Dermot Moran

"Heidegger's Transcendental Phenomenology in the Light of Husserl's Project of First Philosophy"

pp 135–150

Transcendental Heidegger

Edited by
STEVEN CROWELL and JEFF MALPAS

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
2007
Heidegger's thinking as a whole and is a direct consequence of the attempt to address the question of being in a way that remains true to being as such, but which is also true to the belonging together of being and beings, of presence and what is present. All of Heidegger's thought, as he himself said, can be construed as an attempt to articulate the place of being. And in doing this, what Heidegger attempts is something that is difficult and even obscure, largely because it is so fundamental, so simple and so close: "The one thing thinking would like to attain and for the first time tries to articulate in Being and Time is something simple. As such, being remains mysterious, the simple nearness of an unobtrusive prevailing." And elsewhere he writes: "To think being does not require a solemn approach and the pretension of arcane erudition, nor the display of rare and exceptional states as in mystical raptures, reveries and swoonings. All that is needed is simple wakefulness in the presence of any random unobtrusive being, an awakening that all of a sudden sees that the being 'is.'" The homecoming that Heidegger finds spoken of in Hölderlin is thus a homecoming that indeed consists in a remembrance of and a return to a place that properly we can never leave. Heidegger's task of thinking is to achieve such a homecoming, a homecoming that must always be carried out in each and every place and time. We may choose to say that, for Heidegger, philosophy itself is such a homecoming, but we may also wonder, as Heidegger did himself, whether it is proper to speak of this still as philosophy at all. Heidegger talks of thinking, a kind of meditative thinking, that looks to preserve the place of being, to speak it, and in so doing provide us with a reminder of who and what we are, of our own being as mortal creatures, born and destined to die, and yet nevertheless given over to a world that itself shines, as Heidegger puts it, as a world, as a world that shines in the truth and beauty of gathered place.

Chapter 10

Heidegger's Transcendental Phenomenology in the Light of Husserl's Project of First Philosophy

Dermot Moran

In this chapter I want to interrogate Heidegger's commitment to a transcendental phenomenology during his so-called "phenomenological decade" (roughly 1919-29) in relation to Husserl's parallel project of transcendental "first philosophy" in those same years. Husserl initially conceived of phenomenology in the Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen) as "theory of knowledge" (Erkenntnistheorie), but, in his mature transcendental period that began with Ideas I (Ideen I; 1913), he reconceived it as "first philosophy," reviving Aristotle's proté philosophia, without regard, as he put it, to the sedimented history of the phrase. By this "first philosophy" he did not mean metaphysics or epistemology (neo-Kantianism had made epistemology the "first philosophy"), but rather "a philosophy of beginnings instituting itself in the most radical philosophical self-consciousness." In 1923, at the very time Husserl was lecturing on proté philosophia, Heidegger began composing Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) as a contribution to phenomenological ontology, radically revising the Greek problematic of being for the contemporary age. As is well known, despite their close personal contacts, Husserl's and Heidegger's projects steadily grew apart in the mid-1920s. Nevertheless, there are strong links between these approaches to philosophy. Both emphasize the need to return to "concrete" experience, getting to the matters themselves. Both are interested in specifying conditions of possibility. Both want to appeal to self-evidence. Both accept the possibility of Wissenschaft, not as a mystical practice but as attention to what is revealed in all revealing. Both want to anchor conceptuality in preconceptual
givenness, to do justice to the world as the backdrop and "horizon of validity" for all experience. Both wanted to have genuine grounding as opposed to merely apparent grounding. Both assume that there is an essence to philosophy itself and that its "primary establishment" (Ursatzung) in ancient Greece continues to have significance if one peels back the sedimented history that has accrued to it. Both are involved in a rethinking or deconstruction of the history of philosophy.

But, besides their parallel approaches to phenomenology, is there a deeper philosophical relationship between Husserl's "first philosophy"—the "science of the all," with its search for "ultimate foundation" (Letztbegiindung) through an account of the genesis and constitution of the "ultimate sense" (letzter Sinn), that is, the "sense of being" or "being-sense" (Seinsquint) and "validity of being" or "being-validity" (Seinsgelattung) of all entities—and Heidegger's inquiry into the "meaning of Being" (Sinn von Sein)? To investigate this question, I shall proceed by tracing the parallels between the themes of these two thinkers in their lecture courses during that period, including their unsuccessful collaborative project on the article on "Phenomenology" for the Encyclopaedia Britannica.8

1. The Being-Question

According to Heidegger's self-reflections, his entire life's path in philosophy was motivated by the "Being-question" (die Seinsfrage), a question that also calls for reflection on the meaning of philosophy itself, provoking complex questions about its historical achievement and essential possibility. Husserl, too, was interested in the meaning of philosophy, especially in the 1920s. His Erste Philosophie lecture course (1923–24) opens with an account of the Greek breakthrough to the universal and the ideal in Plato and then proceeds with detailed analyses of the emergence of transcendental philosophy in Descartes, its naturalistic distortion with Locke, and the recovery of the transcendental in Kant.

Husserl, of course, was intent on elaborating his phenomenology in transcendental terms, but he used several different modes of approach into this domain. He is best known for his "Cartesian way" of approaching transcendental phenomenology, portraying it as a radicalized exploration of the true meaning of the Cartesian discovery of the ego cogito, especially in the period dating from his 1922 London lectures to his 1929 Paris lectures. Meanwhile, Heidegger, at the same time, was intent precisely on deconstructing that Cartesian legacy, which he diagnosed as bearer of a deep metaphysical residue that he initially located in the Latin transmission of Greek thought but later found at the heart of the Greek experience itself. However, as is now well documented, Husserl's so-called Cartesianism was just one face of a many-sided approach. Equally important as the Cartesian way is the way of thinking about the transcendental field by contrasting it with the psychological domain. In fact, the difference between psychological and transcendental subjectivity is a theme that is common to both the Cartesian way and the way through psychology.

Heidegger, too, was struggling to express his own unique problematic of the meaning of being. In the lectures leading up to Being and Time, and in that work itself, Heidegger remains within the framework of the Husserlian legacy of transcendental philosophy, and develops his existential analytic of Dasein specifically within the tension between natural, mundanized subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity. Heidegger thought that Dasein cut across that opposition and offered the beginnings of a solution to the transcendental problematic. Husserl, of course, regarded it as a collapse back into naturalism and anthropologism. What I want to show in this chapter is that, whatever was the precise motivation for Heidegger's long engagement with die Seinsfrage, he could not have formulated his question without deep absorption in the central problematic of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger's problem is not the legacy of the Greeks but the manner in which the meaning of everything that appears as such can have its site in a finite, temporal, mundanized existent, Dasein.

The origin of Heidegger's being-question, at least in the manner in which he originally broached it in Being and Time, is to be found in Husserl. From the outset of Husserl's career he had been concerned with the conditions that make objective knowledge possible, and was precisely documenting the nature of objectivity in its many varieties, including real being, possible being, and so on. He often speaks of the totality of all things as "being" of "the totality of what is" or "the being of the world," and he speaks of his project as an attempt to understand the relation between consciousness and the "all." According to the Cartesian Meditations, phenomenology proposes to solve the problem of objective being. The central claim of his transcendental phenomenology was that every experience of beings is at the same time an experience of beings as appearing to and correlated with a constituting subjectivity, and that the objects that appear to consciousness are "achievements," "accomplishments," or "performances" (Leistungen) of that consciousness. The nature of Husserl's transcendental outlook is well expressed in the Crisis:

As scientists, can we content ourselves with the view that God created the world and human beings within it? . . . The enigma of the creation and that of God himself are essential component parts of positive religion. For the philosopher, however, this, and also the juxtaposition "subjectivity in the world as object" and at the same time "conscious subject for the world" contain a necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is possible.10
It was that essential *correlation* between being and site of appearance of being that Heidegger inherited as his central problem. The question of being, as it is posed in Heidegger’s 1925 lecture series, *History of the Concept of Time*, which might be considered the “first draft” of *Being and Time*, emerges from a sustained and penetrating critique of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.\(^{11}\) In particular, Heidegger makes problematic the being of Husserl’s constituting subject. While acknowledging that Husserl was laudably trying to develop a deeper account of subjectivity in his own *Phenomenological Psychology* lecture course of the same semester,\(^{12}\) which he sees as a Diltheyan project of reviving a personalistic psychology (*History of the Concept of Time*, § 13), he then criticizes Husserl both for neglecting the being-question and even for distorting the grounds that would make it possible to pose that question in a radical way.

Heidegger detected in Husserl, especially in *Ideas I*, an unquestioned presumption drawn from traditional philosophy, specifically, that there existed an essential distinction between material being and the being of consciousness, such that consciousness was “absolute being.” As he wrote in 1962:

> Meanwhile “phenomenology” in Husserl’s sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of thought remained completely foreign to such a position. . . . The being-question, unfolded in *Being and Time*, parted company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I still consider a more faithful adherence (*Festhalten*) to the principle of phenomenology.\(^{13}\)

Despite these emerging disagreements, Heidegger stresses, even as he offers a penetrating critique of Husserl, that “it almost goes without saying that even today I still regard myself as a learner (als Lernender) in relation to Husserl.”\(^{14}\) Two years later in *Being and Time* he wrote:

> The following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logical Investigations* phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its activity as a philosophical movement. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility.\(^{15}\)

In his autobiographical essay “My Way to Phenomenology” Heidegger claimed that what he gained from Husserl and from phenomenology was the practice of “phenomenological seeing.”\(^{16}\) Indeed, both in his explicitly phenomenological decade and in his post-*Kehre* writings, Heidegger frequently explicates his philosophy as a genuine phenomenological seeing in contrast to other superficial conceptions of phenomenology that lay claim to “essential insight” without justification. Thus, in his “Letter to Richardson” of 1962, Heidegger portrays himself as a phenomenologist.\(^{17}\) Similarly, in a letter to Eugen Fink in 1966, he says that phenomenology “does not refer to a particular direction of philosophy. It names a possibility that continues to exist today, i.e., making it possible for thinking to attain the ‘things themselves,’ or to put it more clearly, to attain the matter of thinking.”\(^ {18}\) As he had written in 1959, “I was trying to think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary manner.”\(^ {19}\)

Heidegger struggled with Husserl’s phenomenological approach to being right from the start. In the theology faculty of Freiburg University, where Heidegger studied from 1909 to 1911, Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* lay on his desk ever since his first semester there.\(^{20}\) Surely Husserl—a student of Brentano—could shed light on the problem of the underlying unity of the manifold senses of being. Heidegger was drawn to Husserl’s endorsement of the objectivity of truth that seemed compatible with scholastic realism, and to the Sixth Logical Investigation with its discussion of categorial intuition that allowed the dimension of “supersensuous” being to appear. In Sixth Investigation, section 44, Husserl explains that the concept of being is not arrived at through reflection on the judgment but is given in the fulfillment of the judgment itself: “the concept of Being can arise only when some being, actual or imaginary, is set before our eyes,” and being set before our eyes here involves an intuition broader than sensuous intuition (Sixth Logical Investigation, § 45). The message of the Sixth Investigation is that being appears in a distinct kind of founded judgment.

Part of Heidegger’s fascination with the Investigations was that Husserl had defended ideal truths, objective senses, and the direct intuitive grasp of nonsensuous categorial entities. But Heidegger was also drawn to Husserl’s resolute antinaturalism. Husserl had already rejected psychologism, which in his 1906–7 lecture course on he called the “original sin” of philosophy, the “sin against the Holy Spirit of philosophy.”\(^ {21}\) Soon afterward, in *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft; 1911*) he was attacking the project of the naturalization of consciousness and naturalism in general. He now sought to construe the activity of constituting consciousness in a nonpsychological, nonnaturalistic manner. Heidegger accepted this transcendental antinaturalistic orientation, but he actually thought Husserl retained a commitment to naturalism in his starting point, namely, the natural attitude and its supposedly inherent assumption that humans were to be construed as rational animals (*homo animal rationale*). In Husserl’s stratification of attitudes, according to Heidegger: “The *fundamental stratum* is still the naturally real (das Naturwirkliche) upon which the psychic is built, and upon the psychic the spiritual.”\(^ {22}\) Heidegger was never comfortable with Husserl’s retention of metaphysically loaded concepts of subject (the Latinized thinking of *to hypokeimenon*) and consciousness, instead of attempting a more unprejudiced description of the being that discloses beings in the being, namely
what he would call Dasein. Although, in his "On the Essence of Ground" ("Vom Wesen des Grundes"), Heidegger acknowledges: "If one chooses the title 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein' then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity."23 Being and Time would claim that phenomenology required that study of the intentional structures of consciousness needed to be replaced with the more fundamental study of the relation between Dasein and being itself. As Heidegger later wrote: "What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the unconcealedness of what is present, its being revealed, its showing itself."24 We shall leave aside the Greek spin on phenomenology, to concentrate on the title 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein' then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity.

"Vom Wesen des Grundes" in "Being and Time" would claim that phenomenology required that study of the intentional structures of consciousness needed to be replaced with the more fundamental study of the relation between Dasein and being itself. As Heidegger later wrote: "What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the unconcealedness of what is present, its being revealed, its showing itself."24 We shall leave aside the Greek spin on phenomenology, to concentrate on the title 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein' then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity.

Heidegger still followed Husserl's project of explicating the modes of givenness of objectivity in terms of a set of structured and gradated achievements, but now the achievements are attributed to Dasein in its relation to world. In Being and Time, he even endorses a kind of transcendental idealism as having an "advantage in principle" over realism: "If what the term 'idealism' says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic."25 Of course, idealism is not usually construed as the thesis that being is transcendental for every entity, and indeed Heidegger himself observes that adopting this definition would mean that Aristotle, along with Kant, would be considered idealists. But the point, for Heidegger, is that the meaning of objective being lies beyond or behind those beings, transcendental to them. This transcendental domain has been construed by idealists as "consciousness," but this does not clarify the nature of the region in question. Dasein, on the other hand, with its intrinsic relation to being, offers a chance for clarification.

Interestingly, Husserl himself, when he finally came to grips with Being and Time, thought that the root of the disagreement between himself and Heidegger concerned the issue of transcendental philosophy. In his Amsterdam lecture of June 1931 he focuses precisely on the meaning of transcendental philosophy. He points out that the transcendental question can be posed in several ways: "It is the problem of cognition or of consciousness. It is the problem of the possibility of objectively valid science. It is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics—and so on."26 But what concerns him in particular is the manner in which being gets rethought as certainty of being (a shift he attributes to Descartes). Transcendental self-reflection involves the new awareness that "a universal belief in

being flows through and sustains my entire life."27 This "constant certitude of being" has up to that point sustained all scientific inquiry. However, the new transcendental science must put this certitude under the epoché. Both the whole world, the "totality of entities," and myself as an individual human being are put under suspension. The world becomes world-phenomenon, specifically a stream of experiences: "World in the sense of this universal phenomenal of validity is obviously inseparable from transcendental consciousness."28 Husserl was the first to articulate the importance of worldhood and the backdrop of horizons that make possible the subject's acts of meaning-intending. The world transcends all experiences and makes them possible and gives them validity by offering a backdrop for the harmonious course of experience. To conceive of a transcendental ego is also always to conceive of a world correlated with it.

Heidegger's discussion of the structures of worldhood, and especially the correlation between Dasein and world such that Dasein can be characterized essentially as "being-in-the-world" (In-der-Welt-Sein), is an essential development of the Husserlian theme, but it does so without putting the world in brackets as world-phenomenon. Husserl would react to Heidegger's move by calling it "anthropology," suggesting he had fallen back into naiveté by seeking to ground the world in a finite being who was part of that world, something his own transcendental philosophy had overcome.

Clearly, then, the nature of Heidegger's transcendental phenomenology of the 1920s needs to be explicated by careful comparison with Husserl's project in that very period. In order to make sense of the relation between Husserlian constitution of Seinsinn and Heideggerian Seinsfrage, I shall first briefly rehearse Husserl's and Heidegger's sense of their respective philosophical missions, and then examine some of their complex interactions in order to situate Heidegger's transcendental philosophy as an extension of Husserl's mature phenomenology.

2. The Task of Phenomenology

As Husserl makes clear in his Erste Philosophie lectures, the whole purpose of philosophy in its Socratic "primal instituting" (Urstitfung) is to achieve the examined life, the life of Selbstbesinnung, which is also the life of complete "self-responsibility." In his early Halle and Göttingen years Husserl spoke of this philosophical aim more narrowly as a phenomenological clarification of the conceptual elements, objects, and subjective performances that contribute to the theory and critique of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie and Erkenntnisethik) with regard to "fixing" the components of scientific knowledge. His aim was to clarify the epistemology of the statements of scientific knowledge. How do they gain their sense? What grounds their validity? In particular, of
course, he was interested in grounding logical claims, but his overall aim was a critique of science as such. But the initial investigations were primarily focused on the nature of objectivity and the kind of warrant held by statements claiming to objective status.

Interestingly, Husserl’s analysis of the formal category of object as such led him to develop formal ontology, a term inserted into the second edition of the Investigations to refer to the pure, a priori theory of the forms of objects as such and their component parts (e.g., the very concepts of “parts,” “whole,” “relation,” and so on that allow one to refer to objects at all). Husserl went on to contrast this formal ontology with the various material or regional ontologies that dealt with specific objects (e.g., nature). Formal ontology is always seen by Husserl as the counterpart of logic understood as assertive or apophantic. Formal ontology, however, does not deal with the experience of being or with the fundamental correlation between consciousness and being; these themes belong to phenomenology, the investigation of the relation between consciousness and being. As Husserl explains in 1911: “If epistemology will nevertheless investigate the problems of the relationship between consciousness and being, it can have before its eyes only being as the correlate of consciousness, as something ‘intended’ after the manner of consciousness: as perceived, remembered, expected, represented pictorially, imagined, identified, distinguished, believed, opined, evaluated, etc.”

Being is always “being-for” consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand, is “absolute being” (and Husserl never wavers from this position), as he put it in Ideas I.

Since all concepts have to be traced back to their origins in intuition, must the “sense of being” (Seinsinn) too be located in lived experience? Husserl locates the original sense of being in perceptual certainty. Being is given in perception as that which is itself there, with complete certainty. As Husserl writes in his 1924 lecture on Kant:

[Perception] is what originally makes us conscious of the realities existing for us and “the” world as actually existing. To cancel out all such perception, actual and possible, means, for our total life of consciousness, to cancel out the world as objective sense (als gegenstandlichen Sinn) and as validating actuality for us (als geltendes Wesen); it means to remove from all world-thought (in every signification of this word) the original basis of sense and legitimacy (den ursprünglichen Sinnes- und Rechtsboden). 22

In other words, perception is what gives rise to the “being-sense” and the original consciousness of validity. As he writes in his Passive and Active Synthesis lectures: “Every normal perception is a consciousness of validity.” Building on the primitive certainty or Unbreakable of sense perception, Husserl finds more and more layers of being correlated with high-order cognitive acts, including judgments.

The radical doctrine of categorial intuition, which interested Heidegger so much, claims that there are higher levels of givenness beyond the sensory. Being and properties of the object are given in higher-order intuitions, founded on the sensible. As Heidegger himself explicates in his History of the Concept of Time lectures: “Categorial acts are founded acts; in other words, everything categorial ultimately rests on sense intuition.” 24 Heidegger comments that a broadened concept of the sensible is at work here, such that spatiality, for instance, is sensuously apprehended, although not by means of “sense data.”

Heidegger writes: “Sensuousness is a formal phenomenological concept and refers to all material content as it is already given by the subject matters themselves.”

For Heidegger, Husserlian phenomenology provided a means for grasping the revelation of being. Furthermore, constitution really meant letting-be-seen: “Constituting does not mean producing in the sense of making and fabricating; it means letting the entity be seen in its objectivity.” 26 It is the transcendental ego that constitutes sense and being, as Husserl put it in the Cartesian Meditations: “Transcendence in every form is a within-the-ego, self-constituting being-sense [Transzendenz in jeder Form ist ein innerhalb des Ego sich konstituierender Seinsinn].” 27

Husserl saw his program as tracing the layers of constituted meaning in all aspects of meaningful reality, including not just the actual but every possible world insofar as each such world is correlated with a subjectivity and an actual or possible consciousness. Indeed, phenomenology, carried out with systematic concreteness, is ipo transcendental idealism, albeit in a fundamentally new sense. He adds that this idealism is not the product of arguments against realism, but rather from close investigations of constituting consciousness in all its possible modalities. Thus he asserts: “The proof of this idealism is therefore phenomenology itself. Only someone who misunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional method, or that of transcendental reduction, or perhaps both, can attempt to separate phenomenology from transcendental idealism.” 28 Also in 1929 Husserl writes: “The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity.”

Various claims have been made for how radically Husserl himself interprets the constitution of “sense and being” or “being-sense” by transcendental subjectivity. As Pötzl points out, he does on occasion speak of constitution as creation. A. D. Smith has recently defended a particularly strong interpretation of this idealism. I also believe that Husserl intended it in a strong sense. There is no being, no reality, no world, other than those constituted by transcendental subjectivity. To even think of an entity beyond consciousness is a countersense.

Of course, there are complicating factors in interpreting the meaning of this idealism. Husserl explicitly rejected any solipsistic construal of his idealism,
and was emphatically neither a Berkeleyan nor a Kantian. His transcendental ego has corporeality, is embodied in the world, is intersubjectively constituted, has practical motivations, and so on. Already, in 1925, he was stressing the complexity of the layered intersubjective life: “The task necessarily arises of descriptively pursuing systematically coherent multiplicities of consciousness which pertain essentially to the cognitively becoming aware of objectivities of every category. Every category of possible objectivities designates an index for a methodic regularity of possible psychic life; every possible real world, a regularity of possible, intersubjective psychic life.”44 Husserl emphasized the intersubjective grounding of objectivity: “Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient foundation (Sinnboden), out of which everything objective (the totality of objectively real entities, but also every objective ideal world) draws its sense and validity.”44 Moreover, especially in the later work, as Dan Zahavi and Natalie Depraz have shown, the Husserlian subject is shot through with the non-egoic, with the “foreign,” das Ich-fremde, and so on.49 Just as temporal presence involves and includes absence, and perception has a necessary absent element, so also the ego implies the non-ego. These are difficult themes in the later Husserl but they were already consistently to be found in his lectures and writings between 1915 and 1925, in his Freiburg period generally.

But in all his transcendental discussions, the key point for Husserl is to overcome naïveté and to gain (and sustain) the “absolute attitude” of the transcendental onlooker. The transcendental attitude is to be contrasted with the manner in which we normally live our lives “anonymously” in the natural attitude: “The natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is realized in running its natural, practical course. It was the only form from millennium to millennium, until out of science and philosophy there developed unique motivations for a revolution (Umwandlung).”46

Husserl’s genius in part lay in identifying the kinds of attitude that illuminate beings in their specific entitative and sensible status, that is, their Seinsboden. The epoché and reduction are introduced in order to break the grip of the dominant natural attitude, enwined as it has been since the modern breakthrough of Galileo with the mathematical scientific attitude, in order to grasp the hidden constituting subjectivity at work. To every objectivity there corresponds a set of constituting “acts” (not to be construed in an active sense) and indeed objectivities only come to light when approached through a certain attitude. To being actual there corresponds the attitude of certainty, but there are other modalizations of attitudes that yield objectivities under different modalities (possibility, dubitability, etc.). There are many kinds of attitude (Einstellung) but the most prominent are the natural attitude, the personalistic attitude (which humans take to each other and their local and cultural world), the theoretical attitude, the attitude of the formal mathematicizing sciences, the aesthetic attitude, the religious attitude, and so on. An art object only comes to light as such under the aesthetic evaluating attitude, and likewise a tool is only recognized as such under the practical attitude.

With the gaining of the natural attitude, a whole new domain of experience is opened up, and for the time a science of spirit can begin:

It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has made of the spirit qua spirit for the first time a field of systematic experience and science and has thus brought about the total reorientation (Umstellung) of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit surrounds everything that exists with an absolute historicity, to which nature as a spiritual structure is subordinated. Intentional phenomenology, and specifically transcendental phenomenology, was first to see the light through its point of departure and its methods. Only through it do we understand, and from the most profound reasons, what naturalistic objectivism is and understand in particular that psychology, because of its naturalism, has to miss entirely the accomplishment, the radical and genuine problem of the life of the spirit.47

As Husserl was making these extraordinarily strong claims for phenomenology, Heidegger too was employing phenomenology to solve the central philosophical issue, the meaning of being.

3. Phenomenology and Ontology

Following his mentor Husserl, Heidegger too is “opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings” and to all “pseudo-problems,” and wants to secure all claims in a certain kind of “self-evidence.”48 He follows the phenomenological maxim “not to flee from the enigmatic character of phenomena not to explain it away by a violent coup de main of a wild theory but rather to accentuate the puzzlement.”49 Furthermore, phenomenology is a method, and above all not a “standpoint.” In fact, as Heidegger puts it in his earliest Freiburg lecture course (1919), to think of phenomenology as a standpoint is the “original sin” of philosophy.50 Heidegger too is concerned with what Husserl refers to as “the life of spirit” (Geistesleben) and his early Freiburg lecture courses extol the phenomenological virtue of “absolute sympathy with life,” allowing life to be seen and expressed philosophically without distorting it.51

In Being and Time Heidegger seeks to reawaken the question of the meaning of being and to do so through a complex phenomenological approach that identifies a particular being—Dasein—and then undertakes a twofold investigation of it by means of an existential analytic of Dasein followed by a rethinking of this with temporality in view. Moreover, phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology (Basic Problems, § 5). Scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology, Heidegger says in History of Time lectures.52
“Phenomenology is always only the name for the procedure of ontology,” he says. In his 1925 lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology he asserts (and emphasizes at the initial point it remains just an assertion) that “being is the sole and proper theme of philosophy” and hence that “philosophy is ontological.” Philosophy is the theoretical interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological. Philosophy is to be “universal phenomenological ontology,” and it is to be carried out through a hermeneutic of Dasein, which provides the thread to lead philosophical questioning out of the labyrinth.

In Being and Time, section 7, Heidegger claims that his own use of the term ontology is so "formally broad" there is no point in trying to trace its history: “Since the term 'ontology' is used in this investigation in a sense which is formally broad, any attempt to clarify the method of ontology by tracing its history is automatically ruled out.” He makes similar assertions in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “we take this expression [ontology] in the widest possible sense” (§ 3, p. 11). Because it is new, it has no model to follow:

When, moreover, we use the term “ontology”, we are not talking about some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with others. Here one does not have to measure up to the tasks of some discipline that has been presented beforehand; on the contrary, only in terms of the objective necessities of definite questions and the kind of treatment which the "things themselves" require, can one develop such a discipline. Ontology must emerge from the phenomenological situation and not by aping any of the existing sciences. Heidegger is claiming then that ontology is a completely new science.

Heidegger's 1925 lectures articulate his sense of phenomenology in quite considerable detail. He discusses Husserl's work at length—not just the Logical Investigations, but also Ideas I, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, and even the unpublished discussions of the personalistic attitude of Ideas II. Heidegger traces a very powerful critique of Husserl in these pages, emphasizing the need to inquire more deeply into the being of the subjective. Husserlian intensional description failed because it did not interrogate the sense of the being of the subject and its intentional "acts," and did not link the sense of this subjectivity to transcendence and falling (Verfallen). In contrast to this extended discussion, Being and Time does not mention intentionality, except in a note where Heidegger promises to show how intentionality is grounded in the ecstatic nature of Dasein.

Heidegger in Being and Time stresses the importance of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Here he draws heavily on Husserl, who had an awareness of "world" from the beginning. In one sense it is the ultimate horizon, the whole of which everything else is a part (it has this meaning in the Third Logical Investigation). The world in the reduced sense as the world of experiences plays a central role in his transcendental phenomenology. Husserl sees all experience as presuming a world.

Let us consider for a moment Husserl's analysis of world in his 1925 lectures published as Phenomenological Psychology, where world-experience and the experienced world become themes for description. According to Husserl, there is always a "pregiven world" as the backdrop of experience. World is the "all-inclusive abiding ground of existence" and the "all-inclusive field for all our activities." It has its own universal, a priori, essential structure, which includes the spatial and the temporal but also much more. The world is always experienced and it is experienced as "one and the same world." It is grasped pre-theoretically and pre-predicatively. Assertions are about it, and thus in a sense it precedes predicative truth. Truth in fact presupposes this world, which is given prior to our activities of questioning, judging, conceiving, theorizing. This world allows a "world truth" to be sought. It is a world spread out before us and receding from us without end. A central—and essentially new—achievement of this work is its characterization of the Lebenswelt or life-world in which we find ourselves primarily and most of the time. It is precisely because the scientific worldview has been adopted as the only true worldview that the life-world has become visible for the first time. Moreover, this initial experimental world is not divided into nature and spirit. It is experienced as one totality. It is experienced through the harmonious flow of experiences confirming each other "continually progressing and concordant experience."

Heidegger takes over many aspects of this analysis and it would take too long here to detail the relation between their respective concepts of world. Sufficient to say, that Heidegger emphasizes more than Husserl the manner in which Dasein is always involved in falling, that is, being lost in the world. Whereas Husserl sees the understanding of world as giving a new security to the sciences, Heidegger sees it as a way of entering into "existential" discussions concerning inauthentic and authentic ways of living as an individual in the world, either caught in das Man or somehow authentically oneself.

Overall, however, in his 1925 lectures Heidegger sees Husserl as beginning from the natural attitude and thus already beginning from a standpoint shot through with traditional metaphysical assumptions. For Heidegger, Husserl's fault is to assume that, in the natural attitude, we "naturally" regard humans as rational animals, as entities in the world. While he regards Husserl's development of the personalistic attitude as a positive improvement on this position, he sees Husserl as actually beginning from a distorted conception of the "natural attitude," in fact from an overly naturalistic reading of the natural attitude. Heidegger's move is to restore to the natural attitude
the thickness of its conceptions of human existing, everything that comes under the title Dasein. Husserl falsely assumes that it is "natural" to think of human nature as body and consciousness and so on. This is the Cartesian residue in his thinking. The very starting point for his reorientation (Umschlag) remains uninterrogated.

As a result Heidegger thinks it is impossible for Husserl to recover the true sense of humanity in the transcendental attitude, since the transcendental attitude alters the value of everything received in the natural attitude. Heidegger raises a question that he believes is characteristic of the Husserlian project and yet unanswerable in it: "How is it at all possible that this sphere of absolute position, pure consciousness, which is supposed to be separated from every transcendence by an absolute gulf, is at the same time united with reality in the unity of a real human being, who himself occurs as a real object in the world?"

Indeed, this precisely is Husserl's central transcendental question in his mature years. As he himself asks in Crisis: How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects appearing in cooperation, are themselves only a partial formation within the total accomplishment?

Both Heidegger and Husserl wrestle with this question, which we might call the fundamental transcendental question. How can that which constitutes the whole be itself a constituted part of that very whole? Husserl sees this as a paradox, but resolves it in terms of two different attitudes—the attitude of "common sense" (he uses the English term), and the attitude of the "disinterested spectator." The way to grasp the question is to apply the epoché and reduction, and to remain within them, as Husserl emphasizes in his Amsterdam lectures.

Heidegger's response to this problematic, on the other hand, is to raise the being-question. Heidegger explicates this paradox in terms of Dasein, which both manifests being and is also a being. The distinction is between beings and being, for Heidegger, between the "ontic" domain of beings and the "ontological" (in Heidegger's new sense) domain of Sein, the to-be, the "how" of beings. This "how" had been thought by Husserl as the modes of givenness to constituting subjectivity. Heidegger too starts from this standpoint (in 1925) but soon goes beyond it.

In attempting to address the central paradox of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl was only too aware that he might be heading into the phenomenological equivalent of the medieval theological absurdity of the two kinds of truth. He refers in Crisis to the notorious doctrine of "double truth." But, for Husserl, the problem is in fact resolved by the distinction between two attitudes—the natural and the transcendental. Objective truth as such is found only in the natural attitude: "Objective truth belongs exclusively within the attitude of natural human world-life."

Truth, for Husserl, emerges as a practical concern within the world for securing the attitude of certainty against its possible modalizations (into unbelief, etc.). All sciences deal with the objective world and hence are naive about the productions of transcendental subjectivity. When the subjective correlations are exhibited in the transcendental attitude, we are no longer in the domain of objective truth.

In the reorientation of the epoché nothing is lost, none of the interests and ends of world-life, and thus also none of the ends of knowledge. But the essential subjective correlates of all these things are exhibited, and thus the full and true ontic meaning of objective being, and thus of all objective truth, is set forth.

Husserl emphasizes the need to live in the natural attitude in order to make possible the break from it in the transcendental attitude that will grasp intentional life as "accomplishing life" (als leistendes). This is precisely what Heidegger seizes on to criticize. If the natural attitude is treated as the outlook of modern philosophy then we have imported prejudices into our discussion. Phenomenology has become unphenomenological, as he will repeatedly say.

The struggles between the competing Husserlian and Heideggerian interpretations of the task of "first philosophy" are nowhere more evident than in the differences between the drafts of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article and in the notes Husserl made in his personal copy of Being and Time. Both sets of documents reveal a perplexity on the side of Husserl as to what Heidegger meant by fundamental ontology. Where Heidegger speaks of the inquiry into the meaning of being as the most basic and concrete of questions, Husserl agrees, but he comments in the margin that this is a "transcendental-phenomenological question" about the constitutive meaning of being.

In his note at the bottom of Being and Time, section 3, Husserl explains that all entities have certain formal ontological properties in common and that every individual being is a concretization of these forms. Husserl is clearly invoking his distinction between formal and material ontologies. In so far as there are categories (unity, part/whole, identity, individual, species) that belong to anything insofar as it is a thing, then these topics belong to formal ontology.

Husserl could only see in Heidegger's transcendental analytic of Dasein an account of human existence in the natural attitude and hence a kind of anthropology. Husserl, however, never does resolve how human beings as...
entities in the world are at the same time world-constituting. How can the transcendental ego (belonging to no matter what kind of intersubjective community) be mundanized, incarnated, temporalized? Are we not left in Husserl with a "double truth"? Husserl is protected from the consequences of this problem by the epoche that separates *Seinssinn* from existence (Dasein in Husserl's sense). Heidegger, on the other hand, by making historically existent Dasein both a transcendental condition for world and at the same time mediating the meaning of being, thinks, at least in *Being and Time*, that he has found a way of solving the transcendental problem. That he would soon be forced to abandon the language of transcendental philosophy and seek an "other thinking that abandons subjectivity" is another story.78

**CHAPTER 11**

**The "I Think" and the For-the-Sake-of-Which**

Mark Oksent

In two recent articles, I argued that one of the early Heidegger's most significant contributions to transcendental philosophy involved a major rethinking of the nature of self-consciousness.1 "Transcendental self-consciousness" is always understood by Kant to involve a conceptual representation of the act in which a subject conceptually represents an object. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues that, while "the self which the Dasein is, is somehow in and along with all intentional comportments," the intention directed toward the self is not properly seen as either a representation or as conceptual. Rather, Heidegger suggests, "we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of."2 The self is primarily tacitly intended as that "for the sake of which" things matter to us and our activities make sense. For Heidegger, it is only insofar as our interactions with things are implicitly organized in terms of a style of life embodied in such a "for-the-sake-of" that we are capable of using concepts to make judgments concerning objects, or to cognize ourselves as the subject of our experiences.

If, as I have previously argued, Heidegger systematically rethinks the nature of the "I think," this suggests that he must also have rethought the role of the "I think" in transcendental arguments. For Kant, the ability to attach the "I think" to all of my representations is tied up with the ability to form judgments, and this ability in turn is essential for the ability to cognize objects independent of our apprehensions of them, and the capacity to form a coherent, unified experience of an objective world. But Heidegger thinks that it is a mistake to think of the basic form of our self-apprehension in terms of a conceptual representation accompanying our other representations and to think of the activity of judging as the most basic human intentional