Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality

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Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano’s conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in *Being and Time* (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his account. Heidegger’s criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl’s. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl’s account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged.

Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality in order to uniquely characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by psychology. His student, Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano’s conceptual framework, went on to place intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness. Husserl’s own one-time assistant, Martin Heidegger, however, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in *Being and Time* (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Furthermore, many recent commentators have sided with Heidegger on this point. Thus, Hubert Dreyfus has endorsed Heidegger’s critique of Husserl and Brentano as an overcoming of all epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. For Dreyfus, Heidegger’s contribution has been effectively to remove intentionality from the domain of the mental and relocate it in the practical. But does Heidegger really turn his back on Husserl’s and Brentano’s accounts of intentionality? Heidegger claims to be re-thinking intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein in a way which radically transforms the whole problematic, overcomes Husserl’s intellectualism, and leads to the question of being. But, it was originally Husserl who characterized intentionality in
terms of transcendence, even in the *Logical Investigations*, and indeed, who elucidated transcendence in terms of its relation to temporality. Similarly, Heidegger’s radicalizing of the problematic of intentionality in terms of the question of being seems already to be anticipated in Husserl’s descriptive distinctions between the different kinds of ‘objectivities’ encountered in our conscious life, in his development of formal and material ontologies, and in his account of the relation between judgement and truth. Indeed, Heidegger himself repeatedly acknowledged Husserl’s account of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation as having provided a stimulus to his own thinking on the nature of being. I argue here that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning Husserl’s account, as many commentators have suggested. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl’s account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice.

I. Brentano’s Original Motivation for Introducing Intentionality

Brentano had only an incidental interest in intentionality, as is evident from his sparse references to the topic throughout his life’s work. His main focus, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) and elsewhere, was to found a new strict science, later termed *descriptive psychology* (*deskriptive Psychologie*), a classificatory science of mental acts and their contents based on the apodictic self-evidence of inner perception. Intentional ‘directedness to an object’ (*die Richtung auf ein Objekt*, PES 88) was simply the one positive feature which best characterized mental acts. Husserl initially followed Brentano’s programme for founding the sciences on *descriptive psychology* in his first publication, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), which aimed at the clarification of arithmetical concepts elucidating their ‘psychological origin’. Ten years later, in his *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), Husserl understood that intentionality had a much broader philosophical significance than Brentano had originally envisaged (LI V §9, 553; Hua XIX/1 378), and, while rejecting almost every aspect of Brentano’s project, he retained what he took to be the core intuition, now applied to a new project. Husserl wanted to provide a theory of scientific knowledge as such (*Wissenschaftslehre*), and, in particular, an account of what guarantees the objectivity and universality of scientific knowledge, i.e., a theory of *evidence* or *self-evidence* (*Evidenz*). Initially, Husserl thought the answer lay in clarifying the nature of the objectivities encountered in mathematics and logic (numbers, logical connectives, and so on), of the a priori, ideal laws connecting them, and of
our access thereto. This clarification itself required an account of our cognitive acts in general, beginning with our acts of meaning (Meinen), our ‘meaning-conferring’ acts (bedeutungsverleihenden Akte, LI I §9), while avoiding the misconstruals of traditional philosophy. Thus, in Ideas I (1913) Husserl came to see intentionality as the key to the phenomenological analysis of cognition and consciousness, of the whole human endeavour to be self-consciously and universally rational: ‘Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology’.

Given the fundamental role of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology, it is initially something of a shock that Heidegger’s Being and Time, while explicitly claiming to be a phenomenological treatise, contains only two brief references to intentionality: a critical remark regarding the inadequacy of Scheler’s analysis of the person as the performer of intentional acts (SZ §10, 73; 48); and a single footnote on intentionality as grounded in the temporal transcendence of Dasein. On the basis of this paucity of reference, it has been widely supposed that Heidegger had rejected Husserl more or less from the start. However, the publication of Heidegger’s Marburg lectures (1923–28) reveals that Heidegger was deeply familiar with both Brentano’s and Husserl’s (and even Scheler’s) accounts of intentionality. Indeed, in these lectures, Heidegger appears to be more or less endorsing Husserl’s account of intentionality, while at the same time calling for ontological clarification, specifically of the nature of the intentional relation and the being of the entities related. In the mid-1920s, then, Heidegger himself saw his own project as an ontological clarification of the important insights of Husserl’s phenomenology. In several later autobiographical reflections, furthermore, Heidegger confirms the importance of Husserl’s phenomenology for his own development.

In the Marburg lectures, Heidegger briefly sketches the evolution of the discussion of intentionality from Brentano, where it is used ‘to bring the psychical into view, prior to all the explanations of the natural sciences’, to Husserl, who treated intentionality as the constitutive feature of consciousness; which ‘determines the essence of consciousness as such, the essence of reason’ (MFL §9, 133; GA 26 167). In his 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger sees the ‘enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality’ as designating a problem rather than a solution, a diagnosis he repeats in his 1928 lecture course Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (MFL §9, 134; GA 26 168). In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he claimed the being of the intentional had not been interrogated, and the manner of its treatment in recent philosophy has been ‘inadequate and external’ (unzureichend und äusserlich, BP §15 161; GA 24 230). Similarly, in 1928, Heidegger reiterated his claim that Husserl did not inquire into the nature of the being of consciousness. Furthermore, Heidegger charges – essentially repeating Husserl’s own critique of Brentano (LI V §11) – that the
nature of the intentional relation has been misconstrued either, crudely, as a real relation between two extant things, or, as in Brentano, as an immanent relation between the mind and its private contents, an account which essentially repeats the representationalism of modern philosophy. Heidegger, then, wants to radicalize the philosophical interrogation of intentionality by raising more fundamental questions, neglected in traditional philosophy, of ‘the question of being’ and, specifically, ‘the question of the being of the intentional’ (die Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionalen), as he puts it in his 1925 lectures. But radicalizing is not the same as overthrowing or abandoning.

Heidegger claims that, in the traditional accounts of intentionality (here he includes Brentano, Husserl, Rickert, and others), the being of the intentional object has also been misunderstood as the merely ‘present at hand’ or ‘occurrent’ (das Vorhandene). So, too, the nature of the self-reflection which uncovers the object has been wrongly characterized as a kind of noesis, as ‘cognitive intending’ (ein erkennendes Meinen, MFL §9, 134; GA 26 169), whereas Heidegger, following Max Scheler, wants to broaden out the kinds of behaviour or ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) which are to be considered as having an intentional structure. In his 1928 lectures Heidegger claims that Husserl’s insight into intentionality did not go far enough and that ‘grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of the human being’ (MFL §9, 133; GA 26 167). Heidegger cites Scheler approvingly for having the insight that the radical rethinking of intentionality as related to the human person must go beyond idealism and realism, but then criticizes Scheler for not having the conceptual tools to progress the analysis. Instead, for Heidegger, the whole intentional relation must be rethought in terms of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

For Heidegger, then, as is apparent both from these Marburg lectures and from Being and Time, intentionality must be understood in terms of the structural features of Dasein, specifically Dasein’s transcendence, that is, the fact that Dasein is already somehow beyond itself, already dwelling in the world, among things, and not locked up in the privacy of its own consciousness as the representationalist, Cartesian picture assumes (MFL §9, 135; GA 26 169). The intentional relation, then, too often misunderstood in Cartesian terms as the subject trying to reach the object, must instead be founded on the ‘being-with’ or ‘being-by’ (Sein-bei, MFL §9 134; GA 26 168) of Dasein, i.e., intentionality is a form of ‘ontic’ transcendence which can only be understood if Dasein’s more basic ‘ontological’ transcendence is understood (MFL §9, 135; GA 26 170). As Heidegger puts it in 1927: ‘Intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes’ (BP §9 65; GA 24 91). The radical rethinking of intentionality will lead Heidegger to a fundamental interrogation of Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’ (BP §15 164; GA 24 234),

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where Dasein is to be understood as nothing other than the very possibility of beings gaining entry to world, having ‘world-entry’ (Welteingang, MFL §11, 193; GA 26 249). Heidegger, then, wants to use intentionality as the way to understanding Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

Heidegger’s emphasis on transcendence has often been understood by Heidegger’s followers as being opposed to Husserl’s supposedly subjectivist account of intentionality. Yet, as early as Logical Investigations, Husserl used the notion of transcendence to characterize the object in its relation to consciousness. The intentional object is never a reell part of the act; all objects of consciousness are transcendent – from actual ‘external’ things to objects such as ‘God’ or ‘square circle’ (LI V, 594–6; Hua XIX/1 437–38). Indeed, throughout his writings Husserl emphasizes that intentionality involves transcendence (e.g., FTL §62). Furthermore, from the early 1900s, Husserl also had clearly identified the link between transcendence and time; human perception always overruns itself with its anticipations and protentions on the one side as well as its retentions on the other. No perceptual act of a physical object is entirely rooted in the present. Its very structure is temporal through and through, as every act grasps a ‘profile’, ‘adumbration,’ or ‘aspect’ (Abschattung) which may change as our perspectives shifts, but the act itself already looks beyond itself to those other profiles, assumes them in grasping the object. Indeed, for Husserl, it belonged to the very structure of material objects that they are given to consciousness only in one-sided temporal adumbrations. Husserl sees this as a limiting feature of objecthood as much as a feature of consciousness, hardly the position of a radical subjectivist.

II. The Controversy over the Being of the Intentional Object

Heidegger’s worries about the nature of the intentional relation and the being of the intentional object were not original, but in fact had a long history in the Brentano school. Brentano’s initial characterization of the intentional object as something which may or may not exist, as something with ‘intentional inexistence’ (intentionale Inexistenz, PES 88), motivated some of his close followers, e.g., Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, to attempt to clarify the nature of the supposed inexistence or ‘in-dwelling’ (Einwohnung) of intentional objects. What kind of being have these intentional objects or ‘objectivities’ (Gegenständlichkeiten) as Brentano had earlier called them? How could one be intentional related to such strange entities as square circles, gold mountains, green emotions, and other such non-actual things? The different senses in which something can be the object of an intentional act had to be disambiguated.

One way of clarifying the concept of the intentional relation was suggested
by Brentano’s Polish student, Kasimir Twardowski, who drew on the Austro-
German logical tradition (Bolzano, Kerry, Zimmermann, Meinong and
to propose a distinction between the *content* and *object* of presentations and
judgements. The content may be said, following Meinong and Höfler, to act
like a ‘sign’ or inner ‘mental picture’ of the object (COP 7). The content is
presented *in* the act of presentation, the object *through* the content (COP 16).
Twardowski stressed, as did Meinong and Husserl, that we must distinguish
the properties of the *content* (what is presented) from the properties of the
*object*. The content is a *real* part of the act and really exists. Twardowski
argues that a ‘square circle’ can be the *genuine object of representation*, since
it possesses a genuine ‘meaning’ (*Sinn*), and its properties can be enumerated,
even though these are contradictory properties and hence the object cannot
exist in actuality. It will simply be the case that true judgements will deny it
existence. Twardowski’s clarification of the role of the psychological content,
though it offered a sophisticated analysis of the structure of the intentional
act, nevertheless, left the ontological problem of the status of intentional
objectivities unresolved. Indeed, Twardowski followed Brentano in rejecting
any ontological problem at all.

In the 1890s, following his own intensive reading of the Austro-German
logicians, as well as through his correspondence with Gottlob Frege, Husserl
himself came to criticize Brentano’s account of intentionality for failing to do
justice to the ideal identity of meanings grasped by temporal psychic processes.
Husserl was also familiar with Twardowski’s treatise and had even written a review, which however remained unpublished. Husserl
thought Twardowski’s refinement of the Brentanian account was still too
*immanentist* in its understanding of the notion of content, and contended that
Twardowski could not really explain the *sameness* or *identity* of meaning
which our different acts share. For example, when we both think of a *tree*,
each one has his or her ‘subjective presentation’ (Bolzano) or ‘phantasm’
(Husserl). Both Husserl and Twardowski agree that the psychic act must be
understood as a real occurrence or event in the natural world, subject to
psycho-physical laws, and possessing real (*‘reell’* in Husserl’s early
vocabulary) temporal parts. Its *content*, in one sense of that ambiguous
term, is also a genuine, though dependent, part of the act, i.e., it cannot
survive on its own apart from the act, it swims in the act, as it were. But, for
Husserl, there is another dimension to the act: it tokens an ideal meaning, and
that ideal meaning must also be a part of the act, but not now a *real* part.

This *ideal* content is what guarantees sameness of reference, reiteration of
the same meaning over a number of acts. The crucial point, for Husserl, is that
these ideal senses are *multiply accessible*, i.e., repeatedly accessible by the
same speaker, or shared between speakers. As such, these identities are non-
individuated, trans-temporal *idealities, tokened* in psychological contents. At
this early stage of his development, Husserl had not yet clearly distinguished between the ideality or abstractness of the meaning-content and the kind of being of the state of affairs which is said to ‘hold’ or ‘obtain’ (bestehen) if the statement is true, and which is expressed by the act. The Logical Investigations would address this problem directly.

In the Logical Investigations (1900–01) Husserl, elaborating Stumpf’s part–whole analysis, proposed a more complex account of the relation between concrete and the abstract parts in the unity of a mental process, and between the dependent (unselbstständigen) and independent (selbständigen) parts (LI III, 435; Hua XIX/1 227). In the First Edition, Husserl treated the sense or signification as an ‘abstract’ or ‘one-sided’ part of the act, a dependent element which only came to be when the act engendered it, not a real (reell) part of the act. To see a cat is to see an object which can be re-identified and hence has a sense which goes beyond, or exceeds, what strictly appears in the presentation. ‘Cat’ signifies a species, a type. Nevertheless, we really do see an individual cat; we see a token of the type. Husserl is insistent that seeing a cat is an instance of straightforward perception, where in normal cases of perceiving, word and thing are given together (incidentally, Heidegger agrees fully). It is a phenomenological distortion to construe genuine perception as the judgement, ‘this is a cat’. The objectivity instantiated in a judgement is different from that given in perception. Thus, for example, to see that the cat is black, is to ‘constitute’, in Husserl’s phrase, borrowed from the Neo-Kantians, or instantiate in a specific thought process, the ideal, or general, objective sense-unity, the being-black of the cat, a complex objectivity which Husserl, in keeping with the Brentano school, calls a state of affairs (Sachverhalt). Husserl distinguishes a hierarchy of different kinds of objectivities, and in fact proposes a kind of general theory of objects not dissimilar to that of Meinong. We can grasp real individual empirical objects or ideal individual or general objectivities, simple or complex, positive or negative. Husserl further distinguishes the ideality of the species from the ideality of the state of affairs. Thus, for Husserl, in the early formulation of the Logical Investigations, the statement ‘a is bigger than b’ expresses a proposition which represents a different state of affairs and has a different meaning-content from the assertion ‘b is smaller than a’ (LII §12). In order to handle the difference between the object intended and the way it is grasped in the Fifth Investigation, Husserl distinguishes the object which is intended from the object as it is intended, that is, its mode of presentation. Different meanings or senses (Bedeutungen) may intend the same object and have the same objective relation (gegenständliche Beziehung). Thus, to employ Husserl’s own example, ‘the victor at Jena’ and ‘the vanquished at Waterloo’ are two ways of thinking about, or presenting, the same entity, Napoleon (LI I §12, 287; Hua XIX/1 53).

Distinguishing between the sense or meaning (for Husserl, indifferently
Bedeutung or Sinn) and the objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) of the expression allows Husserl to accept that ‘golden mountain’ is meaningful but lacks objective reference (LI I §15, 293; Hua XIX/1 60). Similarly, Husserl, agreeing with Twardowski, holds that talk of a square circle is not meaningless, not an Unsinn, as logicians such as Sigwart and Erdmann thought; rather a set of meanings is posited which contradict one another, rendering the phrase a counter-sensical absurdity (Widersinn). In other words, in intending a square circle, we are able to perform a meaning-conferring act without our being able to bring it to meaning fulfilment (Bedeutungserfüllung), to complete the objective relation.\textsuperscript{15} The expression carries an expectation of meaning accomplishment which will always be frustrated; it lacks a ‘fulfilling sense’ (erfüllender Sinn). This goes further than Twardowski’s attempted solution of the problem which distinguished the intentional object from the object asserted as existing.\textsuperscript{16} Husserl’s original contribution to the Brentanian problematic of intentionality, then, is his elaboration of the view that every perception or every thought has a certain signification or meaning (Bedeutung) which itself either presents with or promises varying levels of confirmation or fulfilment.

Husserl’s separately published Prolegomena (1900) to the Investigations attempted to underscore the necessity for a sharp distinction between a mental act, understood as a particular temporal, psychic occurrence in the stream of consciousness with its own immanent content, and the ideal meaning which it tokens as a first step to securing the independence of logic from all forms of psychology. For both Frege and Husserl, meanings were idealities. Unlike Frege, who, notoriously, placed these objectivities in a third realm, ‘ein drittes Reich’,\textsuperscript{17} Husserl was generally unconcerned with positing a special realm of being and vacillated on the issue of whether or not he was committed to some form of Platonism. He was more concerned with the epistemological role of these ideal entities as underpinning acts of genuine knowledge. To entertain a knowledge claim is to be in touch with certain ‘objectivities’ (Gegenständlichkeiten) or ideal ‘unities’ (Einheiten). In the First Edition of the Logical Investigations, in fact, Husserl has a quasi-nominalist position regarding these idealities. The ideal universal is tokened in the actual. I see an individual red patch and can have a categorial intuition (about which, more later) that this is ‘species red’. I grasp, by ‘ideational abstraction’, this red patch as an instance of redness in general, or indeed as an instance of colour. In the First and Second Investigations he disavowed a Platonism which would place these objectivities in a ‘heavenly place’, topos ouranios (LI I §31, 330; Hua XIX/1 106) as a doctrine that had long been refuted.\textsuperscript{18} For Husserl, existence understood as actuality (Wirklichkeit) always means existence in time and hence he usually denies that ideal objects ‘exist’. For Husserl they are necessary conditions for meaning, ‘objectivities’ rather than actual entities. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic (§57) he will speak of them
as ‘irreal formations’ though it must be conceded that Husserl is rather lax in his terminology and often speaks of these ideal objectivities not just as ‘holding’ (bestehen) but as ‘existing’.¹⁹

Rather than focusing on the mode of being of these objectivities, Husserl was mostly interested in how we gain cognition of them, in particular whether we reach them by selective attention, or by treating the individual as standing for any instance of something similar, as the various empiricist theories suggested (LI II). In the Second Edition (1913) of the Logical Investigations, Husserl replaced his earlier account of ideational abstraction with an account of direct intuiting of essential possibilities, the notorious Wesensschau. In these later accounts, the procedure of bracketing (epoché) of actuality, and suspending the natural attitude, means that the whole focus is on the objectivity and identity of meanings encountered, not their being or actuality.

Though Husserl constantly emphasized the need to distinguish the ‘reell’ psychological process, which occurs in time, in ‘the Heraclitean flux’ of our stream of experiences (der Erlebnisstrom), and which may be said to have dependent parts or moments which make it up, from the selfsame, identical meanings expressed and ideal entities referred to, it would be a serious mistake to read Husserl as rejecting psychologism simply in order to affirm the independent existence of the logical and the ideal. Indeed, Husserl later expressed frustration that the Prolegomena had been read in just this manner.²⁰ Rather, the whole point of the Prolegomena is to demonstrate the theoretical necessity of ideal objectivities in logic and epistemology as a first step to opening up the huge issue of how such employment of objectivities is arrived at and then validated, justified, evidentially secured. Later, Husserl’s turn to transcendent phenomenology, away from descriptive psychology, is a determined attempt to interpose a transcendent–phenomenological domain of necessary laws between the empirically real and the ideal. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl articulated his aim more clearly: to show the structural process whereby the ideal or irreal objectivities are constituted in empirical acts of consciousness (FTL §100, 263–4; Hua XVII 270–71). The precise status of these a priori transcendent–phenomenological structures has long been a source of dispute both within and outside phenomenology. But for our purposes, it is important to see that Husserl does not simply posit ideal objective unities as a way of overcoming psychologism; he even acknowledges the initial plausibility of psychologism (FTL §57, 154; Hua XVII 162); namely, that all knowledge is constituted in empirical acts of knowing, and hence the assumption that the objects of those acts (numbers, sets, etc.) are also mind-related in some way. What Husserl wants to explore are the a priori, necessary conditions which psychic acts require in order to achieve grasp of the identical meanings necessary for knowledge. This, in short, for Husserl, is the problem of constitution. Thus, when Heidegger, in Being and Time §44, recognizes the unsatisfactory nature
of the problem of positing both real acts and ideal objects without discussing the nature of the relation, *metexis*, which binds them, he is doing no more than repeating Husserl’s central concern, though he is stressing the *being* of the relation, its ‘subsistence’ (*Bestand*, SZ §44, 259; 216), rather than its structural characteristics, as in Husserl. Heidegger, like Husserl, opposes both psychologism and the hypostatization of idealities. For both philosophers, the middle way is *transcendental*, seeking the conditions for the possibility of grasping objectively valid significance. Of course, Husserl’s constituting transcendental subjectivity is replaced by Heidegger’s supposedly more concrete term, Dasein, whereby the transcendental element is given a decidedly historical, worldly and ‘existential’ slant, but, it remains the case that *Being and Time* is on its own terms an exercise in transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger is going over and rethinking the same ground as Husserl, though his radically different language for articulating Dasein’s being-in-the-world helps to overcome problems in what he thought of as Husserl’s still too Cartesian way of articulating the intentional relation. But, as we have seen, there are many features of Husserl’s account which are simply repeated by Heidegger and not necessarily in a deeper manner, though of course they are recontextualized into Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein.

III. Meaning Fulfilment and Evidence

As we have already briefly mentioned, Heidegger criticizes Husserl for failing to appreciate intentionality as transcendence, and for failing to explore ‘the being of the intentional’. He further criticizes Husserl for overstressing the cognitive aspect of intentionality. These criticisms are intertwined since Heidegger wants to show that the specific kind of being, presence at hand (*Vorhandenheit*), displayed by the objects of cognitive acts is not ‘primary’ (*primär*), but is itself founded on something more basic. For Heidegger, the prioritization of *Vorhandensein* has misled ontology in the past, including Husserl, despite the fact that his phenomenology has been responsible for the revival of interest in ontology (MFL §10, 150; GA 26 190). Indeed, Husserl had an interest in formal ontology, in classifying the kinds of objectivities, their parts and relations, in interrogating the nature of ‘what is in general’, but, as he repeatedly stated in unpublished notes of the early 1930s, he regarded Heidegger’s peculiar construal of the question of being as confused, since it eradicated the important distinction between formal and material ontologies, and ended up mystifying ontology.

To understand Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s over-emphasis on cognitive intending, we need to look more closely at Husserl’s discussion of ‘fulfilment’ (*Erfüllung*). Husserl, ever the radical empiricist, always begins
from acts of sense perception, and his most detailed analyses of fulfilment relate to sense perception. From Brentano, and from the empiricist tradition in general, Husserl retains the notion of a core, originary, intuitive givenness or ‘presentedness’ in a ‘founding’ act, around which the other intentional modalities cluster and on which they are ‘founded’. (Though we cannot deal with it here, Husserl understands the notion of founding in terms of his part–whole analysis [LI III].) As Husserl says, ‘meaning (das Bedeuten) is a variously tinctured act character, presupposing an act of intuitive presentation (einen Akt anschaulichen Vorstellens) as its necessary foundation’ (LI I §23, 310). In the case of an actual visual perception, the seen object is what is ‘made present’ (gegenwärtig); it is there in propria persona, ‘in the flesh’, bodily (leibhaftig, LI V §27, 608–9). The sureness of our normal grasp of the heard sound or the seen object is paradigmatic of all cognizing, Erkennen. Now, and this is crucial, different kinds of acts apprehend their objects in different ways. Though I can think about something in its presence or in its absence (in recall, imagination, expectation, and so on), the thought in absence somehow refers to, or is founded on, at least the possibility of an actual perception, where there is genuine ‘being with the object’ (das Da-bei-sein, FTL §19. Note that Husserl is here employing precisely the ‘being-with’, Sein-bei, emphasized by Heidegger in his account of transcendence).

For Husserl (as later for Merleau-Ponty), actual sensory perception is the most basic intentional modality and the one whose intuitive fulfilment is most clearly understood. In other modalities, e.g., the ordinary act of calling something to mind (Vergegenwärtigung, ‘recall’, often misleadingly translated as something mysterious: ‘presentification’) in memory, fantasy, expectation or in hoping, the object is not presented ‘bodily’. In recalling sensorily the blackbird in the garden, the object is certainly ‘seen’ in a certain sense, but not grasped as bodily present, it is there as ‘remembered’. The levels of ‘fullness’ of the object can diminish, until in the cases of merely talking about something (e.g., a bridge we have never seen, a concept we have not mastered) we are merely employing the name of the object, still signifying it, but now with a form of ‘empty intending’ (Leermeinen), a purely ‘signative’ form of referring (LI VI §8, p. 695n1; Hua XIX/2 567n). Much of our discourse actually consists of this symbolic or empty intending. However, in order for an empty signifying to be meaningful at all, it must be possible to retrace it to original acts of full presence, where the object is given as it is. This is Husserl’s fundamental and essentially Cartesian assumption. Thus we must differentiate a number of distinct moments found united in a perceptual act: an intending sense, a fulfilling sense, and the object itself (LI I §14). Furthermore, Husserl says, we can, at the lowest level of empty intending, understand the meaning of a reported act of seeing without carrying out the seeing ourselves (LI VI, §1, 676; Hua XIX/2 545). The hearer of the expression ‘I see a blackbird’ does not have to be enacting the actual seeing of
the bird (although she may do so) in order to understand the meaning; the hearer fulfils the expression in her own special way (LI VI §4, 681; Hua XIX/2 551).

Husserl’s focus is on the way every act sets up a set of expectations, which presume or suppose certain kinds of appropriate fulfilment, conditions of fulfilment or ‘satisfaction’, to use John Searle’s term. Listening to music awakens certain expectations as to how the melody will unfold. Husserl, of course, wants to emphasize that not every relation of an intention to its fulfilment has the character of a futural expectation. Not all fulfilments are ‘future-oriented’ in that way (LI VI §10). Cases of actual perception discharge the expectation by presenting the sensory in its fullness, in its given presence. When an act is fulfilled in the appropriate way, Husserl speaks of the matter as being given with evidence (Evidenz). Something is evident when it is given just as it is in itself, with the ‘consciousness of self-having’, as Husserl somewhat awkwardly puts it. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic, intentionality and evidence are characterized as correlative, ‘evidence is a universal mode of intentionality related to the whole life of consciousness’ (FTL §60, 160; Hua XVII 168). Though we cannot pursue the topic here, Husserl, following Brentano, is always emphatic that we should not mix up genuine evidence with feelings of conviction. Evidence is warranted insight, rational recognition rather than any emotional state. Thus to be evidently justified in grasping that, e.g., $S^3 = 125$, it is necessary to understand the chain of potential fulfilments that confirm it, ultimately going back to the self-given evident certainty that $1 + 1 = 2$ (LI VI §18).

In order to accommodate the many different grades of evidence, Husserl differentiates between provisional, adequate, and final fulfilments, where final fulfilment is an ideal of knowledge, a limit-idea (Vollkommenheitsideal, LI VI, 670; Hua XIX/2 540). When I see a blackbird under normal circumstances, the seen object fills the perception bodily, even though I see it only from one perspective. There is a coincidence between the sense intention and its intuited object. The perception intrinsically contains the presumption that I can see the same object from other perspectives and I may in fact do so, carrying on further confirmations, gradually building up layers of meaning-achievements or possibly frustrating certain sets of expectations as I examine the object. Husserl thought of properly clarified, evident insights, where we have circumscribed what is actually given as it is given, as yielding certain, even apodictic, knowledge. Husserl, unfortunately, had a habit of claiming apodicticity, and infallibility for insights that were given with evidence, leading to the misconception that he was promoting a radical intuitionism in his epistemology. But, even in the Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguished adequacy of fulfilment from apodicticity (and, like Descartes, the cogito seems to be Husserl’s prime example of an apodictic insight). The truth is that Husserl regarded winning fulfilled, evidential insights outside of the
domain of sensuous perception as most difficult, akin to solving a mathematical problem for example. Long years of application to the task led to insights that were guaranteed by the matters themselves, and required the distinction between supposed and genuine evidence (FTL §44, 125; Hua XVII 129–30). What matters is that we understand the inner relation between intentionality and evidence. For our purposes, fulfilment is the manner in which being is first given, first made present. The key point is that there are different fulfilment conditions for different acts, different conditions of satisfaction. Husserl’s concern is how meaning-conferring (‘signifying’, ‘significative’) acts are fulfilled, that is, as he says, ‘confirmed’ or ‘illustrated’ in the appropriate way (LI I §9). In the sensory and practical domains, moreover, we are fully familiar with evident insights, with evidence as performance or ‘achievement’ (Leistung, FTL §107). They are everyday occurrences and as such we simply live them. Indeed, Husserl himself saw his own Ideas II (to which we shall return) as the phenomenological exploration of these practical evidence-achievements (FTL §107).

Husserl’s interest is in determining precisely the modes of fulfilment correlated with different meaning-endowing acts and how they unite in ‘syntheses of identification’ (LI VI §13). Now, although Husserl usually focuses on perceptions and acts of judgment, he never held that all forms of fulfilment were of the purely cognitive kind. Some are achieved in actions or emotions and are fulfilable only through bodily capacities. If I see a cup, perhaps I also immediately see it as ‘pickable-up’, as liftable by the handle. This is a meaning-intention and the condition of its satisfaction is that in fact it can be picked up. The cup is perceived with a ‘horizon’, an open set of ‘I can’s’, according to Husserl, possibilities often construed through my own bodily capacities. In other words, bodily action may be implicated in the conditions of satisfaction of a perception. If I am given an apple and attempt to bite into it, only to discover it is a waxwork figure, then the expectation is in ‘conflict’ or cancelled, or ‘frustrated’ (LI VI §11), and a new set of expectations is set up (LI V §27). As Husserl will later put it in Ideas I, the cluster of essential possibilities belonging to the intended object as intended, the noema (e.g., ‘eatable apple’) has ‘exploded’.

IV. The Role of Sensation in Meaning-Fulfilment

Husserl’s account of everyday sense perception takes cognizance of the fact that our experience is directly realist, e.g., we directly see the box. Furthermore, phenomenologically, I see the box itself not my sensations (LI V §14, 565; Hua XIX/1 396); we see the blossoming tree in the garden and not the ‘perceived tree’ (Ideas I §90). In accounting for this directly realist experience, Husserl wants to avoid the naive empiricist mistake of elevating
the sensory element of our experience into that which constitutes the whole of the meaning-intending. Of course, sensations are present to some degree in all our mental processes as an irreducible element of givenness, what Husserl calls the ‘matter’ or ‘hyle’ around which the act is formed. But the sensations themselves are not intentional (contrary to Brentano), nor are they directly intended except in rather abnormal conditions. Rather, in grasping the object we take up and interpret the sensations, performing a sense-interpreting act which yields an interpreted sense, Auffassungssinn. Similarly, in hearing and understanding a linguistic utterance, the meaning-endowing acts are complexes built upon the founding act of hearing the sounds, but what is intended is not the sound but the meaning-objectivity. Now in very simple perceptual acts, the sensation cluster is the ‘making present’ of the object, the object seen confirms the experience of seeing. But Husserl was not happy about extending this account to all acts. In more complex or higher-order acts, another form of intuition is operative: categorial intuition, which is a making-present of a different kind. Husserl then acknowledges an interpretative element in all intentional acts, but – at least in the Logical Investigations – more or less limits the interpretative function to sensations.

V. Categorial Intuition

Husserl distinguishes between the sensuous and the categorial features of a complex intentional act. He knows that an observer’s report that she sees something, a blackbird in the garden, can be based on different acts of seeing the object. Furthermore, the same act of seeing can be the basis of different expressive acts (LI VI §4, 680; Hua XIX/2 550): ‘that is black!’; ‘that is a blackbird!’; ‘there flies the blackbird!’; ‘there it soars!’ and so on. Different expressive acts (assertions of different propositional contents) can be founded on the same sensuous perceptual experience. The perception alone is not sufficient to determine the meaning of the expressive act, and, furthermore, as Husserl says, ‘the sense of a statement survives the elimination of perception’ (LI VI §4, 681; Hua XIX/2 551). If this is the case, then, the act of perception itself never constitutes the full meaning of a statement of perception (LI VI §5, 682; Hua XIX/2 552). The perception alone, the act of seeing, is not the act which fully achieves the sense. Indeed, Husserl goes so far as to claim that no part of the meaning of the expression is located in the percept (LI VI §5, 685; Hua XIX/2 556). As Dreyfus has rightly recognized, Husserl never succeeds in clarifying the precise manner in which the sensory experience belongs to the fulfilment of the intuition, though Husserl attempted to improve the situation in Ideas I with the notion of the noema, one of its functions was to guarantees the sameness of sense in different categorial acts founded on the same perceptual act.
Husserl’s critics have often misunderstood Husserl as claiming, against Kant, that we have intellectual intuitions in addition to our sensory intuitions. For Husserl, however, while all categorial acts ultimately rest on sensuous intuition (LI VI §60), he rejects out of hand the notion of intellectual intuition. Thus he goes out of his way to emphasize certain continuities with Kant’s discussion of sensuous intuition. However, we can perform acts of abstracting from the sensuous, e.g., where we intend or mean ‘colour’ when we see an individual red patch. We can have higher and higher order categorial acts: I see this red, I see this red as a species of redness, I see colour, I see a property, and so on. There are purely sensuous, mixed, and pure categorial acts. We can grasp meanings independent of the sensuous element of the act, e.g., in higher categorial acts which grasp the logical concepts of unity, plurality, etc. At the highest level of categorial intuition, we are grasping insights which do not employ the sensuous in any aspect of their meaning.

Complex intentional acts are categorial; they involve categorial intuition (kategoriale Anschauung). Categorial intuition involves acts of identification and discrimination, acts of synthesis. Suppose we perform the expressive act ‘this is a blackbird’. It consists of a certain synthesis between the act of meaning expectancy or signification and the act of fulfilment. Of course, these acts of synthesis are themselves only grasped by acts of reflection, but the crucial point is that they must be present for a meaning to be understood holistically, to be given as an objectivity. Categorial acts are those in which we grasp relations and make identifications of the form ‘x is y’. It is through categorial intuition that our grasp of ‘is-ness’ comes about, that we directly encounter being as that which is the case. It is not surprising, therefore, that Heidegger saw Husserl’s discussion of categorial intuition as crucial to his own account of intentionality in terms of the meaning of being. Heidegger himself always pointed to Husserl’s discussion of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation as providing the most important step in his own quest to understand the ‘meaning of being’ encountered in Brentano’s reading of Aristotle. Furthermore, it was Heidegger who urged Husserl again and again to bring out a revised edition of the Sixth Investigation. Heidegger clearly saw that Husserl depended on, but had not properly analysed, the concept of being present in the bodily fulfilment of sensuous intuitions and in the categorial synthesis expressed by the copula in more complex acts. To this extent, then, Heidegger rightly recognized that Husserl’s account called for a further analysis of the being of what is grasped in the intentional act.

VI. Heidegger’s Rethinking of Husserl 1919–28

As is now well known, the young Martin Heidegger, seeking to clarify his initial problematic of the different senses of being and their underlying unity
as presented in Brentano’s dissertation, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, first took up Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* in the belief that it would cast light on this question. Heidegger was particularly drawn to the distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation, where, so it seemed to him, *die Seinsfrage* was indeed raised in Husserl’s reflections on truth as the active identification of the meaning-intention with its fulfilment (LI VI §§36–9). Furthermore, Heidegger studied the *Logical Investigations* in Heinrich Rickert’s seminars and continued to meditate on their importance while reading Emil Lask and Max Scheler (see, for example, HCT §6 69; GA 20 94, see also SZ 493–4; 218n.xxxiv).

Heidegger first met with Husserl in Freiburg in Spring 1916, but it was really only after Heidegger returned from the War in 1919 that he began to engage directly and critically with Husserl. Later, in his Marburg lectures (1923–28), Heidegger displays his familiarity not only with the *Logical Investigations* but also with Husserl’s 1911 *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* and his 1913 *Ideas I*. We also know Heidegger had access to Husserl’s manuscripts. It is clear from these lectures that Heidegger is thinking his way through Husserl, moving slowly towards his own conception of phenomenology. Heidegger is not simply expounding Husserl in these lectures, he is engaging dialectically with Husserl’s whole problematic, performing what he himself terms in his 1925 lectures an ‘immanent critique’ (*immanente Kritik*, HCT §11), one which leads more or less directly to his own ‘phenomenology that is grounded in the question of Being’ and hence to his phenomenology of time, thus producing an important early draft of *Being and Time*. It would be entirely wrong to disregard Heidegger’s careful elucidation of the task and achievements of phenomenology in these lectures as Heidegger merely paying his dues to Husserl, or as trying to disguise his planned betrayal of Husserl. While Heidegger had ambitions to succeed Husserl, it is also clear he benefited greatly from his talks with the ‘old man’ (as his letters to Arendt from this period confirm). Heidegger is not distorting the matter when in later years he said he was thinking *through* phenomenology towards his own ‘thought’.

The lectures themselves stay very close to Husserl. Thus, for instance, Heidegger characterizes phenomenology in Husserlian terms as the ‘science of the a priori phenomena of intentionality’ (HCT §9 86; GA 20 118) and seemingly accepts Husserl’s characterization of intentionality, categorial intuition, constitution, and even the accounts of the *epoché* and reduction. For example, Heidegger sees the phenomenological act as an act of reflection. He speaks of the ‘real inclusion’ (*dieses reelle Beschlossensein*) of the intentional object in the act of reflection, wherein we are directed at the nature of our own thought (HCT §10 96; GA 20 132). Following Husserl, Heidegger construes *immanence* here as having the traditional meaning of ‘being in another’ (*in einem anderen sein*, HCT §11 103; GA 20 142), the domain of, as it were,
immanent ‘reality’ (die Reellität, HCT §11 103; GA 20 142). Contrasted with this immanence is the initial transcendent perception by which we reach real things. The chair itself does not ‘swim in and with the stream’ of Erlebnisse, as Heidegger puts it, echoing Husserl.

Now, according to Heidegger, although Husserl had used phenomenological reflection to get at the domain of pure consciousness in a manner far in advance of any other philosopher, nevertheless, he had passed up an opportunity to examine the ontological nature of the intentional acts and objects themselves. The anti-psychologistic thrust in Husserl, which laid so much emphasis on the discovery of ideal objectivities, had the drawback that the being of acts themselves has been neglected, leaving open the possibility that they would be treated merely as psychological facts. As Heidegger puts it (HCT §13 116; GA 20 160 and in SZ §44), the distinction between the psychologically real act of judgment and its ideal meaning-content needs interrogation as to the reality or being of the act (die Realität, das Aktsein). Does not the positing of an ideality beside the real immediately raise the problem of the relation between the two domains? Not just between the content and the object, but between the real act and its ideal content. What kind of existence does the relation between ideal and real possess? Is this relation itself real or ideal? As Heidegger explicitly acknowledged in Being and Time, the merit of psychologism had been that it had at least tried to remain true to factual experience and had held out against the separation of the ideal from the real (SZ §44 259; 217). Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, which replaces Husserl’s talk of consciousness is his attempt to straddle the temporal–historical and the transcendentally ideal, to replace the ideal/real distinction with an entirely different way of looking at the problem.

Heidegger’s way of moving the problem of intentionality forward is to radicalize Husserl’s account of intentionality as ‘being-with’ (Sein-bei), and to emphasize the understanding of intentionality in terms of transcendence, with transcendence itself related to Dasein’s disclosive role in being. Transcendence is both an activity and a relation, according to Heidegger (MFL §11, 160; GA 26 204). Its traditional meaning is to go beyond, to step over. ‘To be a subject means to transcend’, Heidegger explains (MFL §11, 165; GA 26 211). But, employing exactly the same analogy as Husserl himself uses in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Heidegger thinks that it is wrong to think of this transcendence as like stepping out of a box (FTL §94, 232; Hua XVII 239). Rather, our ‘going beyond’ or ‘exceeding’ or ‘transgressing’ the given is always already part of our being: ‘Dasein is itself the passage across’ (Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt, MFL §11, 165; GA 26 211).

Intentionality has been misunderstood as a moving beyond the subjective to the objective; rather it is the recognition that matters themselves are disclosed. Phenomenology’s great contribution against both German idealism
and British empiricism is that it had ‘demonstrated that the non-sensory and the ideal cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective’ (HCT §6 58; GA 20 79). In other words, the categorial must be understood in its own terms, as a special kind of objectivity coming directly to view. For Heidegger, the whole doctrine of intentionality is one with the doctrine of categorial intuition:

We do not know what we are doing when we opt for the correct conception of the categorial and at the same time think we can dismiss intentionality as a mythical concept. The two are one and the same. (HCT §6 59; GA 20 80)

Heidegger sees that, with the elaboration of the concept of categorial intuition, Husserl has indeed made a breakthrough to the \textit{being} of the intentional.

In these lectures, Heidegger agrees with Husserl that something new is given in categorial intuition, a \textit{new objectivity} is given in the complex categorial act. Furthermore, in his 1925 lectures, Heidegger characterizes the objectivity given as a ‘state of affairs’, \textit{Sachverhalt}, an ideal objectivity, not a real part of the act (HCT §6 63; GA 20 85–86), the recognition of which enriches our ordinary sense of reality. Heidegger, following Husserl, speaks of these ‘ideal unities’ as having an immutable and invariant identity (HCT §6 68; GA 20 92). But Heidegger also criticizes Husserl for never thinking through the manner in which the state of affairs ‘obtains’ or ‘subsists’ (\textit{bestehen}, HCT §6 54; GA 20 72). Is it a matter of the internal structural relations of the states of affairs or something to do with truth as what actually stands or obtains? Heidegger is justified in pointing to serious ontological deficiencies in Husserl’s account here. Heidegger tries to rethink this situation through his own account of manifestation and truth and through his analysis of the various meanings of ‘is’ in the 1927 lecture series.

Following Husserl, Heidegger wants to distance the understanding of categorial intuition from a misleading Neo-Kantian interpretation of it (which he found in Heinrich Rickert), by which it becomes simply a restatement of the Kantian opposition between sensuous receptivity and conceptual spontaneity. Heidegger proceeds to think more deeply about the kind of synthetic achievement involved in categorial intuition, specifically the synthesis expressed in language and logic as the copula. Heidegger goes along with Husserl in thinking that the synthetic achievement is determined by the situation itself; it is given from the side of the object rather than arising from an act of the subject. ‘Constitution’, Heidegger asserts, following Husserl exactly, means not producing in the sense of making or fabricating but ‘\textit{letting the entity be seen in its objectivity}’ (HCT §6 71; GA 20 97). The categorial act \textit{discloses} a new form of objectivity; it does not \textit{construct} this objectivity on the basis of simple acts of sense perception. The
ideal objectivities are not constructs of acts but objects which manifest themselves in acts (HCT §6 70; GA 20 96). Right from the start of his lecturing career, Heidegger had emphasized the primacy of the sense of originary givenness, donation, the essential meaning of ‘es gibt’. Heidegger stresses that the structure of categorial intuition should not be thought of as a series of acts which are then related together, rather the relating together is primary (das Primäre ist das Beziehen selbst, HCT §6 64; GA 20 86), a point on which Scheler is similarly emphatic. Heidegger sees webs of relatings which are on the side of the object, as it were. Before any deliberate, explicit assertion, the conjoined connection, the state of affairs as such, must be grasped and interpreted in a certain way, must be evident, disclosed.

Now, what is crucially important for Heidegger is that the disclosure of the situation, of the truth of the situation, in categorial intuition, is itself determined by our being in the world. That is, our insertion into the world through our practical engagements, our teleological activity, discloses the situation in a certain way, gives us the interpretation of the situation, makes it evident. Even in his very first lecture course in Freiburg given during the War Emergency Semester of 1919, Heidegger emphasizes the embeddedness of experience within a world, and that the primary experience is of the world rather than of the individual objects within it. In our experience of a chair or table, we grasp first the nest, or network of significations, the environment out of which things appear to us: ‘das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre’. 27 It is in this context that Heidegger here uses the expression ‘it worlds’ (es weltet, GA 56/57 §14 73), the first of many such formulations. The world is the context of significations. While Husserl had already acknowledged the concept of ‘world’ in his phenomenology, and had emphasized the draw of the world in the natural attitude, 28 Heidegger specifically emphasizes the hermeneutic dimensions of historical being-in-the-world. Of course, there is already some scope for a hermeneutical moment in Husserlian phenomenology with the Auffassungssinn, the interpretative grasp of the sensuous. But Heidegger redescribes the whole intentional situation as hermeneutical from the ground up, portraying Dasein’s mode of being as interpretative and disclosive through and through.

In Being and Time Heidegger, following Husserl and the logical tradition generally, emphasizes the essential connection of judgment with assertion, with saying, with language and hence with a certain set of presuppositions about our orientation in the world. But Heidegger wants to describe a wider form of disclosure. In his 1925 lectures, Heidegger recognizes that phenomenology had made another ground-breaking contribution when it recognized that linguistic assertions were only one form of an ‘expressness’ (Ausdrücklichkeit) or ‘expressing’ which is fundamental to all forms of human comportment (HCT §5 56; GA 20 74):
It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the object and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter. (HCT §5 56; GA 20 75)

Heidegger is here emphasizing something which Husserl had already described in detail in the *Investigations*, namely that the interpretative act of meaning fuses with the act of linguistic expression. Thus, in a sense, hermeneutical phenomenology already finds its foundation in Husserl’s Sixth Investigation §37. Of course, Heidegger will have a great deal more to say about the nature of this general ‘expressive’ comportment towards things, showing how one’s disclosing can simply tarry alongside the thing, repeating the conventional, or it may disclose in an original and authentic way.

But we can see his thinking on the matter of disclosure owes a deep debt to Husserl’s analysis of truth in the Sixth Investigation, and Heidegger himself has been at pains to point this out, though it is usually neglected by critics who seek to read the earlier Heidegger only in terms of the later Heidegger, rather than in *Auseinandersetzung* with Husserl, his mentor in the phenomenological decade 1917–27.

So far we have seen that Husserl is actually in accord with Heidegger in understanding intentionality as transcendence, in the recognition that categorial intuition presents or grasps objectivities in their being, and in recognizing the nature of the disclosure which founds the grasping of truth in the intentional act. We have also seen that Heidegger claimed Husserl had not made the kind of being of the categorial an issue in its own right. Heidegger’s phenomenological project, at least as he understood it in 1925 and 1927, was meant to rectify this neglect of the being of the categorial. What about Heidegger’s other criticism of Husserl, namely, that he had prioritized the cognitive over the practical in his account of intentional fulfilment? As we shall see in the next section, for Heidegger, categorial intuition is not primarily theoretical, but the grasp of being, of the ‘is’ of the situation is pre-theoretical, is based on Dasein’s orientation in the world.

VII. Husserl and Heidegger on the Primacy of the Practical

As is now well known in the English-speaking world, thanks largely to Hubert Dreyfus’s influential interpretations, Heidegger claims that the manner in which things are given initially is not theoretically, disinterestedly, neutrally to our sight, as it were, rather things are given as items involved in our various tasks and practical engagements, our ‘comportments’ (Scheler had already made the same point somewhat earlier). In particular, Heidegger makes two
significant points: (1) objects are not given on their own, *simpliciter*, (2) objects are not initially attended to in ‘theoretical’ acts. In his 1927 Marburg lecture course, Heidegger quotes Fichte’s injunction, ‘Gentlemen, think the wall’ (BP §15 162; GA 24 231), only to deny the possibility of this first step. We don’t initially encounter individual objects on their own. Of course, I can start examining the wall, when bored by the lecture, but the act of pure seeing (*Betrachten*) is not the primary act, indeed it must be *motivated*, e.g., by boredom. What is originarily given is, as Heidegger has been maintaining since 1919, a kind of ‘contexturing of things’ (*ein Dingzusammenhang*, BP §15 163; GA 24 232), a fused field of vision, for example. I enter a lecture hall and see the hall, its chairs, etc., as a kind of fused totality (such as Husserl had already described in *Philosophy of Arithmetic*). I may see the chairs as to be stepped around. The unified scene is given as a kind of equipmental whole, in an everyday ‘dealing’ (*Umgang*) with things, grasped in a practical looking around or ‘circumspection’ (*Umsicht*). We experience things as ‘ready to hand’ or ‘available’ (*zuhanden*), or indeed as absent, missing, or as obstacles. I reach for a hammer in order to drive in the nail. I turn the handle of the door; I step up each step of the stairs in order to do something else. Things appear as ‘use things’, utensils, as ‘environmental things’ (*Umweltdinge*), rather than as mere natural objects. For Heidegger, the Greek word ‘*pragmata*’, articulated well this sense of things as encountered in human *praxis* (SZ §15, 96–7; 68). Heidegger even goes so far as to proclaim that, in antiquity Dasein was understood as *praxis*, ‘as genuine action’ (*als eigentliches Handeln*, MFL §11, 183; GA 26 236), a remark which in essence encapsulates Hannah Arendt’s approach to action in *The Human Condition* (1958). Heidegger is stressing that action or *praxis* is a better way of conceiving Dasein than the notion of ‘consciousness’. To rethink intentionality in terms of Dasein’s transcendence, then, is to reintegrate intentionality into *praxis*. Here Heidegger draws heavily on Aristotle’s account of teleological actions, actions aimed at a purpose, a topic on which he had been lecturing contemporaneously with his phenomenological studies. In a sense, when we are hammering a nail, our actions aim not at the hammer or the nail, or even the act of hammering, but on the *purpose*, the ‘to hang a picture’ aim, which is foremost for us. Fulfilment, for Heidegger, is not to be understood primarily as the sensuous bodily filling of our significative intuition in disinterested act of perception, but as an *action* achieving its *telos*. Of course, Heidegger thinks that Greek philosophy itself and the subsequent metaphysical tradition lost this insight and began to think of objects as primarily present at hand, as *Vorhandene*, a distortion still prevailing in Husserl.

The circumspection (*Umsicht*) with which we encounter things, for Heidegger, is ‘unthought’ in that it is not something we analyse, rather we simply live in it, a point Husserl himself had repeatedly made about our lived experiences themselves. It is not that we just have circumspection, as it were,
‘mindlessly’, as Dreyfus sometimes suggests, rather, for Heidegger, *Umsicht* has its own kind of sight (SZ §15, 69), requires its own kind of evidence, to use Husserlian terms. The point is that what we grasp immediately is not the object as such, the *perceived as such*, as something occurring – this only becomes available in disengaged reflection – but the set of ‘in-order-to’s’ (*Um-zu*), the for-what’s, the context of references and assignments which determine serviceability or handiness (HCT §23 194–5; GA 20 264). Not the thing but the experienced context is primary in Heidegger’s account (HCT §23 188; GA 20 254). In other words, Heidegger’s understanding of categorial intuition alters Husserl’s account of what is given in the intentional act. Heidegger is claiming that Husserl is wrong to hold that categorial acts are founded, objectivating acts, resting in the last instance on sensory, perceptual acts. Rather seeing an object as such, having a theoretical disengaged perception of an object is a higher order complex act which depends on an act of remotion from the practical everyday. But the practical engagement with things experienced in the environment, *Unweltdinge*, is not primary or founding either. It too is a founded act, constituted by our concerns. What is really primary, what is the basic act upon which all the others are founded, is neither the experience of natural things, nor use-things, but the ‘in-order-to’s’, the set of concerns, involvements, ‘relating-to’s’ which are constitutive of Dasein’s being-with itself. What founds perceptual acts, and other categorial acts, is a set of ways of relating to the world. Heidegger’s main contribution to the rethinking of intentionality, then, lies not in his styling of intentionality in terms of transcendence, but in terms of his rethinking of what is involved in the *contextual element* in the intentional act, the nature of the ‘worldhood’ of Dasein. Moreover, the revealing or unveiling that takes place in our experiential understanding is what provides the basis for our explicit cognition or linguistic asserting. Our thought and speech is determined by engagements with the world, which themselves are not static, but mediated by tradition, by culture, by ‘what one says’ about things. It is this historical and temporal slant of our experience of worldhood which occupies Heidegger in Division Two of *Being and Time*.

VIII. Retrieving Husserl – Against Heidegger

Did Husserl overstress the cognitive dimension in human experience and ignore the practical? It is undoubtedly true that Husserl focused more on elucidating acts of cognition rather than the emotions or human actions, but in no sense did he downgrade the practical and the emotive in relation to our specifically cognitive achievements. Rather, Husserl stresses cognition and, specifically, acts of sense perception, because it is precisely here that the particular kinds of fulfilment his phenomenology seeks to explore are
manifest in their clearest, most paradigmatic form. The forms of fulfilment specific to other kinds of non-cognitive experience are much more difficult to delineate clearly. Thus, Husserl devoted little attention to the phenomenology of desire or love and hate (but see LI V §15). Despite his focus on perception and intellection, Husserl’s phenomenology does not prioritize one form of Erkenntnis over another. As a philosopher of infinite tasks, Husserl was well aware of the infinite diversity of acts and their fulfilments which constitute the field of human Erlebnisse. Husserl’s account of intentionality aims to be generic, applying as much to practical engagement as to the theoretical attitude. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic in particular, he insists on the importance of appreciating the practical forms of fulfilment with which we are most familiar, and regrets that philosophers (including his earlier self) have become over preoccupied with fulfilment in theoretical disciplines such as mathematics.

Moreover, as Husserl’s manuscripts continue to be published, they often reveal a greater sensitivity to the practical and the engaged than is evident in the programmatic statements of phenomenological method published during his life. Thus, in his Ding und Raum lectures of 1907 as well as in Ideas II, the draft planned second volume to Ideas I, Husserl’s detailed description of our ordinary dealings with things in the natural attitude is very close to, and may indeed have partially inspired, Heidegger’s account of the practical intentionality involved in our everyday absorption in the world. We look at the blue sky and experience the sky as beautiful, we ‘live in’ the beauty of the sky. But, Husserl recognizes, we can also judge that it is beautiful (Ideas II §3) without feeling this ‘experientially’ (lebendig). Husserl is interested in the fact that such an attitude of absorbed engagement with the state of affairs itself already harbours an inbuilt possibility of a radical shift of perspective, a shift in perspective towards the purely contemplative or theoretical, what Husserl calls the ‘doxic-theoretical’ (Ideas II §2). This shift in perspective, for Husserl, is what enables scientific understanding. Of course, Husserl is also very aware of the constructed or artificial character of this disengaged theoretical viewing of objects, and this may be in the background of Heidegger’s discussion of curiosity in Being and Time §36.

But Husserl’s real fascination is with the possibility of one attitude giving way to the other and the process of transition between them. The theoretical is one possible outcome of our lived engaged dealings with things, to be valued in itself, even if it has been overemphasized in Western culture. Husserl sees us all as capable of making the transition from one perspective to another, whereas Heidegger sees the theoretical outlook as a specific achievement of Greek rationality. But aside from the historical, genetic account of the emergence of the natural attitude as one finds it in Heidegger, the two philosophers agree closely on the kind of encounter with things prevalent in the natural attitude. Heidegger, who had access to Husserl’s draft manuscripts
for Ideas II, may simply have taken over Husserl’s account, historicizing the shift from the practical to the theoretical, which Husserl saw as a structural possibility inherent in the act itself, and questioning its validity more forcefully than Husserl. Thus, in a revealing if typical passage in Ideas II §50, Husserl characterizes the world of things discovered in the natural attitude as ‘on hand’ (vorhanden). Nevertheless, I may also be concerned with things in their uses. Things can offer themselves to our apprehension ‘as a means of nutrition, or as use objects of various sorts: heating materials, choppers, hammers, etc. For instance, I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for heating . . . it is “burnable” . . . ’. 29 Here we see that Husserl is already characterizing things experienced as being encounterable as use-objects, as a means to the satisfaction of needs. He even makes use of the very example of the hammer later employed to such effect in Being and Time. But, and this is crucial, Husserl also sees that our experience of things as just being present also belongs intrinsically to our natural attitude. We simply see the sky. Heidegger, in his attempt to emphasize the practical, has overstated the matter. Surely Husserl is more accurate; we do encounter the occurrent, the present-at-hand, in our everyday awareness, and not just as a matter of remotion from the practical.

In support of this interpretation, let me point to an unpublished manuscript written in May 1931 and specifically labelled ‘gegen Heidegger’, Husserl emphasizes that ‘the theoretical interest’ as he calls it is motivated, like the artistic, by a desire to play freed from concerns for the necessities of life, and this theoretical curiosity is by no means a deficient mode of the practical as Heidegger had claimed: 30

Special motives are required in order to make the theoretical attitude possible, and, against Heidegger, it does appear to me, that an original motive lies, for science as for art, in the necessity of the game (Spiel) and especially in the motivation for a playful ‘intellectual curiosity’, one that is not springing from any necessity of life, or from calling, or from the context of the goal of self-preservation, a curiosity which looks at things, and wants to know things, with which it has nothing to do. And no ‘deficient’ praxis is at stake here.

Heidegger’s contribution to the analysis of intentionality lies especially in his detailed exploration of the web of relatings which he calls the ‘worldhood of the world’, the a priori backdrop to the encounter with things, and in his emphasis on its fundamental temporal structure. For Heidegger, ‘elucidation of the world-concept is one of the most central tasks of philosophy’ (BP §15 164; GA 24 234). But, Heidegger, in bypassing Husserl’s complex discussion of the kinds of intentional act and their fulfilment in order to concentrate on being, succumbs, in fact, to a philosophical error which he is quick to diagnose in others in the philosophical tradition, namely, levelling off the achievement (here, of Husserl). In particular, Husserl’s focus on the
possibility of theoretical viewing emerging from the practical leaves more room for a positive appreciation of the specific character of scientific knowledge, whereas Heidegger, under the influence of Augustine, cannot help thinking of such theoretical inspection as motivated by ‘curiosity’ (Neugier, SZ §68), Augustine’s *vana curiositas*. In this respect, Husserl’s interest in intentionality for the theory of scientific knowledge may have longer currency than Heidegger’s attempts to transform the problematic of intentionality into the question of being.

NOTES


6 In this footnote, SZ §69, p. 363n23, which is a comment on Husserl’s characterization, LI VI §37, of sensory perception as ‘making present’, *das Gegenwärtigen*, Heidegger promises to address the grounding of intentionality in ‘the ecstactical temporality’ of Dasein in the next Division, which, of course, was never published. The Macquarrie–Robinson translation erroneously has ‘ecstactical unity’ in place of ‘ecstactical temporality’. The importance of this footnote is underscored by Heidegger himself in his 1928 Marburg lecture series, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, Gesamtausgabe (= GA) 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 215, trans. Michael Heim, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 168. Hereafter ‘MFL’ followed by page number of English and then German. ‘Gesamtausgabe’ will be abbreviated to ‘GA’.


8 It is important to stress here that Heidegger is in essential agreement with, and merely reiterating, Husserl’s own critique of Brentano’s conception of relation. Heidegger’s critique of immanence, contra Dreyfus, does not include Husserl.


In this sense, Twardowski is not that much different from Meinong, who wants to hold that there are ‘objectivities’ which do not necessarily exist. According to Meinong, once we overcome ‘our prejudice in favour of the actual’, we actually recognize that there are far more objects than there are existing spatio-temporal entities.

For this correspondence, see J. N. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

E. Husserl, ‘Critical Discussion of K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand’, in *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, trans. Dallas Willard, *Husserl Collected Works* V (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 388–95; Hua XXII 349–56. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl continued to regard Twardowski as important, though criticizing him (e.g. LI I §13, p. 290n). By the time of *Ideas I* (1913) §129, Husserl, however, regards the content/object distinction as having become a tired slogan which fails to elucidate, since it is not based on a proper phenomenological elucidation of the act.

Husserl was very taken aback when one of the founder members of the Vienna Circle, Moritz Schlick, in his *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, scathingly attacked Husserl for claiming that psychic acts were not a real part of the psychic flow at all, were not actual events in the world, but were ideal acts. Husserl rejects this ‘insane’ view in his Foreword to his Second Edition of Book Two, Part Two of the *Logical Investigations* (LI 663; Hua XIX/2 535).


But, as many commentators have observed, his understanding of Platonism is somewhat skewed. He takes Platonism to be a naïve claim about the existence of a non-sensory realm of objects, a hyper-realism. His later idealism comes closer to the interpretation of Plato’s Ideas found in Natorp’s *Platos Ideenlehre* (1903 and 1921, reprinted Hamburg; Meiner, 1994). Husserl himself credits Lotze’s interpretation of the Platonic Ideas for helping him understand the meaning of Bolzano’s propositions in themselves (*Sätze an sich*), see Husserl’s review of Palagyi, in Dallas Willard, trans., Husserl, *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, op. cit., p. 201; Hua XXII 156.


30 Husserl Archiv B 1 32, Nr. 17. I thank Dr. Sebastian Luft for drawing my attention to this passage and the Husserl-Archiv, Leuven, for permission to quote from this unpublished text. The translation is mine. The passage reads: ‘Es gehören besondere Motive dazu um theoretische Einstellung möglich zu machen, und gegenüber Heidegger will es mir scheinen, daß ein ursprüngliches Motiv liege, für Wissenschaft wie für Kunst, in der Notwendigkeit des Spielles und speziell in der Motivation einer spielerischen, das ist nicht aus Lebensnotdurft, nicht aus Beruf, aus Zweckzusammenhang der Selbsterhaltung entspringenden ‘theoretischen Neugier’, die sich die Dinge ansehen, sie kennenlernen will, Dinge, die sie nichts angehen. Und nicht ‘defizierte’ Praxis soll hier vorliegen’.

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