre-stage in philosophy, though even here some of the key positions were laid down by Ryle and Feigl almost fifty years ago. Perhaps no subject illustrates this ebb-and-flow in philosophy better than metaphysics. Since the time of Bacon, Descartes and Galileo and later Hume and Kant, metaphysics had been under attack. It was again attacked at the beginning of this century by positivism, linguistic analysis, and pragmatism, as well as by the descriptive phenomenologies of Brentano and Husserl, and by the discourse philosophies of Habermas and others. On the European Continent perhaps only certain followers of Heidegger (impressed by his call for the revival of the question of Being) and the Neo-Thomist movement (which revived the issue of the nature of esse, the act of existence often as an antidote to existentialism—as in the case of Gilson and Maritain) held out hope for a revival of a metaphysics that Aristotle or Leibniz would have recognised. But now metaphysics, including descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Strawson), has been thoroughly revived, and indeed a new subject known as "analytic metaphysics" has emerged, finally putting paid to the positivist strain of contemporary analytic philosophy. There does not appear to be much cross-fertilisation between the European and the analytic proponents of metaphysics; there is not much evidence of the Neo-Thomists and Neo-Heideggerian ontologists leaping for joy at the news of having found kindred spirits in Kit Fine, Saul Kripke, David Lewis and others, in the analysis of substance, essence, existence, form, possibility, actuality, necessity and causation.

The sense of a crisis in the subject, an urgency to interrogate foundations, then, is not widely spread across the various sub-disciplines of philosophy. There are, however, indicators of some subterranean forms of disturbance in other areas of philosophy. Often it takes place where a flowering of one of the 'sub' areas seems to challenge or even to eclipse the 'main' subject itself. Thus in ethics, alongside traditional discussions of ethical justification (usually involving some contrast between Aristotelian, Kantian and Utilitarian positions), we witness not just the resurgence of traditional forms but also an increasing recognition of the need to tackle directly what has plenastically come to be known as 'practical' or 'applied' ethics. The crisis here comes when the sub-discipline threatens to engulf the main one, the offspring devouring the parent.

One may simply view bio-ethics and environmental ethics, as applications of traditional philosophical skills to new areas, enlarging the scope of philosophy and perhaps drawing attention to its blind spots. Similarly, in other areas, one can look at the debate over "Black Athena" and African origins of philosophy as a healthy attempt to enlarge classical philosophy which is perhaps too narrowly Hellenic in focus, while recognising the patent absurdity involved in some of the claims that the Greeks stole the achievements of "black" Egyptians. Or one can see the rediscovery of women philosophers as calling attention to the issue of the traditional exclusion of women from philosophy. On this way of looking at things, the sub-disciplines complement the traditional subject, feminist epistemology adds a new area and offers some corrective to the traditional practices in epistemology, and can usefully contribute to the subject of the philosophy of knowledge.

Some new-comers to the philosophical stage threaten to disrupt the unity of the subject altogether. Thus some versions of environmental philosophy or 'ecosophy' (as Arne Naess calls it) claim that traditional ethics is speciesist in privileging human beings as the primary bearers of rights, and thus questioning the whole basis for apportioning moral considerability (and hence duties and rights). Some radical forms of ecosophy question the centrality of the human being in ethics altogether and want to put primary emphasis on the "ecosystem" as the unit of moral considerability. Here the new area threatens not only to overshadow the old area but to replace it with the new counter-discipline. This is certainly the case with some versions of the
gender philosophy and various forms of cross-cultural or multicultural philosophy which claim to reject the entire tradition of previous philosophising on their chosen area. So, an epistemologist may feel comfortable with the notion of feminist epistemology as just another branch of epistemology, but there are more vociferous forms of philosophy which want to attack the whole tradition of argument and counterargument, which challenge all conceptualisation and deride the whole tradition as inescapably flawed for one reason or another. Though sometimes these areas are simply presented as new fields (gender, race) on which to apply traditional philosophical practices, is it not rather the case that devotees of these new areas employ a rhetoric which demands replacing the traditional with new practices culminating in an entire revisioning of philosophy itself? Some of the theorists in these areas are not only entirely out of sympathy with the traditional canon of philosophical texts and questions, but also reject traditional forms of philosophical confrontation using argument and counterargument and appealing to reasons. We have then phenomena such as 'queer theory' or, as a recent APA Newsletter attests, 'dyke philosophy' where, according to Joyce Trebilcot, "the idea is not to discover 'the truth' and, competitively, to present it more clearly or accurately or completely than anyone else; it is, rather, to contribute one's own words, insights, speculations, jokes, to feminist realities".30

Philosophers are often quite blasé about the nature of this phenomenon. They point out that, over two and a half thousand years, philosophy has been able to spawn many new theoretical disciplines, some of which at times threatened to engulf philosophy entirely, and yet the subject has shown itself to be extraordinarily resilient and to keep reappearing, long after it had been pronounced dead. It is perhaps inevitable that at the end of the twentieth century the ancient theme of the end of philosophy should again have resurrected itself (along with the Neo-Hegelian theme of the end of history raised popularly by Francis Fukuyama). But as Jacques Bouveresse has said philosophy has not finished ending yet.31 Some contemporary writers claim to have overcome philosophy. Thus Derrida, as we have seen, sometimes insists that he is outside philosophy, at the limit, or margins of the subject. This rhetoric is only possible, however, if one works with a rather circumscribed approach to the nature of the subject itself. Derrida may be considered to assume a certain kind of essentialism about what constitutes the true nature of philosophy which is precisely what is currently under attack.

The traditional liberal approach to pedagogy has usually responded to the challenge posed by these new developments with toleration, often adding these subjects as "options" or "electives" while leaving the central core of teaching intact. But this benign paternalism is increasingly under attack, with more and more demands for a kind of replacement therapy; rather than adding on new areas, the new disciplines reject such 'complementarity' and 'marginalisation' and seek to be re-baptised as the core subject itself. However the emergence of new strands of philosophising which so radically challenge the traditional pattern of argument and counterargument threaten the subject in increasingly disturbing way. What is philosophy about and how is it practised? Clearly, from the time of Socrates, philosophers have often sought to demonstrate the essential nature of philosophy through good practice rather than by resorting to rhetorical encomia of the virtues of the subject. But, increasingly, self-doubt is the order of the day. Needless to say, self-doubt is hardly foreign to the history of philosophy as traditionally understood: Socrates, Descartes, Kant, and Wittgenstein, all recognised some malady central to the body of philosophy itself and saw in their own philosophy a kind of remedy. Thus Socrates abandoned the physics and cosmologies of the earlier Greek thinkers and resorted to ethics. Descartes frequently expressed worries about the vagrant and discordant nature of philosophy in contrast to mathematics. Thus in his letter to the Theology Faculty of the Sorbonne he contrasts those who pursue geometry and those who philosophise à la mode:

In philosophy, by contrast, the belief is that everything can be argued either way; so few people pursue the truth, while the great majority build up their reputation for ingenuity by boldly attacking whatever is most sound.32
Kant lamented that metaphysics which should be queen of the sciences has fallen victim to endless faction-fights, and Wittgenstein thought that philosophy's endless tussle with problems was generated by a misapplication of various linguistic tools outside of their proper sphere. Interestingly, since the late seventies, Hilary Putnam has taken up this theme and expressed alarm at the manner in which postmodern cultural relativism and the scepticism engendered by forms of contemporary scientific realism both converge in threatening the central moral intuitions of the philosophical tradition of the West.\textsuperscript{33} Though individual philosophers may remain focused on the problems within their own specialisation and shrug their shoulders when dealing with the larger issues of the nature of philosophy and its justification as a pedagogical practice (Voltaire's tactic of cultivating our own garden and minding our own business: \textit{revenons à nos moutons}), minding one's business inevitably requires us to classify and set some tentative boundaries on the business we have to mind. It is easy to adopt the current mood of anti-essentialism and deny there is any Platonic form of philosophy. But the real diversity of the practices doesn't allow us to rest with a family resemblance notion either (assuming for the moment that family resemblance rules out essences) —as practices, self-critical rationality and self-indulgent celebration and yea-saying seem not to belong to the same family at all.

The current situation in philosophy, then, is not only that of an academic discipline which is besieged from without, and which is always vulnerable to the sceptical virus it harbours within itself; in addition there is a noisy set of conversations going on, not with one another, but in parallel. Sometimes the noise from one conversation momentarily disrupts the other, but after a short interval the separate conversations continue. Those, like Gadamer and Rorty, who see philosophy as conversation are not at all disturbed by this picture, indeed for them it is proof of the resilience of Western postmodern, liberal culture. But those who believe that philosophy should at least have truth as its goal are more perturbed in that they see in the profusion of different voices a challenge to the nature of philosophy itself. Failure of communication is an integral part of the nature of philosophy as \textit{conversation}. Conversations by their nature are deeply embedded in complex and often quite restrictive contexts, assuming presuppositions and a certain sense of shared history, which means that philosophical conversation in Germany may be radically different from a similar discussion in France (think for example of the very notion of the "French Heidegger"). Richard Rorty, however, is one of those who has been sceptical about the possibility of rapprochement between traditions. He sees an inevitable clash between those who see philosophy as a pursuit of truth and those who believe in philosophy as some kind of flowering of the spirit, the expression of a way of life, as "world-disclosure"\textsuperscript{34} or as a life enhancing practice.

Though few now claim that philosophy is a rigorous science, there are many who see philosophy as gaining some of its special intelligence from the critical encounter with the sciences. Here there does appear to be a genuine, and perhaps unbridgeable, divide between analytic and Continental philosophy. The American physicist Alan Sokal has unmasked the pretensions of some contemporary philosophers of the postmodern persuasion who like to dress their philosophical claims in a language drawn from science, producing thereby a pseudo-scientific mess of pottage. As is now well known, Alan Sokal originally wrote an article mock-seriously entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", which he submitted to the cultural studies journal \textit{Social Text}.\textsuperscript{35} Soon after the article was published, Sokal disclosed in the journal \textit{Lingua Franca}\textsuperscript{36} that his article was a hoax, spoofing up the pretentious claims of postmodernists to be able to incorporate recent quantum science into their theoretical speculations. In fact, he found it rather easy to assemble a pastiche of pseudo-scientific comments from the leading figures in postmodernism —including Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray.\textsuperscript{37} Thus Sokal identifies the following choice morsel from Derrida:

\begin{quote}
The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a centre. It is the very concept of variability —it is, finally, the concept of the game. In other words, it is not the concept of \textit{something} — of a centre
\end{quote}
Derrida, the undisputed author of this nonsense, was clearly offended to be linked with others in the poststructuralist movement who abuse science in the manner illustrated by Sokal. Derrida now claims that this spoken answer to a question should not have been used against him. Derrida was quite angry at being quoted out of context, for a remark made at a philosophy conference in answer to a question on general relativity posed by the French philosopher Hippolyte. It is amusing to see Derrida resorting to this defence given his own penchant for putting texts from different contexts beside each other (as in Glas) and for asserting that marginality and supplementarity are often the guiding key to interpreting what is going at the centre of the text. Moreover, even if one has total reverence for the exact context, nothing in that context (a professional public meeting of philosophers) justifies Derrida uttering non-sensical statements and then leaving them uncorrected in print.

In a book recently published in France, Sokal has expanded on his original unmasking and has ridiculed the claims of Lacan, Lyotard, Serres, Irigaray, Baudrillard, and the early Kristeva. Interestingly the French defence mounted against Sokal so far has relied almost entirely on the "style" defence. The French intellectuals in question apparently concede that their science is cock-eyed but defend their use of pseudo-scientific imagery because their genre is the essai — the brief, imaginative, literary article which has been a central contribution of French intellectual life since the 17th century. But does the essai form really allow one to wield tranches of nonsense in the name of philosophical speculation in the hope of generating 'real' thinking, characterised by "extravagant hypotheses" and a "faculty of hyperperception which illuminates our society better than the weighty demonstrations of specialists"? Similarly Kristeva, while admitting her errors, still offers a defense of her misuse of science by claiming poetic licence. Kristeva goes on to contend that a 'Francophobia' is at the root of Sokal's attack though Sokal himself has vehemently disclaimed any such intention and pointed out that some of the worst offenders are his own American colleagues.

Perhaps the defence claim is that the science is not being asserted as scientific theory or fact but rather certain images detached from their scientific contexts are being used for imaginative purposes, as metaphors, vehicles to assist the mind in radical thinking (and thereby assuming that science does not think radically). But if the metaphors are based on inaccurate images, how can they be truly said to work? If through a misunderstanding of zoology, I think that a tortoise is a fast-moving animal, then my metaphor "he ran like a tortoise" will end up meaning the very reverse of what I had intended. It seems clear that in order to utilise metaphors instructively the network of comparisons and truths which ground them must be respected.

But, apart from Sokal's pinpointing of the ridiculous in some theorists' scientific claims, the whole Sokal affair points to a deep tension between the sciences and the humanities in the present-day academy. We are now in the grip of a phenomenon only roughly sketched by C. P. Snow with his notion of the two cultures where he criticised classicists and historians for not being interested in science. Part of the problem is the manner in which philosophy students have often been streamed away from contact with mathematics or science from their first days in the university. Here I am explicitly referring to the university systems in Ireland and the United Kingdom, where philosophy is usually taught within the Arts Faculty whose students are entirely separated from those who enter the Science Faculty. The result is that Science students will not be exposed to philosophy (except perhaps as a supply course or an option in the History and Philosophy of Science). The consequence of this institutional streaming of all science students away from Philosophy courses is that many of the typical Arts students are those with little or no knowledge of or enthusiasm for science. Thus, it is not unusual for philosophy teachers to encounter huge student resistance to any symbolisation at all. Arts Faculty students (unless already familiar with mathematics) manifest a genuine fear of logic, and
same departments respond by making logic an elective or non-essential course or else offer only informal (non-symbolic) logic in the earlier years of learning. It is often argued that students who are required to tackle a complex literary or historical text will gain the same kind of skills as those imparted by the study of informal logic, and, since most students have encountered some kind of literary critical formation before entering university, the university discussion of philosophy seems to flow naturally from the literary critical or general humanities mode of approach and the imposition of logical terminology and formulae seems foreign and alienating. Thus a whole culture has developed which sees philosophy as a kind of loose, imaginative free-wheeling entertaining of ideas and conceptions (including contradictory ideas), and indeed it is not hard to find philosophers who share this vision and practise it in their writing.

Sokal has diagnosed this anti-scientific irrationalist mood as being particularly strong in cultural studies areas in the USA. Indeed Sokal does seem to have touched a sore point, judging by the vehemence of the reactions against him. Rather than simply admitting that these authors have got their science wrong, some defenders have sought to claim that postmodern philosophy is above being judged by the standards of logic and rationality. Thus Babette Babich, author of several studies on Nietzsche and the sciences in a recent article in Common Knowledge claims that Sokal is out of his depth in literary/social/culture theoretical matters:

For Sokal's difficulties began with his consummate inability (an inability typical of natural scientists) to attempt to imagine the significance of social scientists' and cultural critics' investigation of the social and political conditions of science, together with a flat-footed grasp of linguistic functions. 45

Babich, then goes on to assert that while "meaningful discourse need not (though it may well) observe ordinary patterns of logic", she thinks that "philosophical speculation about the fundamental nature of logical constructions cannot do so. A critique of logic and truth cannot be conducted on the ground of logic or truth". 46

Babich ends this article with a conclusion that philosophy must be prepared "to think in and with contradictions". 47 Now a philosophy that unashamedly asserts that it thinks in contradictions and that it cannot be judged by the standards of logic or truth cannot expect to be taken seriously as making any assertions at all. Perhaps better than the Searle/Derrida encounter, this encounter between Sokal and the postmodernists illustrates a clash between standards of logic and rationality on the one hand and extreme irrationalism on the other. One of the shocking aspects of this encounter is the manner in which logic is associated solely with science and is assumed to have no application in governing arguments within philosophy.

Shouldn't philosophy teachers be most concerned that this could have come to pass? Despite the vast number of books and courses on the nature of informal argumentation, on fallacies of reasoning and so on, how can it occur that a number of practitioners in the field known as philosophy can hold such views? Somewhere along the line philosophical pedagogy has entirely neglected teaching logic in any form.

Hasn't this separation of logic from philosophical reasoning been associated (wrongly in fact) with the tradition of European philosophy since Hegel, and especially with Heidegger's denunciations of logic as a school-master's art and not a vehicle of real thinking? The remedy is obviously that important traditions of philosophy —Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche and their successors— need to be tackled in the context of a larger tradition of philosophy which values argument, the attempt at definition, rigour in reasoning, and the pursuit of clarity in expression. Indeed many proponents of 'Continental' philosophy (to use a kind of shorthand here) recognise the distortions which inevitably arise if Derrida and Lévinas are taught outside of a deep knowledge of the traditions which Derrida and Lévinas are criticising. Enthusiastic undergraduates who read Derrida in English, with no Greek or Latin or French or German and little or no knowledge of the state of the subject of linguistics or the history of philosophy, cannot be expected to gain an accurate
picture of what Derrida is trying to do, or be in a position to
criticise him. The students then substitute the effort to
understand Derrida for the work of criticism. The result is whole
slews of books on cultural theory which utilise aspects of
Continental philosophy but display only a limited knowledge of the
history of philosophy, often replicating Derrida's idiosyncratic
meandering through the texts of Plato, Rousseau and Ponge as if
it constituted a genuinely historical approach to the subject. One
can find plenty of Neo-Heideggerians enthusiastically adopting
Heidegger's habit of crossing-through words (Durch-streichen),
e.g. crossing out the word "Sein", without having any conception
of the metaphysical tradition which Heidegger read carefully and
was in a sense criticising from within. Relying on Heidegger or
Derrida for a history of the errors of past philosophy, is not
unlike relying on Bertrand Russell's History of Western
Philosophy for accurate portraits of Hegel or Nietzsche. Surely,
one has to put a stop to the self-limiting and blinkered nature of
the reading which each tradition is prescribing?

How are teachers of philosophy to cope in this crisis? How is one
to preserve a conception of philosophy as a discipline or set of
disciplines and of the subject as worthwhile as it appears to be
rapidly disintegrating or at least devolving into co-existing
separate governed territories? Philosophy departments in the
main have either seen themselves as pursuing mainstream
philosophy or have emphasised specialised areas. Some philosophy
departments will identify and develop their particular strengths and
cheerfully admit ignorance or lack of competence in other
areas. Thus a department may set itself up to specialise in
Philosophy of Science, or in Philosophy of Language, or in
"Continental" philosophy, but usually even in these departments
there are numbers of staff whose expertise is in traditional
areas.

Some departments have sought to claim a kind of pluralism in
their practice. But what does it mean to say that a department is
pluralist? In a recent informal survey of what 'pluralism' meant
when applied to Philosophy departments, John J. Stuhr reports
some of the following semi-serious answers: 'a department that
can't or won't do logic or science'; 'a Continental, history-
oriented department'; a department that teaches both 'Searle and
Dennett, Rawls and Dworkin'. On these definitions, pluralism
either means a department of predominantly Continental
philosophy or one which has a wide variety of specialisations in
current analytic philosophy. Perhaps the most revealing answer in
Stuhr's survey is the following:

The defining mark of a pluralist department is that some members
of the department believe other members don't simply hold
philosophical positions or address philosophical issues at all. A
pluralist department is a nice old liberal idea but in reality it is just a
place for hatred, envy, jealousy, disappointment, manipulation, and
pettiness.48

Pluralism, on this account, simply indicates a group of competing
and apparently irreconcilable claims as to what philosophy is,
carried on in an institutional setting which does not come to grips
with the issue. When Stuhr answers his own question he claims
that a pluralist department is one where the faculty not only have
philosophical differences with one another but also "share a
philosophical commitment to pluralism".49 Now, it is quite a
requirement that philosophers not only be specialised in their own
area and championing it, but also must also acknowledge that what
they do may not be the only way to do it right. Kathleen Higgins
puts forward the Philosophy Department at Haverford50 as an
instance of a genuinely pluralist department where courses on
'Buddhist, Hindu and Zen Philosophy' sit side by side with 'Jewish
Philosophy', 'African-American Philosophy' and 'Anglo-American
Analytic Philosophy'. Though this broad sweep of philosophy is
clearly challenging to the dominant tradition of focusing on a few
figures in recent western philosophy, one can also see that it is
quite culturally specific and indeed limited in its own right and
perhaps open to the charge of being biased. Clearly a philosophy
department should attempt to treat of the subject in a universal
way as well as being aware of local variations reflecting the local
tradition. Why should a department in Ireland consider teaching
African-American philosophy? Or would it be sufficient to
identify the issues and problems covered in this course (issues of oppression, resistance, identity, post-colonialism or whatever) and cover it in a course on Political Philosophy? One can also see other problems arising in the Haverford curriculum: why have 'Jewish Philosophy' but not 'Islamic Philosophy' (Surely it is less biased to treat of both — alongside Christian Philosophy — in a course on Medieval Philosophy?). I know Australian analytic philosophers who would feel excluded by the label 'Anglo-American' (leaving aside the German and French traditions which speak of 'Anglo-Saxon' philosophy!).

Opponents of this kind of pluralism will argue that, though there is a diversity of styles of philosophising, in so far as the aim of philosophy is to achieve truth about the world and ourselves, then it must be the case that some views are less close to truth than others. Even those who maintain that truth in philosophy is rather like truth in literature—that there are multiple, irreducible, even incommensurate visions of the truth (in Shakespeare, Beckett, Thomas Mann and so on)— still want to think of some views as better formed than others, as more expressive of the nature of life, as conforming better to the interest guiding the inquiry and so on. There is no escaping the evaluative ranking of answers in philosophy and the critical questioning of the procedures which gave rise to the answers. Questioning requires critique and this in turn requires making judgements of value. If pluralism means instantly conceding that the other party's view may also be true, there does not seem to be much point in continuing to advance one's own position. Can't we rethink the relevant point about pluralism in philosophy in terms of a certain sensitivity to the fallibility of our position and the need to see our views as revisable in the light of the best arguments put forward against them (from whatever source)?

There are many who fear that pluralism is an ideal which properly belongs to the social and political domain and that it would be ruinous to import it into a subject where truth is an issue. Thus, there is the understandable reaction to 'pluralism' to see it as merely adding an acceptable veneer of tolerance and multiplicity, perhaps driven by the current obsession with "multiculturalism", and that it may actually betray the discipline of philosophy. If philosophy must have truth as its target, then "bridge-building" rhetoric has no place. Scientists do not often talk about the need to promote harmony between different approaches; different theoretical approaches must in the end either be different notational variants of the one theory or else be competing theories one of which has a greater right to claim truth. Now admittedly, an attempt to keep truth centre-stage is made problematic by a number of moves in contemporary philosophy: Wittgenstein's incommensurable forms of life; Putnam's conceptual schemes and his emphasis on the manner in which our interests govern what we take to be true; Rorty's deflationary story; Nietzsche's notorious claim that truth is a series of metaphors; Foucault's wish to avoid using truth and Lyotard's claims that true statements are simply those it is good to use, those which are accepted in the social circle of the interlocutors. But these approaches relocate rather than eliminate the search for truth. I do not have space here to develop the issue of the nature of philosophy's claim to truth, other than to say that perhaps the crucial issue for the teaching of philosophy is some explicit discussion of the claim that literature and science offer different visions of truth. Discussions about theories of truth may be remote from practical procedures in philosophy but surely the issue of the two sources of truth (e.g. literature and science) has immediate implications for the teaching of philosophy.

Surely one way of achieving genuine understanding of different positions is through close analysis of any one of the major texts. Admittedly, there are different styles of doing this. Analytic philosophy has (speaking very generally) avoided using proper names in its allocation of labels to different ways of approaching a topic. So while historically-oriented philosophers will speak of the Cartesian or Humean account of substance, analytic philosophers prefer to detach these possible interpretations from their historical context and speak of the 'independence theories' of substance as opposed to 'cluster theories'. Sure this is a
there has been a huge
helps
alternative
Putnam,
revival
Henry
work of Peter Strawson and Graham Bird in the UK and
questions. For
much evidence that
the
form of the
not be
arise in different forms in each tradition. Specifying the common
I
philosophy.
ought to be the driving force in a
manner, but the very effort to
this question, to see if we can clarify just how to
realise. On
historical;
historical
facto
a growing sense that the
possibilities
clash on the question as to whether these grids of
philosophy;
philosophical
picture
he can then be seen in the
context of his radical rereading of the Greeks (which Heidegger
also saw in Nietzsche) as well as his radical questioning of
cherished ideals of German Idealism. A critical reading of Hegel
would also help to connect students with questions concerning the
possibility of world-history, of the fusion of different cultural
horizons through philosophy; and it would be a way of introducing
students to Gadamer and Habermas as well as to some issues in
recent analytic philosophy. There is an encouraging new tradition
of the analytic Hegel (e.g., Michael Inwood, Terry Pinkard, John
McDowell and Robert Brandom are, at the time of writing,
preparing books on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit).

We need much more debate on the question whether 'analytic' and
'Continental' styles of teaching emphasise different skills. There
is little doubt that the tradition from Hegel to Gadamer places
more emphasis on interpreting a philosophical problem with
reference to the historical situatedness of the questioner and the
contextually rooted nature of linguistic expression of the problem.
Contemporary Continental philosophy thus emphasises more the
manner in which problems inevitably arise out of the history of
philosophy and do not lose this historical specificity even when
treated as abstract conceptual puzzles. This approach emphasises
hermeneutics and the conflict of interpretations, general literary
contextual skills, irony, and so on. Analytic philosophy, on the
other hand, tends to emphasise precision in definition, strong
clear argumentation, the elimination of irrelevancies (including
the actual context of the question) and so on. In its worst
excesses, it can seem to be totally detached from the human social and historical situation. A genuine advance in philosophy would require the nature of these different styles to be carefully studied and evaluated. I believe such study would demonstrate that much of the claims about exclusivism are exaggerated. Careful study of the philosophical tradition shows that it has infinitely more conceptual tools and flexibility than any one-sided approach has recognised.

Thus, some recent exponents of post-Heideggerian Continental philosophy have a suspicion of the notion of radical questioning (despite Heidegger’s emphasis on the centrality of the question in thinking). These philosophers have sought to abandon questioning as the very first tool of the philosopher. But even in his most serene attitude of Gelassenheit, Heidegger could justly claim that “questioning is the piety of thinking”. True reverence requires radical questioning. Furthermore, Heideggerian philosophy does have a strong record of questioning presuppositions, in the sense of exposing them to questions. Husserl, too, understood the practice of philosophy as rational self-responsibility.

Clearly we do not want to teach our students a kind of journalism, which uses incantatory phrases like ‘the death of history’ as headlines in essays which are little more than regurgitations of existing ideas. In this respect it is important to emphasise the common critical heritage of contemporary philosophy in both traditions. Heidegger and Wittgenstein in many ways tried to think against the self-images of the age, not in sympathy with them. Students are of course attracted to the melodramatic gestures of some philosophical writers: Nietzsche’s manmad running around with a lamp at midday, the rhetoric of the death of God and so on. Perhaps, current analytic philosophy could be less self-effacing about the strong current of melodrama in its tradition most notably in its ‘thought experiments’: brains-in-vats, the notions of twin earth, the possibility of zombies and so on. But allowing that students should experience some drama they must also come into contact with some core philosophical values —values usually summed up by the term “argument”. Students must learn that in order to put forward an argument, it is not enough to preface it with the performative; “I argue that ...” Or that in order to demonstrate that Derrida or Rorty is not a relativist, it is not enough to point to the fact that, on page ... of his book, Derrida says he is not a relativist. One of the things we should be teaching our students of whatever tradition is that it is one thing to state one’s commitment to a position and quite another to defend one’s entitlement to that commitment.

In conclusion, I believe that philosophy teachers must overcome the general reluctance to make broad-sweeping claims about the nature of the subject, and begin the difficult task of critically selecting what is living and what is dead in the different traditions and philosophical styles now current in the profession. There is no denying that we live in an age of profusion, but we do not want the outcome at least in terms of our students’ conceptual awareness to be one of world-weariness and confusion. In the end, behind all the styles, formats and traditions, there is only good or bad philosophy, and teachers should be in no doubt — and leave their students in no doubt — on which side of this divide they stand.

Notes

1 The issue of pluralism in philosophy has been much discussed in recent years, see for example David Archard, ed., Philosophy and Pluralism (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) and N. Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: OUP, 1993).

Richard Rorty is one of the very few who disputes philosophy’s claim to be a free-standing discipline or Fach, field of inquiry, see his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 390.

David Cooper, in his "Modern European Philosophy", in N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, eds, *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 703, has pointed out, that at the beginning of the twentieth century Nietzsche had few advocates, while Kierkegaard was known only to some German theologians.


Rorty, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 60.


The literature is vast but see, for example, Frank Lentricchia, *Criticism and Social Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).


Thus John Hospers, in his preface to the 4th edition of *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. v, acknowledges that he has decided to begin with epistemology though the temptation is obviously to begin with subjects thought to be closer to the students' own experience: for example, ethics or religion.

E.g. Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics with Alasdair MacIntyre or Michael Slote, or various forms of Kantianism, e.g. Christine Korsgaard, or the new interest in moral psychology and the philosophy of the emotions.

The original claim concerning the black origins of Greek philosophy was made by Martin Bernal in his book *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation* (New Brunswick: Rutgers U. P., 1987). For a scathing attack on Bernal's central theses see Ann Macy Roth, "Building Bridges to Afrocentrism. A Letter to My Egyptological Colleagues", in Paul Gross, Norman Levitt and Martin Lewis, eds, *The Flight From Science and Reason, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 775 (New York: NY Academy of Sciences, 1996), pp. 313-326. The whole debate is an interesting spin on the traditional trope (found in Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa) concerning the utilisation of the "spoils of the Egyptians" (i.e. the arts and sciences) which the Israelites took with them when fleeing their Egyptian captivity.

See Jean Grimshaw, "Feminism and Philosophy", in N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, eds, *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 732-41 who sees first stage as "highlighting endemic misogyny of many male philosophers" but it needs to be supplemented by theories of how such sexism influences the nature and structure of the philosophical theory itself, whether philosophical theories are "gendered" even when not discussing gender, and whether
traditional philosophy theories have espoused and universalised a "masculine" point of view. Grimshaw is actually suspicious of too neatly characterising the diversity of traditional philosophy as all expressing a "masculine" point of view, but does see feminism as part of a critique of a general assumption that there can be a "view from nowhere". On her account, feminism is attentive to the concrete situation from which it speaks. However, all these problems can be found mirrored in other areas (non gender areas such as the question of racism in philosophy, or the general relation of cultural specificity to the overall universalism of traditional philosophical claims), so it is unclear whether feminist philosophy has actually created a new discipline, rather than seeing a specific application of more general problems in the philosophical tradition (e.g. historicism and relativism). Thus ancient sceptics recognised the diversity of views — how fish, animals, humans see the world — and since none is privileged and there is no standard for comparing them, concluded they are both equally good or equally bad at delivering truth.


29 For further discussion of this topic see Dermot Moran, "Towards a Philosophy of the Environment", in John Feehan, ed., Educating for Environmental Awareness (Dublin: University College Dublin Environmental Institute, 1997), pp. 45-68.


37 In fact, Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt had already identified many of these confused pieces of pseudo-scientific nonsense in their somewhat intertemperate but altogether timely study Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1994).


39 Derrida made these remarks in a seminar held in University College Dublin as part of his Agnes Cuming Lectures there in 1996. The transcript of Derrida's seminar will be published in Richard Kearney, ed., After Ethics (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

40 Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures intellectuelles (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1997).

41 See the defence offered by Pascal Bruckner in Le Nouvel Observateur, No. 1716 (25 September - 1 October 1997), p. 53.


48 See the humorous replies to John J. Stuhr's informal questionnaire to two dozen philosophy departments as to what constitutes a pluralist department, in his "Fundamentalism and the Empire of Philosophy: What Constitutes a Pluralist Department", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 70, No. 2 (November 1996), pp. 172-79.


WORLD INTER-LEARNING: GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY

KUANG-MING WU
Florida and Taiwan

Our twenty-first century world —homo-global Lebenswelt— is a shrunken Global Village that needs to grow in reciprocity. Human world-growth hinges on world-education that is philosophical. Hence, our agenda. Philosophy, teaching, and globalness co-imply; their interrelation enriches all three. This essay considers (1) what, (2) why, and (3) how we should implement our agenda of historical-cultural globalizing philosophical education.

1. The What of the Agenda

Our agenda manifests (1.1.) co-implication among its three items in (1.2.) their respective integrity-in-mutuality.


First, 'philosophy' as the loving pursuit of wisdom is thinking that starts from unquenchable curiosity, what Aristotle called 'wonder' at the beginning of his Metaphysics. Curiosity goes everywhere: it strives, within thinking, for accuracy, precision, consistency without contradiction, coherence of explication-implication among its parts; it comprehensively considers everything, every aspect, horizon, universal, perspective, worldview, culture, frame of reference. Philosophy as the most consistent, coherent, and comprehensive thinking with undying critical curiosity, is global.

Then, 'teaching' is intimately related to philosophy. For 'education' means educing the growth of the 'educated', be they persons or objects. Education educes ourselves by inducing...