Wittgenstein, Newman, and Hinge Epistemology Network
This new academic network is dedicated to research in hinge epistemology, a new branch of research in the philosophy of knowledge which is typically traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) view in On Certainty (1969) that "the questions that we raise, and our doubts, depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn" (OC 341). The network is supported by the UCD Newman Centre.
Hinge epistemology is rapidly becoming one of the most exciting areas of epistemology and Wittgenstein studies, with significant implications for topics such as epistemic normativity, rational agency, the justification of religious and ethical beliefs, and the limits of scepticism and doubt.
However, there is a rich and often under-appreciated connection between Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology and the epistemological views of nineteenth-century thinker St. John Henry Newman (1801-1890). While their intellectual contexts and methodological frameworks differ significantly, both Newman and Wittgenstein develop accounts of knowledge and justification which challenge evidentialist theories and sceptical views.
Newman, in his Grammar of Assent (1870), defends the view that much of our belief rests not on inference but on what he called “antecedent probabilities” and “the illative sense”—a faculty of rational judgment that operates beneath formal reasoning. Newman’s emphasis on the implicit trust and certitude that ground our reasoning anticipates themes later found in Wittgenstein’s work.
Wittgenstein, especially in his final writings collected as On Certainty, takes up the problem of radical doubt and proposes that some propositions stand fast for us—they form the bedrock on which doubt and knowledge alike depend. These “hinge propositions” or "hinge commitments" are not known in the usual sense, but are enacted in our practices and form the backdrop to any epistemic activity.
Hinge epistemology draws on these insights to investigate the nature and role of non-propositional or non-justified certainties in human cognition. This site serves as a resource for anyone interested in contemporary hinge epistemology and the relations between Newman’s and Wittgenstein’s views on knowledge, scepticism, and the rationality of religious and ethical beliefs.
To learn more about the network, go to https://whnenetwork.weebly.com/.
To join the network, please email Daniel Esmonde Deasy at daniel.deasy@ucd.ie.
