The European Politics of Apolitical Integration: Policy harmonization, cultural convergence and the case of the Republic of Ireland

Bryan Fanning

WP09/06

January 2009

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN
BELFIELD DUBLIN 4
The European Politics of Apolitical Integration: Policy harmonization, cultural convergence and the case of the Republic of Ireland

Bryan Fanning

Abstract

According to Christian Joppke (2007) the EU Common Basic Principles exemplify an institutional harmonization of integration ideologically defined in neo-liberal terms. The analysis presented here addresses an implied cultural convergence seen to accompany institutional harmonization. It suggests that integration seems to have become depoliticised at the level of the nation-state due to a functional convergence characterised by a generic modernisation of belonging. Here ethnic solidarities are to some extent superseded by emphasis on individual capacities for reflexive self-integration. Although the EU presents integration as an apolitical project it becomes politicised where it requires the extension of welfare solidarities to non-citizens. A putative EU ‘integration-as-social inclusion’ project is impeded within Member States by welfare ethnic nepotism. The case study presented is the Republic of Ireland where the cultural politics of bounded national identity have apparently been sidestepped in political decisions to encourage mass immigration. Here shifting rules of belonging are traced to a mid-twentieth century nation-building project of developmental modernisation. Whilst ethnic nepotism can be seen to influence Irish social policy current antipathy to ‘integration-as-social inclusion’ must also be explained in terms in terms of a limited altruism towards co-ethnics. A prevailing narrow definition of integration in terms of labour participation is one equivalent to how the social inclusion of Irish citizens has come to be defined.
Introduction

Drawing on an analysis of The Netherlands, France and Germany Christian Joppke in 2007 emphasised a growing EU convergence of integration policy. A new European pro-immigration consensus had reversed three decades in which immigration was mostly unwanted. Well into the 1990s the joint stance of European states was ‘to sternly reject new labour migration’. During the 1990s, the main category of migrants were refugees; refugee migration became explicitly politicised. A resurgence of anti-immigrant political populism contributed to a ‘Fortress Europe’ harmonisation whereby member states individually introduced harsh policies towards these. But alongside this Joppke argues that a fundamental shift occurred whereby labour immigration is now presented a ‘permanent, even desirable feature of European societies’, necessary to counter demographic decline and to preserve European competitiveness. Joppke’s critique of EU integration policy harmonization depicts it as rooted in an influential cosmopolitan elite consensus as well as in economic imperatives. The Europeanisation of civic integration policy is seen to occur though cultural standardisation no less than it does by legal mandate. Here culture is defined apolitically in the bloodless language of policy-speak (‘the soft force of best-practice emulation’) in contrast with European histories of blood and soil nationalist identity politics (Joppke, 2007: 247).

Joppke does not argue that national difference in dealing with immigrants and ethnic minorities will disappear in Western Europe. But it is unlikely to be couched in grand ‘national models’ or philosophies of integration. He suggests that national difference will persist in two ways: ‘trivially, as sheer contingency and history, which will never be the same in any two places’ and in nation-state efforts ‘sometimes to obstruct, but more often to accommodate and mould the new in the image of the past (Joppke, 2007: 272). Here, the declining influence of nation-building processes of modernisation, as influentially depicted by Ernest Gellner, is suggested. Nation-building identity politics are portrayed as residual in the face of top-down EU-wide harmonization.

Joppke’s account of harmonization is predominantly institutional. It instances the 2000 EU Race Directive which requires that member states pass and implement laws against direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. This protects non-EU immigrants as well as member state citizens. Its remit encompasses education, employment, social protection, health care and access to vital goods and services such as housing and private insurance. A second instance of harmonisation is the 2003 Directive that extended the free-movement rights of EU citizens to non-EU residents. The third and most explicit indication of an EU integration project is the 2003 Council of the European Union agreed non-binding Common Basic Principles For Immigrant Integration in the European Union.

In Joppke’s analysis two different elements characterise the ‘two way process’ emphasised in the Common Basic Principles (CBP). Civic integration renders the individual responsible for her own integration. An accompanying emphasis on ‘antidiscrimination’ (‘the liberalism of equal rights’) at best retrospectively ameliorates inequalities resulting from the former:

The logic of civic integration is to treat migrants as individuals who are depicted as responsible for their own integration; civic integration is an extension into the migration domain of the austere neoliberalism that frames economic globalisation. The opposite logic of antidiscrimination is to depict migrants and
their offspring as members of groups that are victimized by the majority society. There is thus reintroduced at the tail end of integration the ameliorative group logic that has been discarded at its beginning by the harsh individualization of civic integration’ (Joppke, 2007: 247-8).

Joppke concern is with the top-down diffusion of policy norms, influenced heavily by the Dutch rejection of multiculturalism and neo-liberal EU responses to globalisation, the latter exemplified by Lisbon agenda goals of making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.”(2007: 272) His analysis suggests a distinction between political and apolitical integration. The former is preoccupied with ‘traditional’ culture, poses integration questions from the vantage point of host country national identity and historically derived (essentialist) conceptions of social membership. The latter, exemplified by EU policy norms and directives potentially works to depoliticise integration. Insofar as institutions are the structural manifestations of culture, institutional shifts suggest underlying cultural ones.

The Republic of Ireland, a kulturnation that recently opened itself to mass immigration (Fanning and Mutwarasibo, 2007), is examined here as a case study of the intersections between such apolitical and politicised integration. As (until recently) an enthusiastic participant in the EU, Ireland has been open to the kinds of institutional harmonization emphasised by Joppke. The major Irish integration policy document to date, Migration Nation (2008:30), states that the Common Basic Principles have been and will be a major influence on Irish integration policy developments. A further key domain of harmonisation revealed in the Irish case is that of social inclusion policy (described by Joppke as ‘the dominant integration rhetoric of the EU). But Ireland’s mass immigration-without-politics cannot be understood without considering the modernisation of belonging that changed the ground rules of being Irish. The convergence emphasised by Joppke concerns the means of harmonization. This article examines this in terms of a convergence of ends, by which we mean the kind of society into which integration might (or not) occur as a political project. Here, modernization theory as applied to the ‘traditional’ kulturnation by Gellner and theories of reflexive modernity applied by Beck, Giddens and Urry to ‘post-traditional’ projects of social reproduction posit shifting integration ends. The rules of belonging are as ever predicated on answers to the question ‘integration into what?’

Integration into What?

Changing rules of belonging

Normatively, integration refers to the process by which immigrants become accepted into a society, both as individuals and as groups (Penninx, 2003). However it comes to be defined, the implicit EU assumption is that conformity represents “successful” integration (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003:8). But conformity to what? Sociological, political science and social policy vantage points posit three sets of overlapping rules of belonging. The first is preoccupied with social reproduction and the relationships between changing social structure and individual agency. Here, the integration of immigrants and the social inclusion of existing citizens must hit a moving target. The second posits integration in contractual terms whereby migrants
must negotiate expectations about citizenship rights and behaviour in the public sphere. Ideologically, the *Common Basic Principles* presume the replacement of essential nationalism and multiculturalism by liberalism as a public sphere value culture. An influential sociological literature emphasises the primacy of capabilities for social and economic self-integration, theorised in terms of reflexive modernity and neo-liberal individualism. Here integration becomes defined sociologically in terms of autonomous individual capacity to flourish and individual responsibility to do so. Reflexivity, so understood is something to be engineered as a political project just as were the older mass identities of cultural nationalism. The older nation-building projects of social modernization and social reproduction are presumed to be residual.

The traditional and reflexive modernization perspectives on which this article draws are theories of convergence. They present norms as functional and posit that similar changes occur in different nation states for similar reasons (Wilensky, 1975). This view of power perceives social control and socialisation as expressions of an underlying consensus in society. The presumption is that integration harmonization becomes necessary because it is functional. It is responding to similar bottom-up changes in the nature of social solidarity even if it appears intellectually and politically driven by an elite consensus. European champions of functional cosmopolitan reflexivity such as Ulrich Beck advocate a post-national understanding of citizenship whereby rights within the nation state do not depend on naturalisation (Beck, 2000). These also emphasise how cosmopolitan ideals have translated into norms of international reciprocity through the formation of trans-national political and legal structures (Fine and Boon, 2007).

**Reflexive versus ethno-national modernity**

Insofar as the entities charged with integrating immigrants are nation states, essentialist ideologies of belonging that precipitated their historical development have inevitably featured in political responses to immigration. As influentially articulated by Herder and Fichte in the early nineteenth century these included the belief that people can only realise themselves fully as members of an identifiable culture defined in terms of language, tradition and historical roots. Herder emphasised the multiplicity and incommensurability of the values of different cultures; different societies could have equally valid ideals but, in reality, they were incompatible (Berlin, 1998:393). Fichte influentially maintained that linguistic homogeneity defined nationality; a Gaelic revival was integral to Irish nation-building. Herder emphasised the incommensurability of different national cultures. Nationalism developed as an ideology of cultural separatism. Both Herder and Fichte exerted an intellectual influence on nineteenth century Irish nationalism (Cruise O’Brien, 1998: 192).

A key feature of EU integration norms – not emphasised by Joppke but central to the analysis presented here – is their presumed capacity to de-politicise integration by side-steeping thorny local histories of essentialist national identity. The new politics of immigration and integration charted by Joppke, with its emphasis on convergent legal and policy norms, is depicted as apolitical at the level of the nation-state. For example, as presented in the EU *Handbook on Integration for Policy Makers and Practitioners* (2007) the emphasis is on pragmatically redefining thorny questions of integration ends or goals into one about integration means or methods:

What does integration mean? The question might be expected to trigger familiar debates about assimilation and multiculturalism, but participants at the technical
seminars preparing the handbook hardly used these terms. As policy makers and practitioners working with immigrant integration on a daily basis they took a rather more practical approach, focusing on outcomes in terms of social and economic mobility, education, health, housing, social services, and societal participation (2007:8).

The Handbook emphasised the acquisition by migrants of competencies that would enable them to integrate. Language acquisition aside what is required is the same kinds of social capital required of the overall population. For example the Handbook called on ‘each individual to engage in a process of lifelong learning’ through ‘continuous training and education’. It emphasised individualised empowerment through reflexive skills of ‘learning to learn’ (2007: 8). Integration, as such, is equated with normative social policy understandings of individualised social inclusion.

The meaning of social inclusion has shifted since the unravelling of post-WW2 growth and security welfare settlements (Hughes and Lewis, 1998). Theories of obligatory reflexivity emerged to explain the deterioration of security (Beck, 1992, Beck Giddens and Urry, 1994). These presented the archetypical successful candidate for integration as a risk-taker who takes responsibility for her own welfare through autonomous reflexive re-adaptation (Sevenhuijsen, 2000). Matthew Adams summarises the claims that reflexivity is emancipatory in the following terms:

Reflexive self-awareness provides the individual with the opportunity to construct self-identity without the shackles of tradition and culture, which previously created relatively rigid boundaries to the options for one’s self-understanding (2003: 222).

As alternatively described by Lisa Adkins, the self-reflexive subject is ‘the ideal and privileged subject of neo-liberalism’ (2002; 123). Thinking of citizens rather than migrants, Paul Sweetman (2003) summarises the experience of reflexivity as one of regulation, self-surveillance and nervous self-scrutiny. In all this citizens are candidates for integration; they must continually negotiate changing rules of belonging. But migrants who cannot muster the required reflexivity might be rejected out of hand. The example Joppke gives is that of the Netherlands where requirements that immigrants demonstrate ‘autonomy’ through labour market participation and learning the Dutch language have become increasingly coercive. In effect responsibility for integration becomes individualised. In Joppke’s critique what ensues is a neo-liberalism of ‘power and disciplining’. Here:

…the contemporary state, hollowed out by economic globalisation, is coercing individuals, as well as the ‘communities’ that they constitute, to release their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver. Civic integration is the equivalent on the part of immigrants to the welfare policies that the general population is subjected to in the context of shrinking welfare states: both use illiberal means to make people self-sufficient and autonomous (2007: 268).

The reflexive modernisation perspective is an extension of modernisation theory stripped of the role ascribed to tradition in Gellner’s account of nation-building.
Modern nations needed a shared sense of authentic culture. What they had little use for, according to Gellner, were the ‘often baroque structures’ and the plethora of ‘nuances and ambiguities and overlaps’ that served the functional needs of pre-modern society (Gellner, 1987: 15). National cultures became streamlined and homogenised and ontologically altered. Gellner’s prerequisites for nationalism as a basis of social cohesion include mass literacy and school-inculcated culture. Such inculcation may have promoted essentialist beliefs about national culture but what arguably occurred, according to Gellner (writing about Irish modernisation) was the phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft (1983: 57). The ‘new primary ethnic colours, few in number and sharply outlined against each other, became deeply internalised. In Gellner’s account ‘tradition’ as invoked by nation-builders was invented. Modernity produced shifts in dominant cultural identities and nation-state rules of belonging through the modernisation of culture and through ontological displacement; out-groups whose beliefs, cultural practices and norms presented them as out of step with dominant current ones were remaindered (Gellner, 1987: 16).

Theories of reflexive modernisation presume a shift away from an explicit ethnic politics of national identity; identity is (again) seen to become de-traditionalised. Essentialist nationalism became relegated to fringe political movements in the post WW2 era though anti-immigration national front parties have persisted. Within the political mainstreams of many EU Member States racism and religious sectarianism became stigmatised. Essentialist nationalisms have been discarded in favour of looser and in some case ‘post-nationalist’ depictions of identity. A key project of the EU has been to facilitate this.

The persistence of ethnic nepotism

However claims that national identities and ethnocentrism have a minimal bearing on integration need to be treated with caution. Again, Joppke has charted the decline of ethno-racial exclusive immigration policies (2005). The inference is that solidarity is no longer defined by a homogenous ethno-national mass culture (Klusmeyer, 2001). The Irish case bears this out. A proactive immigration policy targeted the Irish Diaspora until 2000 when it was believed that the pool of potential returning expatriates was becoming exhausted. In 2004, when co-ethnics constituted a small proportion of overall immigration, the Irish government allowed unlimited access to migrants from the EU Accession States (Hayward and Howard, 2007). But simultaneously in the Irish case legislation was introduced to remove welfare entitlements from migrants. Immigration became depoliticised but not integration which required extending welfare solidarities to non-citizens.

David Goodhart, echoing the claims of ethnic nepotism theory, has influentially argued that there is an inevitable conflict or trade-off between social solidarity and diversity (2004a, 2004b, 2008) In the United Kingdom the influence of Goodhart’s arguments can be seen in The Path to Citizenship green paper (2008). Using, as Goodhart put it, ‘a rhetoric that would have been unthinkable 10 years ago’ The Path to Citizenship proposed that newcomers incur additional taxes to ‘pay their way’ (Goodhart: 2008). This was, as the Labour integration minister put it, to ‘win an emotional argument about immigration’ (cited ibid, 2008). Goodhart depicts welfare nepotism as political pragmatism:
The justification for giving priority to the interests of fellow citizens boils down to the pragmatic claim about the value of the nation-state. Without fellow-citizen favouritism, the nation-state ceases to have much meaning. And most of the things liberals desire – democracy, redistribution, welfare states, human rights – only work when one can assume the shared norms and solidarities of national communities (2008).

Diversity, according to ethnic nepotism theory, undermines the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests. As presented by its leading advocate Frank Salter ethnic nepotism is more a political theory of human interests than a socio-biological theory of human behaviour. (2002, 2004) It proposes calculus for ascertaining ethnic genetic interest (in copies of one’s own genes) in different relational situations that Salter uses to argue how ethnic groups ought to act in specific circumstances. Here ethnic kinship is presented as relative to the population chosen for comparison. Ethnic nepotism theory developed from theories of inclusive fitness that portrayed individuals as ‘programmed’ by natural selection to extend preferential treatment of others in proportion to their degree of common descent (Vananen, 1999: 73). It presumes that inclusive fitness can be applied to altruism towards non-relatives with whom genetic affinity can be recognised (‘extra-familial nepotism’). Here ethnicity is ultimately defined in terms of common descent; ethnic and racial sentiments are understood as extensions of kinship sentiments; ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism (Salter, 2002:112). Kenan Malik summarises the political appeal of ethnic nepotism in the following terms:

The echoes that reverberate between Goodhart’s and Salter’s arguments are not because Goodhart has accepted Salter’s unsavoury claims about the dangers of miscegenation or the need for an ethnically homogenous society. Rather they reveal the ways in which in which contemporary anxieties about diversity can be reformulated into different political idioms. In part, this is because diversity has today become so ambiguous, indeed incoherent, in its meaning that both sides of the debate can simultaneously be for it and against it. Critics of diversity view ethnocentrism, and hence the tendency to diversify, as universal and often as adaptive. Proponents of diversity wish to limit the corrosive character of diversity in the name of cultural authenticity (Malik, 2007:263).

Ethnic nepotism theory presumes a kind of anti-integration harmonization, one described by Joppke as a comparative normative shift characterised by new welfare stratifications between citizens and immigrant non-citizen groups (1999:620). Whilst EU member states extend reciprocal welfare rights to one another, they are not required to extend integration-as-social inclusion to non-EU migrants. The new welfare ethnic nepotisms cannot be reduced to a revival of essentialist nationalisms. The political audience being addressed are cosmopolitan values and social democrat advocates of universal welfare entitlements. Goodhart argues that the legitimacy of such entitlements depends on these being restricted to fellow citizens. Implicit and explicit welfare ethnic nepotism can be identified in a number of Member States. It is alluded to as a barrier to integration in the sixth CBP. This asserts that: ‘Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on an equal basis to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is an indispensable foundation for better integration.’
Integration-as-social inclusion

The social policy integration project exemplified by the CBPs extends the techniques of nation-building modernisation to the promotion of a new modernization of belonging, one defined by globalisation and one targeted at host Member State populations as well as migrants. The first CBP defines integration in terms of rights and responsibilities as a two way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. A number of CBPs emphasise integration goals that apply also to the citizen population of member states.

The EU social inclusion agenda encompasses normative understandings of the structural causes of poverty and deprivation, of the role of social policy in promoting social cohesion and, crucially, efforts to measure social inclusion (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003). The dominant paradigm emphasises social cohesion. It defines social exclusion in terms of poverty, related phenomena such as unemployment, the spatial concentration of multiple disadvantages and discrimination. The focus is on processes of exclusion and processes of inclusion, on relational understandings of social capital on access to the resources needed to achieve security but also to the attainment of societal norms. A normative focus on social cohesion, defined in terms of ‘shared values, feelings of common identity, trust, a sense of belonging to the same community can also be identified. Prevalent EU definitions of social inclusion, social capital and social cohesion posit communal interdependence, shared loyalties and solidarity as the basis of integration (Cremer-Schäfer et al, 2001: 34-5). Such normative communal, even communitarian integration values are clearly at odds with expectations of reflexive individualism as the basis of inclusion.

However, an emphasis on reflexivity can be identified in social inclusion definitions that depict individual autonomy as a core aspect of quality of life and human development. Here capabilities equate to ‘the idea that individuals actively and consciously direct their lives according to their preferences’ (Cremer-Schäfer et al, 2001: 9). The CBPs place considerable emphasis on social policy understandings of integration. These can be seen to apply to citizens more so than to migrants where stratifications of rights and entitlements result in exclusion from social exclusion. The sixth CBP states that ‘Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on an equal basis to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is an indispensable foundation for better integration’. It summarises the integration case against welfare nepotism:

Conversely, uncertainty and unequal treatment breed disrespect for the rules and can marginalize immigrants and their families, socially and economically. The adverse implications of such marginalisation continue to be seen across generations. Restrictions on the rights and privileges of non-nationals should be transparent and be made only after consideration of the integration consequences, particularly on the descendents of immigrants.

Rights to welfare are emphasised as a means to an end (integration-as-social inclusion) rather than as an end in themselves (as an entitlement of citizenship).

What an EU integration-as-social inclusion project might involve is most clearly spelt out by the empirical indictors devised on behalf of the European Commission. These established an EU-wide baseline ‘common language’ for conceptualising and measuring social inclusion (Noll, 2002). The purpose was to
define core EU social values and place a normative pressure on member states to pursue social inclusion policies, to ‘define social indicators conceptually, to apply them empirically, and to use them in politics’ (Vandenbroucke, 2002: vii). A key mechanism here has been the requirement that member States devise National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPincl). The eleventh (and final) CBP proposed these as the basis of EU integration-as-social inclusion project:

Although it is a process rather than an outcome, integration can be measured and policies evaluated. Sets of integration indicators, goals, evaluation mechanisms and benchmarking can assist measuring and comparing progress, monitor trends and developments. The purpose of such evaluation is to learn from experience, a way to avoid possible failures of the past.

Ireland has been an early adopter of social inclusion plans and targets. In 1997 it became the first EU member state to adopt a national poverty reduction target (Atkinson et al, 2002: 53). In 2001 it agreed both a follow-up Revised National Anti-Poverty Strategy and its first National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (Government of Ireland, 2001).

The Irish Case

Social Inclusion and integration policy harmonisation

The Republic of Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973. Until recently it has been regarded as an enthusiastic member of the EU. It remained a net beneficiary of EU funding until well into its ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom period. A Referendum in 2008 rejected the Treaty of Lisbon. It became just one of three countries, along with Sweden and the United Kingdom that allowed free movement of labour from EU-Accession states in 2004. A country with a problematic history of handling cultural difference overtly pursued large-scale immigration as a neo-liberal response to globalisation. The first major Irish immigration policy statement, Integration: A Two Way Process (2000) anticipated key elements of the Common Basic Principles. As defined in the report ‘integration means the ability to participate to the extent that a person needs and wishes in all the major components of society, without having to relinquish his or her own cultural identity’ (DJELR, 2000: 29).

This case for integration, defined in terms of capacity to participate fully in society drew on that for addressing social exclusion contained in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (1997) and restated in the revised National Anti-Poverty Strategy (2002). Definitions of social exclusion were incorporated into the 1996 and 2000 social partnership agreements, Partnership 2000 and Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. The former defined social exclusion in terms of ‘cumulative marginalisation: from production (employment), from consumption (income poverty), from social networks (community, family and neighbours), from decision-making and from an adequate quality of life’ (Government of Ireland, 1996, 2000). All of these asserted that the social exclusion of marginal groups in Irish society must be contested in the interests of the greater good. As put in NAPS:

No society can view without deep concern the prospect of a significant minority of people becoming more removed from the incomes and lifestyles of the
majority. It is the tackling of the structural factors that underpin this exclusion which requires the strategic approach set out in this document (Government of Ireland, 1997: 4).

‘Migrants and members of ethnic minority groups’ were first identified as a distinct target group within the Revised NAPS (2002). This set an objective of ensuring that these are not more likely to experience poverty than majority group members (Government of Ireland, 2002: 17). It signalled (in theory) an integration remit for Irish social inclusion policy. However, the expectation voiced by various government ministers was that was that the integration of new immigrants would occur through the economy.

Ireland’s response to EU Enlargement in 2004 was to allow immediate labour market access to migrants from the Accession States whilst simultaneously introducing explicit welfare ethnic nepotism. The Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (2004) removed rights from new immigrants to Unemployment Assistance, Old Age (Non-Contributory) and Blind Pension, Widow(er)’s and Orphan’s (Non-Contributory) pensions, One Parent Family Payment, Carer’s Allowance, Disability Allowance, Supplementary Welfare Allowance (other than once-off exceptional and urgent needs payments) and Children’s Allowances. The group most seriously affected by these new welfare stratifications were non-EU migrants. In February 2006 the government acknowledged that EU law (EEC 1408 of 1971) imposed reciprocal obligations on EU State to recognise the entitlements of citizens from other EU countries resident in their own countries. This meant that the removal of entitlements set out under the 2004 Act could never have applied to immigrants arriving from the new EU member states. Throughout 2004 and 2005 was generally presumed by government departments and NGOs that the 2004 Act applied to all immigrants (Fanning, 2009).

It is noteworthy that no specific political advocacy of welfare ethnic nepotism preceded the 2004 Act. However, a politics of citizenship ethnic nepotism did emerge in 2004 through the government’s campaign in support of a Referendum on Citizenship. the outcome of the Referendum was to remove the birth-right to Irish citizenship from the Irish-born children of immigrants. Citizenship had been constitutionally defined in Ius Soli terms in a context of high emigration. The change towards a Ius Sanguine basis of establishing rights to citizenship was a direct response to immigration. Within the politics of the Referendum the prevailing discourse the distinction was one between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals.’ The latter were portrayed as having a right to citizenship due to a loophole in the Constitution. That over 80 percent of voters in the Referendum voted in favour of ‘commonsense citizenship’ (the government slogan) points to the salience of theories of ethnic nepotism in the Irish case (Fanning and Mutwarasibo, 2007).

Just one month before the Act was passed the Irish government hosted a conference entitled Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion as part of its EU Presidency (Office for Social Inclusion, 2004). The report from the conference, whilst couched in the rhetoric of social inclusion, placed little emphasis on welfare rights and entitlements. The equation emphasised by the Conference was one between the promotion of mobility for economic reasons and the need to ‘specifically promote the social inclusion of these workers and where appropriate, that of their families (Ibid, 2004: 27). Yet the Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion conference defined social inclusion and integration predominantly in terms of the economic
integration of workers (Ibid, 2004: 8). Yet, the social policy case for integration-as-social inclusion was acknowledged in the foreword to the conference proceedings:

Mobile workers, and especially those who migrate from other regions and countries, are particular vulnerable to social exclusion. Mobility can involve leaving behind the supports of family, friends, local community and one’s own culture, and experiencing much difficulty in finding comparable supports in the host country. This demands that, in solidarity, we work to provide them with the supports they need to achieve social inclusion and integration. It is clearly also in our interests to do so. The social exclusion of migrants can result in their working well below their potential as well as high rates of unemployment. This has negative consequences both economically and in relation to social cohesion. Two key goals of the Lisbon agenda, greater economic competitiveness and social cohesion, are well served, therefore, by reconciling mobility and social exclusion’ (Ibid, 2004: 6)

This partial endorsement of integration-as-social inclusion coincided with the welfare ethnic nepotism of the 2004 Social Welfare Act. In this context it was unsurprising that migrants and ethnic minorities received just a one-paragraph mention in the 2005 report on the implementation of the National Action Plan against Poverty and Social Exclusion 2003-2005. This noted to the ‘need to provide migrants with access to social protection and other services’ (Office for Social Inclusion, 2005:4). For specifics it pointed to another policy document, Planning for Diversity: The National Action Plan Against Racism. This in turn noted the need to include immigrants within ‘national plans and programmes that target poverty and social exclusion.’ Again nothing specific was envisaged. The National Action Plan Against Racism contained some emphasis on the need to address institutional barriers but placed none on structural barriers encountered by migrants not entitled to (some) welfare goods and services. Integration was envisaged as occurring through ‘macro economic and social policy planning’ through ‘employment rights, responsibilities and workplace policy’ (DJELR, 2005: 31).

During the peak years of immigration before and after EU Enlargement in 2004 there was little or no political debate on either cultural integration or on the role of social policy in furthering integration. Policy development gathered pace in 2007 with the establishment of Cabinet post with responsibility for integration. The first comprehensive report on integration policy was published the following year. Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management sets out the following “key principles” which were claimed to inform Irish State policy on integration:

- A partnership approach between the Government and nongovernmental organisations, as well as civil society bodies to deepen and enhance the opportunities for integration
- A strong link between integration policy and wider state social inclusion measures, strategies and initiatives
- A clear public policy focus that avoids the creation of parallel societies, communities and urban ghettos, i.e. a mainstream approach to service delivery to migrants
• A commitment to effective local delivery mechanisms that align services to migrants with those for indigenous communities (Government of Ireland, 2008: 9)

Overall the principles could be seen to endorse integration-as-social inclusion. But none of the related key actions set out in *Migration Nation* did so. These emphasised immigration controls ‘to facilitate access to Ireland for skilled migrants with a contribution to make’, ‘citizenship and long-term residency to be contingent on proficiency of skills in the spoken language of the country and enhanced anti-discriminatory measures. *Migration Nation* stated that ‘Integration policy will be a two-way street involving rights and duties for those migrants who reside, work and in particular those who aspire to be Irish citizens’ (2008: 9-10). All of these were very much in keeping with the harmonization identified by Joppke and the thrust of the CBPs.

A number of measures identified in *Migration Nation* fell to the wayside by the end of 2008. These included funding for migrants in schools (undermining linguistic integration goals) and plans for a Commission on Integration. The stated reason was the need to make cuts in public expenditure in response to the global financial crisis. But state-funded bodies with anti-discriminatory remits were subjected to hugely disproportionate cuts (the Equality Authority) or were shut down altogether (National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism). The Combat Poverty Agency, which had long driven the development of social inclusion policy in Ireland, was abolished. Arguably, Irish governance had purged its advocates of integration-as-social inclusion. Significantly, *Migration Nation* (unlike the earlier *Integration: A Two Way Process*) did not cite or paraphrase social inclusion documents. It made no specific commitments to integration-as-social inclusion.

*Developmental modernity and cultural convergence*

*Migration Nation* engaged directly with the question of institutional harmonization and social convergence. It argued from a nation state perspective that there would be limits to the former; only so much could be drawn on from the experiences of other countries:

In applying such international models, the most important consideration be taken into account is that integration takes place in the very specific context of individual cultures and traditions, legal systems, immigration histories, administration practices, religious profiles and shared value-systems. This is not to say that lessons cannot be learned but such lessons must be strictly filtered to allow for such differences (2008: 29).

*Migration Nation* also emphasised the ‘soft’ but ‘binding’ harmonizing role of the EU:

The point has already been made that globalisation, among other international phenomena, binds us together with other States and standardises experiences generated by the movement of people. As an EU Member State, this binding is a powerful determinant of integration issues and the role of the EU is particularly relevant. In general, the EU, in understanding the contextual nature of integration, has to date adopted a relatively soft approach to the co-ordination of
international policy and concentrates on the articulation and development of best practices as opposed to harmonisation. Thus, EU leadership initiatives focus on exchange of information and principles of integration common to Member States (2008: 29).

In keeping with the CBPs Migration Nation de-emphasised national identity politics. However, its very title implied a cultural focus of integration. It specified two historical reference points. The first claimed that Ireland’s history of Diaspora implied an intrinsic solidarity towards immigrants. The Minister of Integration’s foreword (2008: 7) evoked memories of past Irish emigration (‘a sense of failure evoked by our own inability to provide for our own people and the courage it took to start a new life far from home’), and claimed a role for the Diaspora in formulating Irish identity (‘In purely historical terms it is not an exaggeration to state that the Irish identity is as much as a product of those who left our shores as those who stayed at home’). A degree of intrinsic solidarity with migrants was claimed (‘This Ministerial Statement of policy is predicated on the idea that Ireland has a unique moral, intellectual and practical capability to adapt to the experiences of inward migration’).

Such sentimental rhetoric belied several generations of post-Famine exclusionary pressures that, as deeply internalised within families and communities, ruthlessly consigned those without prospects to emigration or lesser status (Crotty, 1986, Inglis 1987). Ireland’s response to its Diaspora was one of considerable ambivalence. An ongoing sense of Malthusian fatalism depicted emigration as a manifestation of overpopulation whereby any increase in population was not to be condoned because it would mean a decline in living standards for the rest (Lee, 1989: 647). Through the 1998 Good Friday Agreement the Irish abroad became officially recognised by the Irish state as part of the Irish nation. The return of emigrants was promoted by the State during the late 1990s boom. Irishness was now portrayed as ‘a global family, linked by blood and ancestry’ (Ni Laoire, 2008: 39). A ‘Jobs Ireland’ campaign set up by the State encouraged co-ethnics abroad to ‘think with their blood’ in fulfilling their patriotic duty to return. However, invitations to this family reunion were selective; the focus was on attracting the skilled Irish abroad (Hayward and Howard, 2007: 57-8). Migration Nation offered a similar conditional welcome to immigrants.

The most prominent advocate of ethnic nepotism in the Irish case has been David McWilliams, an influential economist and journalist. In a 2007 bestseller book (and accompanying television series) McWilliams argued that large-scale immigration was accepted because economic growth ensured that there were no distributional conflicts between natives and newcomers (2007: 60). He posited (and advocated) an emerging politicisation of immigration as one between nativists (whom he termed Hibernians) and cosmopolitans. McWilliams advocated a selective cosmopolitanism meshed with an essentialist conception of Irishness, closer to fringe nationalist groups than any of the mainstream political parties. He proposed a ‘New Hibernia’ nation-building project modelled to some extent on Zionism and Jewish history. This would privilege the co-ethnics of the Diaspora whilst rejecting other migrants (2008: 243). He advocated pulling out of the EU because of treaty requirements to accept EU migrants. It is noteworthy that anti-immigration did not feature in any of the no campaigns prior to the 2007 Referendum that rejected the Treaty of Lisbon and that the fundamentalist ethnic nepotism McWilliams advocated found no support in the political mainstream. This indifference suggests the limits of ethnic nepotism theory in the Irish case. Large-scale immigration was justified by ‘a national interest.
discourse’ after the numbers of available co-ethnic migrants went into decline (Boucher, 2008: 6). This ‘national interest’ was distinct from ethnic interest as defined by Salter and McWilliams insofar was some co-ethnics were less desired than some migrants. Arguably, McWilliam’s ideas met with indifference because these were deliberately framed as a recovery of a kind essentialist nationalism that had long been displaced from the Irish rules of belonging.

The second historical contingency emphasised in Migration Nation was the emergence of developmental nation-building (aka developmentalism) which won out over an earlier ‘Irish Ireland’ cultural phase. The preoccupations of the latter were the cultural reproduction of the Irish language and of Catholicism (Hibernicism as described by McWilliams). From the 1950s a new developmental nation-building de-emphasised the cultural reproduction of Irish national identity in favour of economic growth, social liberalism and the individualisation of Irish life. The origins of a developmental nation-building project trace back to the publication of the influential Economic Development in 1957. Under the political leadership of Sean Lemass, and influenced heavily by the 1965 OECD/Irish government report Investment in Education, developmental social reproduction goals came to the fore (Government of Ireland, 1965). Investment in Education amounted to a paradigm shift whereby a combined mercantile and human capital paradigm broke with an earlier dominant theocentric one. Developmental secular liberalism clashed with Catholic conservatism as well as the primacy of cultural liberalism. Within education policy religious expertise, epitomised by Papal Encyclicals and Episcopal pronouncements, was displaced from the 1960s onwards by World Bank, OECD and EU reports and policies (O’Sullivan, 2005: 105-115).

Developmental modernity (precipitated by the expansion of education and urbanisation) was accompanied by ontological shifts in rules of belonging (social liberalism, secularism and individualism). In the standard Celtic Tiger era accounts, exemplified by Tom Garvin’s Preventing the Future: Why was Ireland so poor for so long?, developmentalist had triumphed over a history of economic failure, emigration and cultural stagnation (2004: 170). As defined by Joseph Lee, developmental liberalism was a visceral psychological and emotional response to post-colonial underdevelopment, a necessary valorisation of liberal agency and enterprise culture in the face of widespread fatalism (Lee, 1989). Developmentalism de-traditionalised Irishness but it did not de-ethnicise it (Frost, 2006). The state continued to constitutionally reflect the Catholic culture of the dominant ethnic group. At the same time it defined the national interest in primarily economic terms as the pursuit of growth. Insofar as optimum economic development was in the national interest so too was large-scale immigration. As justified in Migration Nation:

The important point for all Irish citizens to understand is that immigration is happening in Ireland because of enormous recent societal and economic improvement, beginning in the 1990s, but built on an opening to the world created by the late Sean Lemass as Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in the 1960s (2008: 8).

Irish modernity had arguably become a generic one where the rules of belonging had become de-traditionalised, human capital-centred, determined by educational attainments and by the labour market. In 2005 the National Economic Social and Council (NESC) influentially proposed the extension of developmentalism to all aspects of social policy. The Developmental Welfare State (DWS) echoed the notions
of reflexive modernity and of an individualised risk society developed by Giddens and Beck. In policy terms the parallels here were with the Third Way reconfiguration of social policy proposed by Giddens in the United Kingdom. As applied by Beck to the British case it identified an institutionalised individualism in opposition to neo-liberal market individualism. Beck argued that most rights and entitlements associated with the British welfare state were designed for individuals engaged in paid-employment: ‘In many cases they presuppose employment. Employment in turn implied education and both of these presuppose mobility. By all these requirements people are invited to constitute themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals.’ (Beck cited in Giddens, 1998: 36). In The Third Way Giddens argued that the (developmental) role of the state was to support individual reflexivity in managing risks and hazards across the human lifecycle (1998: 99).

As outlined in DWS: ‘A fundamental standpoint from which to judge the adequacy and effectiveness of overall social protection is to access the risks and hazards which the individual person in Irish society faces and the supports available to them at different stages of the lifecycle (2005: xxiv). DWS exemplified an ontological modernisation of belonging that had come to remainder Irish citizens lacking in flexibility and reflexivity. It emphasised that these would have to compete with immigrants in possession of both (2005: 57). Whilst some migrants are exempted from social inclusion partly because of ethnic nepotism, some citizens experience a delimited ethnic altruism.

Conclusion

Arguably, what is being harmonized through the EU no single integration paradigm but a number of social, institutional and political ones. From a convergence perspective harmonization of integration exemplifies a new chapter in parallel modernization of belonging within Member States. The harmonization of integration has emerged in a context of multiculturalism writ large where the politics of incommensurability – the Europe of continual wars and, in Ireland, sectarian conflict predicated on the religious and political divisions of the Reformation - has been tamed but by no means eliminated. In this context Member States extend cosmopolitan reciprocal welfare altruism towards one another and welfare ethnic nepotism towards outsiders. As presented in the Common Basic Principles harmonization preserves the linguistic claims to incommensurable national identities characteristic of essentialist nationalism. Ireland is something of an exception here insofar as the nationalist Gaelic revival was only a partial success. English flourished after independence for utilitarian reasons, a harbinger of the developmental nation-building project that began to displace cultural nationalism from the Irish rules of belonging from the mid-twentieth century. EU integration norms posit a ‘generic’ modernisation of belonging. Insofar as the Irish case validates Joppke’s harmonization thesis it does so because of an underlying cultural convergence characterised in the Irish case as developmental modernity.

Irish integration policy debates have come to be defined by a national interest developmental liberalism open to mass immigration with minimal commitment to integration. Whilst Irish social policy is considerably influenced by EU social inclusion debates Irish ambivalence to integration-as-social inclusion exemplifies the civic integration harmonization, with its accompanying welfare stratifications identified by Joppke. Irish integration policy ultimately defines the national interest in neo-liberal terms and privatises responsibility for integration to individual migrants.
(Boucher: 2007:6). While Joppke is dismissive of the ‘rhetoric’ of social inclusion integration-as-social inclusion is posited here as offering clear policy alternatives to unsustainable neo-liberal civic integration. It is viable insofar as it is predicted upon transferable institutionalised knowledge about the dangers of social exclusion of citizens to social cohesion. The EU has successfully promoted welfare reciprocities between Member States. But the political problems of extending welfare solidarities beyond citizens and co-ethnics tend to be de-emphasised in what is described here as apolitical integration and in EU documents as soft harmonization. Yet, the EU policy game of repetitively commending social inclusion norms to Member States can be seen as a cosmopolitan challenge to welfare ethnic nepotism. In the Irish case an embryonic and very much beleaguered integration-as-social model has a national interest case to make against integration defined in neo-liberal terms. In this context integration-as-social inclusion offers a case for solidarity between migrants and citizens of the nation state that may only be politically realised partially and retrospectively.

**Bibliography**


Government of Ireland (1965), Investment in Education (Stationary Office/OECD, 1965)


