Joyce’s Early Aesthetic

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This article assesses Joyce’s early pronouncements on beauty, goodness and truth, written under the aegis of St. Thomas Aquinas. Joyce seemed unaware that Aquinas already examined the relation between these characteristics of being, regarding them as identical in reality but differing in their relation to man’s spiritual capacities. Joyce relied upon quotations acquired as an undergraduate rather than consult the Summa Theologiae. He confused the relationship between goodness, beauty and truth, introducing moreover a false dichotomy between beauty as the object of a sensible aesthetic appetite and truth as object of the intellectual appetite. The article examines Jacques Aubert’s claim that Joyce was heavily indebted to Bernard Bosanquet both for his knowledge of Aquinas and for strong Hegelian leanings: no evidence is found for either.

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I wish to revisit an aspect of Joyce’s work that was repeatedly, indeed repetitively, analyzed during the early years of Joyce scholarship, but that has elicited meager interest in recent decades. I propose to analyze, textually and philosophically, Joyce’s earliest reflections on aesthetics, penned at the age of twenty-two, shortly after his arrival in Pola. In these reflections, recorded in a student notebook now in the National Library of Ireland, Joyce discusses the relationship among the three fundamental concepts of goodness, beauty and truth.¹ In his pronouncements, two of which were written under the aegis of quotations from Aquinas, Joyce set out—presumably to his own satisfaction—important principles, epistemological, philosophical and psychological, of his aesthetic theory. He subsequently incorporated them into his autobiographical novels Stephen Hero and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. The fact that they are signed with the flourish of the young author’s initials suggests that, rather than attribute a naïve theory to Stephen Dedalus as part of a strategy to portray him ironically (as some commentators have claimed), Joyce is of one mind with his literary alter ego on fundamental matters of aesthetic theory. I will assess Joyce’s conclusions against Aquinas’s own thought, since it was explicitly in response—perhaps in reaction—to the latter that he elaborated his aesthetic. The question might be asked whether Joyce “distorted” Aquinas’s aesthetic theory, but that would assume that he intended his theory to
be an elaboration of the Thomistic definitions he cited, whereas they were more likely a cue for his independent theorizing.

On 20 March 1903, Joyce wrote to his mother from Paris: “My book of songs will be published in the spring of 1907. My first comedy about five years later. My ‘Esthetic’ about five years later again.” (Letters II 38).² In fact, Joyce made his first serious attempt at an aesthetic theory within eighteen months of that letter. He conceived the embryonic elements of his aesthetic theory in November 1904, shortly after settling on the Adriatic coast. Over a period of ten days, Joyce inscribed in his notebook three elaborate reflections on the nature of aesthetic experience: goodness, beauty and apprehension; these formulations constitute his clearest attempt to codify an aesthetic theory. It appears that Joyce pursued his aesthetic program from the start of his literary activity and that it was important for him to work out his own theory of beauty. We are told in Stephen Hero that, helped by his younger brother Maurice, Stephen was actively engaged “in the building of an entire science of esthetic” (36).

Joyce’s explanation of his own aesthetics is significant—that is, if we take his account of Stephen as largely autobiographical. In Stephen Hero we read: “His Esthetic was in the main ‘applied Aquinas,’ and he set it forth plainly with a naïf air of discovering novelties” (77). This characterization is reaffirmed in Portrait: “MacAlister, answered Stephen, would call my esthetic theory applied Aquinas” (209). Joyce’s debt to Aquinas is confirmed in Stephen Hero: “But, during the formulation of his artistic creed, had he not found item after item upheld for him in advance by the greatest and most orthodox doctor of the Church. . . while the entire theory, in accordance with which his entire artistic life was shaped, arose most conveniently for his purpose out of the mass of Catholic theology?” (205) This Thomistic inclination is further confirmed in Portrait, where we are informed of Stephen’s “search for the essence of beauty amid the spectral words of Aristotle and Aquinas” (176). In Portrait we have a particularly emphatic confirmation of Stephen’s commitment and attachment to Aquinas: “[I]t wounded him to think that he would never be but a shy guest at the feast of the world’s culture and that the monkish learning, in terms of which he was striving to forge out an esthetic philosophy, was held no higher by the age he lived in than the subtle and curious jargons of heraldry and falconry” (180).

Aquinas nowhere expounds a theory of aesthetics as such. His remarks on beauty are spare obiter dicta on the margin of other topics. Aquinas would share the surprise of Father Butt, who “confessed that it was a new sensation for him to hear Thomas Aquinas quoted as an authority on esthetic philosophy” (SH 104). Such an aesthetic must be constructed from elements drawn from his psychology and theory of knowledge as well as his metaphysics and theology. Joyce’s elaboration of an aesthetic from the sparse pronouncements of Thomas Aquinas is testament to either his creativity or naiveté. There is perhaps feigned modesty in Stephen’s claim to the Dean of Studies: “For my purpose I can work on at present by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas” (P 187). Ellmann tellingly observes: “Inspired cribbing was always part of James’s talent; his gift was
for transforming material, not for originating it. . . As he remarked in later life to Frank Budgen, ‘Have you ever noticed, when you get an idea, how much I can make of it?” (xv). Joyce did not require exhaustive knowledge of Aquinas’s works to convince himself that his theories were essentially Thomist, although adapted to his own secular aesthetic.

The clearest illustration of Joyce’s stated reliance upon Aquinas are the carefully honed declarations composed under the banner of two statements from St. Thomas on the nature of goodness and beauty. These are of primary importance for the investigation of Joyce’s aesthetic theories and their subsequent application in his creative writings. In particular they are the basis for the doctrine later expounded in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*. The two phrases are: “*Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*” (“The good is that towards which the appetite tends”) and “*Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*” (“Beautiful things are those which please when seen”). A third reflection, entitled “The Act of Apprehension,” is Joyce’s explication of the cognitive process involved in the aesthetic experience.

Thematically the three speculations of November 1904 are closely related, dealing as they do with beauty, goodness and truth. It is significant, as it was unfortunate, that Joyce was unaware of the fact that in the two paragraphs of the *Summa Theologiae* from which he quotes separately (Questions 5 and 16), Aquinas provides a comprehensive summary of the integral relationship among goodness, beauty and truth. Even more intriguing is to discover that in Question 5, Aquinas himself defines both goodness and beauty in relation to one another, something of which Joyce seems totally unaware since, within a gap of only eight days, he cites variants of Aquinas’s definitions in isolation, unaware that Aquinas had explicitly set them in clear comparison and contrast, in order to show their fundamental coherence and organic relation.

The motto for Joyce’s first reflection (7 November 1904) reads: *Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*; that of his second (15 November): *Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*. Question 5, article 4 of the *Summa Theologiae* states: “Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivism, *pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent*.” (“Goodness properly relates to the appetite, _good being what all things desire_, and therefore it has the aspect of an end, for the appetite is a kind of movement towards a thing. On the other hand, beauty relates to the knowing power; for _those things are called beautiful which please when seen_” [Summa Theologica, Vol. I 26; modified, emphases added].) In Question 16, article 1, Aquinas wrote: “Sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, its verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus.” (“As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends” [Summa Theologica, Vol. I 94].) Had Joyce been familiar with these passages, he would immediately have seen that Aquinas had already examined exactly those relationships that were uppermost in his own mind. Joyce’s first reflection begins: “The good is that towards the possession of which an appetite tends: the good is the desirable. The true and the beautiful are the
most persistent orders of the desirable.” In Question 5 of his *Summa*, St. Thomas situates the good vis-à-vis beauty, and in Question 16 he relates goodness and truth. What amazes Joyce’s reader is to discover that Aquinas integrates the two principles (cited separately by Joyce) precisely to define the essence of goodness and beauty in their mutual relationship—goodness as goal of the will, truth as goal of the intellect. Aquinas, like Joyce, was concerned with the relation among goodness, beauty and truth. These three ultimates had been the focus of profound speculation as early as Plato and developed into the highly sophisticated theory of the so-called “transcendental,” i.e., those characteristics pertaining to all things simply by virtue of the fundamental richness of their existence. Because of their importance as pristine characteristics of divine being, Aquinas examines their relations in the early questions of the *Summa Theologiae*.Commenting separately on Aquinas’s definitions, Joyce was familiar with single phrases but did not grasp Aquinas’s overall perspective. It is evident that he had no first-hand knowledge of Aquinas’s most important systematic work; otherwise he would have recognized that these early pages treated precisely those fundamental notions—*bonum*, *pulchrum*, *verum*—with which he was himself so keenly preoccupied.

Two “errors” in Joyce’s quotation from Aquinas on beauty confirm that he was working from memory rather than with the text. Instead of “*Pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent*” (“those things are called beautiful which please when seen”), he wrote “*Pulcra (sic) sunt quae visa placent*” (“those things are beautiful which please when seen”). The misspelling of “*pulchra*” is in itself unimportant—an “error” that persisted through later citations (SH 95, P 186). The interpretive implications of the second error—substituting “*dicuntur*” for “*sunt*”—are not inconsiderable: by defining beauty as that which is called beautiful, Aquinas assigns a role to the subjective element of experience. A complete discussion of Joyce’s modification lies beyond our present scope.⁵

A further detail of considerable textual interest may be noted, which further reveals Joyce’s erratic yet keen understanding of Aquinas’s philosophy despite his lack of direct textual knowledge. The heading for Joyce’s first reflection is a slight variation of the phrase from Question 16 just quoted. Aquinas wrote: “*Bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus*.” Joyce cites: “*Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*.” Significant is the fact that this formulation of the principle occurs only once in the entire corpus of Aquinas.⁶ Joyce cites it virtually verbatim, and certainly from memory.⁷ Apart from this single exception, St. Thomas always defines the good as “that which all things desire” (*bonum est quod omnia appetunt*); this is a simple translation of the definition from the start of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aquinas refers to Aristotle’s definition more than thirty times throughout his writings. Joyce encountered the expression in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, which he frequently read;⁸ it is twice cited in a chapter devoted to the allied principle that “every agent acts for a good” (*omne agens agit propter bonum*).⁹ It is therefore remarkable that, instead of the more common formulation, Joyce chose as the motif of his reflections the once-off formulation of the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 16: “*Bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus*.”¹⁰ It is tantalizing to speculate
where Joyce might have encountered this single occurrence of the formula, but we can understand his preference for the more active meaning that it conveys, expressing the tendency of the individual appetite, rather than an impersonal generalization of a universal definition.

The fact that Joyce elaborates separately, at a distance of over a week, upon the phrases *Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus* and *Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*, might suggest to the reader that they were also expounded separately by Aquinas, whereas in fact the two principles occur in the same short paragraph, the point of which is precisely to distinguish between *bonum* and *pulchrum*, goodness and beauty. In Question 5, Aquinas juxtaposes to the definition of beauty his standard definition of the good: *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. He does this for the purpose of mutual definition and thus to highlight the specific distinctions of goodness and beauty. Joyce it seems had retained—probably from undergraduate lectures from scholastically trained Jesuit professors—some tags of Aquinas. Had he been familiar with the text, he would immediately have grasped the relevance of the contrast. Aquinas explicitly clarifies the relation investigated by Joyce: goodness attracts the will that desires possession of the reality known, beauty is the attraction that is fulfilled simply by cognition. Joyce, it seems, was unaware of this simple distinction stated clearly by Aquinas.

There is yet a further intriguing feature of Joyce’s second aesthetic elaboration (15 November 1904), written under the heading “*Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*.” He begins by stating: “Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases.” This happens to be an almost exact translation of an alternative formulation of Aquinas’s definition, given by Aquinas much later in the *Summa*: “*Pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet*” (*STI*–II. 130; 27, 1 ad 3: “Let that be called beauty, the very apprehension of which pleases” [My trans.]). This confirms the surmise that Joyce was familiar with the most common phrases from Aquinas on beauty, although he appears not to have known any of his works besides the *Contra Gentiles*. I conjecture that he acquired these phrases in the conversations on aesthetics in which he frequently engaged with his professor of Italian at University College Dublin. As an argument that he was unfamiliar with the original text, I have suggested his failure to recognize the close connection between the texts chosen for commentary and the relevance of Aquinas’s wider discussion.

We may perhaps glimpse the motivation for Joyce’s interest in goodness and beauty from the account in *Stephen Hero* of the young student’s discussions on aesthetics with the professor of Italian, named here as “Father Artifoni.” We are told: “The Italian lessons often extended beyond the hour and much less grammar and literature was discussed than philosophy” (169–70). It would be legitimate to suppose that the Italian Jesuit, educated with Latin manuals replete with appropriate citations, may have been the source for Joyce’s telegrammatic knowledge of Aquinas’s notions of beauty. From our point of view, the following passage from *Stephen Hero* is most relevant, as it reproduces verbatim a significant portion of Joyce’s text from Pola; it suggests moreover the problem in Joyce/Stephen’s mind to which it responds: “They argued very acutely of the beautiful and the good. Stephen wished...
to amend or to clarify scholastic terminology: a contrast between the good and the beautiful was not necessary. Aquinas had defined the good as that towards the possession of which an appetite tended, the desirable. But the true and the beautiful were desirable, were the highest, most persistent orders of the desirable, truth being desired by the intellectual appetite which was appealed by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible, beauty being desired by the esthetic appetite which was appealed by the most satisfying relations of the sensible” (170–71).

The account in Stephen Hero continues: “Father Artifoni admired very much the wholehearted manner in which Stephen vivified philosophic generalizations and encouraged the young man to write a treatise on esthetic” (171).

Joyce’s real-life Italian teacher was Fr. Charles Ghezzi SJ. His real name is given in Portrait, in a greatly curtailed account of their conversation that makes no reference to their discussion of aesthetics but that retains the rebellious riposte: “He said Bruno was a terrible heretic. I said he was terribly burnt” (249).¹¹ If we are to believe the fictional account, Ghezzi’s spirit of open debate and questioning suited the young artist.¹² We may presume that he was an important source for Joyce’s philosophic and aesthetic ideas. While Joyce never formally studied Aquinas at University College Dublin, philosophy—doubtless that of Aristotle and St. Thomas—dominated Italian classes with Fr. Ghezzi. Eugene Sheehy depicts the scene: “Joyce and I both attended the same class for Italian. Our lecturer was an Italian Jesuit named Father Ghezzi... My function in the class was to listen to Father Ghezzi and Joyce discuss philosophy and literature in Italian, and, for all I could understand of the dialogue, I would have been more profitably engaged in taking high dives from the spring-board at the Forty-foot Hole in Sandycove” (14).

**BONUM, PULCHRUM, VERUM**

In what remains I will offer a brief evaluation of Joyce’s philosophic reflections—they are such—from the point of view of Aquinas. Since Joyce posts his reflections on aesthetics under the banner of Aquinas, and expounds them in terminology largely borrowed from him, it is legitimate to analyze and assess these reflections in the light of Aquinas’s philosophy. In order to do this, we must first outline the relation between *bonum* and *pulchrum* as understood by Aquinas and sketch also his theory of cognition.

As noted, the two principles commented on by Joyce were formulated by Aquinas by way of reciprocal clarification. The fact that Joyce comments separately on the phrases *Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus* and *Pulchra sunt quae visa placent* suggests that they are also expounded separately by Aquinas, whereas in fact they occur in the same short paragraph, the point of which is to distinguish between *bonum* and *pulchrum*, goodness and beauty.

In the course of *Summa Theologiae* I, Question 5, Aquinas raises the very question considered by Joyce in the first of his Pola reflections, namely the relation between goodness and beauty. He is dealing with goodness as pertaining to the
nature of God. Article 4 of Question 5 asks whether God’s goodness functions as final, formal or efficient cause. At the start of his *Nicomachean Ethics* (2; I, 1, 1094a 1–2) Aristotle had given the classic definition of goodness in terms of final causality: the good is that which all things desire. This is Aquinas’s view but, following the didactic style of his *Summa*, he first considers a number of contrary positions. The first objection cites Dionysius’s declaration that “Goodness is praised as beauty” (*Bonum laudatur ut pulchrum*). But since beauty has the nature of a formal cause—as the objector would have us believe—goodness must be a formal rather than final cause. In his reply to this objection, Aquinas is obliged to distinguish between beauty and goodness. His reply is worth citing in full:

> Beauty and good in a subject are the same, for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently good is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite, since *the good is what all things desire*, and therefore it has the aspect of an end (for the appetite is a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the knowing power; for *those things are called beautiful which please when seen*. Hence beauty consists in due proportion, for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty.

> Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and likeness relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.¹³ (*Summa Theologica* I: 26)

It would be interesting to speculate what different conclusions Joyce might have reached if he had had before him at Pola the full text from which he quoted. He would have seen that for Aquinas goodness and beauty are identical, responding to different faculties of the soul. Instead of antinomy or dichotomy, there is fundamental unity in reality; they differ only in their relationship to our spiritual capacities. Aquinas is preoccupied with precisely the same relationship as is Joyce, namely that of goodness to beauty. As is obvious from this passage, for Aquinas more than for Joyce, “a contrast between the good and the beautiful was not necessary” (*SH* 170). In reality they were identical; they differ only according to how we perceive and appreciate them.

Joyce is also unaware that a little further on in the *Summa*, in the question from which he unwittingly cites the once-off definition of goodness, Aquinas is concerned with the relationship between the good and the true—which, along with beauty, is Joyce’s other preoccupation in the Pola reflections. Again it is worth citing Aquinas’s text:

> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the thing desirable, and the term of knowledge, namely true, is in the intellect itself.¹⁴ (*Summa Theologica*, I: 94)
TRUTH AND BEAUTY AS DESIRED

If Joyce’s intention was to avoid a dichotomy between the beautiful and the good, it remains to be seen how successful his attempt was to harmonize them. Having defined the good as the desirable, he continues his first reflection: “The true and the beautiful are the most persistent orders of the desirable.” He thus ranks them together as desirable goods. In a certain sense he is stating the obvious. Aquinas quotes Aristotle as saying that truth is the good of the intellect.¹⁵ (Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics* with the phrase “All men by nature desire to know” [Complete Works 1552; I, 1, 980a 22].) Superficially this is adequate, but there is a deeper and more universal connection among the three. Joyce apparently is unfamiliar with Aquinas’s metaphysics regarding the relations among being, goodness, truth and beauty (the doctrine of transcendentals). According to this doctrine, every being, precisely as real, has the characteristic of truth insofar as it can be the object of knowledge; every being, inasmuch as it can be the goal of desire, has the quality of goodness; every being, insofar as it can elicit pleasure when known, has the character of beauty. It is reality that is desirable and therefore good; it is reality that is the goal of knowledge, and therefore true; it is reality that gives pleasure when known, and is therefore beautiful.

In Joyce’s Pola reflections, there is thus a confusion between reality, or being as such, as the primary datum of experience and the different aspects or points of view under which it is experienced. Having endorsed Aquinas’s definition of the good as “that towards the possession of which an appetite tends” (i.e. “the desirable”), Joyce proceeds to list truth and beauty among the things that are “good”: “The true and the good are the most persistent orders of the desirable. Truth is desired by the intellectual appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; beauty is desired by the esthetic appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible” (Scholes and Kain 81). There is here a confusion between the senses of “being” (*ens*), “goodness” (*bonum*), “truth” (*verum*) and “beauty” (*pulchrum*) in their basic meaning. It is true that beauty and truth may be labeled good, but only in a secondary or supervenient sense; ontologically, they do not subsist in themselves but abide in the relationship between concrete entities and the capacities of intellect and will. *Bonum* is reality as it satisfies the will; *verum* is the real in its agreement with intellect; *pulchrum* is the delight added to intellect in its discernment of certain characteristics of the object as experienced. Truth and beauty are without doubt desirable, but they are not what is primarily intended by Aquinas’s definition of the good as that which is desired.

AQUINAS’S THEORY OF COGNITION

In order to disentangle the somewhat confused terminology used by Joyce in elaborating the fundamental principles of Aquinas, it will be helpful to outline the latter’s interpretation of knowledge. As understood by Thomist epistemology,
cognition involves a number of distinct stages: sensation, perception, imagination, the concept and judgment. We might say it germinates in sensation, buds in perception, blossoms in the concept and bears fruit in judgment. The first single complete act of knowledge, however, is the judgment in which the mind or intellect affirms or denies what is known. In judgment alone is cognition complete and truth attained, when the mind pronounces upon what it knows.

In the philosophical theory of knowledge, “judgment” is used as a mildly technical term for the actual pronouncement made by the mind upon what it knows. The earlier stages of sense perception and concept formation are necessary for knowledge, but are not sufficient of themselves: they do not attain truth. In sense perception, an object in the external world stimulates one or more of the sense organs and impresses certain characteristics in a dematerialized manner upon the sense faculty. Elaborating upon what is thus given, the intellect forms a concept of what is experienced. But neither the percept nor the concept is knowledge properly speaking. Only when intellect reflectively affirms the identity of what it knows with the object given is the cognitive operation completed; only then is truth achieved. Aquinas states: “secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur” (Quaestiones Disputatae. Vol. I, De Veritate. 18; 19); ‘The intellect knows truth insofar as it reflects upon itself and its affirmative commitment to what is known’ (my translation). Truth is therefore attained in recognition—the recognition of the relation between what I know and the manner in which I know it. To know that I know is to know that something really is as I assert it to be. In this recognition, the mind attains fulfillment. In this sense, Joyce is correct in suggesting that the most complete form of cognition (which he calls “apprehension,” incorrectly, as we shall see), involves satisfaction. This is confirmed by Aquinas in his reply to the first objection of Question 16 of the Summa Theologiae, from which Joyce takes the epigraph to his first reflection. Discussing the nature of truth as it applies to God, Aquinas asks if truth resides in the thing known or the intellect. He states that whereas the good is that toward which the appetite tends, truth is that toward which the intellect tends: verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. The intellect has an innate tendency towards the truth; we might even say that it is the appetite for truth. Only in the moment of recognition does it achieve quietas, its quietude or satisfaction.

DIVORCE OF SENSE AND INTELLECT, BEAUTY AND TRUTH

In his second exposé, delivered under the heading “Pulchra sunt quae visa placent” and dated a week later, Joyce elaborates on the content and nature of beauty: “Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases. Therefore beauty is that quality of a sensible object in virtue of which its apprehension pleases or satisfies the esthetic appetite which desires to apprehend the most satisfying relations of the sensible” (Scholes and Kain 81). This expands the earlier statement that had included beauty among the things that are good: “beauty is desired by the esthetic appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible.”
It is interesting to observe the progress of Joyce's ideas and their articulation in the three consecutive Pola reflections on aesthetics. The first entry includes the following brief statement: "Beauty is desired by the esthetic appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible." This is elaborated in the second: "Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases. Therefore beauty is that quality of a sensible object in virtue of which its apprehension pleases or satisfies the esthetic appetite which desires to apprehend the most satisfying relations of the sensible." Having, in the first entry, distinguished between truth and beauty as instances of the good (and hence as objects, respectively, of the intellectual appetite and the esthetic appetite), Joyce proceeds, in the second entry, to consider beauty in itself under the motto "Pulchra sunt quae visa placent." As already noted, his elaboration includes without acknowledgement Aquinas's alternative formulation of the same definition (pulchrum dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet: "Let that be called beautiful the very apprehension of which pleases" Summa Theologiae I–II: 130; 27, 1 ad 3).

Retaining the plural of the phrase cited as his epigraph, Joyce translates: "Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases." Aquinas's use of the word "apprehensio" perhaps explains Joyce's predilection for this term, which occurs fifteen times in the Pola paragraphs. Having defined beauty as that which pleases merely by its apprehension, Joyce attempts throughout the entire second entry to explain the nature of this term, together with its attendant and constituent elements. In his second reflection Joyce unambiguously restricts beauty to the domain of the sensible, making it the object of a unique and properly esthetic appetite.

Joyce has his own strange ordering of the relation between truth and beauty. Confusion ensues when, pursuing his explanation of truth and beauty in terms of desire and goodness, he defines this distinction as one between intellect and sense: "Truth is desired by the intellectual appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; beauty is desired by the esthetic appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible." This is a perplexing arrangement, as it inverts a number of items in the Thomist scheme—a scheme adopted from Aristotle. For Aquinas there is no distinct "esthetic appetite" separate from the "intellectual appetite," "which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible." Beauty is always apprehended by intellect. While this occurs most frequently in cooperation with the senses, beauty in itself may also be exclusively intellectual and supra-sensible. While human experience of beauty is always sensitivo-intellectual, we may analogically affirm beauty of God.

For Aquinas, the intellect has an appetite for truth, which is appeased through the recognition of its agreement with affirmed reality. It is difficult to understand why Joyce limits truth to "the most satisfying relations of the intelligible." For Aquinas the real, precisely as real, is intelligible although as mysterious it may surpass our mental grasp: as opposed to the Hegelian motto "The rational is the real, and the real is the rational" (Grundlinien 14; My trans.). All being has the transcendental quality of truth (verum). For Aquinas, the intellectual appetite is directed not simply towards intelligible relations but towards reality itself, the
ground of all intelligibility. Truth, as we have seen, is itself a relationship of agreement (convenientia) between intellect and reality; intellect affirms truth when it reflectively discerns a relationship of agreement between its knowledge and the thing itself: between how it conceives something and how the thing itself is.

Joyce's identification of the aesthetic appetite with the capacity for satisfactory sensible relationship is perhaps to be explained by his reliance upon Aquinas's definition, which he cites repeatedly: *Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*. Moreover in elaborating his own view he unwittingly borrows from Aquinas's alternative definition: “Those things are beautiful the apprehension of which pleases.” While this would allow for beauty as something more than sensible, Joyce relates aesthetic pleasure to the grasp of sensible relations. We find an explanation of this misunderstanding in *Portrait*. Referring to Aquinas, Stephen says: “He uses the word *visa* to cover esthetic apprehensions of all kinds, whether through sight or hearing or through any other avenue of apprehension” (*P* 207). He correctly assumes that *visa* is understood by Aquinas as extending to all sensible apprehension. Aquinas in fact goes further; using “visa” to refer to those things that please when known, he restricts beauty to neither the visual nor the sensible. To the question whether “light” is properly affirmed of spiritual realities, he quotes St. Ambrose that “splendor” is one of those characteristics affirmed metaphorically of God.¹⁶ Aquinas explains that while vision (*visio*) originally refers to the sensible act of sight, “since sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, the word is extended, in accordance with linguistic usage, to all cognition through the other senses . . . and ultimately to intellectual knowledge.”¹⁷

Joyce contrasts the intellectual appetite, which seeks the most satisfying relations of the intelligible, with the aesthetic appetite, which aims to discern the most satisfying relations of the sensible. This contrast is open to multiple interpretations, and it is not at all clear what Joyce has in mind. Does he mean that the intellectual appetite is focused upon non-sensible realities and relationships? For Aquinas, however, the relations between physical beings and events are no less intelligible. My act of breaking a window, for example, is indeed a physical relationship, but it is also intelligible in terms of cause and effect, my free will and my bad upbringing.

By contrasting the intellectual and aesthetic appetites in terms of the most satisfying relationships, respectively, of the intelligible and sensible, Joyce introduces a false dualism between truth as the grasp of pleasing supra-sensible relationships and beauty as the apprehension of pleasing sensible relations. Why is this false? From the Thomist point of view, the intellect grasps not only the supra-sensible but also the sensible. And beauty pertains not only to the most satisfying relations of the sensible but also to harmonious relations at every level of existence — Aquinas's primary interest is in beauty as a divine characteristic. It is true that our first experience of beauty comes through the senses, but our concept expands to apply to the non-physical.¹⁸ In the order of reality, spiritual beauty is primary, as it coincides with the intrinsic integrity, harmony and splendor of divine being, which is the origin of the beauty of the created universe.
Joyce radically departs from his putative authority. Having cited two phrases from Aquinas (the explicit Latin quotation and an unacknowledged translation of another Thomistic phrase), he makes bold to state: “Therefore beauty is that quality of a sensible object in virtue of which its apprehension pleases or satisfies the esthetic appetite which desires to apprehend the most satisfying relations of the sensible.” Most curious and questionable is the inference expressed in the word “therefore.” It is certainly his own inference, because it could not be more removed from Aquinas’s position. For Aquinas there is no “intellectual appetite” or “sensible appetite;” there are intellectual and sensible capacities or powers to receive the realities that potentially may be known. The will as a conjoined, but distinct, power of the individual motivates the person to seek knowledge, both sensible and intellectual. The pleasure that attends sensible and intellectual cognition is the blossom upon the actualization of the cognitive capacities.

Joyce distinguishes between the intellectual appetite having truth as its object and the aesthetic appetite having beauty as its object. From the Thomist point of view, this is likewise a false contrast. The phrase immediately preceding Joyce’s second heading from Aquinas states: \( \text{Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam} \). Beauty relates to the knowing power: it thus must have some relationship with truth. There is no separate “esthetic appetite.” A person may have a desire for beauty, but beauty is experienced through the selfsame faculty with which he knows. Joyce’s statement that “The true and the beautiful are spiritually possessed” is uncontroversial; for Aquinas all experience, even that of sensation, is spiritual. In \textit{Portrait}, Joyce rejects as unaesthetic those emotions that are “not more than physical,” since they are akin to the purely reflex action of the nervous system (P 206).

\*APPREHENSION*

As already noted, the word “apprehension” and its cognates occur as many as fifteen times in the Pola reflections; in Joyce’s second reflection it occurs twelve times, while the third is entitled “The Act of Apprehension.” Why such importance and frequency? We may only speculate that he might have encountered Aquinas’s alternative definition of beauty, noted above, as that whose very apprehension pleases (‘pulchrum dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet’ [\textit{Summa Theologiae} ST I–II: 130; 27, 1 ad 3]). Needless to say, for Aquinas \textit{apprehensio} is broader than \textit{visio}, and less obviously sense-related.

If Joyce had studied the required textbook for his second-year course in Logic at University College Dublin, he would have become familiar with the philosophical meaning of the term “apprehension.” In its widest sense, the word “apprehension” (from \textit{ad}, to + \textit{prehendere}, to seize) may denote any act of knowledge; like its cognate terms “perception” and “conception” it depends upon the analogy between physically “taking hold of,” or “seizing,” an object and mentally “grasping” a thing’s nature through intellectual intuition. In scholastic philosophy, “\textit{apprehensio}” received a particular meaning through the addition of the word
“simplex.” In the definition of a textbook used in Joyce’s student days, “Simple apprehension is the act of perceiving an object intellectually, without affirming or denying anything concerning it” (Coppens 9). According to Aquinas, the intellect performs two distinct, successive, operations: apprehension and judgment. Through the first act, the intellect grasps a thing’s nature, its essence or quiddity (whatness). In a second act of cognition, it affirms or denies something (compositio et divisio) about the object—its existence or a particular characteristic. This second act is called “judgment” because the mind pronounces upon what is grasped through apprehension; in judgment the act of cognition is completed and truth is possible. Apprehension in itself is neither true nor false, since it makes no pronouncement; alternatively we might say that it is always true, since the mind infallibly grasps at least some of the essential features of the object. Truth, in the strict sense, is attained when the intellect asserts its own acknowledged and self-reflected agreement with reality; this occurs in judgment.

Truth is more than spontaneous apprehension; it involves the further affirmation of what has been apprehended. The sensation of beauty is the delight caused by that which pleases simply by its mere apprehension. This experience is direct, immediate and spontaneous. It requires no reflection or analysis. We may of course investigate this experience and the objective and subjective conditions that make it possible. We may analyze the elements inherent in the object that provoke the delight. We may conclude, for instance, that it comports with integrity, proportion and clarity; this theoretical knowledge, however, is not itself a requisite for our enjoyment of the beautiful.

Aquinas frequently uses “apprehension” as synonymous with knowledge itself. He uses it on occasion to refer not only to intellectual knowledge but also to the initial activity of sense perception and the intermediate stage of imagination. At one point he remarks that “the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch” (Summa Theologica 779). Joyce also variously uses the word “apprehension” in a variety of senses, but without clarity or precision. His interpretation of apprehension in the second and third Pola reflections is particularly confused.

Joyce was clearly struggling to formulate his ideas, with evident success, since the paragraph of 16 November 1904 is clearer and more succinct than the prolix deliberation of the previous day. For the sake of both brevity and clarity, it is sufficient to consider this shorter text, which contains Joyce’s essential conclusions. A continuing problem is that Joyce takes what are for Aristotle and Aquinas three related aspects of a single and dynamically progressive act of cognition to be separate activities: the initial act of simple perception, the moment of recognition and the ensuing satisfaction.

We have seen that sense perception and the moment of intellection, in which the mind recognizes the nature of what is perceived, are distinct but united stages in a single act of cognition. Joyce treats them not only as distinct but separate activities, and he posits yet another, namely the activity of satisfaction. He proceeds to attribute to each activity its specific pleasure and degree of beauty. The confusion is multiple: the satisfaction of cognition is
not distinct, but rather identical with the act of recognition; moreover beauty is grasped intellectually at the moment of recognition, rather than in the passivity of sensory experience. Recognition is at once the moment of aesthetic experience.²² It is true that for Aristotle and Aquinas—here Joyce has made their view his own—each activity is accompanied by its attendant pleasure.²³ But even though Aristotle states that since “the activities of the intellect differ from those of the senses, so also therefore do the pleasures that perfect them” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 599; X, 4, 1175a 27–28), he does not equate sensory pleasure with the experience of beauty.

**ARISTOTELE, AQUINAS OR HEGEL?**

The most detailed commentary to date on Joyce’s aesthetics is Jacques Aubert’s influential book *The Aesthetics of James Joyce*.²⁴ The indispensable hypothesis for Aubert’s study is the assumption that the primary source for Joyce’s aesthetic was Bernard Bosanquet’s *A History of Aesthetic*, and that in consequence his approach was predominantly Hegelian. However, no hard evidence is presented to support this premise. While Joyce entered the bibliographic details of Bosanquet’s *History* in his notebook in Paris, there is no indication that he consulted it; nor is there any evidence that he ever read Hegel. It seems to me that on the basis of the most tenuous associations Aubert attributes to the young Joyce a Hegelian influence. From the crucial statement in Joyce’s early autobiographical essay “A Portrait of the Artist” (7 January 1904): “He had interpreted for orthodox Greek scholarship the living doctrine of the Poetics” (Scholes and Kain 67), Aubert draws the following conclusion:

> “Interpreted” and “living” strangely echo “applied” in “applied Aquinas” and add another dimension to it. The words suggest both a historical perspective of impermanence and decay compensated for by rebirth and the necessity to reread (“interpret”) the text of past doctrine: a dialectic that the use of the word “applied” tends to specify as Hegelian, in the spirit if not in orthodox doctrinal terms. (*Aesthetics* 7)

I believe this interpretation to be entirely ungrounded and find not the least evidence for direct Hegelian influence. As a possible interpretation of Joyce’s reference to the “living doctrine of the Poetics,” Aubert suggests: “Butcher and Bosanquet were making exciting intellectual news exactly at the time when Joyce was being exposed to the Aristotelian teaching of his English Literature professors” (*Aesthetics* 8). While this may be true, temporal coincidence does not amount to causal influence.

According to Aubert, it was Hegel, and not Aquinas, who provided the main inspiration for Joyce’s aesthetics. Despite the corruption of the printed text, Aubert’s position is clear: “Here again we are threatened by hasty oversimplifications and may be misled. A couple (sic) red herrings are, if I may say so, a particularly bright red, one involving Thomas Aquinas more than any other” (*Aesthetics* 4–5). I have argued elsewhere that the most likely source for Joyce’s Thomist
aesthetics were the philosophical handbooks written by the Jesuits of Stonyhurst, which were the prescribed texts at University College Dublin (O’Rourke, “Joyce’s Thomist Masters” 325–27). This opinion had already been expressed with emphatic conviction by Joyce’s classmate, Con Curran. Joyce had no need to depend upon Bosanquet for his knowledge of Aquinas. Aubert’s suggestion that, as a sixteen-year-old schoolboy, Joyce “enlists Hegel’s help” in writing the essay “Force” (Aesthetics 12) is difficult to credit. Joyce entered the bibliographic details of Bosanquet’s book in his notebook during his stay in Paris in 1903, which possibly suggests that he had previously been unfamiliar with it. We may be confident that he had elaborated the kernel of his aesthetics while still an undergraduate (i.e., before his visit to Paris). According to Aubert, Joyce’s talk of “the great things that are hidden . . . in the leaves of the trees and in the flowers” (Critical Writings 21) “seems but a commentary on the Hegelian conception of nature” (Aesthetics 13). The surmise is gratuitous: the facts of nature are common to all; the poetic and youthful Joyce did not need to rely upon the German idealist to be moved by the power of Nature.

Aubert remarks that from the 1860s until the end of the century, due to an accelerating rate of translations, “Hegel’s philosophy was the major influence in English philosophy” (Aesthetics 7). In fact there was relatively little of Hegel available in English; his influence within the Catholic philosophical circles of Ireland was certainly minimal. Central to the channel of influence upon Joyce, as Aubert would have it, is not only Bosanquet’s A History of Aesthetic (1892) but also his partial translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Fine Art (1887). As a Neo-Hegelian, Bosanquet viewed the development of aesthetics as “a dialectical history of aesthetic consciousness” (8). There is, moreover, a relationship of dialectical influence between Bosanquet and S. H. Butcher, editor of Aristotle’s Poetics. According to Aubert, Bosanquet’s influence may be observed in the Preface to Butcher’s book Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (142, n 28).²⁵ The only explanation I can find for Aubert’s suggestion is that he equates Aristotle’s insight into “the essential quality of Poetry, as a concrete expression of the universal” with Hegel’s notion of the “concrete universal” (often regarded as Hegel’s greatest discovery). The two notions, however, could not be further apart.

For Aristotle, the notion of the “concrete universal” is contradictory. It must be noted that the term is indeed open to ambiguity. From Latin con and crescere (with-grow), “concrete” denotes an entity composed of more basic principles. In Aristotelian terms it refers to a particular “this” (tode ti), a composite (suntheton) of primary matter and substantial form. In Metaphysics VII, Aristotle considers it as one of the candidates for the primacy of being (ousia = “beingness,” or substance), but since it derives from its constituent principles it cannot itself be ultimate (Complete Works 1625; VII, 3, 1029a 29–32). Another candidate for the ultimacy of existence is the universal character shared by a multiplicity of individuals and grasped by the general concept. As such, however, this exists only in the intellect although with a basis in the physical world. In the Aristotelian scheme, the concrete individual and the universal belong to distinct orders or levels of knowledge
and reality. Only in the worlds of Parmenides and Hegel, for whom fundamentally only a single self-existent individual exists, and reality and thought are identical, can one speak meaningfully of the “concrete universal.”

From his repeated references to Bosanquet, the reader of Aubert might expect to find on pages 147–48 of *A History of Aesthetic* the full range of Aquinas’s pronouncements on aesthetics, providing everything needed for both Joyce’s Pola reflections and Stephen’s theories in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*. One might even assume that, in formulating his aesthetic theory, Joyce was “a man of one book.” In fact Bosanquet simply gives the references to some important passages of the *Summa Theologiae* (*ST* II–II. 630; 145, 2; *ST* I. 199–201; 39, 8; *ST* I. 27; 5, 4); he cites some phrases, but not a single complete sentence. Joyce would have had to trace these texts for himself; apart from the fact that such was not his practice, there was no copy of the *Summa Theologiae* in the National Library. Furthermore, as I have argued above, had he actually consulted the relevant text of Article 4 of Question 5 of the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*, he would have immediately recognized that the question was concerned with the relation between goodness and beauty. Moreover the epigraph to one of his passages was the unique phrase “*Bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus*” from *Summa Theologica* I Question 16, not referred to by Bosanquet.

Aubert has presented interesting affinities among Joyce, Hegel and Bosanquet. This is, I suggest, an indication both of the universal and perennial stature of Aristotle and Hegel and of Joyce’s unlimited curiosity and philosophical interest; it does not provide convincing evidence that Joyce himself consulted these authors. The supposed influence of Hegel upon Joyce is more likely a case of their common admiration for Aristotle. Butcher rightly remarked of Aristotle’s perennial importance: “His philosophy has in it the germs of so much modern thought that we may, almost without knowing it, find ourselves putting into his mouth not his own language but that of Hegel” (114). Aubert quotes this passage in support of his claim of Hegelian influence in Joyce; I suggest that he has himself fallen prey to the temptation identified by Butcher. Joyce draws from the Aristotelian source and not the Hegelian repository; what has been taken as Hegelian influence points instead to a common inspiration. Hegel’s own admiration for Aristotle was unbounded. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Hegel remarks: “He penetrated into the whole universe of things, and subjected its scattered wealth to intelligence; and to him the greater number of philosophical sciences owe their origin and distinction” (Lewes 18). He would have agreed with Joyce’s opinion that Aristotle was the greatest philosopher of all time. Indeed it is significant that Joyce seemed to consider Kant rather than Hegel the greatest modern philosopher: “In the last two hundred years we haven’t had a great thinker. My judgment is bold, since Kant is included. All the great thinkers of recent centuries from Kant to Benedetto Croce have only cultivated the garden. The greatest thinker of all times, in my opinion, is Aristotle. Everything, in his work, is defined with wonderful clarity and simplicity. Later, volumes were written to define the same things” (Borach 71).
It is also significant that none of Hegel’s books is listed in the catalogue of Joyce’s Trieste library. In all of his available writings we find but a single serious reference to Hegel, one of little importance; otherwise there are a jocose reference and a few parodied variations upon his name. There is no mention of Hegel as a source of inspiration. Nor, apart from the bibliographic entry in Joyce’s commonplace book, are there any references to Bosanquet’s *A History of Aesthetic*; there is no indication that Joyce ever consulted or owned a copy. It has been suggested that Joyce never had an unpublished thought: had Hegel been so important, this would be evident from his writings. Richard M. Kain commented aptly: “Always restlessly curious, he put everything he knew, everything he remembered, into his two great works” (“Position” 94). Joyce left us in no doubt about the sources that influenced him, and he nowhere mentions Hegel. There is not the slightest evidence that he ever read a word of Hegel. Hegel and Bosanquet are, it would appear, the red herrings that distract from the pursuit of Joyce’s aesthetic.

Aubert’s comments on Joyce’s Pola texts include a radical misconception stated at the outset. The epigraph for the first text (*Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*, i.e., “The good is that toward which the appetite tends”) is adapted from the start of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*; Aubert concludes: “This sets the key for the whole Pola Notebook, whose line of investigation is definitely *ethical*” (102). This is quite incorrect: Aristotle’s concept of goodness is not confined to ethical value, but is associated with the wider notion of end in whatever domain. To say that grass is good for horses is not to make a moral judgment but to recognize grass as suitable nourishment, allowing a horse to function properly in accordance with its nature. The horse instinctively perceives it as good without any moral awareness; Aristotle’s definition applies equally to the appetite of the horse. Inversely if I say that grass is bad for humans I am likewise asserting a functional fact rather than pronouncing a moral censure. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, goodness is predicated of function in relation to goal. For Aristotle goodness is ultimately founded upon being: “It is better to be than not to be” (*Generation of Animals* 130; II, 1, 731b 28–30).

Aubert’s assumption is that not only was Joyce entirely indebted to Bosanquet for his knowledge of Aquinas’s aesthetics, but that Bosanquet’s Hegelianism was the decisive influence in shaping Joyce’s own aesthetic theorizing. He argues that “by giving chapter and verse for the Aquinian texts on beauty,” Bosanquet may have been the decisive stimulation for Joyce’s interest in Thomist aesthetics (107). This is an unwarranted assumption, one which is moreover unnecessary since the most likely source was the philosophical handbooks published by the Jesuits of Stonyhurst, which were the daily fare of Joyce’s fellow students at University College Dublin. We have the following convincing testimony of C. P. Curran regarding the source for Joyce’s aesthetics: “These Stonyhurst manuals would have escaped the attention of no intelligent student in the College; Joyce could have got what he wanted from them in half an hour” (37). Joyce himself mentions these volumes in *Stephen Hero*, referring to Cranly’s friend, O’Neill, in the National Library: “He was very busy all the summer reading philosophical handbooks” (148).
One may note in conclusion that while there is no evidence that Joyce was directly influenced by Hegel, it would be foolish to deny that he was influenced by the neo-Hegelian spirit that was in the air at the time. Pater, for example, was a definite influence; such influence, however, is nowhere evident in the Pola reflections.\textsuperscript{34}

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Notes

1. What were previously believed to have been two separate notebooks (“The Paris Notebook” and “The Pola Notebook”) are now more accurately referred to as Joyce’s “Early Commonplace Book.” See Crispi.

   Joyce’s notes on aesthetics are reprinted in Gorman 133–35, Critical Writings 146–48, Occasional, Critical, and Political Writing 105–07, Aubert 138–40, and Scholes and Kain 81–83. A slightly modified version of the first paragraph, also dated 7. XI. 04, is included in the Joyce MSS at Yale and reproduced in the \textit{James Joyce Archive} 7, 108.

2. From the start of his career, Joyce used the spelling “esthetic.” When the typesetter at \textit{The Egoist} substituted “aesthetic” in the serialized publication of Portrait (1913) Joyce reversed in each case the printer’s “correction” (Archive 7, 415–17, 426–32). In the present article I retain Joyce’s spelling in quotations but otherwise use the standard spelling.

3. William Noon refers to “Saint Thomas’s slight, incidental aesthetics” (78).

4. Referring to this passage in his General Metaphysics (129), John Rickaby states that “as truth is what intellect tends to, so goodness is what the will tends or appetite tends to; yet with this difference, that whereas the true is so determined primarily from the intellect, the good is so denominated primarily from the thing.”

   On Rickaby as one of Joyce’s sources, see note 33 below.

5. See Levy 131.

6. A variation occurs in Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics: “Considerandum est quod finale bonum in quod tendit appetitus uniuscuiusque est ultima perfectio eius” (\textit{In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio} 4; I, 1, 12): ‘The final good to which the appetite of each thing tends is its ultimate perfection’ (my trans.).

7. We can be quite sure that Joyce felt no obligation to consult Aquinas’s works while formulating his aesthetic theories. My enquiries into library facilities in Pola at the time indicate that they were not in fact available in the academic or public libraries of the city. The first public library in Pola, the Biblioteca Civica or Biblioteca Comunale (1903), was closed in 1930 and was succeeded by the Biblioteca Provinciale, with most of its collections eventually passing to the university (some books ending up in Venice). The present university library of Pula has no works of Aquinas that were in its collections in 1904. I am grateful to Adriana Gri Storga of the Archaeological Museum of Istria and to Tijana Barbić-Domazet of the University Library in Pula for their gracious and efficient correspondence.

8. See O’Rourke, “Joyce’s Thomist Masters” 327.
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9. *Summa Contra Gentiles* III: 5–6; III: 3. Jacques Aubert (101) incorrectly gives this as the reference for the epigraph to Joyce’s reflections of 7 November 1904; the correct location is *Summa Theologicae* 93; I 16, a.1.

10. “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus” (*Summa Theologicae*. 93; I: 16, 1): ‘I reply that, as the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends’ (my trans.).

11. In *Portrait*, Joyce’s Pola reflections are repeated not in Fr. Ghezzi’s Italian class but in Stephen’s conversations with the Dean of Studies and with his friend Lynch.

12. The author shows a sharp self-awareness of the relationship between student and professor: “The teacher probably knew the doubtful reputation of his pupil but for this very reason he adopted a language of ingenuous piety, not that he was himself Jesuit enough to lack ingenuousness but that he was Italian enough to enjoy a game of belief and unbelief” (SH 169–70).

13. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similimudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis” (*Summa Theologicae* 27; I: 5, 4 ad 1; my emphases).

14. “Sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam” (*Summa Theologicae* 93; I: q. 16 a. 1).

15. “Verum enim, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus” (Aquinas, *In Peri Herm* 15–16; I: 3, 29 [7]): ‘Truth, as the Philosopher says in Ethics VI, is the good of the intellect.’ The reference is to *Nicomachean Ethics* 328; VI: 2, 1139a 28–30. See also *Summa Contra Gentiles* II: 71; II: 59; *Summa Contra Gentiles* II: 72; I: 61; *Summa Contra Gentiles* II: 83; I: 71; *Summa Contra Gentiles* II: 246; II: 84; *Q. Disp. De Ver.* 21; 1, 10. *Q. Disp. De An.* 290; 3, 1.

16. “Ambrosius ponit splendorem inter ea quae de Deo metaphorice dicuntur” (*Summa Theologicae* 327; I 67, 1, Sed Contra); ‘Ambrose includes splendor among those things which are said of God metaphorically’ (my trans.).

17. “Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad ommem cognitionem aliquor sensuum . . . et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus” (*Summa Theologicae* 327; I: 67, 1).

18. See Aquinas *Summa Theologicae* II-II:

Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. Et ideo in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialetier invenitur pulchritudo. (777; 180, 2 ad 3)

Beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these has its roots in the reason, because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of reason, there is beauty in it *per se* and essentially. (*Summa Theologica* II: 1932)
As may be gathered from Dionysius, beauty or handsomeness arises when fine proportions and brightness run together; he says that God is named Beautiful because he is the cause of the consonance and clarity of the universe. So beauty of body consists in shapely limbs and features having a certain proper glow of color. So also beauty of spirit consists in conversation and actions that are well-formed and suffused with intelligence. Since this is of the essence of the honourable, which we have identified with the virtuous or the tempering of human affairs by intelligence, it follows that the honourable is the spiritually beautiful. Accordingly Augustine remarks, “By the honourable I mean what is beautiful to the mind, and this we properly designate as spiritual.” And he goes on, “There are many things lovely to the eye which it would be hardly proper to call honorable.” (Summa Theologiae Vol. 43, 77)

Summa Theologiae II–II:

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum movens appetitum est bonum apprehensum. Quod autem in ipsa apprehensione apparat decorum, accipitur ut conveniens et bonum, et ideo dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile. Unde et ipsum honestum, secundum quod habet spiritualem decorem, appetibile redditur. Unde et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. (630; 145, 2 ad 1)

The object rousing the appetite is a good that is apprehended. When in the very apprehending it is seen as a beauty it is received as desirable and just and right, by the mind. And so Dionysius says, The beautiful and good is beloved by all. Thus the honourable by its spiritual beauty becomes desirable. And so Cicero reflects, Thou perceivest the very figure and the features so to speak of honourable worth; were it to be seen with the eyes, what wondrous loves, as Plato declares, it would arouse for wisdom. (Summa Theologiae Vol. 43, 75)

19. See Rickaby, Metaphysics 75: “Simple apprehension is, as Aquinas calls it, intelligentia indivisibilium et incomplexorum, ‘the perception of what is indivisible and without complexity.’”

20. See Aquinas, In Peri Herm:

Sunt autem rationis tres actus: quorum primi duo sunt rationis, secundum quod est intellectus quidam. Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro praedicamentorum. Secunda vero operatio intellectus est compositio vel divisio intellectus, in qua est iam verum vel falsum. Et huic rationis actu deservit doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro periermeneias. Tertius vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in alium, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui libri logicae. (147)
Now there are three acts of the reason, the first two of which belong to reason regarded as an intellect. One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the intellect. To this operation of the reason is ordained the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book of *Predicaments*. The second operation of the intellect is its act of combining or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present. And this act of reason is the subject of the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book entitled *On Interpretation*. But the third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar to reason, namely, to advance from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the unknown. And this act is considered in the remaining books of logic. (*Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* 4)


22. In the longer version of 15 November, Joyce had initially written “satisfaction” in three sentences, to be subsequently replaced by “recognition.” The sentence “Now the act of apprehension involves at least two activities, the activity of simple perception and the activity of consequent satisfaction” was revised as follows: “Now the act of apprehension involves at least two activities, the activity of cognition or simple perception and the activity of recognition.”

23. Intellectual insight or recognition is the first single completed act of human knowledge achieved by the human psyche. For its basic meaning there is no need to refer to the dramatic *anagnorisis* of the *Poetics*, as suggested by Aubert (103).

24. For Aristotle, pleasure is simply the natural feeling that accompanies any unimpeded activity, perfecting the exercise of that activity. See *Nicomachean Ethics* 595; X, 4, 1174b21–23: “For each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as also have thought and speculation, and its activity is pleasantest when it is most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good condition and when it is directed to the most excellent of its objects; and the pleasure perfects the activity.” Aristotle emphasizes the relation between activity and pleasure: “They appear to be inseparably united; for there is no pleasure without activity, and also no perfect activity without its pleasure” (599; X, 4, 1175a19–22). See also Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*: “Pleasure perfects activity not as a habit that is inherent, i.e., not as a form intrinsic to the essence of the thing, but as a kind of end or supervenient perfection, like the bloom of health comes to young people” (608).

25. The original French version appeared as *Introduction à l’esthétique de James Joyce*.

26. Aubert also states that in the second edition (1897), Butcher “explicitly” acknowledges his debt to Bosanquet (*Aesthetics* 8), thereby suggesting that Bosanquet had decisively influenced his interpretation of Aristotle; this is an unwarranted inference. Butcher merely states: “I desire to acknowledge my obligations to friends, such as Mr. B. Bosanquet (whose *History of Aesthetic* ought to be in the hands of all students of the subject)” (xx).

27. I offer here a historical interpretation of Hegel: in Joyce’s time Hegel was understood as a monist. While more recent interpretations have viewed him in less Spinozist terms — the immanent whole is internally differentiated — there is finally only one individual for Hegel.

28. “*Claritas et debita proportio*,” “*Integritas sive perfectio*,” “*Debita proportio sive consonantia*,” “*Claritas*—i.e., *color nitidus*,” “*Sicut in sibi similibus*” (Bosanquet 147).

29. Bosanquet explains that in writing his *History of Aesthetic* he has drawn on Erdman’s *History of Philosophy*, and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. He states: “In the case of Thomas Aquinas in particular, I profess no original knowledge at all” and thanks Dr. Gildea for having provided “very full quotations” from St. Thomas (xiii).
30. “Aristoteles ist in die ganze Masse und alle Seiten des realen Universums eingedrungen und hat ihren Reichtum und Zertreuung dem Begriffe unterjocht; und die meisten philosophischen Wissenschaften haben ihm ihre Unterscheidung, ihren Anfang zu verdanken” (Hegel 132).

31. See Joyce’s letter of 9 October 1923 to Harriet Shaw Weaver: “I am sorry that Patrick and [?] (sic) Berkeley are unsuccessful in explaining themselves. The answer, I suppose, is that given by Paddy Dignam’s apparition: metempsychosis. Or perhaps the theory of history so well set forth (after Hegel and Giambattista Vico) by the four eminent annalists who are even now treading the typepress in sorrow will explain part of my meaning” (Letters I. 204).

There is a jocular reference in one of his limericks: A holy Hegelian Kettle / Has faith which we cannot unsettle / If no one abused it / He might have reduced it / But now he is quite on his mettle” (Poems and Shorter Writings 110). See also FW 12.21: “like so many heegills and collines,” 107.36–108.01: “who in hallhagal wrote the durn thing abyhow?” 416.32–33: “The June snows was flocking in thuckflues on the hegelstomes.”

32. Northrop Frye remarks that Hegel “is not the kind of source one looks for in Joyce” (5). Joyce shares Hegel’s totalizing spirit, but not at the cost of sacrificing the minutiae of everyday experience. In this respect, Joyce’s outlook is diametrically opposite to that of Hegel and closer to Wittgenstein’s. While walking together in Dublin’s Phoenix Park in 1948, Wittgenstein was asked by his Irish friend Dr. Drury: “What about Hegel?” Wittgenstein replied: “No, I don’t think I would get on with Hegel. Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things that look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different” (Drury 157).

33. I see no reason to support Aubert’s suggestion that “Joyce obviously exploits Bosanquet’s presentation of Aquinas’s view of symbolism” (103).

34. Curran states:

As to Aquinas, I must also mention Boedder’s Natural Theology, the textbook used in the class of religious doctrine open to all students. He had a page or two on Thomistic aesthetics starting out with pulchra enim dicuntur ea quae visa placent. [John] Rickaby’s General Metaphysics was read in the philosophy classes. Joyce could not but have seen it in the hands of his friends who were reading philosophy including, for example, J. F. Byrne (Cranly), who sat at the same table with him in the National Library and at least in the first week of the term would have opened its pages. Rickaby, between pages 148 and 151, holds the marrow of Joyce’s aesthetics. It is Rickaby who quotes from St. Thomas well nigh all that Joyce uses touching the good and the beautiful which by its mere contemplation sets the appetite at rest. He discusses its unity, or integritas, its harmony of parts or consonantia, and its clear lustre, or claritas; commonplaces, it may be said. (36–37)

35. According to Russell (AE), Joyce had become “infected with Pater’s Relative.” On learning that AE sought the Absolute, “he again sighed, this time regretfully, and said that ‘AE’ could not be his Messiah, as he abhorred the Absolute above everything else” (Kain, “Yankee Interviewer” 157).

Works Cited


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