Abstract. Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider the influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made transcendence an explicit theme of his writing. I argue that Husserl does recognize the essential experience of transcendence within immanence; even the idea of a physical thing has “dimensions of infinity” included within it. Similarly, he asserts profoundly that every “outside” is what it is only as understood from the inside. Jaspers too makes the experience of transcendence central to human existence; it is the very measure of my own depth. For Edith Stein, everything temporal points toward the timeless structural ground which makes it what it is. Transcendence is an intrinsic part of being itself. Furthermore, the very lack of self-sufficiency of my own self shows that the self requires a ground outside itself, in the transcendent. There is strong convergence between the three thinkers studied on the concept of transcendence, which is indeed a central, if largely unacknowledged, concept in phenomenology both in Husserl and his followers (Stein), but also, through Jaspers, in Heidegger.

In memory of Gerry Hanratty

I.

Phenomenology and Transcendence: The Problem. Phenomenology’s relationship with the concept of transcendence is not at all straightforward. Indeed, phenomenology, from its inception, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. Phenomenology, as the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion
has recently emphasized, is *par excellence* the philosophy of givenness, reflecting specifically on the “givenness” of the given, on what Husserl speaks of as the “how” (*Wie*) or “mode” (*Art, Weise*) of givenness. Phenomenology deliberately restricts itself to describing carefully and without prejudice whatever is given to experience in the manner in which it is so given. Marion frames the essential question of phenomenology thus: “Can the givenness in presence of each thing be realised without any condition of restriction?” But, if phenomenology is restricted to givenness, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? As such, and from the outset, then, the *epoché* of Husserlian phenomenology brackets the transcendent and, specifically, traditional metaphysical or onto-theological conceptions of God as a transcendent being outside the world. Is, then, the relation between phenomenology and transcendence always one of distance and renunciation, or is another way of relating possible?

In this paper I wish to re-examine the role of the concept of “transcendence” in phenomenology, focusing explicitly on the work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Edith Stein (1891–1942), but I shall also refer briefly to the German philosopher of existence Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), precisely because he made transcendence a central theme of his philosophy, and because of his influence on Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Heidegger’s conception of the transcendental and of transcendence appears to have come from his *Auseinandersetzung* with his mentor Husserl, but also from his close personal relationship during the 1920s with Karl Jaspers, the medic turned philosopher, who himself was greatly influenced by Kierkegaard and existential philosophy. Following a discussion of the Husserlian problematic of transcendence, I shall examine Edith Stein (1891–1942), specifically her work attempting to relate phenomenology to Thomistic ontology. Here I shall be concentrating on her understanding of being as fullness and of the ego as the primary sense of being, as somehow encapsulating

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2An earlier version of this paper was presented as an address to the conference on “Transcendence and Phenomenology” held by the Centre of Theology and Philosophy, University of Nottingham, September 1–2, 2005. My thanks to John Milbank for his comments.

3Husserl and Jaspers had a distant but professionally respectful relationship. Husserl had read Jaspers’s *General Psychopathology* and owned a copy of the three-volume *Philosophie* (although only volume 1 showed signs of having been perused). Their correspondence is to be found in Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Karl Schuhmann in collaboration with Elizabeth Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente 4 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).

the mystery of being. Stein sees a way of combining the insights of Husserlian eidetic phenomenology with traditional Thomistic talk about the divine, to find a new way of articulating transcendence. What unites Husserl, Stein, Jaspers, and Heidegger is that they all accord a special place to the transcendence of the self, the transcendence of human existence, or the transcendence of Dasein. The paradox at the center of their philosophies is that the most immanent self-experience is precisely that which reveals transcendence.

Transcendence means literally “going beyond.” In one sense, transcendence refers to the region of “otherness,” whatever lies beyond or is other, especially other than one’s self. In this regard the French phenomenologist Natalie Depraz has claimed, for instance, that phenomenology is the philosophy of otherness. But, in Husserl’s phenomenology, transcendence as going-beyond is intrinsically related to a deeper experience of selfhood or “self-experience” (Selbsterfahrung) such that, paradoxically, genuine transcendence has to be discovered in immanence. The original transcendence, for Husserl, is the living ego itself, in that it is directly experienced, and is temporally constituted and hence never completely able to be captured in a totalizing view. The self is essentially self-transcending. Heidegger makes this “transcendence of Dasein” into an essential part of existential analytic of human existence.

Both Husserl and Stein begin, as do in their own ways St. Augustine and Descartes, with one’s own first-person experience of one’s own being. Self-experience, as Husserl argues in the *Cartesian Meditations*, has to be the starting point and the measure for all other experiences if these experiences are to be captured purely under the *epoché*. Of course, this is not to say that self-experience ought to be considered as self-enclosed and solipsistic. Quite the reverse. Husserl and Stein both saw subjectivity as a one-sided abstraction from the interrelated nexus of concrete intersubjectivity. On the other hand, it would be phenomenologically inaccurate to deny that experience is deeply “egoic” and first-person in its core originary nature.

Stein received her doctoral training under Edmund Husserl, and was intimately involved in the theory and practice of Husserlian phenomenology (at Göttingen); but she later moved to embrace Catholicism, and in her mature

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writings offers a very original and independent re-conceptualisation of the Thomistic heritage illuminated by her phenomenological background. This work of synthesis between phenomenology and Thomistic metaphysics receives its fullest articulation in her *Endliches und ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being)*, a book written, as she said echoing Husserl’s own view of himself as a phenomenologist, “by a beginner for beginners,” to explain Thomistic philosophy for the modern mind. In this work, Stein explicitly acknowledges that she wants to use Husserlian phenomenology as a way of gaining access to Thomistic or “scholastic” thought. *Finite and Eternal Being*, a vast compendium of speculative commentary on key Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts, including a kind of new cosmology, is at its core a very deep appreciation of the experience of being as *fullness*, a concept that unites Husserl and Aquinas, although Husserl is attempting to approach being precisely from its experiential meaningfulness as given.

Husserl’s own leanings towards empiricism and his suspicion of Hegelian invocations of the absolute led him to distrust metaphysical speculation that was not grounded phenomenologically. Furthermore, when he embraced the Kantian critical and “transcendental” approach, he further distanced himself from naïve discussions of the transcendent. But transcendence is problematic for Husserl for an even more essential reason, namely, because of the methodological strictures phenomenology imposes on itself with regard to the importation of speculative assumptions. Indeed, it is one of the explicit functions of Husserl’s “bracketing” or “suspension” (*epoché*) to exclude consideration of the transcendent, at least in the sense of that which may in principle be considered apart from consciousness. If there is to be transcendence, for the mature Husserl, then this is always transcendence under the *epoché*; it is “transcendence-within-immanence,” hence not pure “transcendence.” As Husserl says in his programmatic *Ideas I*, the eidetic attitude of phenomenology after the reduction “excludes every sort of transcendence.” Yet, paradoxically, as Husserl will attest in his *Formal and

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9*FEB*, xxvii.

10Ibid., 12.


12*Ideas* I, § 86, 209; Hua III/1, 178.
Transcendental Logic, it is an essential part of phenomenology's brief to explore "the sense of transcendence" (Sinn der Transzendenz), that is, the manner in which we have experience of an objective world as such.

While Husserl always insisted that phenomenology proceeds in immanence, in an important essay on the relation between Thomism and phenomenology, Edith Stein points out that Husserl was seeking a region of genuine immanence in the sense of a region of immediate, inviolable self-givenness from which all doubt is excluded, but no matter how much he attempted to purify his starting point transcendentally, "traces of transcendence showed up." Stein maintains this is because Husserl's ideal of knowledge is in fact divine knowledge, where knowing and being are one and where there is no transcendence (a version of the "view from nowhere"), where knowledge is simply disclosure of the given without mediation or obstruction or slant. In other words, for Stein in her critique of Husserl, his philosophy of pure immanence cannot escape transcendence. The finite and determined has to open up to the infinite, undetermined, and indeterminate.

In thinking of transcendence, Husserlian phenomenology begins by rejecting thinking of transcendence framed in Cartesian terms, paradigmatic in modern epistemology, whereby the central question is how to "transcend" the closed sphere of subjectivity in order to attain to an "external" objectivity beyond the subject. This conception of transcendence as objectivity opposed to subjectivity is precisely what comes to be challenged in Kantian critical philosophy. Consider the question famously formulated by Immanuel Kant in his Letter to Markus Herz of February 21, 1772, a letter written some years before the First Critique but still considered to express the essentials of the transcendental turn. Kant asked:

What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call "representation" (Vorstellung) to the object (Gegenstand)? If a representation is only a way in which the subject (Subiect) is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how the representation is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect in accord with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can represent something, that is, have an object. . . . In the same way, if that in us which we call "representation" were active

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14 FTL, § 93c, 230; Hua XVII, 237.

with regard to the object (*des Obiects*), that is, if the object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived as the archetypes of all things), the conformity of these representations to their objects could be understood. . . . However, our understanding, through its representations, is not the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends) nor is the object (*Gegenstand*) the cause of the intellectual representations in the mind (*in sensu reali*). Therefore the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by the object (*vom Obiect*) nor bring the object (*das Obiect*) itself into being.16

Kant is the source of most twentieth-century worries about transcendence (insofar as things in themselves transcend every possibility of being meaningfully cognised) and his recommendation of a transcendental turn, whereby we reflect on the subjective conditions that make transcendent objecthood possible, has dominated post-Kantian philosophy.

Yet Kant also recognizes the inalienability of the human desire for transcendence, and this recognition inspired philosophers such as Jacobi to attempt to find again a place for a faith that grasped the transcendent in a way inaccessible to reason. As Hegel comments in his “Faith and Knowledge” essay of 1802:

> Reason, having in this way become mere intellect, acknowledges its own nothingness by placing that which is better than it in a faith outside and above itself, as a beyond [to be believed in]. This is what has happened in the *philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte*. Philosophy has made itself the handmaid of a faith once more.17

Husserl actually tries to find a new way to understand transcendence, not by assigning it to a suprarational faculty or to faith, but rather by rethinking it from within the concept of phenomenological givenness, as we shall see.

Both senses of transcendence (as that which cannot be attained but also as that which must be sought) found in Kant continue to play a significant role in Husserlian and especially in post-Husserlian phenomenology (Levinas, Marion, Henry). Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), for instance, speaks of the

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desire for the absolutely other, l’Autre. But this tendency in Levinas and recent phenomenology is somewhat at odds with Husserl and Stein, who begin with self-experience. Let us now examine Husserl in more detail.

II.

Immanence and Transcendence in Husserl’s Phenomenology. There are a number of concepts of transcendence at play in Husserl’s thought, and it is not clear that these different senses of transcendence ever get fully resolved in his writing. The term “transcendence” does not occur in the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1900–01). It appears in his writing more or less simultaneously with his discovery of the reduction (ca. 1905) and is prominent in The Idea of Phenomenology lectures of 1907. As Stein puts it, Husserl’s “absolute starting point” for phenomenology is the immanence of consciousness to which is contrasted the transcendence of the world. In fact, however, this only a first sense of transcendence. In his mature publications beginning with Ideas I, Husserl explores a deeper sense of transcendence, as we shall see, whereby corporeal things are transcendent because their essence contains a kind of infinity that is never intuitable in a completely adequate and fulfilled way. Every thing is graspable only through a manifold of “adumbrations” (Abschattungen) and “aspects” (Aspekte), which can never be fully actualized by a finite cognizing mind. Even the corporeal thing, then, is in essence what Husserl calls a “Kantian idea,” a manifold of infinite perspectives.

As the French phenomenologist Michel Henry has recognized, one of the first places where Husserl tackles the issue of transcendence and immanence is in his 1907 Idea of Phenomenology lectures. Husserl begins with the classic epistemological problem—how do I know that I know? How do I know that my knowledge is secure? Husserl characterizes this classic epistemological problem as the problem of transcendence. The “riddle” of knowledge is put in Kantian terms as the possibility of its contact with the transcendent. Nothing transcendent can be taken as pre-given; as Husserl writes: “The transcendence of the thing requires that we put the thing in question.”

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19 Stein, “Husserl and Aquinas,” Knowledge and Faith, 61.


21 See IP, 28; Hua II, 36.

22 IP, 33; Hua II, 43.

23 IP, 38; Hua II, 49.
According to Husserl, the very nature of the contact (Triftigkeit—a term inherited from Kant) with the transcendent is precisely what the traditional epistemologist cannot master. Some philosophers have abandoned the possibility that knowledge can be in contact with the transcendent and, at that point, what remains to be explained is how the prejudice has arisen whereby it is assumed that human knowledge does reach the transcendent. For Husserl, it is Hume who took this latter route. For Husserl, on the other hand, the epistemological reduction must be performed whereby every transcendence is excluded, and intentional connections of meaningfulness are revealed.

Overcoming the problematic of traditional epistemology, Husserl defines a new kind of givenness—“absolute givenness”—which he attaches to the very act of conscious experiencing itself, to every “thought” or cogitatio. This leads Husserl to declare in the Second Lecture of the Idea of Phenomenology:

*Every intellectual experience, indeed every experience whatsoever, can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while it is occurring. And in this act of seeing, it is an absolute givenness.*

The stream of experience given in reflection has “absolute givenness.” Husserl goes on to discuss the manner in which the given is immanent in our experience while at the same time emphasizing that there is no actual thing present or immanent in the actual occurring Erlebnis. This leads to a double meaning for transcendence: “it can refer to the fact that the known object is not really (reell) contained in the act of knowing.” Yet “there is another sense of transcendence, whose counterpart is an entirely different kind of immanence, namely, absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense.” This absolute self-givenness consists in “an immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is.” Only the immanent cogitatio is given. The problem now becomes that of how to safeguard the purity of the phenomenon of the cogitatio from contamination by our prejudices, including the psychological reading of the cogitatio (as a psychological fact, a datum in space-time, and so on). This purification goes beyond the epistemological reduction so that Husserl calls it the “phenomenological reduction,” whose aim is to purify the “psychological” phenomenon into the absolute givenness of the pure phenomenon. Husserl contrasts this absolute givenness of the immanent with the “quasi-givennesses” (Quasi-Gegebenheiten) of transcendent objects. The pure phenomenon contains an intentional referring beyond itself, but that must be

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24 *IP*, 24; Hua II, 31.
25 *IP*, 27; Hua II, 35.
26 Ibid.
27 *IP*, 34; Hua II, 44.
28 Hua II, 45.
treated precisely as it is given in immanent seeing. This brings us squarely into the phenomenological perspective or, as Husserl puts it, “and thus we drop anchor on the shore of phenomenology” (und so werfen wir schon Anker an der Küste der Phänomenologie). 29

Continuing the metaphor, Husserl warns that this shore has its share of rocks, is covered by clouds of obscurity, and threatened with the gales of scepticism. We have what is given absolutely and purely in immanence:

On the other hand, the relation to something transcendent, whether I question the existence (Sein) of the transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact (Triftigkeit) with it, still contains something that can be apprehended within the pure phenomenon. The relating-itself-to-something-transcendent (Sich-auf-Transzendentes-Beziehen), to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon. 30

It is worth rehearsing Husserl’s first tentative uncovering of the transcendent at the heart of the immanent in these lectures as a guide to what is the relation between phenomenology and transcendence. Not every transcendence is excluded; there is a genuine transcendence recognized that is the counterpart of the pure immanence of absolute givenness. But about this genuine transcendence Husserl has little to say in these years other than to point to the subject-transcending nature of validity, truth, and other values.

From out of the “Heraclitean stream of Erlebnisse” 31 comes a consciousness of unity, of identity, of transcendence, objectivity, and so on. How is that possible? Husserl furthermore acknowledges that the mere apprehension of the cogitatio in itself is of little value; what matters is the turn toward the eidos. Indeed, the possibility of the critique of knowledge depends on the recognition of forms of givenness other than the singular hic et nunc. We already move beyond these cogitationes themselves when we make judgments about what is true, valid, and so on.

The first genuine transcendence within immanence is then the intuition of the eidos. In later works, specifically Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, Husserl is particularly interested in the manner in which the givenness of the world transcends the imperfect type of evidences that display it 32 as no imaginable synthesis can bring the world to adequate evidence. The being of the world necessarily transcends consciousness; nevertheless the world is inseparable from transcendental subjectivity.

29 IP, 34; Hua II, 45.
30 IP, 35; Hua II, 46.
31 IP, 36; Hua II, 47.
32 See CM, § 28; Hua I, 61–2.
III.

Transcendence in Husserl’s Ideas I. In Ideas I (1913), transcendence is again discussed in a number of places from different points of view. As in The Idea of Phenomenology lectures, the transcendence of the physical thing is contrasted with the “immanence” of the conscious experience apprehending it. This transcendence is not merely the fact that the thing is not “inside” the conscious experience. There is also the eidetic insight that a physical thing can never be captured by any Erlebnis, which distinguishes it essentially from any episode of consciousness. This is not the same as the transcendence in which another person’s conscious experiences are recognized in empathy, Husserl says: “The physical thing is said to be, in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent.” There is an essential contrast between the “mode of givenness” (Gegebenheitsart) of something immanent and that of something transcendent. A physical thing is adumbrated while a mental process is not. For Husserl, it is almost an article of faith that what is absolutely given in immanent consciousness cannot in principle be given in profiles or adumbrations.

However, it is at this point that Husserl’s idealist commitments enter the picture because he goes on to talk about the merely “phenomenal being” of the transcendent as opposed to the absolute being of the immanent. A physical thing is “undetermined” (unbestimmt) as to its hidden sides, but it remains infinitely “determinable” (bestimmbar). The thing is graspable in a highly regulated series of possible perceptions, but there always remains a “horizon of determinable indeterminateness” (ein Horizont bestimmbarer Unbestimmtheit). No God can alter that, Husserl remarks. In this sense, the physical thing is really an “Idea in the Kantian sense.” The idea of a physical thing has “dimensions of infinity” included in it.

As Christian Lotz has shown, Husserl applies the language of regulative ideas in a rather loose manner, namely, to the constitution of perceptual objects, to the unity of the Erlebnisstrom, to the world as such, to essences of exact types, and, finally, in a certain sense, to his own philosophy and the infinity of

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33See Ideas I, § 42, 89; Hua III/1, 76.
34Ideas I, § 42, 90; Hua III/1, 77.
35See Ideas I, § 44.
36Ideas I, § 44, 95; Hua III/1, 81.
37Ideas I, § 143, 342; Hua III/1, 297–8.
38Ideas I, § 143, 360; Hua III/1, 313.
39In a paper delivered to the 2005 Husserl Circle conference in Dublin in response to Abraham Stone’s paper, “The Object as Indeterminable X: Husserl vs. Natorp, Carnap, and Levinas.”
40Ideas I, § 83, 197; Hua III/1, 166.
41See CM I, 98; Hua VII, 276.
42See Ideas I, § 74, 166; Hua III/1, 138.
the phenomenological task. There are therefore many transcendencies in Husserl but a central intuition is that the experience of time is intimately wrapped up with the experience of the transcendent.  

Essentially correlated with the notion of givenness is the notion of a possible consciousness perceiving it. Husserl more and more wants to examine the nature of the transcendental ego as that which is there to apprehend the givenness of the world. The primary infinity, for the mature Husserl, is the transcendental ego itself, which he calls the most basic or “original concept” (Urbegriff) of phenomenology. Moreover, as he will put it in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the science of transcendental subjectivity is the sphere of “absolute phenomenology,” the ultimate science. Thus, in 1927, Husserl could write:

> The clarification of the idea of my pure ego and my pure life—of my psyche in its pure specific essentiality and individual uniqueness—is the basis (das Fundament) for the clarification of all psychological and phenomenological ideas.

Husserl’s analysis of the ego widened to include a range of related issues: the unity of consciousness, the nature of self, subjectivity, and personhood, the “communalisation” of the self (Vergemeinschaftung) with the “open plurality of other egos,” amounting to the whole “intersubjective cognitive community,” or what in his “reconstruction” of Leibniz, Husserl calls “monadology.”

From *Ideas* I onward, Husserl characterizes the ego as an “I-pole” (Ichpol) or “I-center” (Ich-Zentrum), “the center of all affections and actions.” It is a “center” from which “radiations” (Ausstrahlungen) or “rays of regard” stream out toward which rays of attention are directed. It is the center of a “field of interests” (Interessenfeld), the “substrate of habitualities,” “the substrate of the totality of

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43See *Ideas* I, § 149.
44See *Ideas* I, § 142.
45Hua XXXV, 261.
46CM, § 35, 73; Hua I, 107.
47See *FTL*, § 103.
48Hua XIV, 438; my translation.
49Hua I, 149.
50*FTL*, § 104, 274; Hua XVII, 280.
51*FTL*, § 96, 240; Hua XVII, 247.
52Hua XV, 609.
53CM, § 34, 69; Hua I, 103.
55CM, § 34, 69; Hua I, 103.
capacities.” They I “governs,” it is an “I holding sway” (das waltende Ich) in waking conscious life, yet it is also “passively affected.” In its “full concretion,” it is a self with convictions, values, an outlook, a history, a style, and so on: “The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a history.” It is present in all conscious experience and “cannot be struck out” (undurchsteichbar). It is more than a formal principle of unity (in the sense of Kant’s unity of apperception), since it has a living, growing, unifying nature. It is also grossly misunderstood if it is treated as a “piece of the world”; it is not a “thing” or res at all. Rather, it exists both as anonymous source of all meaningfulness and as a growing, developing self, with a history and a future, in relation to other selves, possessing life in the fullest sense of the word. The transcendental ego covers “the universe of the possible forms of lived experience.”

Husserl sees the “self-explication” (Selbstauslegung) of the transcendental ego as a set of “great tasks,” but it is beset by paradoxes: How can the ego be that which constitutes the world and also that which is concretized, mundanized, and corporealized in the world? How can the transcendental ego, the source of all meaning and being, inquire into itself as a meaning- and being-constituting entity? Part of the complexity stems from the very self-referentiality of the ego’s self-knowledge. How can I enquire into what founds me as a self? When I as investigator turn to examine the ego, I am in fact doubling back on myself, inquiring into what constitutes me as functioning self. This necessarily involves a “splitting of the ego” (Ichspaltung), and is extraordinarily difficult to carry out without lapsing into various forms of transcendental illusion. Indeed, Husserl acknowledges, even to say that I who reflect is “I” involves a certain equivocation. Yet, there is both identity and difference in this I. The reflecting ego is in a different attitude and different temporal dimension from the ego reflected upon, yet there is a consciousness of the unity or “coincidence” (Deckung) of the two.

Husserl’s transcendental idealism claims that the objectivity of the transcendent real world outside of us is an achievement of “transcendental intersubjectivity.”

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56 “Substrat der Allheit der Vermögen” (Hua XXXIV, 200).
57 Hua XIV, 457.
58 Ideas II, 114; Hua IV, § 26, 108.
59 Hua XIV, 26.
60 CM IV, 75; Hua I, 109.
61 CM, § 36, 73; Hua I, 107.
62 Hua XXXIV, 228.
63 CM, § 29, 62; Hua I, 97.
This is already articulated in his 1910–1911 lectures but it is constantly reiterated in later works, for example, in the 1928 Amsterdam lectures:

Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient foundation (Seinsboden). Out of it are created the meaning and validity of everything objective, the totality of objectively real existent entities, but also every ideal world as well. An objectively existent thing is from first to last an existent thing only in a peculiar, relative and incomplete sense. It is an existent thing, so to speak, only on the basis of a cover-up of its transcendental constitution that goes unnoticed in the natural attitude.

Everything we experience as transcendent has the “value” written on it “valid for all,” für Jedermann. Everything I experience outwardly is in principle what someone else could experience. This is the very meaning of objectivity (note that Husserl reconstrues the assertions of ideality of the Logical Investigations into the language of intersubjective constitution in later works). The world of spirit coheres into a unity, for Husserl. It is a goal-oriented, rational, communicative world, a “community of monads” (Monadengemeinschaft), a “world of development” (eine Welt der Entwicklung), where, according to one lecture, as in Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, everything takes place for the sake of the Good.

According to Husserl, the discovery of the transcendental brings with it a responsibility to live life on a new level. One remains a “child of the world” (Weltkind), but one is also a disinterested spectator grasping this natural life as the unfolding work of the transcendental ego. The meditator must live thereafter in the very splitting of consciousness brought about by the epoché. There is no going back from the epoché, no healing of the split in consciousness. Genuine transcendental idealism requires living both in the natural attitude and in the transcendental philosophical attitude, while somehow achieving a “synthesis” of these two. For Husserl the adoption of the transcendental attitude is like a person born blind who recovers his sight as a result of an operation. The newly

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65For example, Hua XIII, 184.
68Hua VIII, 123; XXXIV, 12.
69Hua XXXIV, 16–17.
70See Hua VIII, 122.
disclosed world looks completely new so that one cannot rely on any of one’s previous habits and convictions with regard to this entirely new landscape. We have left behind the childhood of naïve natural existence and have entered, to invoke Husserl’s own frequent religious imagery, “the kingdom of pure spirit” (Reich des reinen Geistes).\textsuperscript{71}

In the \textit{Cartesian Meditations} it is precisely the realization that all being and sense come from the transcendental ego which provokes the profound reflection, in the Fifth Meditation, on the meaning of the experience of the other. How can the other in principle show itself within the horizons of my self-experience? Husserl here talks of an “immanent transcendence”: “Within this ‘original sphere’ (the sphere of original self-explication) we find also a ‘transcendent world’ . . . .”\textsuperscript{72} The puzzle is that the objective world, the “first transcendence,” is always already there for me as fully formed, but at the same time it is somehow a result of constitution by the transcendental ego.

As I mentioned at the outset, one of phenomenology’s tasks is to explore “the sense of transcendence” (\textit{Sinn der Transzendenz}).\textsuperscript{73} Again:

If what is experienced has the sense of “transcendent” being, then it is the experiencing that constitutes this sense, and does so either by itself or in the whole motivational nexus pertaining to it and helping to make up its intentionality.\textsuperscript{74}

Husserl makes the very important point in \textit{Formal and Transcendental Logic}, § 99, that nothing (neither the world nor any existent) comes to me “from without” (he uses the Greek adverb \textit{thûrathen}). Rather,

Everything outside (\textit{Alles Außen}) is what it is in this inside (\textit{in diesem Innen}), and gets its true being from the givings of it itself (\textit{Selbstgeben}) and from the verifications (\textit{Bewährungen}), within this inside—its true being, which for that very reason is itself something that itself belongs to this inside: as a pole of unity in my (and then, intersubjectively, in our) actual and possible multiplicities (\textit{Mannigfaltigkeiten}), with possibilities as my abilities, as “I can go there,” “I could perform syntactical operations,” and so on.\textsuperscript{75}

Transcendental phenomenology, according to the \textit{Crisis of European Sciences}, even expresses the inner essence of religion\textsuperscript{76} and provides Husserl, as a deeply religious and unconventional Christian, with the only philosophically justified

\textsuperscript{71}Hua VIII, 123.
\textsuperscript{72}CM V, § 47, 104–05; Hua I, 135.
\textsuperscript{73}FTL, § 93c, 230; Hua XVII, 237.
\textsuperscript{74}FTL, § 94, 233; Hua XVII, 240.
\textsuperscript{75}FTL, § 99, 250; Hua XVII, 257.
\textsuperscript{76}See Crisis, § 53, 180; Hua VI, 184.
basis for comprehending God, given the “absurdity” of thinking of Him as an item in the factual world. As he puts it in Formal and Transcendental Logic, “Even God is for me what he is, in consequence of my own productivity of consciousness.” Husserl goes on to insist that this does not mean that consciousness “makes” or “invents” (erfinde) God, this “highest transcendence” (diese höchste Transzendenz).

As we have seen, the concept of the transcendent in Husserl is multifaceted. In his mature writings it is most often encountered in relation to discussions of transcendental philosophy. In Crisis, § 14, for instance, Husserl contrasts traditional objectivism in philosophy with what he calls “transcendentalism.” Here he defines transcendentalism as follows:

Transcendentalism, on the other hand, says: the ontic meaning (Seinssinn) of the pre-given life-world is a subjective structure (subjektives Gebilde), it is the achievement of experiencing, pre-scientific life. In this life the meaning and the ontic validity (Seinsgeltung) of the world are built up—of that particular world that is, which is actually valid for the individual experiencer. As for the “objectively true” world, the world of science, it is a structure at a higher level, built on pre-scientific experiencing and thinking, or rather on its accomplishments of validity (Geltungsleistungen). Only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity—and specifically the subjectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its content, and in all its pre-scientific and scientific modes, and into the “what” and the “how” of the rational accomplishments—can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning (Seinssinn) of the world.

Husserl sees the traditional, Cartesian problematic of epistemology as the problem of transcendence: How can the certainties I arrive at in the immanent stream of my conscious life acquire objective significance? How can evidence claim to be more than a characteristic of consciousness and actually build up to the experience of an objective world as a whole? What the reduction shows is that this is a non-question because all transcendence is constituted within the domain of transcendental subjectivity:

Transcendence in every form is a within-the-ego self-constituting being-sense. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter

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77 See Ideas I, § 51, Anmerkung.
78 FTL, § 99, 251; Hua XVII, 258.
79 Hua XVII, 258.
80 Crisis, § 14, 69; Hua VI, 70.
81 See CM IV, 81; Hua I, 115.
82 See CM IV, 82; Hua I, 116.
is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.\textsuperscript{83}

The transcendental ego is the “universe of possible sense” so that to speak of an “outside” is precisely nonsense.\textsuperscript{84}

IV.

\textit{Karl Jaspers on Transcendence.} Before moving on to discuss Edith Stein, I wish now to turn to another conception of the transcendent that was being explored in Germany around the same time Husserl was writing. I am referring of course to Karl Jaspers, who had a huge influence on the Heidegger of \textit{Being and Time} and thereby, indirectly, on Edith Stein. Jaspers made transcendence a central issue in relation to the “illumination of existence” (\textit{Existenzerhellung}), especially in his massive three-volume work, \textit{Philosophie}, which, although it did not appear until 1932, had been in gestation all through the 1920s.\textsuperscript{85}

Indeed, many of Jaspers’s central concepts had already been articulated \textit{in nuce} in his 1919 \textit{Psychology of Worldviews} (\textit{Psychologie der Weltanschauungen}), which Heidegger reviewed critically at a formative stage in his own career.\textsuperscript{86}

In his writing Jaspers outlines various ways of dealing with the individual openness to transcendence; one can deny or resist it, or seek a way in the world to accommodate it.\textsuperscript{87} But transcendence continues to intrude on our individual lives since transcendence is what makes our lives individual and authentically experienced.

Jaspers begins from the existential starting-point: “everything essentially real is for me only by virtue of the fact that I am I myself.”\textsuperscript{88} My existence is the “arena” for my self-realization. \textit{Existenz} (a term he consciously borrows from Kierkegaard, who himself found it in Schelling, who opposed \textit{Existenz} to the Hegelian Idea) refers to “possible” individual existence in terms of its freedom and willing. For Jaspers, the very essence of \textit{Existenz} is its intentional tending to the other, that is to say, its transcendence.\textsuperscript{89} Jaspers writes:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{83}CM IV, 83–4; Hua I, 117 (trans. modified).
\textsuperscript{84}CM, § 41, 84; Hua I, 117.
\textsuperscript{87}See Jaspers, \textit{Philosophy}, vol. 3, 6.
\end{footnotesize}
Immanence and Transcendence in Husserl, Stein, and Jaspers

Just as I do not exist without the world, I am not myself without transcendence. . . . I stand before transcendence, which does not occur to me as existing in the world of phenomenal things but speaks to me as possible—speaks to me in the voice of whatever exists, and most decidedly in that of my self-being. The transcendence before which I stand is the measure of my own depth.  

For Jaspers, Existenz is always directed toward transcendence: “Its authentic being consists in the search for transcendence.” Thus, “[e]xistence is the self-being that relates to itself and thereby also to transcendence from which it knows that it has been given to itself and upon which it is grounded.”  

Freedom exists only with and by transcendence. Transcendence is that which is experienced as beyond the person; but it cannot be thought of as anything empirically real or actual. Transcendence encompasses individuals, but it cannot be objectified; it is precisely beyond both subjectivity and objectivity. Transcendence is not something in the world, nor is it simply to be identified with human freedom, but transcendence appears wherever there is Existenz.  

Jaspers begins, as does Husserl, with the subject-object relation familiar to modern philosophy. But for Jaspers, to become aware of the subject-object relation is already to be moving in the domain of what he calls the “encompassing” (das Umgreifende). All thinking involves transcending, beyond the objective and toward the “encompassing,” which we experience as the “horizon of horizons,” the being which is beyond our categorizations: “The encompassing preserves my freedom against knowability.”  

Jaspers writes:

But the encompassing (Umgreifende) is not the horizon of our knowledge at any particular moment. Rather, it is the source from which all new horizons emerge, without itself ever being visible even as a horizon. The encompassing always merely announces itself—in present objects and within the horizons—but it never becomes an object. Never appearing to us itself, it is that wherein everything else appears.  

Jaspers and Husserl share this concept of the “horizon” as that in which objectivity appears as such. The problem for both is that to try to think of the “encompassing”

90Jaspers, Philosophy, vol. 2, 45.
91Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, 21.
92See ibid., 25.
93See Gerhard Knauss, “The Concept of the ‘Encompassing,’” in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, 141–175, at 149. Jaspers links the notion of the encompassing with Kant’s recognition that we never grasp the world but only things in the world. Hence the world is an idea for Kant; see Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, 20.
94Ibid., 23.
95Ibid., 18.
or of “horizontality” is already to objectify it. The result is therefore, as Jaspers says, that “every proposition concerning the encompassing thus contains a paradox.”

Despite the fact that we cannot grasp the encompassing, nevertheless Jaspers suggests that we can become aware of it in a lucidity different from determinate knowledge. Jaspers wants us to philosophize “in the modes of the encompassing” by detaching ourselves from determinate knowledge. Transcendence is experienced through “cyphers.” *Existenz* is the cypher for transcendence. These cyphers appear in art, religion, and in specific aspects of lived human existence (especially our “limit situations”) and, while somehow pointing toward transcendence, they also withhold knowledge of the transcendent, and indeed confirm the impossibility of such knowledge. As consciousness comes to recognize its own limits, it takes on an attitude of foundering or “failing” (*Scheitern*), an experience of insufficiency before the transcendent. More specifically, it is my historicity that makes me aware of transcendence: “Only through historicity do I become aware of the authentic being of transcendence—and only through transcendence does our ephemeral existence acquire historical substance.”

My very contingent existing is itself a cypher of transcendence.

Paradoxically—and it is not clear to me what this means—Jaspers maintains that there is only one transcendence even though there are many existences. The experience of absolute reality is that it is one and that it contains no possibility: “*Existenz* is not a self-contained unity. If there is unity it only is in transcendence.” Moreover, “transcendence is not a matter of proof, but one of witness.” For Jaspers, the perennial task is communication, but the transcendent does not communicate directly with humans. Transcendence in itself is ineffable and incommunicable; yet it can only be experienced in so far as it appears in existence. It can somehow be experienced or lived through. As he writes:

The question “What is Transcendence?” is not answered . . . by a knowledge of Transcendence. The answer comes indirectly by a clarification of the incompleteness of the world, the imperfectibility of man, the impossibility of a permanently valid world order, the universal failure bearing in mind at the same time that there is nothing, but that in nature, history, and human existence, the magnificent is as real as the terrible. The decisive alternative in all philosophising is whether my thinking leads me to the point where I am certain that the “from outside” of Transcendence is the source of the “from inside”, or whether I remain in Immanence.

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96Ibid., 19.
97Ibid., 26.
99Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, 74.
100Ibid., 76.
with the negative certainty that there is no outside that is the basis and goal of everything the world as well as what I am myself.\textsuperscript{102}

Jaspers further says that “the paradox of transcendence is that it can only be grasped historically but cannot be adequately conceived as being itself historical.”\textsuperscript{103}

Paradoxically, given its incommunicability, Jaspers defines transcendence in relational terms: “There is transcendence only by virtue of the reality of my unconditionality.”\textsuperscript{104} There is no transcendence except for existence: “Existenz is either in relation to transcendence or not at all.”\textsuperscript{105} “I am existentially myself in the act of apprehending transcendence.”\textsuperscript{106} I experience myself as given to myself not by myself but by something other, by transcendence.\textsuperscript{107} Jaspers maintains that the “place of transcendence is neither in this world or beyond, but it is the boundary—the boundary at which I confront transcendence whenever I am my true self.”\textsuperscript{108} Jaspers holds the view that my sense of being-in-myself is shattered by the experience of transcendence.

V.

\textit{Edith Stein’s Starting Point: Natural Experience.} For Edith Stein, both phenomenology and Thomism begin with “natural experience as the starting point of every kind of thinking that goes beyond natural experience.”\textsuperscript{109} She continues:

Even though not all knowledge rests exclusively on experience and even though there is, rather, a valid basis of experience which can be known by pure reason, it nonetheless remains the aim of all thinking to arrive at an understanding of the world of experience. Thinking which does not lead to the establishment of the bases of experience but to the abrogation of experience . . . is without any real foundation and inspires no confidence.\textsuperscript{110}

Stein thinks that Husserl and Thomas both begin from experience, respecting the givens of experience. For Stein, the tacit assumption of natural experience

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{103}Jaspers, \textit{Philosophie}, vol. 3, 694; quoted in \textit{The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers}, 403.
\item \textsuperscript{104}Jaspers, \textit{Von der Wahrheit. Philosophische Logik}, vol. 1 (Munich: Piper, 1958), 632.
\item \textsuperscript{105}Jaspers, \textit{Philosophy}, vol. 3, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{106}Jaspers, \textit{Philosophie}, vol. 3, 6; quoted in \textit{The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers}, 504.
\item \textsuperscript{107}See Jaspers, \textit{The Perennial Scope of Philosophy}, trans. R. Manheim (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 17.
\item \textsuperscript{109}\textit{FEB}, 333.
\item \textsuperscript{110}\textit{FEB}, 333–4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
is that there is a multiplicity of objects. There is an assumption that there is a natural world. But, following Husserl, Stein points out that this concept of nature is actually partly constituted by culture; it emerges from an “interlacing” (Verflechtung) with mind. The natural world is always already united with intellect, but, Stein goes on, not just finite minds. It also refers to infinite mind:

The worlds of nature and mind, however, do not exhaust all that which is if by “world of the mind” we mean only a world of finite minds and of structures created by finite minds. The totality of the created world refers back . . . to those eternal and non-become archetypes (Urbilder) of all created things (essences or pure forms) that we have designated as divine ideas. All real being (which comes to be and passes away) is anchored in the essential being of these divine ideas.

Here Husserlian essentialism is wedded to Thomistic reflections on the relation between the finite, created order and its infinite ground.

It is important to emphasize that, in Finite and Eternal Being, Stein is emphatic that her enquiry is philosophical and not dependent on revealed truth. Nevertheless, she recognizes, at the same time, that her enquiry has to be constrained by revealed truth. For her, theological knowledge gives philosophy the distinction between essence and existence or between person and substance. Philosophy uses theology but is not the same as theology. The philosopher who borrows from theology is concerned with revealed truth but not with that truth qua revealed. On the other hand, the ultimate ground of our existence is unfathomable, and hence philosophy needs to be—following Erich Przywara, who strongly influenced her thinking in this regard—“reduction to the mystery” (reductio ad mysterium). Stein recognized, as did Husserl (in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and in the Crisis) that a purely methodological conception of philosophy could not satisfy the age. People seek truth, they need meaning in their lives, they seek a “philosophy of life.” Both Stein and Heidegger agreed on this point. They further agreed that the existing philosophies of life were flights into irrationalism.

With regard to the religious orientation of Husserl’s own thinking, Edith Stein reports (albeit in fictional form in her dialogue between Husserl and Aquinas) Husserl as saying:

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111See FEB, 333.
112FEB, 334.
113FEB, 334–5.
114See FEB, 23–4.
115See FEB, 24.
It never occurred to me to contest the right of faith. It (along with other religious acts that come to mind, for I have always left open the possibility of seeing visions as a source of religious experience) is the proper approach in religion as are the senses in the area of external experience. But knowledge through faith or the faith-intuition is different from rational reflection on faith. Aquinas, on the other hand, believes that faith makes accessible truths which elude the grasp of reason, and that reason can “analyze” these truths and “put them to use.” Stein’s point, which she puts in the mouth of Aquinas, is that natural reason is not able to set bounds on itself. Faith, for Stein and Aquinas, on the other hand, provides its own guarantee.

**Phenomenology and the Meaning of Being.** Edith Stein claims—paralleling Heidegger—that the Greeks’ great question concerned the nature of being. Modern philosophy, however, has lost interest in being, turning instead to epistemology. However, Stein says, again in agreement with Heidegger, ontology was revived by Husserl with his “philosophy of essence” (Wesensphilosophie), thereafter by Heidegger with his *Existenzphilosophie*, and by Hedwig Conrad Martius with her “ontology of the real” (Realontologie). Stein in fact sees phenomenology as deeply concerned with the sense of being. She defends Husserl’s “doctrine of essences” (Wesenslehre) against some neo-scholastic misconceptions. For her, the lesson is that factual being requires a timeless ground: “Nothing temporal can exist without a timeless formal structure (Gestalt) which regulates the particular course of the temporal sequence of events and is thereby actualised in time.”

Stein takes a traditional view of the divine nature as a self-contained timeless plenitude (Fülle), but she also emphasizes the divine as person and uses typically phenomenological ways of articulating both this plenitude and the concepts of personhood and subjectivity. This approach takes her beyond her Thomistic beginnings, into an interesting elaboration of Husserlian phenomenology. Being, for Stein, is to be understood as plenitude or “fullness”: “Being is one . . . Its full meaning corresponds to the fullness of all existents. And when we speak of *being*, we mean this total fullness.” Stein grasps this meaning of being in intentional terms. When we refer to, intend, or mean (meinen) something, we mean the whole thing, even if we are only presented with one side or aspect of it. Hence Stein concludes that our aim is to approximate to fullness: “To approximate the

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117Ibid., 14.
118Ibid., 19.
119See ibid., 18.
120FEB, 6.
121FEB, 102.
122FEB, 332.
apperception of this fullness is the infinite task and goal of human knowledge.”

All plenitude of meaning is contained in the divine being. This for Stein is one possible interpretation of the opening sentence of the Prologue of John, “Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ο λόγος: “in the beginning was the meaning (Sinn).” Interestingly, Husserl makes use of the concept of plenitude or fullness in his own description of the manner in which an object is intended as a whole while at the same time is seen only in part. For Stein, however, to recognize this timeless ground of temporal entities is not to assert that humans have direct intellectual cognition of the purely intellectual or spiritual sphere. She denies, with Kant and Husserl, that we can have knowledge of “things in themselves.”

Our knowledge of essences is always “fragmentary.”

Edith Stein and the Recognition of the Eternal at the heart of the Finite. Edith Stein first attempted a reconciliation of Aquinas and Husserl in her contribution to the invited collection prepared for Husserl’s seventieth birthday in 1929. In this Festschrift essay she begins by emphasizing the link with Brentano and the scholastic background of exact concept formation. She portrays both Husserl and Aquinas as seeing philosophy as a matter of reason (logos or ratio), not “feeling and fancy” or “soaring enthusiasm.” Stein says that Husserl would not have accepted Thomas’s distinction between natural and supernatural reason. Husserl would have seen that distinction as empirical; he is referring to “reason as such.”

Stein recognizes that Husserl, like Kant, begins from the critical and transcendental standpoint: we can work only with our own organs of knowledge—“we can no more get free of them than we can leap over our shadow.” Stein focuses on the fact that for Husserl philosophy and reason unroll themselves endlessly and that full truth is a Kantian regulative idea. Aquinas, on the other hand, holds that “full truth is,” God as truth is “fullness at rest.” Furthermore, Stein believes in a distinction to be made between original and fallen reason. Not everything that is beyond our mind in its natural setup is beyond our mind in its “original makeup.”

123 FEB, 332.
124 FEB, 106.
125 FEB, 104.
126 FEB, 104.
129 Ibid., 10.
130 Ibid., 11.
131 Ibid., 12.
132 Ibid.
For Stein, as for Aquinas, God as ultimate being is the first principle of knowledge, and hence epistemology is really a chapter in ontology. Stein contrasts phenomenology as *egocentric* with Thomistic philosophy, which is *theocentric*. Her basic criticism is that transcendental phenomenology can uncover only being which is *for* consciousness. Being is understood as that which is constituted by consciousness, whereas for Thomas being has to be what it is in itself.

The ego, for Stein too, is the primary transcendent entity but in a manner which is very difficult to articulate. There is “fragility” of the ego. According to Stein, following Husserl, the ego relies on a twofold transcendence: one that is “external” and one that is “internal.” The external is, of course, the content of the world. The internal transcendent is mood, emotion, inner experience. She writes:

> The conscious life of the ego depends thus by virtue of its contents on a twofold beyond [transcendence in Husserl’s sense of the term], an external and internal world both of which manifest themselves in the conscious life of the ego, i.e. in that ontological realm which is inseparable from the ego [immanence in Husserl’s sense of the term].

In her *Finite and Eternal Being*, however, Stein mingles Heideggerian with Husserlian descriptions of our subjective life. Thus, besides talking of the ego, she invokes the Heideggerian notion of the “thrownness” of existence, which she interprets as meaning that humans do not know the “whence” of their existence. Stein maintains that the starting point of enquiry is the “fact of our own being,” which—and here she quotes St. Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, Book X—is given to us as certain. Husserl, following Descartes, asks for an abstention of judgment concerning everything human and relating to the natural world to get at what remains over, namely, “the area of consciousness understood as the life of the ego.” My self-certainty is the most immediate and primordial knowledge I have; it is an unreflected knowledge prior to all reflection. This being I am conscious of (myself) is inseparable from temporality. This very temporality of my being gives me the idea of eternal being. This is Stein’s way of moving beyond Husserl and Heidegger.

Later in the book she writes much more extensively about the “ego-life” (*Ichleben*) and its relation to the soul. At one point she says, “Ego-life is a reckoning and coming to terms of the soul with something that is not the soul’s own self, namely...
the created world and ultimately God.”139 There is a constant self-transcendence going on in the soul and its ego-life.140 This ego is characterized by a “being-there-for-itself” (Für-sich-selbst-Dasein):

The primordial undivided ego-life already implies a cognitive transcending of the sphere of the pure ego. I experience my vital impulses and activities as arising from a more or less profound depth. The dark ground from which all human spiritual life arises—the soul—attains in the ego-life to the bright daylight of consciousness (without however becoming transparent). The ego-life thereby reveals itself as soul-life, and the soul-life—by its going forth from itself and by its ascending to the brightness of light—simultaneously reveals itself as spiritual life.141

Depth of soul is something Stein analyzes subtly and at great length. She gives the example of two people hearing of the assassination the Serbian monarch that gave birth to the First World War.142 One person hears it, registers it, and goes on planning his vacation. “The other is shaken in his innermost being,”143 foresees the outbreak of war, etc. In this latter case, the news has struck deep in his inner being: “In this latter kind of thinking the ‘entire human being’ is engaged, and this engagement expresses itself even in external appearance. . . . He thinks with his heart.”144 She goes on to write that the personal I is most truly at home in the innermost being of the soul,145 but few human beings live such “collected” lives.

Because of its essentially changing nature, Stein characterizes the being of the ego as received being.146 Jaspers has a very similar claim. In his Existenzerhellung, volume 2 of Philosophie, he describes my being as temporal and partial; yet in “metaphysical transcending,” he explains, I can address my being on the basis of a completed temporal existence—the view from eternity as it were.147 For Stein, as for Augustine and Jaspers, my own experience of myself is a kind of void or nothingness.148 Jaspers writes:

I myself as mere being am nothing. Self-being is the union of two opposites: of standing on my own feet and of yielding to the world and

139FEB, 434.
140See FEB, 425.
141FEB, 430.
142See FEB, 437.
143FEB, 437.
144FEB, 437.
145See FEB, 439.
146FEB, 439.
147See Jaspers, Philosophy, vol. 2, 33.
148FEB, p. 55.
to transcendence. By myself I can do nothing; but once I surrender to the world and to transcendence, I have disappeared as myself. My self is indeed self-based but not self-sufficient.\textsuperscript{149}

On Stein’s account, there is something very similar in regard to my zones of self-familiarity. My self-experience runs off into vagueness. I do not have awareness or direct intuition of the origins of my ego. There is always a horizon of vagueness. It is precisely this sense of horizonality that leads Stein to think of the ego as finite and created.

In fact, Stein, following Husserl (and Augustine), takes the divine self-revelation as the “I am who am,” which she interprets as meaning that the personal I has primacy.\textsuperscript{150} Only a person can create according to Stein. She conceives of the I in Husserlian terms as a standing-streaming. For her, the ego on its own is empty and needs to be filled from without.\textsuperscript{151} The divine being, on the other hand, has no contrast between ego-life and being.

Stein says that Husserl calls the self that is immediately given in conscious experience the “pure ego,”\textsuperscript{152} which in itself has no content. This is rather like a point from which streams come out. It is the pure I of Husserl. But there is, also following Husserl, a fuller, more concrete ego. This ego is alive according to different degrees of \textit{Lebendigkeit}. As Stein writes, “The pure ego is, as it were, only the portal through which the life of a human being passes on its way from the depth of the soul to the lucidity of consciousness.”\textsuperscript{153} Stein tends to think of the ego as rooted in a soul, which has a character and individuality uniquely its own:

\begin{quote}
The innermost center of the soul, its most authentic and spiritual part, is not colorless and shapeless, but has a particular form of its own. The soul feels it when it is “in its own self,” when it is “self-collected.” . . . The innermost center of the soul is the “how” of the essence itself and as such impresses its stamp on every trait of character and every attitude and action of human beings, it is the key that unlocks the mystery of the structural formation of the character of a human being.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

The ego-self arises from the hidden depth of the unique soul.

\textsuperscript{149}Jaspers, \textit{Philosophy}, vol. 2, 45.
\textsuperscript{150}See \textit{FEB}, 342.
\textsuperscript{151}See \textit{FEB}, 344.
\textsuperscript{152}\textit{FEB}, 48.
\textsuperscript{153}\textit{FEB}, 501.
\textsuperscript{154}\textit{FEB}, 501–02.
VI.

Conclusion. For Stein, the being of the ego is being to a pre-eminent degree, but at the same time it is fragile as it cannot say when it began and is surrounded by a zone of haziness. It is in this experience of my own “livingness” or liveliness, of the unbounded horizon of my life, that I experience transcendence. Jaspers, Stein, and Husserl, all coming from their different perspectives, agree on this point. This I think can be contrasted with Levinas. There is an excess in my self-experience together with a rupture and a pointing beyond.

Now in Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Stein the experience of horizons and horizontality so intrinsic to my existence is also a feature of the transcendent world. Givenness by its very nature requires horizons within which it can be encompassed and hence grasped. Jean-Luc Marion, on the other hand, maintains that the very notion of an intuition in Kant and Husserl is of something necessarily constrained by limits, by boundaries. There can by definition be no intuition of the unbounded or infinite. For Marion, failure to make something an object is not failure to appear. There is for him the possibility of an intuition that passes beyond the concept. The phenomenon is exceptional by excess. It is a dazzling phenomenon: “the eye cannot not see it, but neither can it look at it as its object.” Marion describes this excessive phenomenon as “invisable” (cannot be intended, aimed at, ne peut se viser), unforeseeable, “unbearable,” “absolute according to relation,” “unconditioned (absolved from any horizon),” irreducible. This again is the paradox of the horizon.

According to Marion, Husserl’s principle of all principles has to be revised and rethought because it cannot cope with the condition of the absence of horizontality, as well as the absence of reference to a constituting I:

[T]he “principle of principles” presupposes the horizon and the constituting I as two unquestioned presuppositions of anything that would be constituted in general as a phenomenon; but the saturated phenomenon, inasmuch as it is unconditioned by a horizon and irreducible to an I,

156Ibid., 210.
158Marion, “Sketch,” 211.
pretends to a possibility that is freed from these two conditions; it therefore contradicts and exceeds the “principle of all principles.”

Marion’s saturated phenomenon gives itself “without condition or restraint.” It is not the sum of its parts. It is experienced through a kind of non-objectifying counter-experience.

But can we abandon this horizontality? Can we really go beyond the horizons of the I? I think we have good reason for staying with Jaspers, Heidegger, Husserl, and Stein, against Marion, in thinking of transcendence as something related to the fractured nature of our self-experience, not as something that either annihilates or cancels the self. Selfhood, subjectivity, and self-experience are the very space where the transcendent is experienced. As Jaspers puts it in Philosophie II:

I stand before transcendence, which does not occur to me as existing in the world of phenomenal beings but speaks to me as possible—speaks to me in the voice of whatever exists, and most decidedly in that of my self-being. The transcendence before which I stand is the measure of my own depth.

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159 Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon,” 212.
160 Ibid.