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Abstract

A number of scholars have suggested that the left-right dimension can be simplified to a conflict over how much inequality should be accepted in society. Yet previous research has found that while acceptance of inequality may correlate with right-wing self-placements in Western Europe, the same does not apply in Eastern Europe. This paper revisits this by examining inequality in relation to class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity (/immigration), taking into account that different inequalities are politicised in different countries and have differing levels of importance for the left-right dimension depending on the context. Results of multilevel regression models demonstrate that attitudes favourable to change in an egalitarian direction correlate with left-wing self-placements in both Eastern and Western Europe. This critical break from previous research is especially important for future studies on Eastern Europe, where the left-right dimension has previously been understood to function very differently compared to Western Europe.

Keywords: Left-right dimension; equality; inequality; ideology; public opinion.

Introduction

An intriguing conundrum for researchers of Left-Right (L-R) politics has been the political landscapes of the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2006. It appears that what was considered left-wing in the Czech Republic was considered right-wing in Hungary. In the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al., 2010), parties on the Left in Hungary were considered more socially progressive, but also more economically right-wing, compared to parties on the Right. However, the opposite was true in the Czech Republic, where left-wing parties were more economically leftist and socially conservative (in comparison with the Right in the Czech Republic). Even though both countries share a large portion of their recent history as parts of the Soviet Union, their left-right (L-R) scales in 2006 were thus in large part the reverse of each other. A seemingly reasonable conclusion to these

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puzzling examples would be that what is considered *left* and *right* in different countries is entirely context dependent.

This stands in stark contrast to attempts at finding a universal explanation for L-R classifications. Many theorists have attempted at finding a stable element of L-R competition that is not context-dependent – a substantive meaning that can travel across time and space. Arguably the most prominent of such explanations is the suggestion that a*cceptance of inequality* (or the equality/inequality criterion) is the core dimension of the L-R distinction, defined in different terms by different authors (e.g., Bobbio, 1996; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Jost et al., 2003; Laponce, 1981; Lipset et al., 1954; Lukes, 2003; MacIver, 1947; Rokeach, 1973). The Czech and Hungarian cases would seemingly weaken this claim because it poses an impossible situation: how can a single criterion explain L-R competition when what is *left* in one country is *right* in another? Possibly even more troubling for the equality/inequality criterion is Thorisdottir et al.'s (2007) finding that acceptance of inequality as a psychological trait is correlated with right-wing self-placement in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. This would mean that attitudes towards equality can only explain L-R self-placements in Western Europe, and the explanation would at best be region-specific. L-R party competition in Eastern Europe provides further doubt for the equality/inequality criterion there. There is a positive correlation between parties being socially conservative and economically left in some countries in Eastern Europe (e.g., the Czech Republic), while social conservatism is consistently linked to right-wing economic policy in party politics in Western Europe (Rovny and Edwards, 2012). All this indicates that L-R politics in Eastern Europe is fundamentally different from Western Europe, and that equality/inequality is not a good criterion for separating left from right in all of Europe.

I demonstrate in this paper that contrary to this established view, the equality/inequality criterion is applicable to voters in Eastern and Western Europe alike. Key to this finding is that previous research has overlooked an important condition that is considered in this paper: attitudes towards different inequalities should only explain voters L-R self-placements *if the specific type of inequality is important/salient in that political context*. Attitudes towards other inequalities are not necessarily correlated with L-R self-placements. To re-examine the equality/inequality distinction in Europe with this in mind, I develop a novel measurement of attitudes towards inequality. Drawing on arguments made by MacIver (1947: 216), Lipset et al. (1954: 1135), Inglehart (1990: 293), Bobbio (1996) and Lukes (2003), I operationalize attitudes towards inequality with four different societal dichotomies – rich/poor, men/women, heterosexual/homosexual individuals, and white citizens/poor immigrants or ethnic minorities. Since different inequalities are important in different political

contexts, acceptance of inequality towards each inequality is hypothesised to correlate with right-wing orientations or have no correlation in each country. Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for 27 countries from 2008 and 2016, I show that across time and space acceptance of inequality is correlated with right-wing self-placement in both Western and Eastern Europe, in contrast to previous research. In most countries this pattern is mainly visible through either economic L-R competition (based on the class cleavage), or the immigration/ethnic inequality dimension. The main contribution of this paper is thus to demonstrate that, in contrast to earlier research, the equality/inequality criterion is indeed applicable to Eastern Europe as well. This result is important because it means that it is premature to dismiss ideas of a criterion that can explain L-R politics in all contexts, and in particular the equality/inequality criterion. Finding such a criterion has the potential of simplifying the most dominant dimension of politics in most representative democracies (Huber and Inglehart, 1995), which would aid researchers and citizens alike in understanding and predicting L-R politics. The paper is structured as follows. I begin by discussing how a criterion can be used to understand the L-R dimension, and subsequently outline the equality/inequality hypothesis (which will be tested) and competing frameworks. This is followed by a review of previous research testing the equality/inequality criterion. The data and methodology utilised in the paper are thereafter presented, followed by the results of the analysis. The paper ends with a section discussing the implications and limitations of the study.

Can a Single Criterion Explain the Left-Right Dimension in Europe?

Jost (2006: 654) describes the left-right (L-R) dimension as "the single most useful and parsimonious way to classify political attitudes for more than 200 years". It is all the more surprising then that there is no consensus as to what the L-R dimension actually entails. Or, to be more specific, whether the dimension actually has any substantive meaning that can travel across time and space. Even though this knowledge is lacking, political scientists nevertheless frequently classify many phenomena and entities as *left* or *right* (such as ideologies and policies), and use the L-R dimension to measure the ideological position of parties and voters (e.g., Cunningham and Elkink, 2018; Dalton et al., 2011). The terminology implies a spatial dimension where different entities occupy areas in relation to each other. The imagined space allows one to say that two right-wing individuals for example are *closer* to each other than to a far left-wing individual. Such closeness in politics signifies similarity, and is useful because it means that these individuals are more likely to agree with each other on important political questions compared to individuals further away on the L-R dimension. Understanding why someone is

placed to the left or right in this imagined space would be of utmost importance to political scientists as it would improve measurement validity (Adcock and Collier, 2001), as well as for voters since a better understanding of what separates left from right could improve their vote choices. Consider the example of the Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden, which first won seats in the Swedish parliament in 2010. Voters and political scientists alike were at the time uncertain as to whether SD was a left-wing, centrist or far-right party (Hellström and Nilsson, 2010: 70). Years later it is now clear that SD is a far-right party (Rydgren and van der Meiden, 2018), but the question is whether this could have been predicted?

Such prediction necessitates knowledge of why something is considered left- or right-wing. Multiple authors have attempted to explain what separates left from right by proposing a criterion (Bobbio, 1996; Inglehart, 1990; Laponce, 1981; Lipset et al., 1954; Lukes, 2003; MacIver, 1947; Noël and Thérien, 2008; Rokeach, 1973; Silverman, 1985). Scholars are divided on this subject, proposing different explanations. The equality/inequality framework provides an instructive example of how there could be a central criterion for ideological L-R competition. Bobbio (1996: 61) defines a policy proposal that includes (re)distribution of something that individuals value (e.g., money, power, status) as more egalitarian if more individuals are included in the redistribution.[2] Additionally, the more that is redistributed the more egalitarian the criterion is. Finally, a criterion such as need is more egalitarian than merit, which in turn is more egalitarian than rank. Consider the implication of this criterion on two important political issues in European politics: support for refugee immigration and economic redistribution. These can be understood to be part of two different dimensions (the socio-economic and immigration dimension), yet support for both positions is often considered to be *more left* than right in Western Europe (Lesschaeve, 2017). From Bobbio's point of view, both political views seek more equality than their counterparts (anti-immigration and capitalist views). Thus, there is a common denominator that explains their left-wing classification.

Recent research may provide some reason to be sceptical of any universal explanation of the L-R dimension (including the equality/inequality distinction), however. Some researchers question whether the L-R dimension has the same meaning for citizens in different countries in Europe, which would mean that the L-R dimension cannot be used in cross-country comparisons, at least not without taking these differences into account (Zuell and Scholz, 2019). While there may be differences in how individuals in various countries understand the L-R terminology, this does not contradict the idea of a criterion and in particular the

[2] It is noteworthy that this definition could theoretically be extended to animals (and even the climate).

equality/inequality criterion. Rather, a criterion can help explain many of these counter-intuitive patterns. Inglehart (1990: 293) argues that the equality/inequality criterion is flexible enough that it can be applied to different inequalities depending on the society. For example, L-R politics might be more about economic inequality in Portugal, while it is more related to the immigration dimension in Austria, but it can nevertheless be explained by the equality/inequality criterion in both instances. The same logic can be applied to citizens of the same country. For example, Caughey et al. (2019: 4) state that (citing Dalton, 2010: 105), a blue-collar worker in Germany may think of social welfare policies when thinking of the Left, while a college student in Germany may think of multiculturalism. Welfare policies relate to the economic dimension much like multiculturalism in Germany relates to the immigration dimension. As discussed earlier, the fact that policies in support of immigrants and the poor are left-wing in Germany is in accordance with the equality/inequality criterion. Thus, the two German individuals are associating different issues with the L-R dimension, yet the equality/inequality criterion can potentially explain the L-R direction in both cases.

Supporting or Opposing Change in an Egalitarian Direction

Bobbio's proposed framework on the equality/inequality criterion is only one in a long tradition of authors proposing similar explanations of the L-R divide (Inglehart, 1990; Lipset et al., 1954; Lukes, 2003; MacIver, 1947).[3] The general agreement is that the Left overall is more in favour of change in an egalitarian direction than the Right (at least in regard to salient group divides/cleavages). There are different nuances between the frameworks, but they can be understood as complementary. Lipset et al. (1954) and MacIver (1947: 216) emphasise the fact that underprivileged groups, either economically or with respect to social status, tend to support the Left, regardless of context. Building upon this work Inglehart notably changes the focus, as noted by Jou (2011: 36), from group support to individual attitudes: "The core meaning of the L-R dimension, we believe, is whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction […]. While conservative movements may be content to defend the status quo, reactionary ones seek change in the direction of greater inequality between classes, nationalities, or other groups" (Inglehart, 1990: 293). Here we ought to find an isolated correlation between being left-wing and supporting change in an egalitarian direction.

[3] Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 257-260) suggest a variant of the equality/inequality explanation, in which the Left argues for equality, and the Right for order. This modification of the criterion, while subtle, makes it different from the equality/inequality hypothesis as tested in this paper.

Similarly to Bobbio, MacIver and Lipset et al. infer that the criterion that separates left from right is *equality*. The word *equality* has however some connotations that are not applicable to the criterion, which should be kept in mind when applying it. For example, the criterion does not imply that all right-wing individuals are against equality. Many right-wing individuals simply value other ends more than equality (such as meritocratic and/or traditional values), which inadvertently lead to relatively more inequality compared to policies proposed by the Left (Kerlinger, 1984: 37). In a similar vein, individuals on the Left who support change in an egalitarian direction are not necessarily egalitarians (i.e. valuing equality) by any means. For example, the furthest most extreme leftists at times harbour hatred of privileged groups (Glaeser, 2005). Revenge could also be a motive, which as long as it is aimed at elevating the lower group in comparison to the upper group (change in an egalitarian direction) will lead an individual to be more left-wing, ceteris paribus. Similarly, Converse (2006 [1964]: 38-39) points out that while many individuals do not have particularly coherent belief systems, they do (in the U.S.) have some of the most coherent attitudes in regard to certain groups. Converse uses the example of attitudes towards black individuals in the U.S. and suggests that one can predict individuals' attitudes towards certain issues depending on their general sympathy for black people. Importantly, individuals who sympathise with black people (and are willing to prioritise this in policy) do not necessarily consciously consider abstract egalitarian principles. They might therefore not favour egalitarian change between other groups, such as between the rich and poor. This further highlights the need to differentiate between attitudes toward different inequalities.

This also relates to a more contemporary debate of multidimensional voter preferences in Europe. Voters are prone to mixing left-wing attitudes on some dimensions with right-wing attitudes on others, while parties tend to be more one-dimensional (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). A party that is left-wing on economic issues is most likely also left-wing on social issues (particularly in Western Europe). This means that the L-R schema is a better predictor of policy positions for parties than it is for voters (Lesschaeve, 2017). Importantly, this can be consistent with the equality/inequality criterion. A Dutch individual might for example favour less immigration but more feminism. These preferences should have diverging effects on the individual's L-R self-placement according to the equality/inequality criterion. The first preference should pull the individual to the right while the latter to the left (as long as the dimensions are salient enough to produce the postulated effects).[4] This multidimensionality among voters also

[4] This is also dependent on how important the individual finds each issue. If economic redistribution is more important to the individual, then this might result in a far-left self-

reflects on the aims of this paper, which does not comment on whether L-R self-placements are meaningful to explain politics or voters' preferences, nor attempt at any new conceptualisation of L-R politics. Rather, this paper is focused on empirically testing whether the equality/inequality criterion can be used to explain correlations between acceptance of inequality and L-R self-placements of individuals in all political contexts in Europe.

Separating between attitudes toward different inequalities is especially important when analysing L-R self-placements in Eastern and Western Europe simultaneously. Studies highlight that L-R competition manifests itself very differently in these two regions. The Right in Poland and Hungary for example increases government spending more than the Left, a relationship that is commonly assumed to be the opposite in Western representative democracies (Tavits and Letki, 2009). Furthermore, researchers find that social conservatism (which is often connected to resistance to egalitarian progressive change) is associated with the West European Right, but with the Left in many countries in Eastern Europe (Rovny and Edwards, 2012: 57). Evidence from regression analyses however show no correlation between parties being socially conservative and left wing in Eastern Europe, when controlling for economic L-R position (see Benoit and Laver, 2006: 132-136).

Despite many authors arguing for the equality/inequality distinction, there is little empirical research testing this hypothesis (especially in Eastern Europe). Evans et al. (1996) find that egalitarian attitudes predict left-wing self-placements in the British electorate. Jost et al. (2003) conduct a meta-analysis of the political psychology literature in which they find that the two most consistent predictors of conservatism are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. Thorisdottir et al. (2007) however find that individuals' acceptance of inequality is only correlated with right-wing self-placements in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. This study is highly relevant for the present inquiry, as it directly tests the equality/inequality criterion at the voter-level in Europe. However, it is not clear whether the equality/inequality explanation really fails to hold in both regions. Thorisdottir et al. measure egalitarian attitudes (with data from the 2002 European Social Survey) through the variable: "He[/she] thinks that it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He[/she] believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life," which measures *equality of opportunity*. This would imply that the most left-wing position (and far-left ideologies) is the most concerned with equalising opportunities. The measurement of attitudes in this paper is instead based on the work of MacIver

placement even though the individual is right-wing on other issues. Crucially, mixing left- and right-wing views on different issues will not always lead to a centrist self-placement.

(1947: 216), Lipset et al. (1954), Inglehart (1990: 293), Bobbio (1996) and Lukes (2003), which as discussed earlier concerns support for change in an egalitarian direction in regards to specific group inequalities. The difference between these two approaches means that a re-examination might deliver different results.

Furthermore, the equality/inequality criterion (as tested in this paper) only relates to prominent group divides, which means that L-R self-placements only necessarily correlate with attitudes towards some inequalities. These inequalities are often based on cleavages (e.g., class, see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), but can also be based on inequalities between groups that are not necessarily classified as cleavages (e.g., sexuality, see Hässler et al., 2020). Different political issues are linked to L-R competition in different countries (Benoit and Laver, 2006: 143). As Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 207) postulate, "the meaning of the L-R schema is defined by the conflicts of the specific societal system."[5] The equality/inequality hypothesis examined in this paper is therefore, succinctly formulated, as follows:

H1: Attitudes supporting change in an egalitarian direction in regard to context-specific inequalities have a positive correlation with left-wing self-placements in both Eastern and Western Europe.

Competing Frameworks

The equality/inequality explanation is not the only one on this topic, nor is it the first. Downs (1957) famously makes the assumption that the L-R dimension can be simplified to a conflict regarding the degree of government intervention in the economy. Yet he points out that the theory is "admittedly […] unrealistic [… in part because] the parties designated as right wing extremists in the real world are for fascist control of the economy rather than free markets" (Downs, 1957: 116).[6] A similar problem is left-wing anarchism, which aims for a stateless society. These notable exceptions are especially problematic if we concede that the L-R dimension is supposed to measure political ideology. In fact, these classifications of ideologies are a part of a puzzle in the field: why are fascism and anarcho-capitalism both often classified as far-right ideologies when these ideologies have little, if anything, in common?

Laponce (1981) suggests that there is an equality/inequality and a secular/religious underlying element of the L-R dimension. What is left and right is thus be separated by two criteria. Rokeach (1973) similarly claims that equality is one of two criteria that separate left from right, freedom being the other, which

[5] It is not entirely clear in the literature why some cleavages and group divides are salient/important when explaining L-R competition, while others are not.

[6] Furthermore, left and right also deals with other questions than only economic ones, such as cultural issues and immigration (e.g., De Vries et al., 2013; Polk et al., 2017: 2).

can be used to separate actors within the Left and Right (what is more left or more right). There is also the idea that the Left is concerned with equality of outcome whereas the Right is concerned with equality of opportunity, as proposed by Noël and Thérien (2008). These are different types of equality and their conclusion thus contrasts with the equality/inequality explanation, which states that the Left is *more* concerned with equality than the Right, and not just another kind of equality. A notable exception to the idea of an equality/inequality element of the L-R dimension is Silverman's (1985) suggestion that the Left embraces universal principles and the Right supports more particularistic ideals. These competing explanations are not tested as hypotheses in this paper, and therefore remain potential criteria explaining the L-R divide, as this paper is focused on the question of whether the equality/inequality distinction is able to explain L-R politics in Eastern and Western Europe. However, additional analysis in the appendix controls for the most important of these explanations when testing the equality/inequality criterion. Future research will benefit from testing these competing frameworks further.

Not all theorists agree that there is any criterion that can separate between left and right in different contexts. In fact, a pervasive argument in the literature is that L-R competition is too dissimilar in different contexts to have any such stable meaning (Sartori, 1976: 335), and that citizens understand the terms in varying ways depending on their context and social background (Bauer et al., 2016; Zechmeister, 2006; Zuell and Scholz, 2019). This hypothesis ought to be understood as the null hypothesis – the absence of any universal explanation for L-R competition.

Data and Variables

To test the equality/inequality hypothesis, this paper examines whether respondents' L-R self-placements in different countries can be explained by attitudes towards salient inequalities. This analysis has two main noteworthy complications. First, when explaining L-R self-placements of individuals, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) suggest three predictors: partisanship, social characteristics (sociodemographic variables) and ideology. Thus, L-R self-placements ought to be a function of these three (coupled with other less important causes). Since this paper is only concerned with the ideological component, this highlights that there are other variables that will interfere with the analysis. While it is possible to control for sociodemographic variables, it is very difficult to separate an individual's party choice and an individual's ideology (as these are inextricably linked, see Mavrogordatos, 1987: 339). Party choice is therefore not controlled for. However, a separate analysis is conducted where

partisanship is controlled for, without changing the conclusions of the study (the analysis can be found in the appendix).

Second, different groups are on different sides of inequalities in different societies. Lipset et al. (1954: 1140) report that protestant Christians in the U.S. (but not Catholics at the time) were more right wing in the 1950s, but that Christians in Lebanon and Syria were on average more left wing compared to the Muslim majority. Yet the Arab minority in Israel was more left wing. Lipset *et al.* suggest that this is a function of the relative position of the group (rather than a function of the religious denomination), where left-wing politics tend to further the interests of the underprivileged. Thus, when measuring support for more equality in multiple countries, it is important to choose group conflicts that will be translatable into different contexts. For example, poorer individuals are likely to always be understood as the have-nots in all societies, while specific religious denominations might vary more in their social status.

Putting these complications aside, this paper utilises data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008 and 2016. The ESS is a cross-national survey,[7] which enables this paper to control for the largest number of intervening variables possible. The individual survey answers are analysed using multilevel models with observations hierarchically structured, i.e. survey respondents (level 1) are located in different countries (level 2). Random intercepts for each country are utilised, as well as random slopes for certain variables. The dependent variable is *L-R Self-Placement*,[8] and there are four independent variables that measure different attitudes regarding change in an egalitarian direction. It is more logical (from the perspective of the cited authors proposing the equality/inequality criterion) to treat an individual's L-R self-placement as being explained by their attitudes towards specific group inequalities, rather than the other way around. This is what Thorisdottir et al. (2007: 185) also argue for, but they use L-R self-placements as the independent variable for computational purposes. However, due to the complicated relationship between L-R self-placements and issue attitudes (i.e. what causes what?), this paper mostly discusses these relationships as correlations.

Attitudes towards inequality are measured with four societal inequalities, that can be characterised as cleavages or group divides. The dimensions are in line with current research on important issue dimensions, such as for example

[7] All countries were included in the sample as long as they (1) were considered a democracy at the time of the survey, and (2) had two democratic elections in recent years, using scores from the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2014). Democratic experience is often assumed to help individuals develop clearer and more consistent L-R self-placements and associations (Thorisdottir et al., 2007: 183).

[8] Measured on an eleven-point scale.

Caughey et al. (2019) who identify the economic, immigration and social dimensions as particularly important in Europe. The first group conflict is the class cleavage, which is arguably the most enduring conflict associated with the L-R dimension (Mair, 2009). This is operationalised with the item *Economic Inequality*, measured in the ESS data with three statements, where respondents are asked to state their level of agreement: "Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts," "For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small" and "Government should reduce differences in income levels." The four independent variables are all operationalised in this manner: using the available and suitable items. This means that if more survey items are available measuring the same concept, they are added to construct the whole variable for that data set. In that sense, the independent variables are not always measuring the same underlying attitude, but function as measurements of individuals' general level of hostility to/acceptance of inequality regarding each group conflict/cleavage. Employing each survey item (for all independent variables) in the regressions individually does not result in meaningful differences for the conclusions of the paper (not reported in the paper for the sake of brevity).

The second inequality is in regard to ethnic minorities/poor immigrants compared to white citizens. The variable *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* is measured in the ESS data with two items: "Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority" and "Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe." Both policies are changes in an egalitarian direction – these immigrants have lesser outcomes than the current citizens, and are seeking to improve their conditions. How the inhabitants of the country would be affected is a debate that is irrelevant for this paper, as long as the immigrants gain more than the inhabitants in relative terms (as specified earlier) by immigration. Furthermore, it would have been different if it was not clear that the immigrants were from poorer countries (or if there was no ethnic element), for example if many immigrants were wealthy and came from well-to-do countries. Since we are concerned here with the specific social position of each group it becomes less reliable to use such a measurement, if the word *immigrant* does not always reflect a group with lesser outcomes and power (a clearer inequality).

The last two inequalities are between women and men, and homosexual compared to heterosexual individuals. Similar to the class cleavage, each of these group conflicts have two groups that have differences in total outcomes. Having better outcomes is defined by what people value, for example money, power and status. The less fortunate group has lesser outcomes on average and has often historically been oppressed (e.g., through legal restrictions that made it impossible for women to vote, or for same-sex couples to marry).

The variable *Intolerance of Homosexuality* is measured with the items "Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish," "Gay and lesbian couples right to adopt children" and "Ashamed if close family member gay or lesbian" (the latter two not available in 2008). The former two items are policy prescriptions. It is irrelevant whether these policies are already in place. If they are not, then being in favour of them constitute change in an egalitarian direction. This is true even if the policy has no implication for heterosexual individuals since equality is a relative concept. If these policies are in place (dependent on the specific country), then opposing them would constitute change in an inegalitarian direction. Of course, it is theoretically possible that someone could oppose these policies based on the idea that *nobody should be free to live as they wish*, or the idea that *nobody should be able to adopt children*. However, the statements are phrased in a manner that makes it unlikely that any substantial amount of respondents had such an interpretation.

"Ashamed if close family member gay or lesbian" is not measuring any specific policy, but rather is aimed at measuring homophobia and prejudice. It is possible to be homophobic on a personal level yet favour egalitarian policies such as gay rights (this would result in measurement error). Therefore, this attitude is considered a proxy measurement rather than a direct measurement of support for change in an egalitarian direction. As a robustness check, the analysis in a subsequent model uses only "Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish" (and using only "Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce" for the *Anti-Feminist Attitude* variable), resulting in no changes to the conclusion of this paper (see Fig SM6. and SM7. in the appendix).

The last independent variable is *Anti-Feminist Attitude*, which is measured with one item in the ESS 2016 data: "Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce." This is a policy description which indicates a change in an inegalitarian direction (for countries where this is not the case). For the ESS 2008 data, the variable "Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family" is also added to the variable. This rather measures sexism, which similarly to the attitudinal item measuring homophobia is used as a proxy to measure how much the respondent favours change in an egalitarian or inegalitarian direction between men and women. As stated in the previous paragraph, an additional analysis only using "Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce," produces in only minor changes to the results (see appendix).

Eight different sociodemographic control variables are included in the analyses, mimicking previous literature on the topic. *Female*, *Age*, and *Household Income* (Thorisdottir et al., 2007) are utilised, as well as *Union Member* (Piurko et

al., 2011). Other standard control variables are included such as *Education Level,*[9] *Religiosity*, *Rural*, *Ethnic Minority* and dichotomous variables for different religious denominations. Further details on how all the variables are constructed can be found in the appendix.

The ESS data allows the control of four psychological variables: *Traditionalism*, *Rule-Following, Need for Security* and *Openness to Experience*. Thorisdottir et al. (2007) treat these as psychological factors that might affect an individual's L-R position, as well as correlating with an individual's acceptance of inequality (see also Jost et al., 2003). One last control variable is added: *More EU Integration*, which reflects attitudes towards the EU. In some countries, positive sentiments towards the EU is more associated with the Left, and in other countries with the Right (Van Elsas et al., 2016).

The data from the ESS is imperfect in that it does not contain some vital measurements. Specifically, there is no variable measuring attitudes towards government intervention in the economy, freedom and resistance to change. Freedom is an important ideological concern (Rokeach, 1973), which could correlate with all four independent variables in the analysis, as well as the dependent variable. Resistance to change is also important as it often correlates with right-wing political orientation and policy attitudes towards inequalities (Jost et al., 2003; Lipset et al., 1954). Government Intervention (Economic) is important because it separates between concerns of economic inequality, and government intervention in the economy. To be able to control for these variables, a separate analysis is conducted (see appendix) with data from the World Value Survey (WVS) as well as the European Values Study (EVS). This analysis is overall very similar to the ESS analysis, with the main difference being the additional three extra variables just outlined, as well as not including controls for the psychological variables *Traditionalism*, *Rule-Following, Need for Security* and *Openness to Experience*. The WVS and EVS analyses, which include Germany, Spain, Estonia, the Czech Republic, the United States, Venezuela, Uruguay and Australia, overall demonstrate the same results for the independent variables as the analysis using the ESS data.

Analysis and Results

The variables are analysed in multilevel regression models with different data sets separated. However, it could be argued that ordinary least regression (OLS) analyses for each country separately would be better suited for this analysis. OLS

[9] However, for ESS 2008, this variable contains a large amount of respondents that could not be classified into any category (around a third, see ESS documentation), and therefore, this variable was substituted with *Years of Education.* This variable ranges between a minimum of 0 and a maximum capped at 18, identical to Harbers *et al.'s* (2012: 957) approach.

models (in the appendix, see Fig. SM8 and SM9) produce overall strikingly similar results compared to the multilevel models. Nevertheless, the focus in this section will be on the multilevel models. The independent variables are standardised in all models (in the paper and the appendix) to facilitate comparison.[10] Earlier research encourages the expectation that the equality/inequality hypothesis will hold in Western Europe. Conversely, earlier research suggests that acceptance of inequality will not correlate with right-wing self-placements in Eastern Europe. The ESS provides data for 27 countries (10 in Eastern Europe, 17 in Western Europe[11]). The four independent variables have random slopes in the multilevel models as they are expected to differ by country. *More EU Integration* also has a random slope since its correlation with *L-R Self-Placement* substantively varies in different countries. The multilevel regression model coefficients can be found in Table SM4 in the appendix.

The equality/inequality hypothesis suggests that different dimensions will have an impact on L-R self-placements in different contexts. Thus, the important task is to inspect the patterns in each country (rather than any overall effect). Fig. 1 and 2 display the coefficients and their confidence intervals[12] in the multilevel models for the four independent variables *Economic Inequality*, *Anti-Feminist Attitude*, *Intolerance of Homosexuality* and *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality*, for each of the countries in the ESS data. The overall results demonstrate support for the equality/inequality hypothesis, meaning that acceptance of inequality in at least one of the four areas correlates with right-wing self-placements in all countries. In some countries, all four variables have significant correlations with *L-R Self-Placement* (such as the Netherlands and Croatia) while this is not the case in other countries.

[10] Table SM2 and SM3 in the appendix display descriptive statistics.

[11] I include Israel (IL) as a West European country because of their inclusion in the ESS.

[12] The confidence intervals were calculated with 400 bootstraps of each model. See Freedman (1981) on the benefits of bootstrapping. The coefficients are the original coefficients from the models.



Fig. 1. Independent Variable Coefficients by Country: ESS 2008

Overall, the independent variables are in almost every country either positively significant or non-significant. However, *Anti-Feminist Attitude* and *Intolerance of Homosexuality* have rather weak effects (and many times non-significant). Instead, *Economic Inequality* and *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* have stronger correlations with L-R self-placements in most countries, which is expected due to the higher level of saliency of these issues. This seems to be the case especially in later years, as the *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* coefficients are stronger in 2016 compared to 2008. This pattern corresponds well with the trend of increasing saliency of immigration as a political issue in recent years (e.g., De Vries et al., 2013).

Importantly, the same patterns are found for East European countries as with West European countries, even though the coefficients are generally somewhat less strong overall in Eastern Europe. This pattern should be expected since, according to Piurko et al. (2011), sociodemographic variables explain more of L-R orientations compared to values in East European countries (whereas the reverse relationship was found in Western Europe). East European countries also have overall lower levels of L-R self-placements (author's calculations).



Fig. 2. Independent Variable Coefficients by Country: ESS 2016

There are differences between countries as to which attitudes correlate with L-R self-placements. Economic inequality is important for L-R self-placements in Sweden, while gender inequality is seemingly less important. Austria (only in the data set for ESS 2016) conversely has a stronger coefficient for immigration and ethnic inequality, compared to economic inequality. In Western Europe overall most coefficients are significantly positive in most countries, so the difference between different countries is mainly based on different sizes of the coefficients. In Eastern Europe however, there is a clearer distinction between different countries, mainly because more dimensions do not have significant correlations with L-R self-placements. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania have rather strong significant correlations on the economic dimension, but not as strong for the other issue dimensions. Latvia and Hungary have instead stronger correlations on the immigrant/ethnic inequality dimension, compared to their coefficients for *Economic Inequality.* Conversely, the strongest significant correlations for Poland, Croatia and Slovenia are the ones for attitudes towards gender and sexuality. This is an indication of that different political conflicts are important in different countries, but more in-depth research is necessary to understand each specific context (which is beyond the scope of this paper). Yet it

is possible to verify many of these patterns, providing partial validation of the results. For example, Romania only has a significant coefficient for economic inequality in Fig. 1, which aligns with cleavage politics in Romania where the socio-economic cleavage is the most important for electoral competition (Raymond, 2013: 296). Another example is Denmark (only in the data set for ESS 2008), which has the second highest correlation between attitudes towards immigration/ethnic minorities and L-R self-placements. This corresponds well with the fact that the issue of immigration is more important for party competition in Denmark compared to many other European countries (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2017). This also helps explain the far-right classification of the Danish People's party. Their economic policies are often centrist (Juul, 2016), and therefore cannot alone explain the far-right classification of the party. The results for Poland similarly fit the literature, specifically the fact that it lacks a significant coefficient for *Economic Inequality* in 2016 (it is significant and positive in 2008). The socio-cultural dimension (/religious) is more dominant compared to the class dimension, which makes the lack of a significant coefficient in 2016 unsurprising (Letki, 2013). The positive correlations between acceptance of inequality between men and women, as well as heterosexual and homosexual individuals, indicate that these inequalities structure L-R competition in Poland. It is however possible that these correlations stem from the religious cleavage in Poland and are thus caused by the religious dimension. Importantly, this explanation would also support the equality/inequality hypothesis since the Right in Poland is associated with the religious side (Letki, 2013), which is the stronger (/more privileged) group compared to secular individuals and religious minorities. A more in-depth case study of Poland is in order to understand which inequalities might structure L-R competition.

While the overall results support the hypothesis, there are some outliers compared to the general trend. The Czech Republic and Lithuania produce the weakest results, with a few significant negative coefficients. Finland also has one negative coefficient (and six positive coefficients) for attitudes towards gender inequality in 2008 (but the coefficient is not significant in 2016). It is striking however that when adding a control for partisanship (Fig. SM4 and SM5 in the appendix), all countries still have positive coefficients for at least one dimension in both 2008 and 2016, but only one negative coefficient remains – *Intolerance of Homosexuality* in the Czech Republic in 2016. Partisanship is therefore a potential explanation for some of these negative coefficients (but then also for some of the positive coefficients). More research is needed to disentangle the effects of partisanship and ideological attitudes when predicting L-R self-placements. Nevertheless, these weaker cases provide important insights, best exemplified by the Czech Republic. The economic dimension is strongly positively correlated

(approximately 0.5), while attitudes towards homosexual individuals in 2008 and 2016, as well as women in 2008, are negatively correlated with L-R self-placements. These coefficients suggest that support for equality on the socio-cultural dimension in the Czech Republic is correlated (albeit weakly) with right-wing self-placements. Yet in one of the additional analyses in the appendix, using the European Values Study from 1999, the same results are not found (see Table SM11). The only consistent effect in all three data sets (as well as when controlling for partisanship) is the economic attitudes (similar to Lithuania and Finland). The *Economic Inequality* coefficient also has a much stronger relationship with L-R politics than the socio-cultural variables. In fact, the Czech Republic has the strongest coefficient for economic inequality of all post-communist countries in both 2008 and 2016. The strength of the class cleavage is also in line with the literature on politics in the Czech Republic (Evans and Whitefield, 1998; Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008; Linek, 2015). The social dimension in Czech politics is possibly not salient/important enough to produce the postulated effect on *L-R Self-Placement*.[13] The same can be demonstrated for Lithuania, where the economic cleavage is also particularly salient (and important for the L-R dimension) according to previous research (Jurkynas, 2004). The Czech Republic and Lithuania thus partially conforms to the theoretical framework, albeit much weaker cases since the effect of the social (and immigration) dimension should be non-significant (not slightly negative).

The fact that the main dimension of politics in the Czech Republic has been the class cleavage also partially explains the puzzling examples of Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2006, discussed in the introduction of this paper. Left-wing parties in the Czech Republic were more socially conservative than those on the Right in the Czech Republic (according the CHES experts), but this is consistent with the equality-inequality criterion given that the main dimension (class) aligns with the equality/inequality explanation. Similarly, the fact that right-wing parties in Hungary were perceived to be more left-wing on economic issues in 2006 (and the fact that the *Economic Inequality* coefficient for 2008 in this study is not significant) does not contradict the equality/inequality explanation. Class has had "little bearing on political divisions" and "the relevant dimension of substantive political conflict in Hungary is cultural" (Vegetti, 2018: 78), in line with the positive coefficients for the non-economic independent variables in this paper. Nevertheless, it is unclear which lines of conflict (or other factors) best explain Hungarian L-R politics. Tóka and Popa (2013: 309) suggest that the positions that

[13] Another issue here is that how much the participants value freedom as a political value has not been controlled for in the ESS models. Valuing (negative) freedom could correlate with tolerance of homosexuality and right-wing self-placements in the Czech Republic.

defined the Right as different from the Left in 2002-2006 were "nationalist, pro-church, socially conservative and anti-communist positions." A more in-depth analysis of Hungary is necessary to disentangle which inequalities may be important to explain L-R politics. The quantitative evidence presented in this paper cannot explain every country-context, but rather test whether the overall correlations are positively significant or non-significant in varying contexts (in line with the expectations from the equality/inequality hypothesis). While some of the country-specific patterns observed in Fig. 1 and 2 can be partially verified, more in-depth research for each context is necessary.

Discussion and Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the equality/inequality hypothesis holds in both Eastern and Western Europe, in contradiction to earlier research. Which inequality is tied to L-R orientations is dependent on the context. In Europe there seem to be two dimensions of greater importance: an economic dimension, as well as an immigrant/ethnic dimension. The Nordic countries and the Czech Republic have the strongest coefficients on the economic dimension, whereas France, Switzerland and Austria have the strongest coefficients on the immigrant (and ethnic) dimension. These country-specific patterns are similar to the patterns Benoit and Laver (2006: 134) find when investigating the importance of the social and economic dimensions for L-R classifications of parties in different countries. Additionally, the broader theme in Europe in the 21st century is also reflected in the results of this paper: the economic dimension has had an important role for the L-R dimension but has been increasingly challenged by the ethnic/immigrant dimension, especially in Western Europe (e.g., De Vries et al., 2013). Populist radical right parties have grown, with refugee and immigrant issues at the heart of their campaigns (Mudde, 2013). This development may also partially explain another important development in Europe over the last 30 years – the decline of Social Democratic parties. A large part of voters who were underprivileged in regard to the class cleavage, are now understood as privileged in regard to this newer immigrant dimension. That many of these voters then have turned to the Right is an expected consequence.

While this paper finds support for the equality/inequality hypothesis, there remain alternative explanations that can explain the results. It is for example possible that the Right is primarily traditional and not interested in what might be argued as recklessly fast change, and therefore does not support change in egalitarian directions (concerning the four dimensions measured in this paper). The same is true for government intervention in the economy – the Right might be sceptical of government intervention and therefore opposes egalitarian change

(although this would not explain non-economic change towards more equality). However, when controlling for *Resistance to Change* and *Government Intervention (Economic)* using World Value Survey and European Values Study data, the correlations for acceptance of inequality hold (see additional analyses in the appendix). The same can be said to be true in the ESS data, since the control variable *Traditionalism* is present.[14] However, *Resistance to Change* and *Government Intervention (Economic)* also demonstrate isolated correlations with *L-R Self-Placement* in the expected directions (see Fig. SM2 and SM3 in the appendix). Thus, it is possible that there are other dividing lines between left and right, which coexist with the equality/inequality criterion in Europe. In sum, this paper does not have enough data to evaluate these alternative explanations in detail and they deserve attention in future research. However, explanations are needed for how these criteria can separate between left- and right-wing ideologies on the ideological spectrum. For example, why fascism is often classified as a far-right ideology, if government intervention in the economy is the criterion, as already questioned by Downs (1957: 116). Similarly, how can *resistance to change* as a criterion explain the right-wing classification of anarcho-capitalism? Greenberg and Jonas (2003: 377) also criticise this criterion based on the fact that many right-wing movements have proposed change (e.g., Ronald Reagan), while the Left in some post-communist countries have opposed change from their communist past. Interestingly, Greenberg and Jonas similarly criticise the equality/inequality criterion because of its supposedly poor application in post-communist Europe. Authoritarian individuals (on the Left) have "increased ethnocentrism, prejudice, and discriminating attitudes toward out-groups," which means that "communist attitudes can also go along with endorsement of inequality" (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003: 379-380). In fact, this encapsulates an important point in this paper: left-wing individuals can be against inequality in many domains of political life, depending on what is considered *left* in their context. However, these dimensions are unlikely to be politically relevant inequalities in their political systems. It is the main salient dimensions of inequality that are tied to L-R politics in the specific political context which mainly affect the L-R self-placements of individuals. If ethnic inequality in a context is not very politically important, then we cannot expect it to have large effects on individuals L-R self-placements. This further highlights that individual L-R self-placements should not be seen as an indicator of how egalitarian in general an individual is. Rather, only whether the individual favors more or less equality regarding the

[14] Thorisdottir et al. (2007) argue that traditionalism is an aspect of resistance to change, albeit not a perfect representation.

salient (/politically relevant) inequality of their context. This may have nothing to do with egalitarianism for many individuals, as discussed previously.

Returning to discussing the limits of the paper, the models also have some limitations that need to be considered. There are country-specific political issues that have not been controlled for, such as nuclear energy and foreign aid, which are tied to L-R politics in certain contexts but not in others.[15] Controlling for these issues is advised for future research. This research also needs to be extended to other regions to further explore the equality/inequality and competing hypotheses – specifically Asia, Africa and Latin America, large regions with many representative democracies not studied in this paper. Though this study has some limitations, the paper has many benefits for future studies in political science as it adds to the knowledge of the L-R dimension. Being arguably the most popular and important single dimension of politics in representative democracies, understanding whether there is a criterion that can separate between what is considered *left* and *right* is of utmost importance for political science. Such a criterion could potentially be an important explanatory variable for a lot of studies in the social sciences. Uncovering this criterion could also benefit citizens' understanding of politics, by for example improving voting choices (informing the citizenry of what tends to structure their politicians' ideological stances). The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that acceptance of inequality can separate left from right in both Eastern and Western Europe, meaning that there is reason to continue exploring this criterion in further research.

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[15] Including random country effects in the multilevel models does mean that most country-level variables are controlled for, such as culture and institutions. Only at the individual level are confounding factors omitted.

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Separating Left from Right in Eastern Europe: Re-examining Attitudes Towards Inequality

Supplementary Material

Contents

1. Survey Items and Corresponding Variables

Table SM1.[16] Survey Items and Corresponding Variables:[17, 18] ESS

Variable name	Years when included	Question wording[19]	Response options
L-R Self-Placement	2008, 2016	"In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"	11-point scale. 0 = Left, 10 = Right.
Economic Inequality	2008, 2016	"Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
	2008, 2016	"For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
	2008, 2016	"Government should reduce differences in income levels."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	2008, 2016	"Allow many / few immigrants of different race / ethnic group from majority."	4-point scale. 1 = Allow many to come and live here, 4 = Allow none.

[16] SM stands for Supplementary Material.
[17] Excluding self-explanatory variables.
[18] Some of the independent variables have been reversed in direction (changing low values to high). Acceptance of inequality thus always corresponds to high values in the variables used in the regression models.
[19] Taken from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008; ESS, 2016).

	2008, 2016	"Allow many / few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe."	4-point scale. 1 = Allow many to come and live here, 4 = Allow none.
Intolerance of Homosexuality	2008, 2016	"Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
	2016	"Gay and lesbian couples right to adopt children."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
	2016	"Ashamed if close family member gay or lesbian."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
Anti-Feminist Attitude	2008, 2016	"Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
	2008	"Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family."	5-point scale. 1 = Agree strongly, 5 = Disagree strongly.
Household Income	2008, 2016	"Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an	10-point scale. 1 =Low, 10 =High.

		estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income."	
Education Level	2016	"What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?"	The response options (see the ESS codebook) have been simplified into three categories: *Lower Secondary or Less* (reference category)*, Upper Secondary or Vocational* and *Tertiary*.
Years of Education	2008	"About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling."	See the ESS codebook.
Religiosity	2008, 2016	"Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?"	11-point scale. 0 = Not at all religious, 10 = Very religious.
Traditionalism	2008, 2016	"Tradition is important to him[/her]. He[/she] tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family."	6-point scale. 1 = Very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all.
Rule-Following	2008, 2016	"He[/she] believes that people should do what they're told. He[/she]	6-point scale.

		thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching."	1 = Very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all.
Need for Security	2008, 2016	"It is important to him[/her] to live in secure surroundings. He[/she] avoids anything that might endanger his safety."	6-point scale. 1 = Very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all.
Openness to Experience	2008, 2016	"Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him[/her]. He[/she] likes to do things in his own original way."	6-point scale. 1 = Very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all.
	2008, 2016	"He[/she] likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He[/she] thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life"	6-point scale. 1 = Very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all.
More EU Integration	2008, 2016	"Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?"	11-point scale. 0 = Unification already gone too far, 10 = Unification should go further.
Rural	2008, 2016	"Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?"	Dichotomous 1 = A big city, 2 = Suburbs or outskirts of big city, 3 = Town or small city, 4 =

			Country village, 5 = Farm or home in countryside Categories 1-3 were combined as urban (0), while category 4 and 5 were combined as rural.
Union Member	2008, 2016	"Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation?"	Dichotomous. 1 = Yes currently or yes previously 0 = No.

2. Descriptive Statistics

Table SM2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: ESS 2008

Variable	Mean (SD)	Standardised Mean (SD)	Range	Standardised Range
Dependent Variable				
L-R Self-Placement	5.13 (2.16)		0 – 10	
Independent Variables				
Economic Inequality	1.67 (0.76)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-2.21 – 3.08
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	2.95 (1.67)	0 (1)	1 – 6	-1.77 – 1.83
Intolerance of Homosexuality	2.15 (1.15)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-1.01 – 2.48
Anti-Feminist Attitude	1.55 (0.98)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-1.58 – 2.50
Control Variables				
Age	47.84 (17.43)		15 – 100	
Years of Education	12.66 (3.54)		0-18	
Household Income	5.63 (2.73)		1 – 10	
Religiosity	4.57 (2.98)		0 – 10	
Traditionalism	3.25 (1.34)		1 – 6	
Rule-Following	2.88 (1.38)		1 – 6	
Need for Security	3.59 (1.23)		1 – 6	
Openness to Experience	3.27 (1.05)		1 – 6	
More EU Integration	5.27 (2.53)		0 – 10	
Dichotomous Variables	Proportion of Respondents			
Rural	0.35			
Female	0.51			
Ethnic Minority	0.05			

Union Member	0.47
Religious Denomination	
Roman Catholic	0.29
Protestant	0.18
Eastern Orthodox	0.07
Other Christian Denomination	0.01
Jewish	0.03
Muslim	0.01
Eastern religions	0.003
No Religious Affiliation	0.41
Other non-Christian Religions	0.002

Table SM3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: ESS 2016

Variable	Mean (SD)	Standardised Mean (SD)	Range	Standardised Range
Dependent Variable				
L-R Self-Placement	5.08 (2.2)		0 – 10	
Independent Variables				
Economic Inequality	1.55 (0.77)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-2.0 – 3.17
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	2.84 (1.68)	0 (1)	1 – 6	-1.69 – 1.88
Intolerance of Homosexuality	2.24 (1.02)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-1.22 – 2.71
Anti-Feminist Attitude	1.85 (1.03)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-0.83 – 3.05
Control Variables				
Age	49.64 (17.79)		15 – 100	
Household Income	5.41 (2.71)		1 – 10	
Religiosity	4.35 (3.11)		0 – 10	
Traditionalism	3.17 (1.38)		1 – 6	
Rule-Following	2.74 (1.41)		1 – 6	
Need for Security	3.56 (1.25)		1 – 6	
Openness to Experience	3.26 (1.05)		1 – 6	
More EU Integration	5.01 (2.62)		0 – 10	
Dichotomous Variables		Proportion of Respondents		
Education Level				
Lower Secondary or Less		0.22		
Upper Secondary or Vocational		0.51		
Tertiary		0.27		
Rural		0.36		
Female		0.5		

Ethnic Minority	0.05
Union Member	0.42
Religious Denomination	
Roman Catholic	0.33
Protestant	0.14
Eastern Orthodox	0.02
Other Christian Denomination	0.01
Jewish	0.03
Muslim	0.03
Eastern religions	0.004
No Religious Affiliation	0.44
Other non-Christian Religions	0.003

3. Multilevel Regression Models

Table SM4. Multilevel Models Explaining L-R Self-Placement: All Countries ESS

	L-R Self-Placement			
	2008		2016	
Fixed Effects	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Intercept	5.18***	4.60***	3.07***	4.38***
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.13)
Economic Inequality	0.45***	0.40***	0.62***	0.42***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.23***	0.22***	0.20***	0.32***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Intolerance of Homosexuality	0.17***	0.13***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.15***	0.11***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.00)		(0.001)
Years of Education		-0.01		
		(0.00)		
Education Level[20]				
Upper Secondary or Vocational				0.15***
				(0.03)
Tertiary				0.04
				(0.04)
Household Income[21]		0.13***		0.05***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Female		-0.10***		-
		(0.02)		0.16***
				(0.03)
Rural		0.10***		0.07**
		(0.03)		(0.01)

[20] *Lower Secondary or Less* is the reference category.

[21] Slovakia's income data is different from the other countries in the 2008 data, as it does not relate to income deciles. See the ESS documentation for more information. The Slovakian income data is therefore standardised before combining it with the other income data. This is an imperfect solution, but acceptable for the purposes of this papers. The regression was run without the Slovakian data, without changing the results. These results can be supplied on demand.

Religiosity	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Union Member	-0.34***	-
	(0.03)	0.34***
		(0.03)
Ethnic Minority	-0.24***	-
	(0.06)	0.37***
		(0.06)
Religious Denomination[22]		
Protestant	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Eastern Orthodox	-0.60***	-
	(0.09)	0.66***
		(0.11)
Other Christian Denomination	-0.50***	-0.29**
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Jewish	1.60***	2.16***
	(0.17)	(0.15)
Muslim	-1.00***	-
	(0.12)	1.33***
		(0.10)
Eastern Religion	-0.34	-0.49**
	(0.22)	(0.20)
Other non-Christian Religion	-0.26	-
	(0.25)	0.61***
		(0.22)
No Religious Affiliation	-0.26***	-
	(0.04)	0.17***
		(0.04)
Traditionalism	0.06***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rule-Following	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Need for Security	0.01	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Openness to Experience	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)

[22] *Roman Catholic* is the reference category.

More EU Integration		0.03**		-0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)
Variance Components				
Residual	3.99	3.8	0.84	3.79
Intercept	0.13	0.16	0.03	0.19
Observations	27,359	27,359	26,444	26,444
Groups (Country)	24	24	21	21
AIC	115,912	114,762	112,521	110,820
BIC	116,085	115,156	112,693	111,221

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

4. World Value Survey and European Values Study

To control for other factors and provide further analysis, this section deals with survey data from the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS) in 1995-1998 (Inglehart et al., 2014b) and European Values Study (EVS) in 1999 (Halman, 2001). The data included a few countries outside of Europe, which were included in the analysis as well. While these regions are not of specific interest for this article (which is focused on European L-R politics), the examined criteria for separating left from right (such as the equality/inequality criterion) aim at universal application, and are not meant to be region-specific. The other countries were therefore included nevertheless in the analysis here in the appendix.

Methodology

Most of the analysis is the same as in the ESS data analysis.[23] In the WVS data, *Economic Inequality* is operationalised through a question asking respondents to place themselves between 1 "Incomes should be made more equal" and 10 "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort." The EVS operationalization of *Economic Inequality* includes this item, combined with a question asking respondents about their level of agreement with the idea that it is important to eliminate income inequality.

The variable *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* in the EVS and WVS data is constructed with mentions of who respondents would not like to have as neighbours. If a respondent mentioned an ethnic group (any of the following: "people of a different race," "Muslims," "Jews" or "people of a different religion"),[24, 25] then the variable is coded as 1, and 0 if not. This operationalization is far from perfect as it does not address any policy proposal and merely measures underlying racism/xenophobia. However, it measures attitudes towards these groups (which have lower social positions in the examined societies) and as such reflect egalitarian attitudes in one sense. This imperfection should nevertheless be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

Intolerance of Homosexuality is measured in the WVS and EVS data with a variable that measures how justifiable respondents found homosexuality. The

[23] Other notable differences: *L-R Self-Placement* is measured on a ten-point scale. There are different dichotomous variables for different ethnic groups in the WVS data, whereas the EVS data contains the variable *Citizen*. There is also no control for union membership.

[24] "Immigrants/foreign workers" were also included in a subsequent analysis, without changing the results. Other groups in the codebook such as "Indian," "coloured" and "black" neighbours were not included in the analysis because they were not asked in the countries examined in this paper.

[25] The EVS *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* variable also included a question on whether to let in people from less developed countries. See Table SM6.

variable *Anti-Feminist Attitude* is measured with one item in the EVS data: "Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce." The *Anti-Feminist Attitude* variable in the WVS data is constructed with the items "Men should have more right to job [sic] than women when jobs are scarce," "on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do" and "a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl."

The EVS and WVS data do not have the psychological variables nor a variable measuring attitudes towards the European Union, which the ESS material contains. Conversely, they do have variables that can control for three other important components that are widely discussed in the literature, namely attitudes towards *Freedom* and *Government Intervention (Economic)*, as well as *Resistance to Change.*

Analysis and Results

The WVS data is analysed with multilevel models where the independent variables have random slopes, as well as *Government Intervention (Economic)* and *Resistance to Change*, which are tested as potential alternative explanations (see appendix). EVS 1999 only has available data (for all the selected variables) for two countries, namely the Czech Republic and Lithuania. These are analysed with ordinary least squares regressions (see Table SM11).[26]

The egalitarian hypothesis holds in all countries except for Venezuela where only the *Anti-Feminist Attitude* coefficient is significantly positive, but *Economic Inequality* is negatively associated with L-R self-placements.[27] However, additional analysis (see Table SM12) reveals that the egalitarian hypothesis is supported in Venezuela in the fourth wave of the WVS, conducted in 2000. The radical differences between the two surveys for Venezuela, and the potential explanations, is further explored in the Venezuela section in this appendix.

[26] One important caveat is that many observations are lost in the Lithuanian case, mainly due to missing observations for L-R self-placements (data for a third of the respondents is missing), with 61% of observations not included in the regression due to missing data.

[27] *Government Intervention (Economic)* and *Resistance to Change* are also not significantly correlated with L-R self-placements in Venezuela.

Survey Items and Corresponding Variables

Table SM5. Survey Items and Corresponding Variables:[28, 29] WVS

Variable	Question wording[30]	Response options
L-R Self-Placement	"In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?"	10-point scale. 1 = Left, 10 = Right.
Economic Inequality	"How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between."	10-point scale. 1 = "Incomes should be made more equal," 10 = "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort."
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?"	Binary variable, coded as 1 if any of the following groups were mentioned: "People of a different race," "Muslims," "Jews," "People of a different religion."
Intolerance of Homosexuality	"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Homosexuality."	10-point scale. 1 = Never, 10 = Always. Reversed scores in the analysis.

[28] Excluding self-explanatory variables.
[29] Some of the independent variables are reversed (changing low values to high). Acceptance of inequality thus always corresponds to high values in the variables used in the regression models.
[30] Taken from the World Value Survey questionnaire (Inglehart et al., 2014b).

Anti-Feminist Attitude	"Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce."	1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither. Category 2 and 3 were collapsed, making it a dichotomous variable.
	"On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do."	1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree.
	"A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl."	1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree.
Household Income	"Here is a scale of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions."	10-point scale. 1 =Low, 10 =High.
Education Level	"What is the highest educational level that you have attained?"	The response options (see the WVS codebook) have been collapsed into three categories: *Primary or less (reference category), Secondary* and *University.*
Religiosity	"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?"	The response options (see the WVS codebook) have been collapsed into three categories: and *Less than once a Year* (reference category), *Once a Year/Special Holidays* and *Once a Month or More.*

Freedom	"If you had to choose, which would you say is the most important responsibility of government:"	1 = "to maintain order in society," 2 = "respect the freedom of the individual."
Resistance to Change	"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion."	See WVS codebook. Transformed to: *Gradual Change* = "Our society must be gradually improved by reforms," *Against Change* = "Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces" and *Revolutionary Change* (reference category*)* = "The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action."
Government Intervention (Economic)	"How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between."	10-point scale. 1 = "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased," 10 = "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased."

Table SM6. Survey Items and Corresponding Variables:[31, 32] EVS

Variable	Question wording[33]	Response options
L-R Self-Placement	"In political matters, people talk of "the left" and the "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?"	10-point scale. 1 = Left, 10 = Right.
Economic Inequality	"Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?"	10-point scale. 1 = "Incomes should be made more equal," 10 = "There should be greater incentives for individual effort."
	"In order to be considered "just", what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement if it is important or unimportant to you. 1 means very important; 5 means not important at all. Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens."	5-point scale. 1 = Very important, 5 = Not at all important.
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?"	Binary variable, coded as one if any of the following groups were mentioned: "People of a different race," "Muslims," "Jews," "Immigrants/foreign workers," "Gypsies."

[31] Excluding self-explanatory variables.
[32] Some of the independent variables are reversed (changing low values to high). Acceptance of inequality thus always corresponds to high values in the variables used in the regression models.
[33] Taken from the European Values Study questionnaire (Halman, 2001).

	"How about people from less developed countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?"	4-point scale, ranging between: 1 = "Let anyone come who wants to," 4 = "Prohibit people coming here from other countries."
Intolerance of Homosexuality	"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Homosexuality."	10-point scale. 1 = Never, 5 = Always.
Anti-Feminist Attitude	"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women."	1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither. Category 2 and 3 were collapsed, making it a dichotomous variable.
Household Income	"Here is a scale of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions."	10-point scale. 1 =Low, 10 =High.
Education Level	"What is the highest level you have reached in your education?"	The response options (see the EVS codebook) have been simplified into three categories: *Elementary*

		(reference category), Secondary and Tertiary.
Religiosity	"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?"	The response options (see the EVS codebook) have been collapsed into three categories: and *Less than once a Year* (reference category), *Once a Year/Special Holidays* and *Once a Month or More.*
Freedom	"If you had to choose, which would you say is the most important responsibility of government:"	1 = "to maintain order in society," 2 = "respect the freedom of the individual."
Resistance to Change	"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion."	See the EVS codebook. Transformed to: *Gradual Change* = "Our society must be gradually improved by reforms," *Against Change* = "Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces" and *Revolutionary Change* (reference category*)* = "The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action."
Government Intervention (Economic)	"How would you place your views on this scale?"	10-point scale 1 = "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased," 10 = "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased."

	"How would you place your views on this scale?"	10-point scale 1 = "the state should give more freedom to firms" and 10 = "the state should control firms more effectively."

Descriptive Statistics

Table SM7. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: WVS 1995-1998

Variable	Mean (SD)	Standardised Mean (SD)	Range	Standardised Range
Dependent Variable				
L-R Self-Placement	5.41 (2.15)		1 – 10	
Independent Variables				
Economic Inequality	5.36 (2.79)	0 (1)	1 – 10	-0.92 – 1.60
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.15 (0.35)	0 (1)	0 – 1	-0.57 – 1.77
Intolerance of Homosexuality	6.42 (3.48)	0 (1)	1 – 10	-1.76 – 0.96
Anti-Feminist Attitude	2.75 (2.13)	0 (1)	0 – 9	-0.46 – 2.84
Control Variables				
Age	43.78 (17.47)		15 – 94	
Household Income	5.02 (2.56)		1 – 10	
Government Intervention (Economic)	4.39 (2.61)		1 – 10	
Dichotomous Variables		Proportion of Respondents		
City Size				
< 10,000		0.19		
10,000-100,000		0.37		
> 100,000		0.44		
Education Level				
Primary or less		0.26		
Secondary		0.47		
University		0.27		
Female		0.52		
Union Member		0.19		
Religious Attendance				
Less than Once a Year		0.47		
Once a Year/Special Holidays		0.20		

Once a Month or More	0.33
Ethnicity[34]	
White	0.87
Arab	0.001
Black	0.03
Brown	0.07
East Asian	0.01
Indigenous	0.001
Middle Eastern	0.002
South Asian	0.01
Other Minority	0.02
Religious Denomination	
Roman Catholic	0.42
Protestant	0.25
Free Church/Non-Conformist	0.02
Jewish	0.01
Muslim	0.003
Hindu	0.002
Buddhist	0.004
Orthodox	0.004
Other Christian denomination	0.01
Other	0.03
No Religious Affiliation	0.27
Resistance to Change	
Revolutionary Action	0.06
Gradual Change	0.77
Against Change	0.17
Freedom	0.5

[34] *White* is the reference category.

Table SM8. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: EVS 1999 The Czech Republic

Variable	Mean (SD)	Standardised Mean (SD)	Range	Standardised Range
Dependent Variable				
L-R Self-Placement	5.96 (2.34)		1 – 10	
Independent Variables				
Economic Inequality	2.41 (1.19)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-1.18 – 2.17
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	3.21 (1.77)	0 (1)	0 – 6	-1.81 – 1.58
Intolerance of Homosexuality	5.55 (3.55)	0 (1)	1 – 10	-1.28 – 1.25
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.33 (0.47)	0 (1)	0 – 1	-0.70 – 1.44
Control Variables				
Age	47.73 (17.13)		18 – 87	
Household Income	4.35 (2.70)		1 – 10	
Government Intervention (Economic)	5.69 (2.20)		1 – 10	
Dichotomous Variables				
City Size				
< 10,000		0.33		
10,000-100,000		0.38		
> 100,000		0.29		
Education Level				
Elementary		0.45		
Secondary		0.41		
University		0.15		
Female		0.5		
Union Member		0.12		
Religious Attendance				
Less than Once a Year		0.66		
Once a Year/Special Holidays		0.23		
Once a Month or More		0.12		
Citizen		0.99		
Religious Denomination				

Roman Catholic	0.28
Protestant	0.04
Free Church/Non-Conformist	0.008
Jewish	0
Muslim	0
Hindu	0
Buddhist	0
Orthodox	0.0008
Other	0.005
No Religious Affiliation	0.67
Resistance to Change	
Revolutionary Action	0.06
Gradual Change	0.76
Against Change	0.18
Freedom	0.82

Table SM9. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: EVS 1999 Lithuania

Variable	Mean (SD)	Standardised Mean (SD)	Range	Standardised Range
Dependent Variable				
L-R Self-Placement	5.52 (2.16)		1 – 10	
Independent Variables				
Economic Inequality	2.17 (1.25)	0 (1)	1 – 5	-0.93 – 2.27
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	3.91 (1.62)	0 (1)	0 – 6	-2.41 – 1.29
Intolerance of Homosexuality	9.15 (1.93)	0 (1)	1 – 10	-4.23 – 0.44
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.31 (0.46)	0 (1)	0 – 1	-0.67 – 1.48
Control Variables				
Age	44.34 (15.02)		18 – 87	
Household Income	4.66 (2.09)		1 – 10	
Government Intervention (Economic)	6.39 (2.44)		1 – 10	
Dichotomous Variables				
City Size				
< 10,000		0.51		
10,000-100,000		0.49		
> 100,000		0		
Education Level				
Elementary		0.10		
Secondary		0.59		
University		0.31		
Female		0.47		
Union Member		0.03		
Religious Attendance				
Less than Once a Year		0.23		
Once a Year/Special Holidays		0.48		
Once a Month or More		0.29		

Citizen	0.99
Religious Denomination	
Roman Catholic	0.81
Protestant	0.02
Free Church/Non-Conformist	0
Jewish	0
Muslim	0
Hindu	0
Buddhist	0
Orthodox	0.02
Other	0.005
No Religious	0.15
Affiliation	
Resistance to Change	
Revolutionary Action	0.21
Gradual Change	0.69
Against Change	0.10
Freedom	0.35

Multilevel and OLS Regression Models

Table SM10. Multilevel Models Explaining L-R Self-Placement: WVS 1995-1998

	L-R Self-Placement	
Fixed Effects	(1)	(2)
Intercept	5.55*** (0.22)	4.53*** (0.58)
Economic Inequality	0.28** (0.10)	0.23 (0.19)
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)
Intolerance of Homosexuality	0.34*** (0.07)	0.24 (0.77)
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.30*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)
Age		0.003 (0.002)
Education Level[35]		
Secondary		-0.21*** (0.08)
University		-0.20*** (0.09)
Income		0.03*** (0.01)
Female		-0.04 (0.06)
Union Member		-0.26*** (0.07)
City Size[36]		
10,000-100,000		-0.06 (0.08)
> 100,000		-0.06 (0.08)
Religious Attendance[37]		
Once a Year/Special		0.06 (0.08)
Holidays		
Once a Month or More		0.30*** (0.07)
Ethnicity[38]		
Arab		-1.18 (0.81)
Black		-0.33* (0.18)
Brown		-0.08 (0.15)
East Asian		0.25 (0.35)
Indigenous		1.19 (0.97)
Middle Eastern		0.32 (0.63)
South Asian		0.08 (0.33)
Other Minority		0.16 (0.22)
Religious Denomination[39]		
Protestant		0.04 (0.08)

[35] *Primary or less* is the reference category.
[36] *< 10,000* is the reference category.
[37] *Less than Once a Year* is the reference category.
[38] *White* is the reference category.
[39] *Roman Catholic* is the reference category.

Other Christian		-0.69** (0.33)
Denomination		
Jewish		-1.30*** (0.38)
Muslim		-0.04 (0.46)
Hindu		-0.37 (0.70)
Buddhist		-0.27 (0.44)
Orthodox		0.30 (0.41)
Other		-0.27* (0.16)
No Religious Affiliation		-0.36*** (0.08)
Resistance to Change[40]		
Gradual Change		0.58 (0.88)
Against Change		0.84 (1.17)
Government Intervention (Economic)		0.09** (0.04)
Freedom		-0.28 (0.60)
Variance Components		
Residual	3.92	3.69
Intercept	0.29	1.78
Observations	5,277	5,277
Groups (Country)	6	6
AIC	22,286	22,242
BIC	22,424	22,781

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

[40] *Revolutionary Action* is the reference category.



Fig. SM1. Independent Variable Coefficients by Country: WVS 1995-1998



Fig. SM2. Government Intervention Coefficients by Country: WVS 1995-1998



Fig. SM3. Resistance to Change Coefficients by Country: WVS 1995-1998

The Czech Republic and Lithuania

Table SM11. OLS Regression Explaining L-R Self-Placement: EVS 1999 – Full Table

	DV: *L-R Self-Placement*	
Variables	Czech Republic	Lithuania
Intercept	-3.19*** (0.89)	1.15 (1.37)
Economic Inequality	0.41*** (0.07)	0.21** (0.10)
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.06 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.10)
Intolerance of Homosexuality	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.18* (0.10)
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.06 (0.06)	0.23** (0.10)
Age	-0.02*** (0.004)	0.01 (0.01)
Education Level[41]		
Secondary	-0.25* (0.13)	0.18 (0.37)
Tertiary	-0.22 (0.19)	0.39 (0.41)
Household Income	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)
Female	0.34*** (0.12)	-0.47** (0.21)
City Size[42]		
10,000 – 100,000	-0.10 (0.14)	0.29 (0.20)
> 100,000	0.08 (0.15)	
Religious Attendance[43]		
Once a Year/Special Holidays	-0. 48*** (0.15)	-0.47 (0.31)
Once a Month or More	-0.16 (0.22)	1.41*** (0.25)
Union Member	-0.41** (0.18)	0.16 (0.64)
Religious Denomination[44]		
Protestant	-0.36 (0.15)	-0.64 (0.81)
Free Church/Non-Conformist/Evangelical	-0.98 (0.63)	
Jewish		
Muslim		
Orthodox	-0.34 (2.04)	-0.36 (0.68)
Other	-0.83 (0.81)	-4.62*** (1.39)
No Religious Affiliation	-0.91*** (0.16)	-0.14 (0.35)
Citizen	1.27 (0.81)	3.31*** (1.18)
Resistance to Change[45]		

[41] *Primary or less* is the references category.
[42] *< 10,000* is the reference category.
[43] *Less than Once a Year* is the reference category.
[44] *Roman Catholic* is the reference category.
[45] *Revolutionary Action* is the reference category.

Gradual Change	1.08*** (0.25)	0.52** (0.25)
Against Change	0.74*** (0.28)	1.12*** (0.39)
Government Intervention (Economic)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)
Freedom	0.66*** (0.15)	-0.22 (0.21)
Observations	1,295	399
R^2	0.26	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.20

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

Venezuela

Venezuela is a peculiar case since only *Anti-Feminist Attitude* is positively significant of the independent variables, while *Economic Inequality* is negatively associated with L-R self-placements. Furthermore, *Government Intervention (Economic)* is not significantly associated with L-R self-placements, and neither is any of the two dichotomous variables measuring resistance to change (see Fig. SM3). These unexpected results warrant another regression analysis for Venezuela, using the fourth wave of the WVS (Inglehart et al., 2014a). This data is from 2000 and includes all the same variables as the third wave of the WVS (which in Venezuela took place in 1996), except for *Freedom*. Excluding this variable have small effects on the overall results for Venezuela 1996 (see Table SM12), but it is worth keeping the exclusion of *Freedom* in mind when interpreting the results for Venezuela 2000. As can be seen in Table SM12, the results change substantially between the two data points. *Economic Inequality* is no longer significant, but *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality* is now positively correlated with L-R orientations, while *Government Intervention (Economic)* and *Resistance to Change* coefficients remain insignificant. The most obvious explanation for these peculiar results seems to be the political turmoil in Venezuela in the early 1990s, and the rise of Hugo Chávez between the two surveys. A part of the explanation might also be that in 1996, the left-right self-placements in Venezuela were heavily tilted to the right in the third wave of the WVS. In the fourth wave the slant to the right had vanished, resulting in a normal distribution curve.

Table SM12. OLS Regression Explaining L-R Self-Placement: Venezuela 1996 and 2000

	DV: L-R Self-Placement		
	1996		2000
Variables	(1)	(2)	(1)
Intercept	7.04***	7.32*** (0.82)	5.61***
	(0.79)		(0.68)
Economic Inequality	-0.31***	-0.30***	0.12 (0.09)
	(0.10)	(0.11)	
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.07 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.23**
			(0.11)
Intolerance of Homosexuality	0.06 (0.19)	0.02 (0.20)	0.10 (0.12)
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.25** (0.11)	0.20** (0.12)	0.11***
			(0.04)
Age	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.002
			(0.01)
Education Level[46]			
Secondary	-0.65**	-0.72** (0.34)	0.04 (0.28)
	(0.33)		
University	-0.08 (0.39)	-0.11 (0.40)	0.02 (0.36)
Income	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.04)
Female	-0.07 (0.24)	-0.02 (0.25)	0.11 (0.21)
City Size[47]			
10,000-100,000	-0.31 (0.41)	-0.34 (0.41)	0.02 (0.46)
> 100,000	-0.66* (0.39)	-0.60 (0.40)	-0.37 (0.43)
Religious Attendance[48]			
Once a Year/Special Holidays	-0.22 (0.35)	-0.26 (0.36)	0.20 (0.28)
Once a Month or More	-0.33 (0.33)	-0.33 (0.34)	0.52**
			(0.26)
Ethnicity[49]			
Brown	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.54)	
Dark Brown			-0.53*
			(0.29)
Light Brown			-0.08 (0.22)
Indigenous			-2.44 (1.55)

[46] *Primary or less* is the reference category.
[47] *< 10,000* is the reference category.
[48] *Less than Once a Year* is the reference category.
[49] *White* is the reference category.

Other Minority			-0.83 (1.90)
East Asian	-0.002 (3.06)	0.10 (3.08)	
Black	-0.69 (0.52)	-0.66 (0.54)	-1.04** (0.47)
Religious Denomination[50]			
Protestant	0.53 (0.52)	0.51 (0.52)	0.06 (0.41)
Orthodox	3.50 (3.01)	3.65 (3.03)	
Buddhist	1.41 (3.06)	1.64 (3.08)	
Hindu	-1.52 (3.02)	-1.75 (3.05)	
Other	-0.28 (1.15)	-0.84 (1.25)	0.50 (1.89)
No Religious Affiliation	-0.06 (0.54)	-0.10 (0.56)	-0.01 (0.24)
Resistance to Change[51]			
Gradual Change	0.57 (0.36)	0.53 (0.37)	0.76*** (0.29)
Against Change	0.83** (0.39)	0.81** (0.41)	0.98*** (0.32)
Government Intervention (Economic)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Freedom		-0.27 (0.25)	
Observations	654	628	774
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.01	0.04

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

[50] *Roman Catholic* is the reference category.
[51] *Revolutionary Action* is the reference category.

5. Controlling for Partisanship

In the following models, an added control for partisanship is added (otherwise the same as the models in the paper). In the ESS, the following question was asked: “Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?” The respondents were then asked which party they felt closer to if they said yes. All parties are utilised as dummy variables, while anyone who did not feel close to a party was included as a non-partisan (the reference category). The analysis thus includes many parties, but the coefficients are not shown in the table. However, it is worth remembering that the issue with this analysis is that we expect respondents to support different parties because of their views on the independent variables. Including the partisanship control variable should therefore lead to underestimations of the effects of the independent variables. Nevertheless, the results are very similar to those without controlling for partisanship (found in the main paper). In fact, the results provide stronger support for the equality/inequality hypothesis, than the models without partisanship controlled for.



Fig. SM4. Independent Variable Coefficients – Controlling for Partisanship: ESS 2008



Fig. SM5. Independent Variable Coefficients – Controlling for Partisanship: ESS 2016

Table SM13. Multilevel Models Explaining L-R Self-Placements – Controlling for Partisanship: ESS

	L-R Self-Placement			
	2008		2016	
Fixed Effects	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Intercept	5.18***	4.76***	5.17***	4.60***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Economic Inequality	0.45***	0.22***	0.45***	0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Immigration/Ethnic Inequality	0.23***	0.12***	0.33***	0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Intolerance of Homosexuality	0.17***	0.06***	0.19***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Anti-Feminist Attitude	0.14***	0.06**	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age		0.001*		0.001
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Years of Education		-0.01***		
		(0.04)		
Education Level[52]				
Upper Secondary or Vocational				0.07**
				(0.03)
Tertiary				-0.01
				(0.04)
Household Income		0.08***		0.03***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Female		-0.07***		-0.12***
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Rural		0.07***		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Religiosity		0.04***		0.04**[*]
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Union Member		-0.18***		-0.19***
		(0.02)		(0.03)
Ethnic Minority		-0.05		-0.18***
		(0.05)		(0.06)
Protestant		-0.04		-0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)

[52] *Lower Secondary or Less* is the reference category.

Eastern Orthodox		-0.31***		-0.36***
		(0.08)		(0.10)
Other Christian Denomination		-0.38*		-0.20*
		(0.11)		(0.11)
Jewish		1.25***		1.80***
		(0.16)		(0.14)
Muslim		-0.56***		-0.80***
		(0.10)		(0.09)
Eastern Religion		-0.10		-0.47**
		(0.19)		(0.18)
Other non-Christian Religion		0.04		-0.46**
		(0.22)		(0.20)
No Religious Affiliation		-0.14**		-0.08***
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Traditionalism		0.04***		0.06***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Rule-Following		0.02**		0.02*
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Need for Security		0.01		0.001
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Openness to Experience		0.01		0.003
		(0.01)		(0.01)
More EU Integration		-0.02**		-0.001
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Variance Components				
Residual	4.0	2.8	4.04	2.95
Intercept	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.09
Observations	26,622	26,622	25,220	25,220
Groups (Country)	24	24	21	21
AIC	112,820	103,643	107,144	99,511
BIC	112,992	106,002	107,315	101,756

Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

6. Changing Indicators for Independent Variables

The operationalisations of *Intolerance of Homosexuality* and *Anti-Feminist Attitude* are discussed in the paper as relying on imperfect survey items, compared to *Immigration/Ethnic Inequality and Economic Inequality*. As a robustness check, the same analysis is carried out with different operationalisations of *Intolerance of Homosexuality* and *Anti-Feminist Attitude* (see full explanation in the paper). *Intolerance of Homosexuality* is measured with the survey item "Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish" and *Anti-Feminist Attitude* is measured using the survey item "Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce." The results can be found below, and the results are overall very similar.



Fig. SM6. Changed Indicators – Independent Variable Coefficients: ESS 2008



Fig. SM7. Changed Indicators – Independent Variable Coefficients: ESS 2016

7. OLS Regressions instead of Multilevel Models

Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models have little effect on the overall results. The coefficients and standard errors are reported in the figures below, where each country has its own OLS regression model. The same variables are used as for the multilevel models.



Fig. SM8. OLS Regressions: ESS 2008



Fig. SM9. OLS Regressions: ESS 2016

8. References

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9. List of Figures