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## Clientelism from the Client's Perspective: An Empirically Grounded Conceptual Framework

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## **Abstract:**

Mainstream political science literature on clientelism has evolved quite separately from the ethnographic literature on the topic. Mainstream literature tends to emphasize the negative impact of clientelism, to focus on vote buying, and to study the supply side of clientelism. In contrast, ethnographic literature often emphasizes the clients' agency and incentives, shows the diversity of clientelistic exchanges, and paints a less negative and more diverse image of clientelism. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the two strands of literature by developing an inductive framework of clientelism from the clients' perspective. We undertake a systematic review of ethnographic literature that feature the client perspective. This delivers forty ethnographic articles on different world regions describing sixty different clientelistic exchanges. We apply a coding scheme that records the characteristics and welfare aspects of these exchanges. We use cluster analysis and principal component analysis to systematize these data. The cluster analysis delivers three main meaningful subtypes of clientelism, which we label as *vote-buying*, *relational*, and *collective* clientelism. The principal component analysis delivers two fundamental dimensions of clientelism, which we label "vertical" and "horizontal". Subtypes are placed sensibly into these two dimensions. Moreover, the two dimensions are associated with different aspects of client welfare. We propose that the vertical and horizontal dimensions of clientelism are associated to different trade-offs from the client point of view, implying that different types of clientelism have different drivers.

## **Keywords**

Clientelism, focus groups, South Africa

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## Introduction

Clientelism, the exchange of particularistic goods for political support, has received renewed interest over the past twenty years. However, most political science literature on the topic has tended to focus on specific types of exchanges (instrumentalist types, such as vote buying or electoral clientelism<sup>i</sup>), and specific types of actors (parties, patrons, and brokers). Much less research has been dedicated to clients and their diverse experiences when interacting with clientelism. Prospective clients have generally been conceptualized as rather passive and, if poor enough, willing vote sellers. Possibly as a result of this focus, this literature generally holds a negative view of clientelism.

In contrast, ethnographers emphasize the rich set of experiences, motivations and views by poor people in clientelistic settings. Whereas some authors' work echoes the instrumentalist view of the exchange, where clients are shown to have a cynical attitude towards clientelism and politics in general other work shows the social embeddedness of some types of clientelism where clients view the relationship in friendship-style terms.<sup>ii</sup> Ethnographic work also emphasizes the agency of clients and shows that clients often deliberately approach patrons or brokers rather than being targeted by them.<sup>iii</sup> Possibly because of this more diverse picture and higher client agency, ethnographers often portray clientelism in a more positive light than mainstream political science literature, at least in certain contexts.<sup>iv</sup>

In recent years, political scientist have started to pay more attention to the role of citizens for clientelism. However, we still lack a systematic framework to think about the diversity of experiences of prospective clients. The political science literature on clientelism has generated little systematic investigation on different types of clientelism and the trade-offs faced by clients. The ethnographic literature on clientelism, in contrast, has generated an extremely rich picture of clientelism and poor people's experiences and views on it, but its very richness makes it difficult to understand whether these are just idiosyncratic local expressions of clientelism or can be generalized beyond the particular context.

As a result, we still do not have satisfactory answers to fundamental questions such as: What are the main types of clientelism that clients experience? What distinguishes these different types? What are their welfare implications? What are the trade-offs clients face when engaging in these forms of clientelism?

This paper seeks to contribute to answering these questions by conducting a systematic review of ethnographic literature on clientelism that features the client perspective. Our systematic review is based on 40 ethnographic (or area study) articles featuring the client's point of view on clientelism in different world regions. We apply a common coding scheme to record the characteristics of clientelistic exchanges described in the articles. We code characteristics such as the type of exchanged goods, the frequency and degree of hierarchy of the interactions between patrons and clients, and the degree of client agency, among others. Articles are coded independently by four researchers and each article is coded by at least two of them.

We perform two types of systematization analyses on our data, a cluster analysis and a principal component analysis (PCA). The cluster analysis groups exchanges into a few subtypes, delivering a typology of clientelism. The PCA combines the characteristics of clientelistic exchanges into two core dimensions that distinguish between different types of clientelism in a parsimonious way. These analyses are mostly data driven with coding

the ethnographic papers being our key input. There are of course still several potential biases and we discuss these in the paper.

These two analyses provide answers to the first set of questions on what the main types of clientelism are and what distinguishes them. The cluster analysis uncovers three main types of clientelism from the perspective of the clients: *vote-buying*, *relational*, and *collective* clientelism. We also find two smaller clusters that correspond to *traditional* and to *modern coercive* clientelism. These types differ in many ways, but the PCA uncovers two basic dimensions that are enough to distinguish between most of them. We label these two dimensions the “Vertical” and “Horizontal” dimensions of clientelism.<sup>v</sup> The vertical dimension taps into how thick and hierarchical the clientelistic relationship is. Relational clientelism is characterized by high verticality. The horizontal dimension taps into the collective vs individual aspects of the exchange. Collective clientelism is characterized by strong horizontality. Vote buying, in turn, displays little horizontality *and* little verticality.

The two dimensions of clientelism also help us answering the second set of questions, on the welfare implications and trade-offs associated to subtypes of clientelism from the client point of view. Our data suggest that each dimension of clientelism matters for client welfare in a different way. The vertical dimension is related to client agency in the sense that more vertical types of clientelism are associated to less client agency. The horizontal dimension is related to how good a deal the client gets: clients get a better deal in more horizontal types of clientelism. We then use the two dimensions to theorize in an empirically grounded way about different trade-offs that drive different types of clientelism from the client point of view. We propose that the vertical dimension represents a trade-off between protection/ insurance, and autonomy; the horizontal dimension represents a trade-off related to the perceived “scope” of politics: is politics seen narrowly as an instrument to satisfy individual needs, or more broadly as a way to improve the needs of one's group?

Our framework provides a basis for a structured study of the demand side of clientelism and some conceptual clarity to the study of clientelism in general. This responds to recent calls in reviews of clientelism in political science and ethnography for a need of more conceptual clarity in the field.<sup>vi</sup> Although most researchers agree to define clientelism as a contingent exchange of personalized favors for political support there is disagreement regarding which types of exchanges ought to be included and which not. A typology such as ours, based on the work of many different researchers working on different world regions can help making sense of these disagreements.

## **Conceptualizations of Clientelism in the literature**

### *Defining and Delimiting Clientelism*

Originally, based on research on “traditional societies” in the 1950, 1960s and 1970s, clientelism denoted a relatively narrow phenomenon. It was defined as “a long term relationship between two people of unequal status who have relatively regular personal interactions” and exchange “goods and services”. From the patron's side, these goods and services may involve material resources, advice, or protection/ insurance, from the

client's side they involve political support or labor.<sup>vii</sup> This definition separates clientelism from a host of other forms of particularistic exchanges such as vote buying or club goods.

In more recent definitions of clientelism, the unequal status and strong personal relationships are no longer mentioned and the concept of clientelism has come to refer simply to an instrumental exchange. This is apparent in Kitschelt and Wilkinson's definition, according to which clientelism is a "*transaction* [our emphasis], the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services", or Stoke's definition as "the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of the distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?".<sup>viii</sup> These definitions capture a much wider series of empirical phenomena than the original clientelism literature envisaged. In the current literature, the key criterion to establish that a political linkage is clientelistic is whether it involves conditionality: the citizen votes for the politician *because* the politician gives benefits and the politician gives benefits *because* the citizen votes for him or her.

Another strand of the research, mostly by economists, has an even broader conception of clientelism. In his widely cited work, Wantchekon considers clientelism anything that is not a public good or otherwise serves the citizens of the country as a whole such as national unity or peace.<sup>ix</sup> Thus, clientelistic goods include local public goods, such as schools in addition to offers of individual patronage.

The most common way of defining clientelism at present is the second one mentioned, as a contingent, or conditional exchange. However, there is a certain ambiguity regarding how literally conditionality ought to be taken. In an extreme case, if this criterion is taken totally literally, it requires that the only reason the patron gives resources to a given citizen is because she receives political support in exchange and the only reason a citizen provides political support is because she receives benefits in exchange. These conditions are hard to fulfill, let alone to identify for an external observer. A type of exchange that generally would fulfill this criterion is vote buying with monitoring: the citizen receives goods just before or at the moment of the election, and the patron is able to monitor that the citizen reciprocates. Maybe for this reason, vote buying and monitoring have been key foci of clientelism research in recent decades.

However, as long as one seeks to have a broader view of clientelism that moves beyond vote buying, as we do in this paper, it is necessary to make the criterion less stringent. We interpret the criterion of conditionality here more loosely, considering that there is conditionality when the *main* rationale for the actions of the two actors is an expectation of reciprocity. This looser conception of conditionality allows us to consider as clientelistic relations of the type envisaged by the scholars of clientelism in the 1960s and 1970s, ("a long-term relationship between two people..."). In such long-term relations, it is difficult to be sure that the *only* reason why a traditional patron provides favors or goods to the citizen is because she provides political support, and vice versa. For instance, there may be social norms, economic reasons, or even genuine affection contributing to the patron actions. But we would count it as clientelistic relation if it appears that the *main* driver of the political behavior of the client is the fact that she receives material support in exchange. Similarly, we can also include as clientelistic exchanges some involving local public goods, as considered by Wantchekon. These exchanges would not be typically included under a literal definition of conditionality, because local public

goods are not excludable; therefore, the patron cannot make sure that the good benefits only those who voted for her. However, we consider them as clientelistic to the extent that the rationale underlying the political interaction is clearly that of an exchange: The politician provides the local public good because she expects votes from the community, and the community (or most of them) provides the votes because they expect the good.

To summarize, we restrict our attention to interactions where the main rationale for the interaction is conditional (i.e. an exchange) and where the side of the exchange that the citizens provide includes some form of political support. This anchors our definition in the current clientelism literature, but makes it flexible enough to consider a great variety of possible clientelistic exchanges/ relations.

### *Typologies and Subtypes of Clientelism*

Distinctions between types of clientelism from the client perspective have not received much attention from the literature in the last decades. The literature from the 1960s and 1970s did acknowledge and pay considerable attention to subtypes of clientelism.<sup>x</sup> While some of these distinctions remain useful, (for instance, between “anthropological” (i.e. social) and “political science” (i.e. electoral) clientelism,<sup>xi</sup> others appear now somewhat dated (“Patrimonial”, “Feudal”, “Mercantile”, and “Saintly”<sup>xii</sup>).

In recent years, the literature has become more attentive to the different logics of current varieties of clientelism and their relevance for clients.<sup>xiii</sup> Various authors have proposed distinctions between different types. Nichter, for instance, distinguishes between *electoral* and *relational* clientelism.<sup>xiv</sup> Electoral clientelism, which includes vote-buying, delivers all benefits to citizens before the elections whereas relational clientelism involves exchanges that include interactions outside election times where citizens approach patrons/ brokers with requests, and, in exchange declare and show their support in addition to voting for the patron. Relational clientelism is deemed to be an insurance to economic or ecological shocks in the absence of a strong welfare state.<sup>xv</sup>

Mares and Young’s recent contributions bring coercion back into the study of clientelism.<sup>xvi</sup> They distinguish between coercive and non-coercive forms of clientelism, depending on whether positive and negative (coercion) inducements are used to “persuade” voters. They further break down positive and negative inducements according to whether the patron uses own resources or resources of the state. Coercive strategies used by patron that have own resources resembles the clientelism used by powerful local elites in the past. Modern coercive forms of clientelism use instead public policies to threaten clients into ensuring political support.

Taking up some of the older literature on the topic, Pellicer et al. distinguish between *modern* and *traditional* clientelism.<sup>xvii</sup> They argue that these different types are sustained by different perceptions clients have about their ability to get policy based (programmatically) redistribution and about the legitimacy of unequal social arrangements. They argue that modern and traditional types have different implications for client welfare.

These recent typologies show a growing awareness that there is a need to understand the mechanics and implications of different subtypes of clientelism. Different types appear to be associated with different social relations, client needs, and client welfare. However,

these recent typologies are not exhaustive and probably are not designed to be so. They emerge from the work on specific types of clientelism that researchers bring to light. The respective typologies position these new types of clientelism in the literature relative to other common forms, usually vote buying. Whereas this scholarship provides relevant new insights, a more inductive and comprehensive typology, that allows to incorporate a broader range of these subtypes, is needed.

## **Coding ethnographic literature on clientelism**

### *Procedure*

Our objective is a systematic review of ethnographic work that focuses on the clients' perspective. Ideally, the work contains explicit quotes of clients or prospective clients describing their attitudes towards clientelism. We selected papers with two main approaches. First, we conducted a literature search using as keywords clientelism (or patronage, informal political exchange, caciquismo, neopatrimonialism), plus our perspective ("client point of view", "demand side", or "micro").<sup>xviii</sup> Second, we sought article recommendations from colleagues in the field of clientelism research. This resulted in a body of literature of approximately 300 articles, books, and book chapters. In a next step, we screened each paper to check that it addressed *political* clientelism (i.e. the client contributes political support to the exchange), and that they gave some information on the client's perspective. This procedure led to a final selection of 40 suitable papers. 83% of the papers are from 1990 onward and are roughly equally distributed between Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

To code these papers, we designed a questionnaire asking about characteristics of clientelistic relations in the papers. The coding process was undertaken by the four authors of this paper.<sup>xix</sup> Each paper was coded by two researchers. The coding process generated a dataset where the observations are specific clientelistic exchanges and the variables are characteristics of different clientelistic exchanges. Papers sometimes describe more than one type of clientelistic relation, and we capture them separately. From the 40 papers we have coded, we extracted 60 separate clientelistic exchanges.

### *Coding Scheme: Characteristics of Clientelistic Exchanges*

The choice which characteristics of clientelistic exchanges to consider is particularly important. Once the characteristics are chosen, the analysis is mainly data-driven. We make this choice following the literature as much as possible.

We start with some obvious characteristics of clientelistic exchanges, such as the type of goods being exchanged: what type of political support does the client provide? A vote, labor? What does the patron provide? Money or small gifts, employment, local infrastructure?

Other characteristics were less obvious; for these we relied on the literature, and particularly Hicken.<sup>xx</sup> Hicken discusses four main dimensions of clientelism: contingency, dyadic relationships, hierarchy, and iteration. As mentioned above, we take contingency (or conditionality) as a definitional characteristic of clientelism and focus on the others.



*Dyadic* refers to how personal the relationship between client and broker/ patron is. If a relation is impersonal, based on the office people hold rather than their personal identity, then it is not dyadic. Different clientelistic relations may be more or less dyadic. We also consider another characteristic related to but distinct from dyadic: how *affective* (vs. pragmatic) the relation is. A personal (clientelistic) relation may incorporate affective links such as respect and mutual care, or may be totally pragmatic and instrumental. Another feature emphasized by Hicken is *hierarchy*.<sup>xxi</sup> Hierarchy denotes the difference in power between the patron and client. It builds on the idea that the relations between clients and patrons are generally perceived to be asymmetric to the patron's advantage. We expand on this idea to consider other relevant features related to this. We consider if the *broker is important in the community* and if the *interests of the broker and clients are aligned*. The last feature emphasized by Hicken is *iteration*. Iteration refers to the recurrent nature of a relationship. Clientelistic relations may iterative (ongoing), or not (once-off). We therefore assess the frequency of interactions between client and patron/ broker. Following this, we consider another measure of intensity of the relation: the *domains of interaction* of the client and her patron/ broker; in particular whether the client and her patron/ broker interact over and above the political realm that constitutes the clientelistic exchange. For instance, is the client an employee of the patron? Is the patron a particularly important social figure in the community, such as a chief?

In addition to these characteristics, we consider two other characteristics emphasized in recent literature. The first is *coercion*, as in Mares and Young.<sup>xxii</sup> We distinguish between two types of coercion to pressure clients: Threats of violence, and threats of withdrawal of government benefits. Second, we consider whether the exchange happens at the individual level (with individual rewards) or at the collective level (with local club goods).

In addition to these core characteristics that we will use in the main analyses, we are interested in the welfare implications of the exchange from the client point of view. We thus record the coder's subjective evaluation of the clientelistic relation, such as how much "agency" the client seems to have, or how good a deal she gets. Finally, we code some basic features of the environment, such as the decade where the fieldwork took place, or whether the setting was urban or rural. Welfare and environmental variables are not included in the cluster analysis or the PCA below.

Appendix B provides more detail on the definition of codes. Table B.1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the resulting variables.

### *Coding Challenges*

There are several challenges in the implementation of our coding scheme. First, there is ambiguity in how many clientelistic exchanges to code in one paper. Papers may describe different types of exchanges with varying detail and it is not straightforward to decide which of these types warrant a separate coding. For instance, a paper may describe a broker engaging in different types of exchanges but may not specify if each exchange occurs with separate clients or with the same client. Are these exchanges coded as one observation or two? In our data, of all the exchanges we identified (60), in almost 70% of the cases (41) the same exchange was identified by the two coders independently. This suggests that the problem of identifying specific clientelistic exchanges, while real, is not

that acute. The exchanges that are coded twice are aggregated by taking the average of the values of the two coders. The rest of the exchanges are kept as separate observations.

Second, there is ambiguity in coding specific variables. Some of the concepts we seek to measure are subjective (e.g. how good a deal the client gets). Even for concepts that are more objective, the papers are not always detailed enough in their description of the clientelistic relation. Table A.1 in the appendix provides several common measures (Cohen's Kappa, Krippendorff's alpha), to study intercoder reliability for each variable, using the 41 double-coded exchanges. All measures deliver similar results.<sup>xxiii</sup> In general, variables report moderate to high levels of agreement, according to commonly used rules of thumb.<sup>xxiv</sup> Unsurprisingly, the worse-performing variables tend to be the most subjective ones, particularly the subjective evaluations of the exchanges (ex. whether clients get a good deal). While we will still use them to explore the welfare implications of different types of clientelism, these results need to be treated with care.<sup>xxv</sup>

## **Types and Dimensions of clientelism**

### *Types of Clientelism*

Our first objective is to derive a typology of clientelism from the data. This involves consolidating the 60 different exchanges into distinct subtypes. This can be achieved by cluster analysis. Cluster analysis takes observations with given characteristics and breaks the observations into groups that are similar among themselves, but different from other groups. There are different ways of implementing a cluster analysis. We choose hierarchical clustering because this approach does not require the user to pre-specify the expected number of clusters in the data, as some other techniques do. This makes it best suited for an inductive, exploratory analysis like ours. As Appendix C explains, it is sensible to choose five clusters. Three of them are fairly large (with 14-18 exchanges each) and two of them are small (with 3 exchanges each). We proceed analyzing all clusters, but placing special emphasis on the three larger ones.

The cluster analysis simply groups similar observations into clusters. The key question is whether these clusters represent recognizable types of clientelism? In order to investigate this, we compute the average characteristics of each cluster. Table 1 below lists the most prominent characteristics of each cluster, in decreasing order of importance. The top panel corresponds to the three largest clusters, the bottom panel to the two small clusters. Characteristics that start with the word "No" are characterized by the explicit absence of the characteristic in a cluster, if a characteristic is not mentioned, it means that values of that characteristic are similar to those in other clusters.<sup>xxvi</sup>

The first cluster is characterized by an individual interaction that is particularly infrequent and that is restricted to the political exchange; that lacks dyadic, affective or hierarchical components; with a broker that is particularly unimportant in the community and whose interests are unrelated to those of the client. The client simply gets money and gives the vote. She certainly does not give loyalty and does not obtain insurance, protection or infrastructure. The cluster analysis does not tell us the name of this subtype of clientelism, but it seems to correspond quite clearly to a one-shot, thin, instrumental type of clientelistic interaction. We thus denote it the Vote Buying cluster.

Table 1: Characteristics of Clusters

Cluster	(1) Vote buying	(2) Relational	(3) Collective
<b>Goods exchanged</b>	Client gets money Client gives vote No Client gets insurance/ protection No Client gives loyalty	Client gets employment <b>Client gets insurance/ protection</b> Client gives vote	<b>Client gets infrastructure</b> Client gives vote <b>No Client gets money</b> No Client gets employment No Client gets insurance/ protection No Client gives labor
<b>Level of exchange</b>	Individual exchange	Individual exchange	<b>No Individual exchange</b>
<b>Characteristics relation</b>	<b>No Additional domains of interaction</b> No Affective relation <b>No Dyadic</b> <b>No Frequent interaction</b> No Hierarchical	Additional domains of interaction <b>Affective relation</b> <b>Dyadic</b> <b>Frequent interaction</b> <b>Hierarchical</b>	No Frequent interaction No Hierarchical
<b>Characteristics broker</b>	<b>No Broker Important</b> No Broker interests aligned to client	Broker Important	Broker interests aligned to client
Cluster	(4) Traditional	(5) Modern coercive	
<b>Goods exchanged</b>	Client gets employment <b>Client gets insurance/ protection</b> <b>Client gives labor</b> <b>Client gives loyalty</b> <b>No Client gets gov services</b> <b>No Client gets infrastructure</b> <b>No Client gives vote</b>	Client gives loyalty No Client gets employment No Client gets infrastructure <b>No Client gives vote</b>	
<b>Level of exchange</b>	Individual exchange		
<b>Characteristics relation</b>	<b>Additional domains of interaction</b> Affective relation <b>Coercion Threats</b> Coercion Withdrawal <b>Dyadic</b> <b>Frequent interaction</b> <b>Hierarchical</b>	<b>Coercion Withdrawal</b> No Additional domains of interaction No Affective relation No Coercion Threats <b>No Dyadic</b> <b>No Hierarchical</b>	
<b>Characteristics broker</b>	<b>Broker Important</b>		

Note: Most prominent characteristics of clusters; characteristics for which the cluster average of the corresponding standardized variable is higher than 0.33 in absolute value. Characteristics in bold have an average above 0.8 in absolute value.

The second cluster features an individual relation that is frequent, affective, hierarchical, and dyadic, where client and broker often interact beyond the strictly political realm. The client gets insurance and employment and gives the vote in exchange. The broker interests are not aligned with those of the client. This corresponds to a Relational type of clientelism.

The third cluster displays a type of clientelism that takes place at the group level (“No individual”). Clients get mainly infrastructure, as opposed to anything else, and give in exchange the vote. The interests of the broker are aligned to those of the clients. The relation is not particularly hierarchical or frequent. This cluster corresponds to a Collective type of clientelism, where the broker appears to be a community leader that represents the community’s interests and bargains for local infrastructure.

The three main clusters thus correspond to *Vote Buying*, *Relational*, and *Collective* types of clientelism – types that have recently been discussed separately in literature on clientelism. The two other clusters (clusters 4 and 5) are far smaller and ought to be taken with more caution. However, we believe that they are still recognizable and convey meaningful types of clientelism. The fourth cluster is quite similar to the relational one, but with some additional features. The relation is also hierarchical, dyadic, and frequent, and the client obtains protection/ insurance. But the relation has also a darker side: it involves coercion, mainly in the form of threats of violence. Moreover, the client does not provide a vote, but rather labor and loyalty. This cluster seems to capture a *Traditional* type of clientelism, as discussed in Pellicer et al. and related to the “Economic Coercion” in clientelism as discussed by Mares and Young.<sup>xxvii</sup> This interpretation is reinforced by the context in which these relations take place: exchanges in this cluster are more likely to be rural, and to have been recorded in older papers (from the 1970s as opposed to the 1990s and 2000s as the other exchanges, see Appendix Table E.).

The fifth cluster shares with the traditional cluster the presence of coercion and the fact that the clients give loyalty and not the vote. But here the similarities end. The type of exchange depicted in the fifth cluster is rather thin, not dyadic or affective and restricted to politics. Coercion in this type mainly about threats of withdrawing benefits, rather than violence. This cluster seems to capture a Modern form of *Coercive* clientelism, similar to the “policy coercion” emphasized in Mares and Young.<sup>xxviii</sup>

### *The Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Clientelism*

Our data contain 18 variables. These are characteristics, or dimensions, of clientelism that describe a specific exchange with a fair amount of detail. In order to build a tractable framework, we need to reduce this number of dimensions while preserving as much of the original richness as possible. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) achieves exactly that, by combining variables into a few distinct components that together account for as much variation in the data as possible.

The PCA shows that two dimensions (down from 18) are enough to characterize the data while preserving a lot of its richness (see Figure E.1 in the appendix). The first two components of the PCA explain quite a lot of the variation, while the third one adds comparatively little. We thus select the first two components of the PCA.

What do these two dimensions represent? Table 2 lists the variables that contribute most strongly to each of the two new dimensions.<sup>xxix</sup>

Table 2: PCA. Most important loadings

Vertical	Horizontal
Frequent interaction	No Individual exchange
Dyadic	Client gets infrastructure
Additional domains of interaction	Broker interests aligned to client
Client gets insurance/ protection	No Client gives labor
Broker Important	
Affective relation	
Hierarchical	

We denote the first dimension, corresponding to the first component of the PCA, the *Vertical Dimension* of clientelism. Vertical clientelistic relations are thick (frequent, dyadic, over several domains, involving affection); hierarchical (the relation is judged as hierarchical, the broker is important); and the goods exchanged are valuable (clients get insurance/protection). Non-vertical relations are the opposite: thin, non-hierarchical and with exchanges of less value. The fact that thickness and hierarchy combine into a single dimension (i.e. tend to go hand in hand) is a relevant result of the PCA. This makes sense in the context of political clientelism, where a key feature of the exchange is political support. There is only so much political support that a regular client (a citizen) can give to a patron/broker. When the relation is strong and the goods exchanged are valuable, it is difficult for the client to reciprocate. Accepting a clearly inferior position can be a way for the client to help fulfill her side of the exchange.

The second dimension of the PCA mainly captures the strength of horizontal ties embodied in the clientelistic exchange. We denote this dimension the *Horizontal Dimension* of clientelism. Horizontal exchanges are at the group level; clients get a collective good (infrastructure), and do not provide labor to the broker/ patron; and have brokers with interests close to those of the clients. This all points an exchange where horizontal ties are strong, among clients, and between clients and brokers. Non-horizontal exchanges are individual and have brokers with political interests unrelated to those of the clients.

By construction of the PCA, the horizontal and vertical dimensions of clientelism are linearly independent. This means that the two dimensions are entirely distinct: Clientelistic exchanges can simultaneously be high on the vertical and horizontal dimension or low on both. For instance, a fully individual relation that is thin and non-hierarchical will be low in horizontality and verticality.

## Putting it all together: Clientelism types, dimensions, and client welfare

### *Types of Clientelism in two dimensions*

We put together the two types of analysis and represent the different types of clientelism that emerged in the cluster analysis in the two dimensions extracted from the PCA. Figure 1 below shows the results.




Figure 1. The location of clientelism clusters on the two first PCA dimensions

The figure clearly displays that the three main clusters are placed at specific locations on the two dimensions. The placement is very sensible. The vote buying cluster is placed at the bottom-left. This corresponds to a type of clientelism where the exchange has little verticality, but also little horizontality. Collective clientelism is placed at the right side: an exchange characterized by a high degree of horizontality. Relational clientelism, a thicker and more hierarchical relation than vote buying, is sensibly placed towards the middle in the horizontal dimension, but towards the top in the vertical dimension. To make our dimensions and clusters more concrete, we place well known ethnographic works on the two graphs. We show the location of accounts of Auyero's "inner circle" clients in Argentina as a paradigmatic example of relational clientelism;<sup>xxx</sup> of Gay on Brazil as an example of group clientelism;<sup>xxxii</sup> and of Lazar on Bolivia as an example of vote buying.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

The figures show that these paradigmatic accounts indeed represent relatively “pure” cases of each of the three types of clientelism.

Of the two smaller clusters (traditional and coercive clientelism), only the traditional cluster is placed clearly: this is the thickest and most hierarchical type of relation and is consequently placed even higher than relational clientelism, at the very top of the vertical dimension. The coercive cluster, in contrast appears placed around the middle. The vertical and horizontal dimensions of clientelism do not seem to characterize coercive clientelism well.

Overall, the two dimensions perform well in distinguishing between the main subtypes of clientelism, even if our reduction of dimensions has been quite radical, from 18 to two. The horizontal and vertical dimensions of clientelism seem to capture the essential features that distinguish main types of clientelism. The clusters are of course not separate “islands” in the figures, implying that real instances of clientelism often share features of different types (for instance, clients often receive both money or little gifts for their vote and also some promise of infrastructure). They may be better thought of as “ideal types” that embody a paradigmatic type of exchange, as illustrated by the placement of paradigmatic ethnographic works.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

### *Client welfare*

Our systematization allows us to provide insights into the implications of different types and dimensions of clientelism for client welfare. Two variables in our data serve this purpose: the extent to which the client has agency and gets a good deal. It must be recalled, however, that the two welfare variables are very subjective and indeed showed low inter-coder reliability. Therefore, the results should be considered as merely suggestive.

Table 4 shows how different aspects of client welfare vary along the vertical and horizontal dimensions of clientelism. The table shows the result of simple OLS regressions of the evaluation variables on the vertical and the horizontal dimension.

Table 4. Client Welfare

	Agency	Good deal
Horizontal dimension	0.039 (0.09)	0.142** (0.063)
Vertical dimension	-0.112* (0.064)	0.032 (0.041)
N	53	53

Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 0.01 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.05 ‘\*\*’ 0.1 ‘\*’.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the paper.

The patterns in the table are quite striking. Different dimensions are associated with different welfare aspects of clientelism. The *vertical* dimension is negatively associated to client agency: vertical exchanges imply less choice. But the *horizontal* dimension is associated to clients obtaining a better deal out of the clientelistic relation. These results imply that different types of clientelism are associated with different welfare outcomes. And indeed, Table A.2 in Appendix shows that relational, traditional (and coercive) clientelism feature less agency than the other two subtypes, whereas clients in collective clientelism get a particularly good deal.

### **Framework: Trade-offs of the Vertical and Horizontal dimensions of clientelism**

The dimensions and typology that we have derived can be useful for theorizing about the choices and trade-offs that prospective clients face. We argue that the two dimensions are associated to different types of trade-offs from the client's point of view. This in turn implies that the demand for different types of clientelism is driven by different factors.

Figure 2 depicts a schematic representation of the two dimensions of clientelism, including the subtypes of clientelism, and the trade-offs and factors associated to each dimension. We leave coercive clientelism aside because it does not seem to be well explained by the two main dimensions we consider.

#### *Vertical Dimension Trade-Offs*

We propose that the *vertical dimension* is associated to a trade-off between insurance and autonomy/ subordination. For clients, the benefit of vertical types of clientelism is that they can provide very valuable goods for the individual: insurance and/ or protection. The cost is that they require the client to be in a subordinate position, and to relinquish autonomy (less agency, as shown in the results on client welfare).

This conceptualization implies that demand for types of clientelism that are high on the vertical dimension will be high in contexts where *insurance and protection are very valuable*, or when *autonomy is not feasible or not very valuable*. This is in line with existing characterizations of relational and traditional clientelism, the two types of clientelism that are high on the vertical dimension. The insurance motive has been recently emphasized by Nichter in his description of relational clientelism.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Landé emphasizes the role of dependence and protection needs of the client in his classic account of traditional clientelism:<sup>xxxv</sup> Traditional clientelism emerges when clients are “heavily dependent upon their superordinates” (high cost of autonomy) and when they are “generally subject to victimization” (i.e. high value of protection).

This implies that demand for vertical types of clientelism is driven by factors that relate to risk, or to autonomy/ subordination. Risk-related factors include the presence of strong political and economic risks, the absence of social insurance mechanisms, and risk aversion.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Autonomy/ subordination-related factors can have a material/ practical side, such as the isolation that renders clients economically dependent on patrons;<sup>xxxvii</sup> and a psychological/ attitudinal side, such as aversion towards subordination or inequality.<sup>xxxviii</sup>






Figure 2: Trade-offs of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of clientelism

In our framework, programmatic politics can also be situated in on the vertical axis - at its very bottom (see Figure 2). Much as vote buying represents less subordination and more autonomy than relational and traditional clientelism, programmatic politics ideally represents even less subordination and more autonomy. In programmatic politics the pattern of subordination between politicians and citizens is (ideally) reversed: instead of the client serving the patron, it is the politician who is supposed to “serve” the people. Similarly, there are ideally no constraints to the autonomy of the voter in programmatic politics; certainly less than in vertical types of clientelism where the politician is bound to the patron, and also less than in vote buying, where one is “bought” to change what theoretically should be the free expression of a political preference. Therefore, programmatic politics can be considered least vertical.

### *Horizontal Dimension Trade-Offs*

The horizontal dimension is associated to a trade-off about the value of supporting distributive politics of different *scopes*. The narrowest level at the left side of the axis is receiving a strictly personal benefit. This corresponds to vote buying. The next level concerns one's own group, leading to demand for local particularistic goods, as in collective clientelism. The horizontal axis can be extended further to the right to accommodate a situation where the policy change considered is the broadest, about society in general, which corresponds to programmatic politics (see Figure 2). This depiction of the horizontal dimension corresponds to Schaffer's characterization of diverse forms of electoral mobilization.<sup>xxxix</sup>

For the client, the main trade-off associated with the horizontal dimension is between certain, concrete, but small rewards of narrow scope vs. uncertain, diffuse, but potentially large rewards of broader scope. Broader politics are rewarding because they have the potential to yield high benefits to many people and are typically seen as morally superior but require coordination and a responsive political system. What factors contribute to demand for narrow scope of politics such as vote buying as opposed to broader politics? First, attitudes towards the self vs. the community vs. society, in terms of identity and (social) preferences. If social preferences are weak or if individual utility weighs very strongly (possibly because of high individual marginal utility), then broader scope politics are unrewarding, and this drives demand for narrow forms of politics. If social/group identity is weak so that collective action is thought unlikely, then the uncertainty of broader politics makes it unattractive.<sup>xl</sup>

A second important driver of the horizontal trade-off relates to views about politics. Broader scope politics are typically considered morally superior but require a responsive political system. Beliefs about the responsiveness of the political system, for instance trust in politicians, are thus key for the horizontal dimension. Moral views about politics are also important, particularly regarding opinions about "what politics is for":<sup>xli</sup> Is politics about "dividing the pie" or about pursuing the common good? An attitude to politics that emphasizes that politics is about dividing the pie corresponds to the pursuit of narrow particularistic goods.

Collective clientelism is in the middle of the horizontal dimension and corresponds to the intermediate cases of the different continua just mentioned. Collective clientelism implies intermediate social identities and social preferences (group-based, in between individual and society). And they require more coordination and responsiveness than is the case when a citizen is selling her vote, but (arguably) less than achieving policy changes at the society level.

Thus, the horizontal axis essentially corresponds to the trade-off in the standard model of demand for clientelism. In the standard model, the trade-off is between deriving an expressive benefit from supporting a political program vs. obtaining individual goods for oneself.<sup>xlii</sup> The typical factors that drive this trade-off are political efficacy/ mistrust of politicians and marginal utility of income.<sup>xliii</sup> Our framework extends this account by including social preferences, identity, and moral attitudes towards what politics is for, and by placing collective clientelism in the middle of the continuum.

## *Poverty and clientelism*

As an illustration of the potential uses of our framework, we consider the role of poverty for the demand for different types of clientelism. Poverty is the most common factor associated to demand for clientelism according to the literature. In the standard framework, poverty increases demand for clientelism through the marginal utility of income, by making material clientelistic offers more attractive relative to policy preferences. In addition, poverty might affect demand for clientelism via risk aversion or discount rates.<sup>xliv</sup> In our framework, poverty potentially affects the demand for different types of clientelism through different channels. We focus on the potential role of poverty in the horizontal and the vertical dimensions.

Poverty is related to several factors driving preferences over narrow vs. broad scope politics in the horizontal dimension. Poverty can be related to political efficacy, to moral attitudes towards politics and to the weight of individual preferences relative to social preferences. In most cases, poverty leads to preferences for narrow, as opposed to broad, scope of politics, and thus to higher demand for vote buying. However, in some cases, the effect of poverty on preferences for narrow vs. broad scopes of politics is more ambiguous and can be complex, notably regarding the weight of individual vs. social preferences. In particular, poverty could have a *non-linear* effect on the value of different scopes. This is indeed what research on the psychology of poverty suggests that finds that poverty is associated to stronger group cohesion, but also to more suspicion towards outgroups.<sup>xlv</sup> Thus, poverty could be associated with a heightened demand for collective clientelism as opposed to either vote buying or programmatic politics. This perspective could reconcile some contrasting findings in the literature on how poverty is linked to demand for clientelism. Most studies linking poverty and vote buying find a positive effect of poverty on vote buying.<sup>xlvi</sup> Kao et al. in contrast, finds that the poor tend to dislike vote buying more than the middle classes, when compared to a platform that resembles collective clientelism.<sup>xlvii</sup> Our perspective can reconcile these findings by noting that poverty may increase the demand for vote buying relative to fully programmatic politics, but decrease it relative to the demand for collective clientelism.

In the vertical dimension, poverty can also have varied and non-trivial effects. On the one hand, poverty may heighten the vulnerability to negative shocks and make protection/ insurance more valuable.<sup>xlviii</sup> Or poverty may lead to psychological adaptations conducive to legitimize inequalities and accept hierarchical relations.<sup>xlix</sup> Through these two channels, poverty would increase demand for vertical types of clientelism (traditional, relational) as opposed to vote buying. But again, poverty may exert an opposite force through other channels and lead to a lower demand for relational clientelism: Poverty may change the terms of the autonomy/ insurance trade-off for client. More privileged individuals may have more to offer to the patron, and be able to obtain the same rewards by giving up less autonomy. This would make vertical types of clientelism more attractive to middle classes, as shown by Bliznakovski.<sup>1</sup>

## **Concluding remarks**

In this paper, we have systematically reviewed more than 40 ethnographic papers on the clientelism with a focus on the client perspective. Applying cluster analysis to our coded data, we have provided a typology of clientelism. Our analysis shows that there is a lot of

scope for mainstream political science to learn from ethnographic work. Clientelism is much more than vote buying. Clientelistic exchanges differ in many interesting ways and are embedded in very different types of relations.

Our systematization naturally entailed a great loss of richness relative to the original ethnographic works. However, we believe our effort has proven useful, uncovering important commonalities between clientelistic exchanges in different parts of the world. The typology we have derived from these exchanges comprises specific subtypes of clientelism emphasized by separate authors in recent literature, such as relational, traditional, and coercive clientelism. Contrary to these efforts, however, ours seeks to be comprehensive and is derived inductively from exchanges described by many different authors in different contexts.

Possibly the most novel aspect of our work is the identification of two fundamental dimensions of clientelism: the vertical and horizontal dimensions capturing the thickness and hierarchicality of the relation on the one hand, and the extent of its collective nature on the other. Together, these dimensions explain much of the variation in the 18 variables we originally used to describe clientelistic exchanges. Moreover, these two dimensions seem analytically powerful. As we have shown, these dimensions intuitively disentangle between the different types of clientelism derived in our cluster analysis, have different welfare implications for the client, and imply different trade-offs for the client.

The distinction between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of clientelism can also put structure into the different ways in which clientelism is usually considered to be normatively negative. First, clientelism is often evaluated negatively because of its implications for inequality. This corresponds to the vertical dimension. At one extreme are vertical types of clientelism (relational and traditional) where relations are very hierarchical, the client loses autonomy, and is supposed to serve her patron. At the other extreme is programmatic politics where, as we have argued, the hierarchy is reversed, with the politician “serving” the voter. In this dimension, vote buying is an intermediate case where the client is not in a particularly subservient position and might be able to pick and choose between patrons in a pragmatic way. Second, clientelism is often evaluated negatively for its particularistic nature and the resulting under-provision of public goods. This corresponds to the horizontal dimension. Here vote-buying is an extreme negative case, an exchange where rewards are purely individual. The other extreme is again programmatic politics, which are supposedly driven by the pursuit of the common good and associated to the provision of public goods. In this dimension, collective clientelism is an intermediate case, where benefits are at the community level.

Recent evidence on vulnerability and clientelism by Bobonis et al. lends some additional empirical support to our distinction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of clientelism from the client perspective.<sup>li</sup> They find that reducing the vulnerability of citizens to negative weather shocks in Brazil reduces needs for insurance and consequently has an impact on the vertical dimension (reduces relational clientelism). However, they also show that such intervention does not lead to a higher demand for public goods and thus has no obvious impact on the horizontal dimension. This provides support for our basic contention that the two dimensions of clientelism are driven by different factors. More generally, this evidence underscores the idea that addressing the different potential negative implications of clientelism require different policy interventions.

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- <sup>i</sup> Chappell Lawson and Kenneth F Greene, "Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance," *Comparative Politics* 47, no. 1 (2014): 61–85.
- <sup>ii</sup> E.g Sian Lazar, "Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El Alto, Bolivia," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23, no. 2 (2004): 228–43. Javier Auyero, "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 3 (2000): 55–81.
- <sup>iii</sup> Javier Auyero, "'From the Client's Point (s) of View': How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism," *Theory and Society* 28, no. 2 (1999): 297–334.
- <sup>iv</sup> Jon Shefner, "What Is Politics For? Inequality, Representation, and Needs Satisfaction Under Clientelism and Democracy," in *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, ed. Tina Hilgers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 41–59.
- <sup>v</sup> Gherghina and Volintiru also propose a distinction between horizontal and vertical clientelism, which is unrelated to ours. Their distinction applies to the supply side of clientelism as opposed to our demand side focus. Their horizontal type represents inter-elite clientelism, which they contrast to the common, pyramidal, vertical-exchange-type. See Sergiu Gherghina and Clara Volintiru, "A new model of clientelism: political parties, public resources, and private contributors," *European Political Science Review* no 9, (2017): 115–137.
- <sup>vi</sup> Allen Hicken, "Clientelism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (2011): 289–310; Tina Hilgers, "Clientelism and Conceptual Stretching: Differentiating among Concepts and among Analytical Levels," *Theory and Society* 40, no. 5 (2011): 567–88.
- <sup>vii</sup> Hilgers, "Clientelism and Conceptual Stretching: Differentiating among Concepts and among Analytical Levels," page 570.
- <sup>viii</sup> Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, "Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction," *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, 2007, 1–49, page 2; Susan Stokes, "Political Clientelism," ed. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, *Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 604–27, page 605.
- <sup>ix</sup> Leonard Wantchekon, "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics* 55, no. 3 (2003): 399–422.
- <sup>x</sup> Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10, no. 04 (1968): 377–400; Carl H. Landé, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism," in *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande, Eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press., 1977, xiii–xxxvii*; Sydel F. Silverman, "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy," in *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande, Eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press., 1977, 293–304*; Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 01 (1972): 68–90.
- <sup>xi</sup> Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties."
- <sup>xii</sup> Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building."
- <sup>xiii</sup> Three of these recent attempts are: Simeon Nichter, "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 01 (2008): 19–31; Isabela Mares and Lauren Young, *Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming); and Miquel Pellicer et al., "Poor People's Beliefs and the Dynamics of Clientelism" (GLD working paper, no 12, 2017).
- <sup>xiv</sup> Nichter, "Conceptualizing Vote Buying"; Simeon Nichter, *Votes for Survival: Relational Clientelism in Latin America*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- <sup>xv</sup> Nichter, 2008 had earlier distinguished between different types of electoral clientelism, notably vote buying and turnout buying, depending on whether the voter is sympathetic towards the given party or not and whether she is inclined to vote or not.

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<sup>xvi</sup> Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young, “The Core Voter’s Curse: Clientelistic Threats and Promises in Hungarian Elections,” *Comparative Political Studies* 51, no. 11 (2018); Mares and Young, forthcoming.

<sup>xvii</sup> Pellicer et al., 2017.

<sup>xviii</sup> Alternative terms to clientelism such as patronage, informal political exchange, caciquismo, neopatrimonialism did not lead to additional, relevant results. An important challenge in identifying scholarship fitting our criteria was that authors of relevant work do not necessarily conceive of their research as work on clientelism and hence do not use this term anywhere in the text let alone as keyword. Instead, much relevant work is conceptualized either as studies of elections and democratic representation or of socio-political relations.

<sup>xix</sup> There was a pilot phase where all four coded the same papers to compare codes, ensure that all understood the concepts in a similar way, and refine the questionnaire.

<sup>xx</sup> Hicken, “Clientelism.”

<sup>xxi</sup> Hicken.

<sup>xxii</sup> Mares and Young, forthcoming.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Appendix C discusses other potential data concerns. These concerns have to do with our own biases and preconceptions. These are perhaps more subtle and less readily quantifiable than the coding challenges just discussed but can be equally relevant for the interpretation of our results.

<sup>xxiv</sup> J. Richard Landis and Gary G. Koch, “The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data,” *Biometrics* 33, no. 1 (March 1977): 159, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2529310>.

<sup>xxv</sup> One of these variables performs particularly badly (whether the client actually receives the goods), far worse than all the rest, and so we exclude it from the analyses.

<sup>xxvi</sup> The characteristics listed are those for which the cluster has an average higher than 1/3 the standard deviation of the variable in absolute value. For a fuller explanation and the data behind this table see Appendix E..

<sup>xxvii</sup> Pellicer et al., 2017; Mares and Young, forthcoming.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Mares and Young, forthcoming. Consistent with this interpretation, what the client tends to receive in this exchange more than anything else are government services (this is not a unique characteristic of this type of clientelism and so does not appear in Table 1, but can be seen in Table E.1 in the Appendix).

<sup>xxix</sup> The table shows characteristics that with a load higher than 0.3, an arbitrary threshold. Table F. in the appendix shows the values of all loadings.

<sup>xxx</sup> Auyero, “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account.”

<sup>xxxi</sup> Robert Gay, “The Broker and the Thief: A Parable (Reflections on Popular Politics in Brazil),” *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 1999, 49–70.

<sup>xxxii</sup> Lazar, “Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El Alto, Bolivia.”

<sup>xxxiii</sup> The only type of clientelism that is not well explained by the vertical and horizontal dimensions is coercive clientelism. Interestingly, the (discarded) third component of the PCA seems to reflect precisely this. This component is a combination of coercion of the withdrawal type, receipt of government services, and lack of affection (see Table F.1 in the Appendix). This dimension is not selected in our analysis because it does not explain enough of the variation of data, but this is probably simply because of lack of cases.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Nichter, 2018.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Landé, “The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism.”

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Landé; Nichter, 2018.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Mahvish Shami, “Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity,” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 03 (2012): 588–606.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Jon Shefner, “Coalitions and Clientelism in Mexico,” *Theory and Society* 30, no. 5 (2001): 593–628; Pellicer et al., 2017.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Frederic Charles Schaffer, ed., *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). See also Miquel Pellicer, Eva Wegner, and Alexander De Juan, “Preferences for the Scope of Protests,” *SALDRU Working Paper* 223 (2018).

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- <sup>xi</sup> Martijn Van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears, “Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives.,” *Psychological Bulletin* 134, no. 4 (2008): 504.
- <sup>xii</sup> Shefner, “What Is Politics For? Inequality, Representation, and Needs Satisfaction Under Clientelism and Democracy.”
- <sup>xiii</sup> Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics,” *The Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (1996): 1132–55; Susan Stokes et al., *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- <sup>xiii</sup> Stokes et al., *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Dixit and Londregan 2013.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington and Jessica Rea, *How Poverty Affects People’s Decision-Making Processes* (Joseph Rowntree Foundation York, 2017).
- <sup>xvi</sup> Stokes et al., *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust, and Lise Rakner. “Money Machine: Do the Poor Demand Clientelism?” GLD Working Paper, no. 14 (2017).
- <sup>xviii</sup> Landé, “The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism”; Gustavo J Bobonis et al., “Vulnerability and Clientelism” (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).
- <sup>xlix</sup> Pellicer et al., 2017; Miquel Pellicer, “Coping and the Political Behavior of Low SES Individuals,” 2018; Jojanneke Van der Toorn et al., “A Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification,” *Political Psychology* 36, no. 1 (2015): 93–110.
- <sup>1</sup> Jovan Bliznakovski, “Benefit-Seeking and the Patron-Client Linkage: Evidence from Six Balkan Societies,” *Paper Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions*, 2018.
- <sup>li</sup> Gustavo J Bobonis et al., “Vulnerability and Clientelism” (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).

## Appendices

### Appendix A. Tables

Table A.1: Intercoder reliability

	<b>Kappa</b>	<b>Kalpha Interval</b>	<b>Kalpha Ordinal</b>
Client receives goods	0.21	0.22	0.19
Coercion Threats	0.36	0.36	0.36
Agency	0.44	0.44	0.46
Affective relation	0.44	0.45	0.45
Client gets employment	0.48	0.48	0.48
Agent gets a good deal	0.49	0.49	0.47
Client gets money	0.52	0.53	0.53
Client gets gov services	0.53	0.53	0.53
Frequent interaction	0.53	0.54	0.54
Client gets insurance/ protection	0.56	0.57	0.57
Client gives labor	0.57	0.57	0.57
Coercion Withdrawal	0.59	0.59	0.59
Additional domains of interaction	0.6	0.59	0.64
Hierarchical	0.63	0.63	0.58
Broker Important	0.65	0.64	0.66
Dyadic	0.66	0.66	0.64
Client gives loyalty	0.69	0.69	0.69
Individual exchange	0.7	0.7	0.64
Broker interests aligned to client	0.71	0.71	0.66
Client gets infrastructure	0.71	0.72	0.72
Client gives vote	0.87	0.88	0.88

Table A.2: Evaluation of clientelism types

	<b>Vote buying</b>	<b>Relational</b>	<b>Collective</b>	<b>Traditional</b>	<b>Modern-coercive</b>
Agency	2.36	1.93	2.54	2	2
Good deal	2.31	2.53	2.75	2	1.83



## *Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics*

We group the variables in four types. First context variables, such as the decade during which the fieldwork took place, or whether the setting is urban or not. Second, variables that describe the clientelistic relation, such as the goods exchanged, how hierarchical (vertical) the relation is, and whether the client is an individual or a group. Third, variables that help to evaluate the relation from the client perspective, such as the degree to which the client has agency or gets a good deal. Finally we also present some other variables of interest, such as whether the client is targeted by the broker (a prominent assumption in much quantitative political science literature on the topic), the extent to which the exchange is conditional, and the degree to which the paper has details on the client perspective.

Some variables are coded as zero/ one dummy variables whereas others are coded as scales ranging from 0 to 4. Some of the variables were categorical in the questionnaire and have been transformed into quantitative variables. For instance, the questionnaire asked about domains of interaction between the client and the patron/broker, which could be only political or also social (such as if the patron/broker is the chief), or also economic (if the client is employed by the patron/broker). This variable is quantified by recording the amount of domains of interaction, either 1, 2, or 3, coded as 0-2. Free-text responses have been added when possible to existing categories. For instance, the category: Client gets employment includes also exchanges where the client receives income generation opportunities or housing opportunities.

The table shows some variation in context, with some rural cases and some urban ones. There is also variation in the variables describing and evaluating the exchange. Variables always span the whole range of permitted values (0-4, or 0-1, or 0-2) and have an average often close to the middle of their range. This suggests that we get a spread but not overly skewed distribution of types of exchange.

There are also interesting patterns in the data. Most of the exchanges are conditional, as standard definitions of clientelism require. At the same time, most clients are *not* explicitly targeted. This contrasts with much of the standard political science literature dealing with clients, which tends to assume that they become clients because they are targeted by brokers/ patrons.

The table also shows a relatively low level of detail on the clients' perspective provided in the papers. Despite our best efforts, a majority of ethnographic papers focuses on brokers and patrons more than on clients. This implies that our coding exercise requires frequent judgment calls from the coder.

Table B.1: Descriptive statistics

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Context</b>				
Year fieldwork	1997	1950	2010	60
Economic development area	0.85	0	2	57
Urban	0.62	0	1	60
Africa	0.2	0	1	60
Asia	0.37	0	1	60
Latin America	0.33	0	1	60
<b>Characteristics relation</b>				
Individual exchange	2.91	0	4	59
Additional domains of interaction	0.72	0	2	59
Frequent interaction	0.48	0	1	58
Dyadic	2.42	0	4	60
Hierarchical	1.93	0	4	59
Broker Important	2.33	0	4	60
Broker interests aligned to client	1.49	0	4	58
Affective relation	0.34	0	1	57
Client gets money	0.56	0	1	60
Client gets infrastructure	0.44	0	1	60
Client gets gov services	0.38	0	1	60
Client gets insurance/ protection	0.32	0	1	60
Client gets employment	0.19	0	1	60
Client gives vote	0.91	0	1	60
Client gives labor	0.35	0	1	60
Client gives loyalty	0.34	0	1	60
Coercion Threats	0.18	0	1	60
Coercion Withdrawal	0.2	0	1	60
<b>Evaluation relation</b>				
Client has agency	2.14	0	4	59
Agent gets a good deal	2.4	0	4	59
<b>Others</b>				
Patron gives conditionally	3.25	0	4	59
Client gives conditionally	3.23	0	4	60
Client targeted	0.43	0	1	51
Detail on client perspective	1.77	0	4	60

### *Appendix C. Data interpretation challenges*

A potentially important concern with the data we produce has to do with our own biases and pre-conceptions. In particular, our coding may reflect a pre-conceived framework of clientelism in our minds: We might believe that some characteristics of clientelism should be associated with another one. For instance, we may believe a priori that hierarchical clientelistic relations should include affection. We may then have a tendency to code these two features together in a paper even if it is not warranted by the information given in the text. Of course, we seek to avoid making this mistake consciously, but it may still occur to a certain degree unconsciously.

It is difficult to gauge the extent of this problem, but several considerations alleviate the concern in our case. First, most of the coding was done before the details of this paper were conceived. In particular, the type of analysis that would be undertaken with the data was not known while most of the coding took place. It was always clear that the data from coding would be summarized in some way, but the decision to undertake a cluster analysis and a PCA was taken after most of the coding was done. Similarly, most coding was done prior to the development of the framework that emerges from the analysis. Concerns about a pre-conceived framework would be more severe if the framework had been developed first, and the coding done after. Second, the fact that there are four separate coders implies that idiosyncratic associations in the minds of a coder are diluted in the final data. To the extent that coders have different unconscious associations in mind, they should not affect greatly the end result.

In order to check if the team of co-authors held some pre-conceived framework that affected the coding, we asked a master student new to the topic to code some of the papers we coded. We counted the instances where our codes disagree substantially, in the sense that the codes of dummy variables were opposed (for instance, she choose zero and we choose one), or differ by more than one unit for variables with more than two values, which usually have 5 values (for instance, she chooses 2 and we choose 4). Comparing her codes to ours, we found that only in 14% of the cases there were substantial disagreements between hers and ours.

A final relevant interpretational issue that needs to be borne in mind when considering our data is that it is not “objective” data from clients or prospective clients. It is data already filtered through the author of the papers we code. This has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that the author has already selected the most meaningful and representative instances of all her ethnographic exploration; the disadvantage is that our data includes, not only our biases and preconceptions, but also those of the authors of the papers.

#### *Appendix D. Choosing the number of clusters*

Hierarchical clustering works as a bottom-up procedure. We start with a dataset of our 60 ID observations reflecting 60 different instances of exchange in the literature. We consider only the variables reflecting the characteristics of the relation, such as frequency of interaction, whether the exchange is at the individual or group level, and so on, because we aim to use the evaluative variables for an analysis of the welfare implications of different types of clientelism later on. As mentioned above, we perform the analysis twice, first with all characteristics and second restricted to those characteristics with highest inter-coder agreement. We compute the distance between the different observations: instances of clientelistic exchange that have similar characteristics will be close to each other. The hierarchical clustering algorithm then joins the two that are closest to form a first cluster. It then computes an average of the characteristics of the cluster, recomputes the distance of this cluster to all other observations, and again chooses the observations/clusters that are closest together. (We use the default method of “complete” linkage in the R function `hclust`.) The next closest observations could be two “new” observations so that we would now have two different clusters, or it could be the original cluster with a new observation, so that we would have a three-observation cluster. We continue this procedure getting less and less clusters until we only have one big cluster including all observations.

The result of hierarchical clustering can be represented in a dendrogram, which helps choosing a sensible number of clusters. A dendrogram displays the bottom-up approach of clustering more and more observations into fewer clusters. Figure D. shows the dendrograms for the two hierarchical clustering exercises, with all and with the restricted set of variables. The horizontal axis shows all observations. The observations get increasingly clustered as we move up the figure. The vertical axis displays the distance between clusters. We can choose how many clusters we want to consider and the procedure tells us which ones make most sense. This is done by slicing the figure horizontally at a chosen distance level and collecting the clusters that hang from the lines crossed. Starting from top to bottom, it makes sense to choose an amount of clusters so that the clustered papers “hang” as low as possible. The lower the clustered papers “hang”, the farther they are from the next cluster. Visually, it appears that two, four, or five clusters could all be a sensible number to choose. When considering five, two of the clusters are small, with only three exchanges, while the three others are larger. We decide to choose five, but emphasizing particularly the three largest. This allows us to explore a large variety of subtypes, while focusing particularly on the types that are more prevalent.




Figure D.1: Hierarchical clusters using all variables and most-agreed variables

## Appendix E. Clusters

Table E. shows the average characteristics of the five clusters. The rows correspond to different exchange characteristics and the columns correspond to the different clusters. The variables capturing exchange characteristics have been standardized (i.e. demeaned and divided by the respective standard deviation). Thus, the numbers in the cells can be interpreted as the average of the characteristic in the cluster relative to the overall average in standard deviations. Going row by row, one can pinpoint the attributes that characterize each of the clusters by comparing the value of one cluster to those of the others. For instance, the last characteristic is whether there is Coercion in the form of the threat of withdrawal of benefits. Clusters 1 and 3 have negative values implying that they tend to display no coercion relative to the average. Clusters 2, 4 and 5 display positive values so they display more coercion than average. The higher the absolute value of the characteristic in the cluster, the more the cluster is distinguished by such characteristic. Cluster 5 displays the highest value, quite larger than all the rest. In our analysis we consider characteristics with absolute values higher than 1/3 (an arbitrary value). Thus, we say that Cluster 5 (and to a lesser extent Cluster 4) are characterized by coercion in the form of withdrawal of benefits. Table 1 in the text lists all the characteristics with absolute value higher than 1/3, in decreasing order and with a “No” preceding characteristics with a negative value.

Table E.1: Characteristics of clusters

	<b>Cluster 1</b>	<b>Cluster 2</b>	<b>Cluster 3</b>	<b>Cluster 4</b>	<b>Cluster 5</b>
Individual exchange	0.49	0.35	-1.26	0.86	0.21
Additional domains of interaction	-0.9	0.78	0.03	1.84	-0.74
Frequent interaction	-0.8	1.05	-0.34	1.11	-0.32
Dyadic	-0.91	0.84	0.16	1.19	-0.91
Hierarchical	-0.49	0.86	-0.42	1.16	-0.84
Broker Important	-0.92	0.5	0.34	1.42	-0.08
Broker interests aligned to client	-0.74	0.19	0.66	0.1	0.23
Affective relation	-0.58	0.92	-0.29	0.73	-0.77
Client gets money	0.69	0.17	-1.04	-0.1	-0.1
Client gets infrastructure	-0.31	-0.16	0.92	-0.95	-0.6
Client gets gov services	-0.14	0.09	0.23	-0.89	0.23
Client gets insurance/ protection	-0.69	0.91	-0.44	1.25	0.09
Client gets employment	-0.11	0.57	-0.5	0.45	-0.5
Client gives vote	0.34	0.34	0.34	-3.02	-2.46
Client gives labor	0.17	0.15	-0.75	1.41	0.29
Client gives loyalty	-0.48	0.32	-0.25	1.51	0.77
Coercion Threats	0.08	-0.14	-0.1	1.1	-0.42
Coercion Withdrawal	-0.21	0.09	-0.12	0.42	0.89

Table E.2: Contexts of clusters

	<b>Vote buying</b>	<b>Relational</b>	<b>Collective</b>	<b>Traditional</b>	<b>Modern coercive</b>
Decade fieldwork	2002.5	1993.44	1998.93	1970	2005
Urban	0.68	0.53	0.71	0.33	0.5

### Appendix F. PCA results

PCA computes as many components as original variables and orders them by importance. The first components explain a lot of the variation of the original data and the following components explain the less and less. Figure F1 plots the percent of the variance explained by decreasingly important components. The first and second components explain a large amount of total variation (more than 25% and 15%, respectively). The third and following components explain much less in addition, less than 10%.




Figure F.1: Percent of the total variance explained by principal components



Table F.1: PCA. Loadings of three first components.

	<b>PC 1</b>	<b>PC 2</b>	<b>PC 3</b>
Individual exchange	0.02	-0.5	-0.13
Additional domains of interaction	0.38	0.1	-0.12
Frequent interaction	0.39	-0.03	-0.05
Dyadic	0.38	0.14	-0.05
Hierarchical	0.31	-0.1	0.08
Broker Important	0.32	0.17	0.24
Broker interests aligned to client	0.16	0.39	-0.02
Affective relation	0.31	0.05	-0.33
Client gets money	-0.1	-0.29	-0.27
Client gets infrastructure	-0.02	0.42	0.04
Client gets gov services	0.01	-0.07	0.37
Client gets insurance/ protection	0.34	-0.14	-0.09
Client gets employment	0.15	-0.18	-0.2
Client gives vote	-0.15	0.17	-0.23
Client gives labor	0.1	-0.33	-0.12
Client gives loyalty	0.24	-0.22	0.27
Coercion Threats	0.04	0.04	-0.04
Coercion Withdrawal	0.06	-0.18	0.62