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ISSUES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY'S SECOND CENTURY

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Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology

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Abstract: In this chapter I argue that the two modernist traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy stem from common roots. Both began with the same conception of philosophy as an a priori descriptive discipline and both rejected absolute idealism and psychologism. Analytic philosophy, however, in the main, especially under the influence of Quine, has been drawn toward naturalism, whereas Husserl’s critique of naturalism has meant that phenomenology has moved in an anti-naturalistic and in fact explicitly transcendental direction. Husserl’s wide-ranging critique of naturalism has particular relevance for analytic philosophy seeking to overcome a reductive scientism, and conversely, recent developments in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences could provide much material for phenomenologists who want to follow Husserl’s program of identifying the ABC of consciousness. In the 21st century, the two main streams of contemporary thought could again merge into a single tradition.

Introduction

According to Jean-Luc Marion, “in an essential way, phenomenology assumes in our century the very role of philosophy.”¹ This is an exaggeration that ignores the recent global reaches of analytic philosophy. It is certainly true that phenomenology has been one of the major currents of Eastern and Western European, Asian, and Latin American thought during the 20th century, attracting some of that century’s best minds and, in one form or another, engaging with most other contemporary philosophical currents, from neo-Kantianism (Natorp, Cassirer), empiricism, positivism, to Hegelianism (Kojève, Hyppolite, Jean Wahl, Gadamer, Marcuse), structuralism, and so on. But if it is a strong current, it is not the only one, and the tradition of analytic philosophy—especially in English-speaking countries—also makes claims to dominance in the 20th century. Indeed, its most enthusiastic proponents claim it to be the only serious way of doing philosophy at all.

Traditionally, both phenomenology and analytic philosophy sought to oppose idealist obscurantism and arguments that proceeded without well-defined terms. Both analytic philosophy and phenomenology struggled to be clear and precise, and both were equally suspicious of grandiose narratives. Despite these parallels the traditions have remained in a state of mutual ignorance and often hostility toward one and other. From the traditional analytic perspective, phenomenology is usually

recognized as historically influential, but is seen as exceptionally difficult, dense, and written in an opaque jargon, a style certainly not to be encouraged. In general the two traditions are in a state of cold war; major studies of the history of logic, such as William Kneale and Martha Kneale's classic *The Development of Logic*,2 can be written with several chapters on Frege, but without even a footnote to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*—which is particularly inexcusable, as William Kneale had visited Husserl in Freiburg in 1928.3 On the other hand, phenomenologists, especially those leaning toward postmodernism, can write on consciousness and the body without the least mention of recent developments in the philosophy of mind or cognitive science (a notable exception is Shaun Gallagher).

There are also encouraging signs of communication and even cooperation. Analytic philosophers especially have broadened their horizons: Bernard Williams can invoke Nietzsche; John Rawls will discuss Habermas; Donald Davidson will acknowledge Gadamer; Hilary Putnam will invoke Husserl's critique of scientism and naturalism; John McDowell and Robert Brandom can even invoke Hegel, once considered the anti-christ for analytic philosophers, and still consider themselves as belonging to the analytic tradition.4 Phenomenologists have been less open. Struggling to come to terms with the enormous legacy left by Husserl, they have tended to remain exegetes and commentators within their own tradition. Only a few—Paul Ricoeur is a prime example—have tried to digest and confront parallel analytic discussions. Thus Ricoeur discusses Davidson and David Wiggins in *Oneself as Another*.5 Similarly, David Woodruff Smith, a student of Dagfinn Follesdal, has made an enormous effort to explain the Husserlian account of intentionality in a manner compatible with analytic discussion.6 But much more is to be done if phenomenology is to grow and strengthen as a movement in dialogue with other traditions, open to other sources of intuition.

In this chapter I want to explore some of the relations and tensions between the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy as they have developed over the past century, in order to sketch how certain issues in analytic philosophy are likely to challenge the ongoing development of phenomenology as it moves into its second century. Following Michael Dummett, and in recognition of the significant contribution made by non-English-speaking philosophers to analytic philosophy, I prefer to speak of analytic rather than Anglo-American philosophy. At the outset the

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4. Both Brandom and McDowell are working seriously on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807).
range of our problematic has to be restricted so as to distinguish it from the broader and more frequently discussed issue of the relations between so-called "Continental" philosophy and analytic philosophy. It is now widely recognised that this latter contrast class, where one term picks out a region and the other refers to a method—similar to a contrast between Japanese and front-wheel drive vehicles, as Bernard Williams has pointed out—is unworkable and ought to be abandoned. The term "analytic philosophy," on the other hand, is the most widely used and preferred appellation of philosophers in this tradition describing their own outlook, even though, as we shall see, the concept of analysis has a broad range of meanings within this tradition or movement. Of course, any attempt at a genuine Auseinandersetzung between these traditions and methods must make clear in advance what is meant by the designations "phenomenology" and "analytic" philosophy. Whose phenomenology? Whose analytic philosophy? I shall therefore begin by sketching some provisional answers to these questions. I shall sketch the nature of the two traditions and list some of the points of convergence between analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology.

I. Common Origins and a Common Tradition

Although the term "phenomenology" has a longer history in German philosophy, originating in Lambert and employed by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel to designate the science of appearances, the phenomenological movement as we shall speak of it was born just over one hundred years ago with the publication of Edmund Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900-1901). Analytic philosophy is roughly the same age and of the same provenance in Austro-German thought. Although it is regularly traced back to Hume, and even to Aristotle, recent analytic philosophy has its explicit modern origin in the work of Gottlob Frege, and was developed in German by Wittgenstein, Carnap, and the Vienna Circle into a significant form of philosophy practiced on the European continent around the turn of the 20th century. A separate wave of analysis was born in Britain with the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell (himself directly influenced by Frege and the French logician Louis Couturat). Furthermore, both Husserl and the Vienna Circle grew out of a certain conception of philosophy and science to be found in Brentano and Mach. Due to the upheavals in Europe caused by the rise of Nazism, both phenomenologists and analytic philosophers alike were displaced to the United States and elsewhere, and in the case of analysis, figures such as Wittgenstein, Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach, and other emigrés ensured that the German-speaking

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and English streams of analytic philosophy fused into one broad river. Willard Van
Orman Quine and A. J. Ayer are two prominent examples of English-speaking
philosophers who were in early contact with the Vienna Circle (Quine studied with
Carnap in Vienna in 1932), but who went on to develop analytic philosophy in
Britain and America. In the case of phenomenology, it spread from Germany to
France, Poland and most countries of Continental Europe, and also, with the forced
emigration of Hannah Arendt, Alfred Schutz, and Aron Gurwitsch to the United
States and specifically the New School for Social Research in New York, it made a
significant impact in the United States from mid-century onward.

There are common origins to and strong links between both traditions. Hilary
Putnam is fond of pointing out that at the beginning of the last century no divide
was felt; William James corresponded with Carl Stumpf, Husserl with Frege, and
Bertrand Russell with Husserl and Frege. Furthermore, the Vienna Circle of the late
1920s (Carnap and Schlick, in particular) were familiar with the phenomenological
tradition, even if opposed to it. Carnap spent a year in Freiburg attending Husserl’s
seminars in 1924–25 while drafting the first version of his Aufbau. In his preface of
1920 to the revised Sixth Investigation, Husserl criticizes Friedrich Albert Moritz
Schlick (1882–1936, founder of the Vienna Circle) for misunderstanding the concept
of intuition in his 1918 book, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (General Theory of
Knowledge).10 where Schlick had argued that Husserl’s Ideen relied on a bizarre
notion of non-physical intuition that required a peculiar strenuous kind of study.
Husserl replies that by “strenuous study” he means no more than the application
of a mathematician. Schlick’s criticism typifies a more general unease in
philosophical circles with Husserl’s emphasis on intuition, which was seen by many
as promoting an irrational intuitionism that could not be corrected. The dispute
between Carnap and Heidegger regarding the meaning of claims like “nothing
nothings” (das Nichts nicht) has come to typify the dispute between the analytic
philosophers and the phenomenologists. But whatever their differences, they were
reading and challenging each other.

Due to this common origin in Europe, one should understand analytic
philosophy and phenomenology as essentially divergent streams of the one
common tradition. Both share an allegiance to modernism.11 An indication of this
modernism is that both phenomenology and analytic philosophy originally
presented themselves as timeless, ahistorical ways of doing philosophy—as
methods rather than traditions moulded by history and practice. Husserl initially
promoted phenomenology as an anti-traditional way of doing philosophy by
avoiding the usual detours through the history of philosophy, what Husserl called

A. Blumberg (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974).
130, claims that analytic philosophy and phenomenology “are integral to modern sensibility and
thought” and that the “split between the two is really a division within modernism.”
“merely criticizing traditional philosophemes” in the Sixth Logical Investigation.12 Similarly, Bertrand Russell felt that philosophy should no longer be taught based on the classics; rather, philosophers should begin by studying science. Both traditions sought to bring scientific rigor to philosophy and to sweep away the tradition, with its speculations and “pseudo-problems” (Scheinprobleme), a term employed by both Heidegger and Carnap to disparage certain forms of traditional questioning. Thus Carnap and Ayer deliberately sought to challenge what they regarded as deviant forms of philosophizing (usually labelled as “metaphysics”) by diagnosing them as being involved in various kinds of nonsense due to being “duped by grammar.”13

Both traditions have common origins in a reaction to the excesses of Hegelian— and neo-Hegelian (McTaggart, Bradley)—speculative idealism. Both sought to confront the issues directly, “the matters themselves” as Husserl famously proclaimed. Both traditions made the issue of meaning central to their inquiry and both quickly recognized the importance and complexity of language. Both traditions wanted to clarify the nature of philosophical inquiry and to determine the limits of rational explanation. Both made significant appeal to the a priori, which they attempted to specify more precisely than Kant. Indeed, both Frege and Husserl explicitly claim to be sharpening Kant’s conception of the a priori. Frege, Wittgenstein, and Husserl all understand philosophy as a kind of a priori discipline. A priori truths also play a central role in logical positivism. Although Quine’s rejection of the a priori as one of the dogmas of empiricism tended to dominate American analytic philosophy since the middle of the 20th century,14 there is now a strong revival of interest in the a priori in analytic circles.15

Both phenomenology and the analytic tradition also attempt to characterize the nature of philosophy itself in distinctive yet similar ways. Both Wittgenstein and Husserl had the same view of philosophy as the work of description—both use the German terms Klärung or Beschreibung—carried out in reflection. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is essentially descriptive, and “leaves everything as it is” ("lässt alles wie

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In fact, for the later Wittgenstein in particular, one arrives at this philosophical clarification through an illumination gained by alteration of the point of view, an illumination usually gained by putting language back into its proper place. For Wittgenstein, a particular philosophical problem emerges because some “picture” holds us captive (Philosophical Investigations, § 115), and the aim of his philosophical description is to break the spell that a picture conception of the world has on us. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself has been seen as doing a kind of descriptive phenomenology of our practices in the world with its different “forms of life,” and his followers, especially Gilbert Ryle, were self-consciously phenomenological in their approach.

As Husserl originally conceived it, phenomenology was an essentially clarificatory science that enabled other sciences to progress beyond their naive assumptions and starting points and achieve clarity about their essential concepts. Husserl also was against big speculative “pictures” of the world, and was fond of saying “no large bills, but small change only.” For him, similarly, every distinction truly made has the status of a scientific discovery. In a similar vein, Wittgenstein remarks that Hegel’s aim was to make things look similar while he wants to show how similar things are really different.\(^\text{17}\)

Increasingly, as both traditions mature, there are signs of some rapprochement, but it is strictly on quite limited terms. Husserl, as we have seen, has already been appropriated by analytic philosophers, who recognize his commitment to scientific rigor and his suspicion of standpoints adopted in advance. The relatively new discipline of analytic metaphysics develops notions that are separately found in Husserl’s discussions of formal ontology, e.g., the analysis of part and whole, the notion of founding, and so on. On a more conscious level, Hilary Putnam’s deliberate invocation of Husserl’s argument concerning the self-refuting character and relativistic and absurd consequences of naturalism and the dangers of reductive scientism in Reason, Truth, and History,\(^\text{18}\) and elsewhere, shows how Husserl can be fitted seamlessly into analytic philosophy. I think this kind of appropriation of Husserl by analytic philosophers is typical, and more recently, Heidegger, too, largely because of the efforts of Hubert Dreyfus, has been discussed and appropriated to an extent by certain philosophers who see themselves as operating within the parameters of the analytic method. On a subterranean level, one can argue that the influence of Husserl is already present—for example, John Searle’s theory of intentionality echoes Husserl’s account on many key points, although Searle disclaims direct influence.

The work of Richard Rorty is a prime example of a philosopher trained in the

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analytic tradition who is willing to draw on Husserl and Heidegger for insights. Indeed, in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Richard Rorty avoids reading the current split as one between analytic and Continental philosophy, and instead presents the choice as that between *systematic* philosophy, on the one hand, and *edifying* discourse, on the other. Systematic philosophy aims at truth, edifying discourse aims at educational formation, what Gadamer calls *Bildung*. Systematic philosophers, for Rorty, include Husserl and Russell. Such philosophers are quite certain of their own practices and how they should be communicated. In this tradition, there is a long-standing claim of philosophy to be a rigorous science (to borrow Husserl’s phrase), engaged in difficult conceptual analysis, and perhaps even achieving discoveries akin to those in the natural sciences. Philosophy on this account includes conceptual analysis, definition, argument, justification, rigor, formal presentation, and clarity. On the other hand, there are those philosophers—Wittgenstein and Heidegger are examples—whose aim is to problematize the whole traditional business of philosophy and thought. It is worth bearing in mind that this kind of distinction cuts right across our distinction between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, and shows how a new tradition might emerge that divided the intellectual currents in quite different ways.

In a significant if limited way, analytic philosophers, especially those who recognize the ambiguous status of the later Wittgenstein as an “analytic” philosopher, have become more open to phenomenology. On the account of analytic philosophy we have been discussing, it is clear that Husserl may be—and indeed has been—appropriated as an analytic philosopher by those studying mind and consciousness. Analytic philosophers of mind, in particular, are willing to admit that phenomenology may have genuine insights in these areas, but they are unwilling to have to penetrate what they regard as the obscure jargon of phenomenology to win these insights. If analytic philosophy has something to learn from phenomenology, then phenomenology will have to unpack these insights and repackage them in a form palatable to analytic philosophers. On the other hand, phenomenologists too have tended to shelter within their own domain, and despite their commitment to openness and dialogue, rarely make the effort to master the subtleties of recent analytic discussions.

In a number of papers I have already attempted to open up dialogue between these traditions by focusing on their different treatments of specific problems—for example, the problem of intentionality. The Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano revived the Scholastic concept of intentionality in order to find a way of characterizing the domain of mental phenomena, the subject matter of his new “empirical” or “descriptive” psychology. Brentano’s thesis was seized upon, on the one hand, by Edmund Husserl and subsequent phenomenologists, as a the key to unlocking the pure science of consciousness that he called *phenomenology*; and, on

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the other hand, it was discussed by Bertrand Russell and more recently by Roderick Chisholm, W. V. O. Quine, Daniel Dennett, and John Searle as to whether it provided a genuine criterion for the mental such that the mental could not be naturalized within the ambit of the physical sciences. In the 1950s Chisholm sought tentatively to reexpress Brentano’s discovery in terms of several peculiar features of sentences. His aim was to find a way to express the autonomy of the mental and to argue against the possibility of reduction of the mental to the physical. Tracing the complex evolution of the problem of intentionality in these traditions is one way to gain some insight into the nature of these traditions’ methods and reasoning. This review made clear that the various debates about the concept might be understood fruitfully as episodes in the one enlarged tradition, yielding a more accurate picture of the development of 20th century philosophy as a whole. Other problems that could be examined include psychologism, the reaction to Hegelianism, the relation of language and thought, the reaction to the project of mathematical formalism in logic, the evaluation of naturalism, and so on. We shall return to some of these problems in the course of this chapter, but I would first like to consider briefly the whole problematic of what it is to belong to a tradition. This is an issue to be faced if the traditions are to confront each other.

A. The Phenomenology of Tradition

Do phenomenological and analytic approaches differ as to how to characterize the very notion of tradition itself? What is it to belong to a tradition? The nature of belonging to a tradition has been foregrounded in phenomenology, especially in both Heidegger and Gadamer. Indeed, the complex problematic of the hermeneutics of tradition is really developed for the first time here. Most of the existing methodology for handling history is drawn from Hegel and from hermeneutics, stemming from Schleiermacher and Dilthey, but including Heidegger, Ricoeur, and

24. Martin Kusch, *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1995), has shown how psychologism was a problem faced by both Husserl and Frege and by neo-Kantian philosophers at the turn of the 20th century.
Gadamer. By contrast, until quite recently, analytic philosophers actually prided themselves on their deliberate avoidance of the history of philosophy and as a result have been slower in developing the terms and tools needed for examining the nature of philosophical traditions and their intersection. Philosophy of history or even of narrative is still something of a Cinderella discipline among analytic philosophers (although philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Arthur Danto, and Charles Taylor have greatly advanced the debate here).

The problem is more complex: the ways of approaching or belonging to a tradition themselves need to be given phenomenological attention. In order to tackle seriously the problematic relation between traditions, we need a phenomenology of what it is to belong to a tradition, as part of a wider phenomenology of philosophy, that is, a phenomenology attuned to questions of hermeneutics and genesis in at least one Husserlian sense. Terms like "tradition," "influence," "practice," and "method" need to be clarified, displaying their "birth certificates," using a Destruktion or Abbau such as Heidegger and Husserl proposed. Indeed, Husserl advocates a similar backward reflection (Rückbesinnung) in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:25

we as philosophers are heirs of the past in respect to the goals which the word "philosophy" indicates, in terms of concepts, problems, and methods. What is clearly necessary . . . is that we reflect back, in a thorough historical and critical fashion, in order to provide, before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding: we must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy . . . We shall attempt to strike through the crust of the externalized "historical facts" of philosophical history, interrogating, exhibiting, and testing their inner meaning and hidden teleology. Gradually . . . possibilities for a complete reorientation of view will make themselves felt, pointing to new dimensions.26

A phenomenology of the tradition of philosophy would be too wide a task for this chapter, but we should bear in mind that Husserl himself considered reflection on the philosophical tradition (e.g., in Erste Philosophie and elsewhere) to be a fruitful source of insights. Today, phenomenologists are called upon to reflect on the current state of philosophizing as they find it, and that includes the highly significant developments of analytic philosophy.

Belonging genuinely or internally to a tradition necessarily involves a foreshortening of one's horizons, so that one is not led at first to question the very basis of that tradition. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his remarkable essay, "The

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26. Hua 6, 16; Crisis, § 7, 17-18;
Philosopher and His Shadow," written on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Husserl’s birth in 1959, grappled with the problem of living in the shadow of a man whom he had never met, but who dominated his thinking. Merleau-Ponty writes:

Establishing a tradition means forgetting its origins, the aging Husserl used to say [La tradition est oubli des origines disait le dernier Husserl]. Precisely because we owe so much to tradition, we are in no position to see just what belongs to it. With regard to a philosopher whose venture has awakened so many echoes, and at such an apparent distance from the point where he himself stood, any commemoration is also a betrayal [toute commémoration est aussi trahison].

Involvement in a philosophical tradition inevitably means to be involved in forgetfulness, blindness, and even betrayal. This is indeed a problem of origins, the forgetting and the return to origins, a problem involving the impossibility of complete return. In the current set of issues before us, the relations between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, we are all the more caught up in forgetfulness of origins, and with that, the attempt to awaken memory, the attempt to realize a certain possibility of phenomenology and to awaken a certain new understanding of the possibilities between traditions. However, as these traditions grow older and in a way cease to have their hold on us, it becomes possible to do the kind of Rückbesinnung or Abbau that Husserl and Heidegger are calling for. We need to recognize the diversities and heresies within both phenomenology and analytic philosophy, and precisely recognizing this richness allows us to develop a more accommodating sense of the enlarged tradition.

B. Characterizing the Phenomenological Tradition

How are we to characterize phenomenology? Whose phenomenology? That the descriptive science of what shows itself in whatever manner it shows itself, as Heidegger calls it, or the science of appearances and of their appearings, the first science of science, first philosophy in its deep Husserlian sense, should admit of such diversity is indeed a challenge both to its claim to be science and to the task of mapping its relation to the analytic tradition or traditions. Lester Embree has identified four “successively dominant and sometimes overlapping tendencies”: realistic phenomenology (early Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Herbert Spiegelberg, and, today, Karl Schuhmann); constitutive phenomenology (the mature Husserl, Gruwitsch, Becker, et al); existential phenomenology (Heidegger, Arendt, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry); hermeneutical phenomenology (Gadamer, Ricoeur, Vattimo, et al.). More recently, Embree has identified a fifth stage that recognizes


28. Merleau-Ponty, Signes, 201; Signes, 159.

phenomenology’s spread into areas such as feminism, the philosophy of the body, and ecology and the philosophy of the environment. Here I will focus exclusively on Husserl as founder of phenomenology, but even here, we must bear in mind that his thought evolved continuously. His understanding of his own “breakthrough” recognition of the essential correlation between the act of experience and the object of experience, which he dates from around 1898, went through an ever-changing evolution and deepening in his own life. Moreover, Husserl himself encouraged the wide development of phenomenology, for example in his Jahrbuch, although he did not always agree with the way it was being done. Nevertheless, despite the nature of its evolution into a movement, there is a certain intrinsic, essential unity to the nature of Husserl’s project, and this is what I shall be appealing to under the name phenomenology.

In the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1901), Husserl employed the term “phenomenology” (Phänomenologie) in a somewhat tentative way to characterize his new approach to issues that belonged essentially to a certain engagement with the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, and therefore as a kind of propaedeutic to “theory of knowledge” (Erkenntnistheorie) or the project of the “critique of knowledge” (Erkenntniskritik). In this work, Husserl was performing a kind of conceptual clarification and analysis of a kind quite familiar to that which Moore and Russell were also pioneering under the name analysis. Husserl’s early discussions of phenomenology were specifically concerned to locate it in relation to epistemology, specifically because he was interested in the phenomenological clarification of the experience of thinking and knowing. In the years up to Ideas I (1913), Husserl struggled both to distinguish phenomenology from all forms of psychology (including empirical, “genetic” psychology and Brentanian “descriptive psychology”) and to show how it was connected to epistemology. Indeed, Husserl is especially concerned to specify how phenomenology stood in relation to the critique of knowledge in general (e.g., in his 1906–7 lectures on Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, but also in the 1911 essay, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”).

Husserl’s phenomenology in its beginnings, then, involved a radicalization of the neo-Kantian project of setting down the conditions for the possibility of knowledge in general, a phrase Husserl himself employs even in the Prolegomena. The relation between Husserl’s project to those of neo-Kantians such as Rickert and Cassirer needs to be studied further, especially since the tradition of neo-Kantianism (Lotze in particular) is also very important for the emergence of both Frege and the Vienna Circle, as Michael Friedman has shown. A close study of Husserl’s understanding of knowledge, of the problem of skepticism, and of the nature of


intuition and justification would greatly aid in understanding how phenomenology both develops and distinguishes itself from the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge.

Husserl's mature phenomenology gave a new impetus to the attempt after Kant to understand the nature of the transcendental, to define and sharpen the sense of the *a priori*, and above all to understand the scope and limits of the philosophical enterprise itself. In his mature thought, Husserl opposed all forms of naturalism as self-refuting ideologies and takes a *transcendental* position, which he adapts from Kant, but which he elaborates and extends in a less metaphysically dogmatic sense. Husserl rails against the false "absolutization of the world" in traditional philosophy ("eine philosophische Verabsolutierung der Welt")\(^{32}\) and argues for the priority of absolute consciousness over objecthood. Husserl's mature philosophy brings into focus the whole issue of being in the world, the natural attitude and its distortions, and the need to make a fundamental break with this attitude in order to grasp the intentional structures of meaning-constituting consciousness in its fundamental status. It is this radical phenomenology of the mature Husserl that presents the greatest challenge to analytic philosophy, for at least two reasons. First, Husserl is rejecting naturalism and objectivism in all forms, and arguing for the priority of consciousness. Second, his method of exploring this pure consciousness (with its correlated world of meanings and objects, now understood in a "reduced" sense) is explicitly transcendental and deliberately invokes the idealism that analytic philosophy sought earlier to oppose. Since analytic philosophy is in the main both self-consciously naturalistic and also anti-transcendental, phenomenology will appear as an alien project.

But in order to understand the tradition of phenomenology, we must also be willing to acknowledge the degree of strife within the movement itself. Not all phenomenologists were enamoured of Husserl's transcendental turn—Ingarden objected to it, for instance, and Merleau-Ponty would only accept it in a much qualified way. Not many phenomenologists would be strict Husserlians in terms of the acceptance and practice of the reduction (Merleau-Ponty himself reinterprets it). Besides the great stumbling block of the *epoché* and reduction, another problem is Husserl's unwavering commitment to transcendental idealism as articulated, for example, in the *Cartesian Meditations*: "Only someone who misunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional method, or that of transcendental reduction, or perhaps both, can attempt to separate phenomenology from transcendental

idealism.  

If phenomenology was ignored and abused by its opponents, it was not more kindly treated by its supposed followers, as Husserl often lamented. Husserl himself was suspicious of much that was produced under the broad label of phenomenology. Already in 1913 in *Ideas I*, and in the draft that became *Ideas III*, Husserl lamented that it had become fashionable to invoke phenomenology in a way that emptied it of its original significance. In similar vein, in his 1914 essay, "Concerning Phenomenology,", Adolf Reinach dismissed mere *talk about* phenomenology as the most idle thing in the world. In much stronger terms, Martin Heidegger, in his lecture course for the summer semester 1923, "Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity," asserts that phenomenology had descended into a prostitution of the mind:

Phenomenology can only be appropriated phenomenologically, i.e., only through demonstration and not in such a way that one repeats propositions, takes over fundamental principles, or subscribes to academic dogmas. A large measure of critique is initially required for this, and nothing is more dangerous than the naive trust in evidence exhibited by followers and fellow travellers. If it is the case that our relation to the things themselves in seeing is the decisive factor, it is equally the case that we are frequently deceived about them and that the possibility of such deception stubbornly persists. Perhaps called once to be the conscience of philosophy, it has wound up as a pimp for public whoring of the mind, *fornicatio spiritus* (Luther).  

Phenomenology then, was not accepted either as a strict science, or as a transcendental idealism, or as the whole of phenomenology or even its principal part by many of Husserl's own students. Clearly, phenomenology has always had a kind of identity crisis. Husserl spent much of his time trying to specify just what phenomenology was. This radical return to origins contributes to the health and vitality of phenomenology. It can never remain satisfied with merely assumed answers about even the nature of philosophy. But, perhaps because of the legacy of Husserl and Heidegger, there has been a tendency to avoid phenomenological exploration in favor of textual exploration of phenomenology's grand works. Is phenomenology now a set of figures, texts, and themes reinserted into the history of philosophy, or is it still possible as "method," as Adolf Reinach insisted in his


elegant 1914 Marburg lecture? Phenomenology for Reinach was a “method of philosophizing which is required by the problems of philosophy.” In other words, even the notion of method is not prescribed in advance of the problematic.

C. Characterizing Analytic Philosophy

Analytic philosophy is also a broad movement that is difficult to characterize precisely. The very notion of analysis suggests a deliberate contrast with synthetic, system-building speculation, and an effort to arrive at separation of parts, decomposition. Analysis, as originally used by G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and others, meant conceptual analysis, the fixing of the limits and senses of concepts, usually involving a disambiguation of different strands of meaning, and was conceived of as a philosophical practice, distinct from empirical science. The European sources of analytic philosophy are now recognized to include not just classic empiricists such as Hume and Mill, but also the Austrian logician Bolzano, Frege’s teacher Hermann Lotze, Brentano, and even Meinong. In part, analytic philosophy developed in reaction to Meinong’s baroque theory of objects, an attempt to overcome a prejudice in favour of actuality by identifying different levels of objectivity, including impossible objects. As Gilbert Ryle put it, Meinong “vaccinated” contemporary philosophy against the theory of objects, Gegenstandstheorie. Certainly, the early Russell was motivated to take a stand against Meinong.

It has been claimed that analytic philosophy has its precise origin in G. E. Moore. Thus A. J. Ayer wrote in his preface to Language, Truth, and Logic: “The view that philosophising is an activity of analysis is associated in England with the work of G. E. Moore and his disciples.” In his essay “The Nature of Judgment,” published in Mind in January 1899, Moore argued that propositions are in fact existent complex objects that may be analyzed into parts, which he called concepts. Concepts, for Moore, are not linguistic or mental entities but in fact make up the world and are ontological items. The analysis of propositions into their proper conceptual parts, then, becomes an exercise both in logic and in realist metaphysics, cutting nature at its joints. The central image of analysis, for Moore and Russell, was that of a certain decomposition or breaking down of complex concepts into their component parts (e.g., recognizing that the concept of knowledge contains the element belief), perhaps on analogy with analysis in chemistry. Other analytic philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle would speak of mapping. Moore’s account of

the proposition and of the reality of its constituent parts and relations convinced Bertrand Russell to abandon his earlier allegiance to the neo-Hegelian idealism of McTaggart and Bradley. In fact, both analytic philosophy and phenomenology agree in their anti-idealist stance, involving the critique of Hegelian idealism and to an extent a critique of Kant. Indeed Bertrand Russell himself lists Husserl along with Dewey, James, Moore, and others as decisive steps in the refutation of idealism.

While early analytic philosophers agreed in opposing Hegelian idealism, some like A. J. Ayer claimed to have found Moore's conception of analysis insufficiently committed to phenomenalism. Ayer turned instead to the work of Moritz Schlick and the Vienna Circle (whose phenomenalism was in fact influenced by Brentano and Mach). Phenomenalism was, of course, later abandoned by most analytic philosophers in favour of direct realism (especially among Australian philosophers). Of course, up to mid-century, analytic philosophy was under the sway of a rather anti-metaphysical and restrictive theory of meaning, e.g., the condition of meaningfulness in terms of verifiability of the Vienna Circle, but by the end of the 20th century analytic philosophy, under the influence of Quine, had shaken off the dogmas of empiricism, and was working with a much enlarged sense of the analytic method. Empiricism was now understood to involve holism about the whole web of beliefs.

As is well known, early analytic philosophy was marked out not just by its commitment to logical analysis, but also because of its linguistic turn. Analytic philosophy generally involves the scrutiny of concepts as they are expressed in language. Indeed, Michael Dummett holds it to be a central tenet of the analytic method that a philosophical account of thought can only be achieved through an analysis of language. He writes: "What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained." Dummett locates the first move in analytic philosophy in Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and specifically his enunciation in his *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884) of the context principle, namely, that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning. The central core of analytic philosophy, on this account, is a philosophical account of language and this in turn requires a theory of meaning.

Of course, enormous complexities creep into the picture right away. Language is by no means a perfect mirror of thought, and indeed it was a central tenet of analytic philosophy that grammar could mislead thought in important ways, as both Frege and Russell recognized. Russell's theory of descriptions, which purported to show that the logical form of a sentence differed from its misleading grammatical form, has been acknowledged as a paradigmatic instance of analytic

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philosophy. The later Wittgenstein also has emphasized that philosophical problems arise through a certain misuse of language, and proposed his own philosophy as a kind of therapy to help overcome the bewitchment of the mind by language. As Wittgenstein writes in the *Philosophical Investigations*: "The philosopher treats a question; just like an illness." Disagreements emerged as to whether there was a single logical form underlying the grammatical structure, and the later Wittgenstein began to look for the distinctive forms of each linguistic practice. As a result, post-Wittgensteinian analytic philosophers, such as Robert Brandom, have recognized the importance of social practices in the formation of rules governing linguistic practice and hence meaning-formation (normative pragmatics).

Recent analytic philosophers have become more historically aware. There is a sense that the whole domain of analytic philosophy has extended so far as to be a meaningless appellation, at best simply an honorific, to pick out good quality, rigorous, conceptually sharp philosophy, without an *a priori* commitment to a particular view of language, logic, meaning, or the nature of the world. Analytic philosophers now can be empiricists or rationalists, realists or anti-realists, even idealists. The discussion of knowledge as true belief in Plato's *Theaetetus* can even be seen as good analytic philosophy. The situation is not so different in the history of phenomenology, where the initial Husserlian characterization of the method has also broadened and transformed in ways unforeseen by the founder. Heidegger, for instance, claimed to find phenomenology practiced more originally among the ancient Greeks.

**D. Phenomenology as the Pursuit of the Experience of Meaning**

Merleau-Ponty ends his celebrated essay on Husserl with the claim that "it is the meaning which is at issue everywhere." Both analytic philosophy and phenomenology engage with the business of meaning. What is particular to phenomenology is its protracted engagement with the movement of subjectivity toward meaning, meaning-detecting, meaning-finding, meaning-establishing, meaning-constituting, meaning-founding, repeating, recovering, retrieving. That the subject is active in the process of meaning and that that subjective contribution can be recovered by reflection, that is phenomenology's central theme. What is most crucial for Husserl—early and later—is that we attempt to recover the living processes underneath the sedimentations of meaning we encounter. Here Husserl's notion of meaning in the dynamic sense of the correlation of act and its sense, of noesis and noema, can have a vital significance for analytic philosophy and especially for its preoccupation with language. It should be noted that whereas analytic philosophy has been primarily concerned with linguistic meaning, this is no longer the case, as philosophy of mind and an interest in philosophical

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47. Merleau-Ponty, *Signes*, 228; *Signs*, 181.
psychology and cognitive science has, in many instances, replaced linguistic
analysis. Spatial perception, for instance, is a hot topic among analytic philosophers
at Oxford.48

While the exploration of language is of course a vital means in the
phenomenological process, it is not the only avenue of approach (as analytic
philosophy has traditionally declared, as we shall see). Phenomenology dwells in
the "correlation" and must develop its own resources to uncover it without
reducing it to something else. Although thought comes to expression in language,
there must be a pre-linguistic, pre-predicative meaning-establishing and
encountering already going on such that we can find ourselves in the midst of the
already constituted world. Since our more mature, fully-fledged expressions of
meaning are mediated by language, phenomenology must carefully express its
relation with linguistic analysis and various current versions of philosophy of
language.

E. Psychology is not the Basic Science of the Experience of Meaning

If the analysis of language is not the only—or indeed the most fundamental—way
of approaching the nature of meaning, similarly, the tracing back of meanings to the
lived experiences that constitute them cannot be a matter for empirical psychology.
As Husserl (or his editor, Landgrebe) writes in the Introduction to Experience and
Judgment: " . . . the necessary retrogression (Rückgang) to the most original self-
evidence of experience cannot be accomplished with the means of psychology."49
Psychology always assumes a subject in an already given world, a world that is
already overlain with idealizations such as "object in itself," "subject of experience," and so on. "The dismantling of these idealizations [Der Abbau dieser Idealisierungen],
the breakthrough to the concealed foundation of their sense [der Durchstoss zu ihrem
verborgenen Sinnesfundament] in the most original experience, is no longer a problem
which can be handled by psychology, no matter how comprehensively and purely
it may be carried out."50 So then, phenomenology is the attempt to describe
meaning, without becoming either fixated by language or drawn into naturalized
psychology.

II. Facing the Challenge of Naturalism

One of the central themes of philosophy for the past two centuries has been the
challenge posed by naturalism, by the assumption that everything knowable about
the world will eventually be delivered by the natural, and specifically physical

49. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed. Ludwig
Landgrebe (Prague: Academia-Verlag, 1939; 7th ed., Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999); Experience and
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Hereafter cited as EU, with page number of the Meiner
dition, followed by section number and page number of the English translation (EJ); the reference
here is EU, 45; EJ, § 11, 47.
50. EU, 46; EJ, § 11, 47.
sciences. Philosophers have been struggling with naturalism since the middle of the 19th century. In *Ideas I* (1913) Husserl saw his work as involving the attempt to overcome the inclination to "psychologize the eidetic." Initially, he saw psychology as distorting the true sense of the work of the mathematician and the logician. He gradually moved from the critique of psychologism to the critique of all forms of naturalism, expressed in his 1911 essay, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ("Philosophy as a Rigorous Science") and thenceforth through to the *Crisis of European Sciences*, Husserl set phenomenology against naturalism, which, with its misplaced concreteness, he saw as the greatest intellectual sin of the contemporary age. Husserl would write to Rickert that both phenomenology and neo-Kantianism faced the common enemy of naturalism. Phenomenology, then, for Husserl had to be essentially both *anti-reductionistic* and *anti-naturalist*. In his later years he sought to explain how this naturalism arose in the first place.

By 1911 Husserl had his focus on the whole program of the naturalization of consciousness, which he found in contemporary science and psychology (Wilhelm Wundt is a special and constant target). Husserl himself employs the phrase "the naturalization of consciousness" (die *Naturalisierung des Bewusstseins*) several times in "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft." But much earlier, in his 1906/7 *Lectures on Logic and Epistemology*, Husserl refers to naturalism and psychologism as the "original sin" (Hua 24, 176), as the "sin against the Holy Spirit of philosophy" (Hua 24, 177). As late as the Amsterdam lectures, Husserl diagnoses this "prevailing naturalization of the mental" as an enduring prejudice that has its origins in Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, and that continued to haunt even Brentano's attempts at descriptive psychology. Much later, in *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl points out that the "naturalization of the spirit" is not an invention of philosophers (EJ, § 8), but is a totally expected outcome of our first outgoing experience that encounters objects as part of the world. Everything either is or is related to the spatiotemporal world. There is a certain truth in this, but also a way in which this truth becomes distorted. Husserl was fascinated again by the promise and betrayal inevitably caught up in the natural attitude and the inevitable (because, he says in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, grounded in matters of essence) move to naturalism.

Husserl's notion of naturalism is worth exploring in more detail, because he sees it as essentially part and parcel of the natural attitude, which encompasses

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51. Hua 3/1, 130: *Ideas I*, §61, 139.
within itself (at least for us) sedimentations of the scientific attitude at work since Galileo. This involves a certain idealization, an assumption about the way things are in themselves that is built up from the horizons of our encounter with objects (EJ § 10). Surely, along with the concept of world, the concept of the natural attitude itself is one of Husserl's great discoveries.

While Husserl regarded both naturalism and positivism as threats to the true nature of philosophy, and indeed, ultimately, as threats to universal rational culture, nevertheless, he admired the commitment to science in both outlooks. Indeed, he went so far as to call himself a true positivist in Ideas I:

If "positivism" is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the "positive," that is to say, on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we are the genuine positivists. In fact, we allow no authority to curtail our right to accept all kinds of intuition as equally valuable legitimating sources of cognition—not even the authority of "modern natural science." When it is actually natural science that speaks, we listen gladly and as disciples.55

In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," he speaks similarly of the vitality of the appropriation of science in naturalism:

From the start, naturalism sets out with a firm determination to realize the ideal of a rigorous scientific reform of philosophy... Precisely in the energy with which naturalism seeks to realize the principle of scientific rigor in all the spheres of nature and spirit, in theory and in practice, and in the energy with which it strives to solve the philosophical problems of being and value—thinking it is proceeding in the manner of "exact natural science"—lies its merit and the major part of its strength in our era.56

Husserl then embraces this same ideal of the necessity to bring genuine science to bear on all the products of the human spirit, but he thinks this enterprise to be completely different from a prejudiced commitment to the ideologies of positivism and naturalism.

On the other hand, a great deal of analytic philosophy, especially those following Quine (e.g., Daniel Dennett), is self-consciously naturalistic. Quine thinks of philosophy as essentially continuous with natural science (a position actually close to that of Franz Brentano) and promotes a most radical naturalism, naturalized epistemology, which gives science a role in determining issues in epistemology.57 This attempt to explain human noises and scratches in purely natural terms, drawing on Darwinian evolution and on behaviorism, dispenses with Platonic notions of sense and meaning, and sets itself against traditional foundationalism in epistemology. Quine's approach has proved to be enormously popular, and, coupled with evolutionary epistemology, attempts to provide a reductive and naturalistic

55. Hua 3/1, 45; Ideas I, § 20, 39.
56. Hua 25, 7-8, 11; "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," 78, 82.
explanation of human behavior. Philosophy ultimately becomes absorbed in natural science. But is not philosophy an enterprise conceptually distinct from science? Or is it a kind of first fumbling that opens up the paths to scientific inquiry? This raises the issue of the kinds of evidence or evidencing available to philosophy, and also the question of the limits of speculative reason. Whereas Husserl's view of the nature of philosophy deserves to be compared more closely with Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical practice, there is also a need to clarify the relation between philosophy and science itself. This issue looms particularly large with the emergence of eliminative materialism, as preached by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland, in the philosophy of mind for instance, which sees sciences as progressively eliminating our "folk-psychology" of the mind.

Husserl's devastating critique of naturalism ought to be more seriously entertained within analytic philosophy. Indeed, partially inspired by Husserl, Hilary Putnam is one analytic philosopher who has become a relentless critic of reductive naturalism—a position he formerly espoused (under the influence of Quine). The project of a naturalistic scientific metaphysics is disastrous according to Putnam because it is in essence a reductive scientism, "one of the most dangerous contemporary tendencies," leading ultimately to skepticism and the destruction of the human point of view. This is almost an exact repetition of Husserl's views in the Crisis, and Putnam, like Husserl, points to Galilean science as a major culprit. In Putnam's work after 1976, the rejection of naturalism is sometimes achieved with self-conscious reference to Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Kant (especially as interpreted by John McDowell in Mind and World, for instance). The thrust of this analytic anti-naturalism is that normativity cannot be naturalized, a point Husserl also insisted on as early as the Prolegomena. As Putnam says, materialists want to explain everything in terms of physical processes plus the number system, but where does the number system get its validity from? Validity is not itself a part of the world.

Some naturalists want to explain both mathematics and other forms of normative action as a kind of following of practices that arise in human communities. There has been an attempt to explain normativity as arising from practices that are seen as natural bits of the world. But there is a huge difference between rule-governed behavior and rule-following behavior, as John Searle has pointed out. A stone falling off a cliff is demonstrating rule-governed behavior (i.e., it "obeys" the law of gravity). But a person who follows a rule has to have a representation of the rule in some form and the rule has to take on "aspectual shape," as Searle calls it—the rule is understood through an Abschattung. For example, to draw again on Searle, a person who intends to follow the rule of driving below 60 miles per hour is not necessarily also intending to follow the rule "drive below 100 kilometers per hour." The same rule presents itself and is followed as such under different intentional aspects. Searle uses this to argue for the basic ineliminability

and irreducibility of intentionality in all discussion of the nature of meaning and normativity. But the point could have been made by Husserl. There is then a growing sense of unease in analytic circles with reductive naturalism, and a desire to recognize the true nature of the normative.

Finally, because I believe the area of consciousness and intentionality in phenomenology is closely related to the revival of this topic in analytic philosophy, I want in the remainder of this chapter to focus on the issue of the relation of our natural approaches to the mind with the various analyses in recent philosophy of mind. Incidentally, Sir William Hamilton (1791-1856), the 19th century Scottish philosopher who influenced Brentano, refers in his Lectures on Metaphysics to the "Phenomenology of Mind" or "Philosophy of Mind," showing that within the origins of British analytic philosophy itself, there is already a correlation between phenomenology and philosophy of mind.

Husserl set out to find the "ABC of consciousness." In Ideas I, he proclaims: "This infinite field of the Apriori of consciousness [dieses unendliche Feld des Bewusstseinsapriori], which, in its peculiar ownness [in seiner Eigenheit], has never received its due, indeed, has actually never been seen, must be brought under cultivation, then, and made to yield its fullest fruits." In 1923 Husserl visited the psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger at his home in Kreuzlingen and, after some discussions concerning the nature of phenomenology, wrote in the visitor's book:

Unless we become as children, we shall not enter the longed-for heavenly kingdom of a pure psychology. We must search out the ABC of consciousness [das ABC des Bewusstseins], and so become true elementary learners [ABC-Schütze]. The path that leads to the ABC of consciousness and thence upwards to elemental grammar and, through a gradual ascent, to the universal a priori of concrete formations is that path that makes possible true science and knowledge of the all.

In a few succinct phrases, again with religious overtones, Husserl is here summarizing his mission; his aim is to find the "ABC of consciousness" as the only way to achieve the goal of philosophy as a rigorous science. This telling phrase, the "ABC of transcendental consciousness," recurs in Husserl's First Philosophy lectures of the same period. Husserl wants to uncover the basic forms of our conscious life in terms of their essential features and necessary structural interconnections.

Today, the problem of consciousness has resurfaced, as what David Chalmers and others have termed "the hard problem of the sciences," namely, how to account for consciousness against the backdrop of the causal closure of the physical. There has been increasing recognition of the intractability of problem of consciousness,

61. Hua 3/1, 135; Ideas I, § 63, 147.
because we must employ consciousness in our pursuit of any knowledge. Subjectivity is involved at all levels of our apprehension of the world, even the scientific one that adopts a neutral, third-person objective stance. Tom Nagel's critique of the "view from nowhere," a perspectiveless perspective, a "God's eye view," in many ways repeats the views of Husserl and of Merleau-Ponty, who even uses the term "la vue de nulle part" in Phenomenology of Perception. David Carr has recently argued that Husserl's philosophy is really an exploration and defence of the "first-person point of view." In Ideas I, § 27, Husserl begins his meditations on the nature of the natural attitude by using "the first person singular" (in der Ichrede, Hua 3/1, 56). In its debate with analytic philosophy on this point, phenomenology must resist being relegated to the "what it's like" aspect of experience if this "how" of experience is treated as a mere irrational and literally non-sensical qualitative feel, as is the case in much recent discussion. Phenomenology does explore the "what it's like" of experience, but this must be understood as exploring the meaningful experience itself, not dissecting it into an information-bearing state and then some "qualitative" "what it is like" to be in that state.

Not all philosophy of mind wants to respect the first-person point of view. In recent analytic philosophy of mind the claim has been made that the first-person, experiential life of consciousness may, if we follow certain forms of naturalism, be eliminated (Churchlands), rendered theoretically harmless (Searle, Dennett), or treated as merely epiphenomenal (Davidson on some readings). We may be zombies after all—that is, it is considered theoretically possible that we could perform all the functions and process all the information we do now, without it passing across the screen of our conscious awareness. This clearly is based on a deformed notion of the contribution of consciousness to the constitution of meaning, but this is something phenomenology must insert into the debate.

Phenomenology's active contributions to these recent debates in the philosophy of mind have been minimal. Recently the following call for papers was circulated for the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness for its conference on "The Contents of Consciousness (Perception, Attention, and Phenomenology)" held May 27-30, 2001 at Duke University. The conference announcement reads:

Consciousness has rich and diverse contents, from sensory experiences such as vision, audition, and bodily sensations such as pain, to non-sensory aspects such as volition, emotion, memory, and thought. All of these conscious states can be seen as part of the contents of consciousness. Furthermore, most conscious states can be seen as having representational contents of their own, in the sense that they are about something: objects and states of affairs in the world, or states of our own body. The contents of these states are all presented to us, in William James's powerful metaphor, as part of a "stream of consciousness."

63. David Carr, The Paradigm of Subjectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 74; see also 77: "his phenomenology is not just about experiences, . . . but about the first-person standpoint itself."
The contents of consciousness raise many important questions: Just how rich is the content present in conscious experience? Do the contents of attention exhaust the contents of consciousness, or is there consciousness outside attention? What is the neural basis of the representation of conscious content? How does consciousness of our own body differ from consciousness of the external world? What methods are available to monitor the contents of consciousness in an experimental context? What is the relationship between consciousness and representation? All of these questions have been actively discussed in recent years by neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers.

The list of plenary speakers included experimental psychologists, neurologists, cognitive scientists and two philosophers of mind, Owen Flanagan and William Lycan, but no phenomenologists. I am willing to hazard a guess that it is unlikely that any phenomenologists will bother to put in papers. Yet the description of the problematic could have been written by phenomenologists and the topics as described could be regarded as directly phenomenological.

While there is an undoubted blindness to phenomenology in analytic philosophy of mind (note the reference to James and not to Husserl), there is an equal fault on the side of Husserlian phenomenologists who do not see themselves as involved and have not bothered for the most part to keep themselves up to date on these debates in the current literature. The onus is surely on phenomenologists to insert themselves into the debate. I am therefore very happy to note the launch of a new journal, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, to address these very issues.

Husserl’s position is transcendental: the meaning of the world is the meaning it has for consciousness, and the correlation of world to consciousness is the primitive fact from which phenomenology starts. Husserl, however, always prioritizes the role of pure consciousness in this correlation and hence always takes up the position of transcendental idealism. This claim has to be balanced by the recognition of the role Husserl ascribes to the mundanized and enworlded ego, the ego that is always embodied and located. Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not just an empirical realism, but a corporealized and historically located realism. The anti-naturalistic, transcendental approach to consciousness here comes to some accommodation with the truth of the enworlded, individualized self. Husserl spent much of his later years meditating on precisely this mystery. I think there is something crucially right about Husserl’s transcendental approach, about its recognition of the assumption of subjectivity as an integral and ineliminable part of the process of knowing that had been misconstrued and misinterpreted by psychologistic naturalism and by historical epistemologies that had been rooted in the representationalist tradition. But did Husserl not make the gap too wide between his transcendental phenomenology and his ”phenomenological psychology”? Husserl even speaks of a new error of “transcendental psychologism.” He does recognize a certain parallelism between psychology and our transcendental
life, but insists that only through the reduction can we conceive of that relation adequately.

I will end with a challenge to the transcendental orientation: if phenomenology has to do with the essential nature of subjectivity in and of itself, without reference to factual instantiations of consciousness, and this moreover is to be achieved through reflection on the invariant aspects of conscious acts, how do these claims get universalized? Husserl, for example, talks of the experience of knowing who we are talking about while forgetting his or her name. Is this a feature of experience that is true for all possible consciousness? Or are we not thematizing possibilities of our distinctly human consciousness? It was Merleau-Ponty who remarked how different our ontology would have been if we have eyes on either side of the head like birds. I suggest that such an experience of knitting the world together would be akin to that achievable while looking out of the two opposite windows of a train. How can we unite the distinctly transcendental claim about the structure of experience in general with the genetic story of how this consciousness arose in the natural world? Should phenomenologists not be alert to those psychological and brain problems that, as Merleau-Ponty showed, distort the birth of meaning for us?

**Conclusion**

So where do we stand? Assessing how traditions intersect and react to each other is something that itself needs considerable care and attention. Furthermore, to summarize, the onus is on philosophy to tackle the situation, the matter itself, and in this case this means the contemporary state of analytic philosophy. We cannot preach from above, but following Husserl, we must be workers at the foundation. Husserl’s phenomenology is an extraordinarily rich resource of insights, conceptual discriminations, analyses, and modes of approach to a whole range of issues that are still current topics of investigation. For example, Husserl has original and subtle insights into metaphysical issues (the nature of wholes and parts, including temporal parts, the relationship of founding, the nature of objectivity, thing, property, relation, necessity, possibility, and so on), that have been developed by Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Kit Fine among others. Similarly, Husserl’s explorations of transcendental logic (including the broader understanding of the task of logic, and the proper way of situating consequence logic, the logic of inference, the right way of tackling modal issues, and so on) are currently being explored, mostly by logicians on the European continent (e.g., Olav Wiegand). Much of this interest in Husserl is driven by the recognition of new problems thrown up by analytic inquiry. Thus Husserl is now being discussed in terms of issues in the philosophy of language and semantics (including theories of meaning, speech act theory, theories of truth and reference, indexicality, the nature of proper names, and so on), philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and cognitive science (the nature of consciousness, intentionality, mental content, supervenience, and so on...)

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reductionism, identity theories, etc.), epistemology (theories of cognition in the broadest sense), theories of perception and embodied behavior, and value theory, including ethics and aesthetics.

However, a concerted effort needs to be made by phenomenologists themselves to draw in the analytic audience, by attempting to introduce unprejudiced reflection of exactly the kind that Husserl himself pioneered. In this respect, not all the onus is on the analytic tradition; phenomenologists have to do some housecleaning and engage in unprejudiced reflection on the strengths and limitations of their own tradition too. Especially worrying is the replacement of the matters themselves with the texts themselves, and the fairly pervasive anti-scientific attitude that builds on Husserl's genuine critique of scientism but seems to assume phenomenology has nothing to learn from science, which is certainly not Husserl's position. Indeed, Paul Ricoeur has criticized recent European philosophy for ignoring science.

Furthermore, the central issue is not a matter of convincing analytic philosophers of the importance of phenomenology. Phenomenologists themselves must become more open. The practice of phenomenology involves no intellectual baggage other than a willingness to tackle the issues themselves, in the very manner in which they present themselves. Phenomenology, then, is achieved in the doing. Strictly speaking it does not have a method, but lets the problems deliver the means of access to them. Phenomenology, then, should have an openness to issues, which includes an openness to the analytic treatment of them. Phenomenology will have to begin reflecting within that tradition, just as Husserl himself began with a radical critique of the traditions of his time. Translated into contemporary terms, phenomenology could very well begin with a reflection on shortcomings in analytic philosophy, engaging from within and not merely criticizing from without. Husserl began in precisely the same way with his critical reviews of logic that led up to the Logical Investigations.

Building a foundation with which to discuss and contribute to analytic philosophy will be the task of the next decades. This may very well be the promise—or at least one of the promises—for phenomenology as the science of possibilities.